|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 222 Records
-
1985 (2) TMI 257 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ances comes down to below ₹ 30 lakhs for the whole of the year, and that of ₹ 24 lakhs during 18-6-77 to 31-3-78. The appellants would, thus, become entitled to the benefit of this Notification No. 176/77-C.E., dated 18-6-77. 23. Though, in view of our above finding, the question has become academic but nevertheless we advert to this issue of rate of duty also. We find a manifest error in Collector’s approach in this regard, as we do not find any concept in Rule 9A(5), as introduced by the Collector to the effect that when the clearances are not in accordance with law, then the current rate as prevalent on the date of payment of duty would be applicable. We are thus unable to subscribe to the Collector’s view that in such circumstances, provisions of Rule 9A(5) would apply. We, therefore, hold that in case any duty was leviable, it would have been in terms of Rule 9A(1)(ii) of the Rules. 24. As a result of our findings in Para 22, we allow the appeal.
-
1985 (2) TMI 256 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... 19-10-76. If they delayed doing so for 6-7 months, it could either be due to their ignorance, or inadvertence or perhaps due to their error of judgment in anticipating whether in the year 1976-77 they would at all be able to make any higher production and excess clearances. We hold that the words, ‘inadvertence’ and ‘error’ in Rule 11, as the rule then read, were wide enough to cover the circumstances of the appellants’ claim. We notice that both the Asst. Collector as well as the Appellate Collector also considered the claim as one falling under the provisions of Rule 11. We, therefore, find no substance in the new plea of the representative of the Department that the appellants should be asked to file a civil suit for their refund claim. 9. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and direct the Assistant Collector to dispose of the appellants’ refund claim on the basis that it was not time-barred under Rule 11.
-
1985 (2) TMI 255 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... han for the refinery’s. A sulphur content of 0.5% not only appears low absolutely, but comparison with other fuel oils standards specified by IS also show that level to be low. The lowest sulphur level specified by IS for fuel oil is 3.5%. If 0.5% of sulphur level is not low, it is difficult to see what is M/s. Indian Oil Corporation’s rejection of the sulphur content as irrelevant is not a correct understanding. The oil is assessable under Item 10 and such assessments are made only on certain specifications prescribed by the law. It is not an argument to say that the CBFS was not used as a fuel oil. Even if it was not, it was assessable under Item 10-CET which is furnace oil, a fuel oil. The oil fell on the wrong side of the qualifications of sulphur content limit for the concession sought and should be assessed at the higher rate of duty of ₹ 138.75. 8. The Appellate Collector’s order does not need to be modified. The appeal is rejected.
-
1985 (2) TMI 254 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... an undue hardship just because there are other liabilities as well, current or contingent or anticipatory. If the Appeal is to be pursued, the current manufacturing activities that will, in the submission of the learned Counsel, consume the whole of the available money, have necessarily to be curtailed to the extent of the mandatory deposit. The Applicant cannot have it both ways. 9. In the premises, we see no merits in the application. We find that the deposit of the duty in a sum of ₹ 30,046.27, in terms of Section 35F, will not cause undue hardship to the Applicant possessed of Reserves to the tune of ₹ 1,29,98,116, in any view of the matter, and this aspect of the Applicant’s liquidity, in terms of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s aforesaid order in the case of M/s. Spencer and Co., is a matter that requires to be considered and is decisive for the disposal of the instant Application under Section 35F. The Application is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 253 - CEGAT MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... ector and the demand issued by the Superintendent is not in the picture. Hence the order of the Appellate Collector is maintainable. 6. I note that at the relevant time the duty leviable on molasses was under Item 68, the levy being on an ad valorem basis. There is no reference to the value of the molasses in the order of the Assistant Collector. Though the rate of duty could be taken for granted as well-known, the value has to be determined by the proper officer; and only when that is known, the exact quantum of levy could be computed. Thus I find force in the contention of the appellants that the order of the Assistant Collector does not stand by itself and has been, so to say, clarified by the demand issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Tirupati Range. In this view of the matter, I consider that the appeal to the Appellate Collector was in time. Accordingly, I set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and remand the case to him for determination on merits.
