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Showing 61 to 80 of 612 Records
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2003 (3) TMI 721 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeal and quash the FIR above mentioned.
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2003 (3) TMI 720 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... otwithstanding the delay, we looked into the order under challenge. We find no reason to interfere with the order. The appeal is dismissed both on the grounds of delay as well as on merits.
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2003 (3) TMI 719 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion Act. Moreover, Section 8 relates to judgments in Civil suits as it has to be read along with Section 7 of the Societies Registration Act. The impugned recovery is not in pursuance of any judgment of a civil in a suit and hence Section 8 has no application. 22. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College vs. State of Delhi A.I.R 1962 SC 458 referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner in our opinion this decision has no application to the present case because the question involved there was whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is a corporation, and it was held that it is not, though it has some privileges analogous to those of corporations (vide Para-19 of the said decision). Since we have held that the veil of corporation can be lifted, then even more the veil of the society can be lifted, because it is not even a corporation. For the reasons given above this petition is dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 718 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tenant Allenberry & Co. surrendered the tenancy and Eng Chick Wong as the sole proprietor of the proprietary concern Waldorf Restaurant who was sub-let into the premises prior to the surrender of tenancy had already vacated the premises and left India, the present firm and its partners with whom the possession of the leased premises were left have to vacate the premises on extinguishment of the rights of the tenants and the sub-tenants the impugned judgment of the Division Bench thus deserves to be set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. Consequently, we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment dated 4.8.2000 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta and restore that of the learned Single Judge dated 20.4.2000. Since respondent No. 1 has dragged on the litigation for such a long period, the appellant would also be entitled to full costs incurred in courts below and in this Court. The counsel fee shall be allowed as per rules.
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2003 (3) TMI 715 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... here may have been justification for forming compact zones and they may be economically viable whether Hazipur or Bilaspur or Bhubaneswar should be made zonal Headquarters has not been adequately considered. The decision of the Central Government to locate the headquarters of South Western Railways at Hubli instead of Bangalore was the subject matter of challenge in Union of India and Ors. v. Kannadapara Sanghatanegala Okkuta & Kannadigara and Ors. Though the High Court had quashed shifting of Headquarters from Bangalore to Hubli, this Court stated as follows - "it is not the function of the court to decide the location or the site of the Headquarters, it is the function of the Government." If benefit of a zonal headquarters in a particular place is more suited than any other place in zone it would not affect the ultimate efficient functioning of the railway administration. Thus all contentions of the petitioners stand rejected. These petitions stand dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 714 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 713 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... egation is of depression of assessable value by the job worker. It was claimed by Shri Lakshmikumaran that at all stages of the proceedings it has been brought to the notice of the department that the values were comparable. In para 64 of the Commissioner’s Order, now impugned, it has been shown that Dixon’s price was on par with the JRE price. This point was made during the hearing before us also but was not contested. In para 64 of the said order the Commissioner has also recorded the submissions that M/s. UPTRON, a public sector unit had also made an offer to supply CTVs at the price comparable to those charged by JRE. This point was also not challenged or contested by the Revenue. The parity display of this price charged by other units for identical goods would go to show that the price charged by JRE was not artificially deflated. 85. On the basis of these discussions we allow the Appeal filed by, BIL, and dismiss the seven appeals filed by the Revenue.
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2003 (3) TMI 712 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... spect of expenses incurred can be allowed under section 35B of the Act only if they are wholly and exclusively incurred for any of the purposes mentioned in the sub-clauses of section 35B(1)(b). It has also been held that for the purpose of claiming weighted deduction, the onus lies on the assessee to prove that the expenditure on which weighted deduction is claimed falls in any of the said sub-clauses. Unless that is done, the assessee is not entitled to weighted deduction under the said Section. 9. Having perused the nature of the expenses on which weighted deduction has been claimed by the assessee, we are of the view that none of the said expenditure fall within the ambit of any of the sub-clauses of section 35B(1)(b) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the third question is also answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The reference stands disposed of in the above terms with no orders as to costs. Partly in favour of revenue
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2003 (3) TMI 711 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he notification and had also applied for consent of the Board which was granted to the respondent. But it may be clarified that this is not the reason for taking the view that we have taken, it is mentioned only by way of an additional fact and nothing more. The whole working and functioning of the Act which is meant for controlling the air pollution cannot be withheld and rendered nugatory only for the reason of absence of the rules prescribing the manner declaring an air pollution control area which otherwise is provided to be notified by publication in an official gazette which has been done in this case. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in revision and the order of the High Court affirming the same. The further proceedings in the case to be resumed in the trial Court in accordance with law on merits which shall not be affected in any manner by observation, if any, made in this judgment.
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2003 (3) TMI 710 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1.1986 on the recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission. They contended that the above-said increase of 125 should be given by NBCC on their revised scales. This was not accepted by NBCC by orders dated 15.10.1990. The contention of the respondents based on legitimate expectation was rejected in view of the peculiar conditions under which NBCC was working in Iraq. It was observed that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' had both substantive and procedural aspects. This Court laid down a clear principle that claims on legitimate expectation required reliance on representation and resultant detriment in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel. The principle was developed in the context of 'reasonableness' and in the context of 'natural justice'. The principles of legitimate expectation have no application to the facts of the present case. Looking at from any angle the appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves dismissal, which we direct.
