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Showing 61 to 80 of 443 Records
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1996 (2) TMI 540 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed. 9. This order shall not cover the dispute in respect of the resolution of the Respondent - N.D.M.C. dated 12.9.1991 revising licence fee from 10 per cent to 30 per cent on the expiry of the licence and payment of interest over the arrears from 15 per cent to 24 per cent. 10. In respect of the grievance made on behalf of the allottees that sales are being made from the show windows. Mr. Ranjit Kumar,appearing for N.D.M.C.pointed out that before the learned single judge, N.D.M.C.took a clear stand in their affidavit filed that no persons shall be allowed to sell any article through the show window, it shall be used only for display purpose and N.D.M.C. shall not implement the resolution No.33 dated 15.1.1985 allowing the persons displaying their articles in the show windows to sell the articles. Accordingly the appeals and the writ petition are dismissed subject to the directions given above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 539 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... counsel appearing for the first respondent was not able to convince us that the learned Judge was right in comparing the signatures himself at any rate in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and rendering the findings against the appellant herein. As we are satisfied on the peculiar facts of this case also that the learned Judge was not right in deciding hundreds of the disputed signatures by comparing the counterfoils by himself to declare the votes as void, we need not go into other arguments advanced before us. As we find that at least 130 votes are validly polled in favour of the appellant for the reasons given earlier then he must be held to have secured 43 votes more than the first respondent herein. In the result, we hold that the learned Judge was not right in declaring the election of the appellant as void and declaring the first respondent as duly elected. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the Election petition is dismissed with costs throughout.
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1996 (2) TMI 538 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view that sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a court when he acts as a statutory authority under Section 18(1) Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period to limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the Collector is a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, we hold that the applications are barred by limitation and Collector has no power to extend time for making an application under Section 18(1) for reference to the court. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court are set aside. The application under Section 18(1) stands rejected but, in the circumstances, without cost.
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1996 (2) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Learned Counsel for the respondents referred to us the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Shakeel Ahmad, 1996 1 SCC 337 and contended that this Court ignored the delay of over 23 days in the disposal of the representation. This decision is of no help to the respondents as the necessary facts on the basis of which the Court came to the conclusion that there was no delay in the disposal of representation, have not been set out. All that has been said is that "in the facts and circumstances of this case, the delay in disposal of the representation of about 23 days also is not fatal". Moreover, the period of detention had already expired and, therefore, what was laid down therein would be of no assistance to the respondents. 27. In view of the foregoing discussion we, after having considered the arguments of the counsel on both sides, by our order dated 21st November, 1995, as aforesaid, allowed these writ petitions and have now recorded the reasons therefore.
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1996 (2) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... law. Such a judgment/decree - by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior, it can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings." the question whether the purchasers purchased the property bona fide subsequent to the permission so granted without notice of the appellants' offer is immaterial in this appeal. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and keeping in view the fact that both the appellants and the purchasers subsequently offered to purchase the property for ₹ 19,40,000/-, remit the matter to the Division Bench of the High Court to call for fresh offers from them, which, needless to say, shall not be less than the above amount the grant permission to sell the same at the higher offer received on such terms as law and equity may demand. The appellants shall be entitled to costs of this appeal from the trustees which we assess at ₹ 10,000/-.
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1996 (2) TMI 535 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... clude typewriting as well, since typing has become more common than handwriting and this change is on account of the availability of typewriters and their common use much after the statute was enacted in 1872. This is an additional reason for us to hold that the opinion of the typewriter expert in this context is admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the observations made in the above extract in the decision in Hanumant on the basis of a concession does not reflect the correct position of law on this point and should, therefore, be treated as no longer good law on the point. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the opinion of the typewriter expert in the present case is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the contrary view taken by the Trial Court and the High Court is erroneous. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders of the Trial Court and the High Court are set aside.
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1996 (2) TMI 534 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... quentially, the operation of the Act, namely, Section 3(2) read with 3(4) will be functional only after the report submitted by the Committee and accepted by the State Government. In terms of the aforesaid orders, any untrained teachers existing prior to the take over are not eligible to be taken over. Section 4 would operate only in respect of the employees qualified and working prior to the taking over. Consequently, the view of the High Court is clearly illegal. It is equally settled law by decisions of this Court in of this Court in J and K Public Service Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan and ors. (1994) 2 SCC 630 (1994) 3 SCALE 597 that no mandamus would be issued directing the Government to disobey the law. In view of the above interpretation, the view of the High Court, therefore, is clearly illegal and cannot be implemented. Tbe appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. Consequently, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on to come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was wholly in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellants application becomes unsustainable in the absence of all the promotees being impleaded as party. So far as question of delay and laches is concerned, as we have noticed earlier the final gradation list was prepared only on 23.12.1988 and the appellants had approached the Tribunal in 1989 and therefore, the question of delay does not arise. In the aforesaid premises the impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The appellants are entitled to get their seniority over the ad-hoc promotees who were appointed as Assistant Director on 27.9.1980. The respondent-State is directed to re-draw the seniority. The appellants' application before the Tribunal stand allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The seniority list may be re-drawn up within 4 months from the date of the receipt of this order and consequential benefits may be given.