-
1985 (2) TMI 252 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... of orders referred to above. On this being brought to the notice of Shri Rohatgi, he did not have any comments to offer against the decision of the Government of India and was not in a position to say whether the view expressed in the aforesaid two orders was anywhere challenged. He accordingly, in the nature of things did not argue against these decisions of the Government of India. We ourselves have gone through the wording of the notification and these decisions, and are of our considered view that the interpretation given to the wording of this notification in the aforesaid two decisions of Government of India is correct. We, therefore, hold that on parity of reasoning, benefit of Notification No. 395-Cus./76 was available to the imports which were subject-matter of the refund claim culminating in the present proceedings. 7. We, accotdingly, allow the appeal, with consequential relief by way of refund as may become due to the appellants under the aforesaid notification.
-
1985 (2) TMI 251 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification dated November 23, 1961 when the dyes said to have been used by the respondent in the manufacture of other dyes were not liable for payment of excise duty when they were manufactured, that is, before the introduction of Item 14D into the First Schedule to the Act even though duty may have been paid on them after the introduction of item 14D?
Whether the demands made in this case fall within the scope of Rule 10-A of the Rules or under Rule 10 thereof?
Held that:- Under the notification exemption could be claimed only where the dyes used in the manufacture of other dyes were liable to, payment of excise duty when they were manufactured and such duty had been paid. A voluntary payment of excise duty on dyes which were not liable for such payment would not earn any exemption under the notification. The finding re p73 corded by the High Court on the above question is, therefore, liable to be set aside
In the instant case there has been no assessment of the manufactured goods at all as contemplated by Rule 52 of the Rules and the delivery of the goods has taken place contrary to Rule 52-A of the Rules. The discussion and correspondence between the assessee and the officers concerned had taken place on December 20, 1961 and January 416, 1962 was in the nature of an advice and not an assessment as contemplated under Rule 52. Hence this case is not covered by Rule 10 of the Rules at all. Rule 10-A of the Rules which is a residuary provision is, therefore, necessarily attracted. Hence the plea of limitation raised on the basis of Rule 10 of the Rules does not survive. In the result we set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent. Appeal allowed
-
1985 (2) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
Termination of services as Deputy Secretary of West Bengal State Electricity Board
Held that:- Not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the Board that Regulation 34 did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution as on the face of it, the regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination- It is a naked ’hire and fire’ rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationship is fast approaching. Art. 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this court as offending Art. 14.
-
1985 (2) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT
Whether cl. 3 (IA) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 issued by the State Government under s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, a. s. R, 800 dated June 9, 1978, with the prior concurrence of the Government of India, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of its delegated powers?