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2003 (3) TMI 709 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Bhan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 708 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e appellant contended that there is no registered sale deed in favour of the respondent and therefore he cannot be held to be a transferee having acquired ownership rights in the property, such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. The fact that the respondent is a transferee under registered deed of sale having acquired ownership in the property was not disputed upto the High Court. At no point of time the appellant ever requested for the original sale deed being brought on record before the Court. A new plea which is essentially a plea of fact cannot be allowed to be urged for the first time at the hearing of appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution before this Court, more so when it is contrary to the stand taken by the appellant himself in the High Court and the Court below. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is held liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly. The decision of the Rent Controller, as upheld by the High Court, is maintained.
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2003 (3) TMI 707 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be dealt with in conformity with the final order of the Revisional Court. 19. Consequently, the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47-C of the Act restricting the power of the Court of Session "to stay the order of confiscation" during the pendency of the revision is held to be Constitutionally valid by reading it down to the extent that the Court of Session would have the power to pass such order of interim nature for the custody and disposal etc. of the confiscated property during pendency of the revision, as may appear to it just and proper in the circumstances of the case as have been conferred on the appellate authority by the proviso to Section 47-B (3) of the Act so that if necessary the property may be kept intact till the decision of the revision petition. Accordingly, the petitioner may pursue the remedy of appeal and revision as provided in the Act. Such appeal or revision should be disposed of as early as possible. The writ petition is dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 705 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her the impugned Act in its present form is in any way in conflict with the Central Act having regard to the changes effected therein pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee constituted by the UGC at the instance of the Central Government. We are further of the view that the High Court committed a manifest error in striking down the entire Act without bestowing its consideration to the fact that the State Act deals with not only higher education but also intermediate education which in no manner deals with the subject matter of Entry 66 of List I of VII Schedule of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that the impugned enactment does not encroach upon the legislation enacted by the Parliament and the same is a valid piece of legislation. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. These appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 704 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... and reported in 2002 (146) E.L.T. 628 (Tribunal) (Beekay Engg. and Casting Ltd. v. Commissioner). While dismissing the appeal the Supreme Court passed the following order - “Delay is condoned. We do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the classification determined by the Tribunal. The civil appeal is dismissed.”
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2003 (3) TMI 703 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the temple and the shops are property of the family of Pandit Durga Prasad, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 (a) to (e) and they do not belong to any public trust?
Held that:- When the party had statutory remedy of assailing the order passed by the District Court by filing an appeal to the High Court itself, he could not bypass the said remedy and take recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Such a course of action may enable a litigant to defeat the provisions of the Statute which may provide for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of court fee or deposit of some amount or fulfilment of some othre conditions for entertaining the appeal.
For the reasons stated, we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error of law in entertaining and allowing the writ petition filed by Pandit Durga Prasad and, therefore, orders passed by the learned Single Judge on 2.9.1994 and by the Division Bench in letters patent appeal on 7.3.1995 are liable to be set aside. Since the Registrar had passed an order on 31.12.1956 for recording Shri Madan Mohan Mandir as a private trust of Pandit Kamta Prasad, there was no occasion for him to file a civil suit to establish his right. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the present case, we consider it in the interest of justice that an opportunity be given to the contesting respondents to establish their right by instituting a civil suit, which they may do within three months from today.
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2003 (3) TMI 702 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2000 118 STC 422 (SC) 2000 UPTC 496 2000 3 JT 355 SC and other cases relied upon are distinguishable. In Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. 2000 118 STC 422 (SC) 2000 UPTC 496 (SC) 2000 3 JT 355 SC it was held that a Validating Act can render ineffective judgments and orders of a competent court or authority provided by retrospective legislation it removes the cause of invalidity or the basis which has led to those judgments. As mentioned above, the Parliament has made a substantive provision by the Amending Act by amending section 9(2B) of the Central Sales Tax Act so far as the levy of interest is concerned. It was the only defect which was pointed out by the apex court in the case of India Carbon Ltd. 1997 106 STC 460 (SC) 1998 UPTC 1. The defect having been removed by the Parliament, there is no illegality in the Validating Act. In the result, the writ petitions have no force and are liable to be dismissed and they are, accordingly, dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 701 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... period after September 7, 1981 but deleted the interest under section 8(1) of the Act. Being aggrieved by the order of Tribunal, the present revision has been filed. 3.. I have heard Sri M.R. Jaiswal, learned Standing Counsel and Sri Piyush Agrawal, learned counsel for the opposite party. 4.. Tribunal has held that at no stage liability of tax was admitted and the imposition of tax was debatable and that being so the assessee can be said to be under bona fide belief that the purchase tax was not liable. Relying upon the judgment in case of Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1982 50 STC 56 (All.) 1980 UPTC 1320 and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Rohtas Industries Ltd. reported in 1989 ATJ 96, Tribunal has held that the demand of interest was not justified. In my opinion the view of the Tribunal on the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be erroneous. 5.. In the result, all the revisions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 700 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... und of impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive. The executive instructions can supplement a statute or cover areas in which the statute does not extend. They cannot run contrary to statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. It is not permissible to travel beyond the terms of the notification. 11.. In view of the foregoing discussions, this writ petition is allowed. The resolution of the State Level Committee dated December 29, 2000 (annexure R-1 ) is quashed. Consequently the demand notices (annexures E-1 , F-2 and L ) are also quashed and it is held that the petitioner-company is entitled for issuance of eligibility certificate for the extended period. Accordingly the respondents are directed to issue eligibility certificate to the petitioner-company as per the decision dated October 29, 1997 as also the notification dated March 31, 1992 (annexure P-3 ) within a period of 30 days. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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