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1996 (2) TMI 532 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that in The Sales Tax Officer and ors. vs. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf and Ors, AIR 1959 SC 135 at 142 , that when the knowledge was acquired by the party for the first time before the judgment was rendered by this Court in previous litigation, the claim for refund would start from the judgment rendered by this Court. We do not have that fact situation in this case. The appellants is a party to the proceedings and at his instance,the assessment of agricultural income tax was quashed as referred to hereinbefore and having had the assessment quashed the cause of action had arisen to him to lay the suit for refund unless it is refunded by the State. The knowledge of the mistake of law cannot be countenanced for extended time till the appeal was disposed of unless, as stated earlier, the operation of the judgment of the High Court in the previous proceedings were stayed by this Court. The suit, therefore, is barred by limitation. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 531 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... the final consumer paragraph 153 of the opinion. The procedure applied by the appellants does not go beyond the extent strictly necessary for preventing such evasion or avoidance. Since the decision as to what is the open market value in the United Kingdom legislation is a matter for the national authorities and ultimately the national court, and the approach to the interpretation of national measures of derogation to achieve consistency with Community law having been laid down by the European Court, I do not consider that any question arises in this case which obliges your Lordships to refer a question to the European Court of Justice pursuant to article 177(3) of the Treaty. Lord Lloyd of Berwick. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friends, Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons they give I, too, would allow the appeal. Appeal allowed. Solicitors D.E.J. Nissen Shakespeares, Birmingham.
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1996 (2) TMI 530 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the alleged non-compliance of Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, hereinafter called "the Act", was fatal to the prosecution?
Held that:- In the special facts of this case where the bag containing the incriminating article, though belonging to the petitioner, was out of his reach after it was checked in and was nowhere near the place where he was apprehended and searched although it was called for from the aircraft luggage compartment and brought to the customs counter for examination. Therefore, the question of compliance with Section 50 does not arise. The High Court was, therefore, right in the view that it took. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (2) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there existed any valid and binding arbitration clause between the parties?
Held that:- In view of the fact that Section 2 [a] of the Act envisages a written agreement for arbitration and that written agreement to submit the existing or future differences to arbitration is a pre-condition and further in view of the fact that the original contract itself was not a concluded contract, there existed no arbitration agreement for reference to the arbitrators. The High Court, therefore, committed a gross error of law in concluding that an agreement had emerged between the parties, from the correspondence and from submission of the tenders to the Board. Accordingly it is declared that there existed no arbitration agreement and that the reference to the arbitration, therefore, is clearly illegal. Consequently arbitrators cannot proceed further to arbiter the dispute, if any. The conclusion of the High Court is set aside. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 528 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... rom the aforesaid discussion that no notice under section 12 of the old Act was issued to the assessee in respect of the assessment year 1986-87 prior to March 21, 1992. It was issued on June 16, 1992, obviously beyond limitation of five years. On this ground alone, the revision petition relating to the assessment year 1986-87 deserves to be allowed. 8.. Admittedly, notice under section 12(1) of the old Act was issued on June 16, 1992 long after the provisions of section 12(2) of the old Act stood amended by the said Amendment Act with effect from April 1, 1991. The period of limitation prevailing on the date of the issuance of the notice was applicable and not the limitation which existed on the last day of the assessment year. 9.. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The reassessment order dated June 2, 1993, appellate order dated September 24, 1993 and the order of the Tax Board, Ajmer, dated August 22, 1995 are set aside. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 527 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... show its statements and made provisional assessment on a total turnover of Rs. 19,27,04,344 as against the net turnover of Rs. 1,58,64,666 shown in form A-2 return. From the impugned order, it is clear that the requirements of rule 12 have not been complied with. The learned Government Pleader was called upon to produce the records. A perusal of the record also does not disclose that reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner-assessee before passing the provisional assessment order. 7.. For these reasons, the impugned provisional order of assessment is liable to be quashed and we accordingly do so. We make it clear that this order does not preclude the first respondent from following the procedure laid down in rule 12 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules and passing the order of assessment to the best of the judgment afresh. 8.. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 526 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the impugned Act [the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944] enacted by the State legislature is one under Entry 53 of the State List, viz., "Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity"?