Held that:- It is amply borne out from the material on record that due to the failure of the southwest and north- east monsoons in successive years, and the consequent poor rainfall, there was a steep fall in production of paddy. In the circumstances, the State Government had no other alternative not only to re-impose compulsory levy on the producers of paddy to the extent of 50%%, but also to introduce a scheme for a monopoly purchase of paddy by the Government with a view to build up its buffer stock for distribution through the public distribution system throughout the State. If one part of the State is faced with a famine or even acute shortage of foodstuffs, it is not unreasonable for the Government to acquire foodstuffs from the surplus areas and distribute the same in areas where they are most needed. The source of power to issue an order under cl.. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act being relatable to the general powers of the Central Government under sub-s. (1) of s. 3, there is no reason for us to give a restricted meaning to the word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act so as not to take in prohibiting'. Appeal dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 248 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... orities. We are, therefore, of the opinion that that case has no application to the present case. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Rama Laxmi Satyanarayana Rice Mill 1975 35 STC 601 (AP), the question whether there can be more than one assessment order made within the framework of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act was not considered. Similarly also in Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1982 51 STC 265 (AP), this question was not considered. Accordingly, we cannot derive any benefit out of that judgment. Accordingly, we hold that there can be only one order of assessment under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act passed by the authorities. The appellate order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has the effect of setting aside the order of assessment directing the making of a fresh assessment. Accordingly, we hold that the writ petition should be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Writ petition dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 247 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o the hierarchical superior orders, it is not necessary for us to hold sub-rule (6) of rule 31 as interpreted by us to be ultra vires of the rulemaking powers of the State Government under section 39. Applying the above, we have to notice that the appellate order in this case passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 31st January, 1977, had not taken into account all the materials which are collected from Jayalakshmi Rice Mill on 31st January, 1974. Those materials are capable of showing that a part of the turnover of business of the petitioner had escaped assessment. As that material has not been dealt with by the appellate authority or the revisional authority under section 19 or 20, we hold that the power of the assessing authority to reassess the escaped turnover is still available and is not subject to the limitation of subrule (6) of rule 31. For the above reasons, we dismiss this T.R.C., but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 246 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat the identical words for each month or part thereof occurring in section 24(3) came up for consideration before this Court in W.A. No. 10 of 1982 (Khivraj Motors Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1985 59 STC 52) and batch and this Court held that notwithstanding the use of the said expression in section 24(3) penalty could be levied by the authorities only on the basis of the actual number of days of delay. That decision rendered in connection with section 24(3) squarely applies to the facts of this case which involves the interpretation of the same words occurring in section 12(5)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal s view seems to be in accord with the view taken by this Court in W.A. No. 10 of 1982 (Khivraj Motors Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1985 59 STC 52) which considered the identical expression for each month or part thereof . We are not therefore inclined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in this case. The tax cases are therefore dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 245 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... at on 19th August, 1975, the Commissioner had called for the records of the DC only for purposes of revision. When that is so, there is hardly any ground to examine the legal contention of Sri Srinivasan in this case. We, therefore, reject this challenge of the petitioner without expressing any opinion on the legal contention. 19.. In revising the order made by the DC, the Commissioner followed the ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Raghurama Shetty 1981 47 STC 369 (SC), which reversed the decision of this Court relied on by the DC to allow the appeal of the assessee. Sri Srinivasan, in our opinion, very rightly did not challenge the decision of the Commissioner on merits. We cannot, therefore, take exception to the order of the Commissioner. 20.. As the only contention urged for the assessee fails, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 244 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y of the order of assessment or imposing penalty or a notice of demand of interest, if any. From a reading of the aforesaid provisions it is abundantly clear that the requirement of the rule is not that a notice of demand should be filed along with the memorandum of appeal. Sub-rule (3) of rule 24 lays down that an appeal shall be accompanied by an attested copy of the order of assessment or imposing penalty or a notice of demand of interest, if any. It does not lay down that the appeal has to be accompanied by a notice of demand. In this view of the matter it is amply clear that the appellate authority was not justified in rejecting the appeal on the ground that it was not accompanied by a notice of demand as it was not required by rule 24(3). In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order