Held that:- As already seen, the specific case of the State and the Board is that the State has been expending its public money for the effective functioning for the KSEB and the duty under the Act is flowing into the public exchequer and, therefore, it is not a duty for the benefit of KSEB coming under Essential Articles Act. Equally, it is not either a threat to the power of judicial review or form of restraint to exercise the power of judicial review over legislative action. It is true that under the Electricity Act which admittedly has been enacted under Entry 53 of the State List, the rate of duty, as amended, is 10 per cent. As stated above, under the duty is an additional impost in the nature of compulsory exaction for the benefit of public exchequer. When we look into the provisions of the Act it is clear that levy and collection of additional duty is not discontinued as contended by Shri Venugopal. As held above, the Act is a complete code in itself and operates retrospectively. Therefore, both the Acts operate harmoniously and do not collide in their operation since 1984 Act is the principal Act and the Act is in addition to, but not in substitution of the principal Act. Therefore, 1984 Act does not get eclipsed with the passing of the Act. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Act is valid. The direction with regard to the refund of duty for the period which the Act did not seek to cover, has already been given by the High Court and no appeal has rightly been filed by the State. Therefore, to that extent that order has become final. We need not dwell upon it. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (2) TMI 525 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... id court that vague generalisations or evasive reference or casting doubts with reference to the contents of the admission would not be enough. The position before us relates to an undisputed admission. 7.. Similarly reliance on yet a third decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Law) v. P.C. Joseph and Brothers 1994 94 STC 296, would not be of any help in view of the peculiarity on facts before us that there is unequivocal admission not at all attempted to be explained in any way. On going through the judgment we have to state that it does not speak of an admission in the context, but is concerned with materials collected during inspection. 8.. Having given our anxious consideration, exercise of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 would be more than difficult as the Tribunal has proceeded on the admitted position and normal and legitimate inferences drawn therefrom. The revision cases stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (2) TMI 524 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the department and held that in the light of relevant provisions of the Act, resolutions and the notification, which is of statutory nature, the petitioner was entitled to tax benefit incentives to the extent of 50 per cent. We do not see any justifiable reason to take a contrary view. As per earlier view, the petitioners are entitled to 50 per cent on the sales tax incentives which was granted in their favour. The impugned action of reducing the said benefit to 25 per cent is, therefore, contrary to law and requires to be quashed and set aside. 13.. For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions require to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned orders revising eligibility certificates and of curtailing tax benefits are hereby quashed and set aside and it is directed that the respondent-authorities will continue to grant benefit of tax exemption as granted in their favour in February, 1987. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 523 - RAJASTHAN TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ier, the petitioner-firm was under obligation to pay additional entertainment tax to the tune of Rs. 2,489 and advertisement tax to the tune of Rs. 40 per month. This works out to Rs. 2,529 for the period from August 26, 1994 to September 25, 1994. The petitioner-firm is liable to pay it to the department. 14.. The Act and its provisions constitute a complete scheme of which section 7 is an integral part. It cannot be divorced from the provisions of sections 4 and 6. Once an exemption is granted under this section no entertainment tax can be levied or collected under sections 4 and 6. We allow the petition in part and direct the petitioner-firm to deposit with the department a sum of Rs. 2,529 within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment, failing which it shall pay interest thereon at of 24 per cent per annum. We also direct the respondents to treat the rest of the demand as cancelled. We make no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1996 (2) TMI 522 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... 23, 1996, this Tribunal was obviously of the view that the proviso to section 8(7) could not be applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no mistake apparent from the record which has been filed under section 16 of the 1987 Act. In the result, the review application is dismissed without any order for costs. The registrar should note that no review application is accepted without necessary annexures including copy of the impugned order which is sought to be reviewed. Moreover, it appears from pages 4 and 5 of the review application that parts of those pages are hand written. The registry should, in future, take care to check such petitions before acceptance, in terms of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Rules and the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Regulations. In this particular case, in spite of those defects, we treated this application as duly filed, in order to avoid delay. Application dismissed.
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1996 (2) TMI 521 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the appellants were the consignors and consignees in regard to their respective consignments. Having examined the documents, the appellate authority satisfied himself that there was no intention to avoid tax and consequently levied a nominal penalty of Rs. 1,000 in each case for not explaining the facts to the check-post officer. The said order did not call for revision. There is no error in the order of the appellate authority nor is it prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The mere fact that the matter was not explained to the checkpost officer properly was not by itself sufficient to revise the order of the appellate authority. In fact, that has been taken note of by the appellate authority in levying nominal penalty of Rs. 1,000. Therefore, the order of the revisional authority cannot be sustained. 7.. Consequently, these appeals are allowed. The order of the revisional authority is set aside and the order of the appellate authority is restored. Appeals allowed.
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