passed by respondent No. 3 dated 15th October, 1982, is quashed and he is directed to decide the appeal on merits. However, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 243 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... has not been able to assail the findings recorded by the Tribunal. The department itself has been treating the commodity manufactured by the respondent-assessee as organic fertiliser in the previous years and the tax was always imposed treating it as organic fertiliser. The Tribunal has also recorded a finding that the respondentassessee crushes bones of the animals and the said commodity is being used as fertiliser and the respondent-assessee does not manufacture crushed bones. In view of the aforesaid fact, the order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be maintained and does not suffer from any error of law. In the result, the revisions fail and are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 242 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ce the rate of tax imposed by the Sales Tax Officer in the previous years was at 3.5 per cent and the assessee deposited the admitted tax at the rate of 3.5 per cent and if the rate of tax was subsequently enhanced the assessee was not liable to pay interest. After hearing learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that there have been no finding by the Tribunal that the assessee acted mala fide in not depositing the tax at the rate of 7 per cent. The demand of interest was not justified. Since the Sales Tax Officer himself has been making assessment and determining the tax at the rate of 3.5 per cent it cannot be said that the assessee did not deposit the admitted tax which was subsequently fixed at the rate of 7 per cent. The circumstances of the case are such which do not warrant the levy of interest on the assessee. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. However, there will be no orders as to costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 241 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aw. It has recorded a positive finding that the assessee bona fide believed that the rate of tax on silicate was 4 per cent. It is also relevant to state that no objection was raised by the department and the rate was applied at 4 per cent by the Sales Tax Officer while passing the assessment order. The mistake of believing the rate of tax may be apparent for the purpose of section 22 of the Act and the mistake could have been rectified but for the purpose of demanding interest the intention of the assessee has to be judged. Since the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the belief of the assessee was bona fide and no mala fide intention can be attributed inasmuch as the rate of 4 per cent was applied by the assessing authority himself, the demand of interest from 1st June, 1976, cannot be justified. In the result the revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. The order passed by the Tribunal dated 30th June, 1984, is confirmed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 240 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... no provision in the Act which authorised the Commercial Tax Officer to refuse to provide the assessee with C forms. If the assessee misused the C form, that will be punishable under section 10 of the Central Act. Beyond that, it had no effect, not even in tax. The Commercial Tax Officer was not constituted as a policeman to regulate and conduct the assessee along with virtuous path. If the assessee had registered himself under the provisions of the Central Act, he was, as a matter of right, entitled to get C forms from the officer, who had no authority to refuse the same. The petition is therefore allowed with costs. Following the ratio contained in the said judgment, which is on all fours to the present case, the writ petition will stand allowed and there will be a rule to the respondent as prayed for in the petition. The C forms and other statutory forms and declarations will be supplied to the petitioner within three weeks from the date of receipt of this order. No costs.
-
1985 (2) TMI 239 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in this case. T.C. (R) No. 19 of 1985 is, therefore, dismissed. T.C. (R) No. 20 of 1985. 6.. This tax revision case is against the order of the Tribunal dismissing the enhancement petition filed by the revenue as regards the cancellation of the levy of penalty under section 12(5) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. In the connected case T.C. (R) No. 19 of 1985, we have held that the assessee is not liable to be taxed under section 7-A of the Act on the purchase turnover of Rs. 9,55,485.78. Now that the tax on the disputed turnover has been set aside by the Tribunal, the Tribunal is justified in cancelling the quantum of penalty levied by the appellate authority on the basis of its finding that the sum of Rs. 9,55,485.78 is taxable under section 7-A of the Act. Since the assessment on the disputed turnover is set aside, there cannot be any levy of penalty for non-disclosure of the purchase turnover of Rs. 9,55,485.78. Therefore, this tax revision case is also dismissed.
-
1985 (2) TMI 238 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ler and levy tax on the first sale. It is not for the assessee, who is the subsequent seller, to show that the first sale has been taxed. Once it is found that the assessee s sale is a subsequent sale and there has been a first sale in respect of the same goods earlier in the State, then it is for the authorities to proceed to levy that transaction of first sale, and the onus cannot be thrown on the assessee to show that the first sale has suffered tax. The onus on the subsequent seller is only to point out that there has been a first sale and the onus is not on him to show that the first sale has, in fact, suffered tax. This is the view this Court has taken in two earlier decisions reported in Govindan and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 35 STC 50 and Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Vijayalakshmi Mills Ltd. 1977 40 STC 463. 4.. Having regard to the said decisions of this Court, the Tribunal s decision does not call for interference and the tax case is therefore dismissed.
........
|
