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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 111 Records
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1973 (7) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Charitable Purpose, Ejusdem Generis, Income From Property ... ... ... ... ..... assistance to maintain Daryalal temple. It has not been contended that any of these words does not indicate the purpose as religious or charitable purpose. The word welfare in this clause takes its colour from the earlier objects which preceded it and is really used in the sense of welfare of the poor, needy or destitute. Nobody expects a trust to be created for the welfare of the well-to-do or the rich. Having regard to the context in which the word welfare is used in the objects clause when the application for registration was made, there can be no doubt that it is used as welfare of the needy, poor and destitute members of the community and in that view it is not even conceivable that the object cannot be regarded as either religious or charitable. Thus, both the contentions urged on behalf of the revenue cannot be accepted and the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (7) TMI 50 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... lear that the minors had no liability in respect of the debts and obligations of the firm and they were not made full-fledged partners. The Income-tax Officer and the appellate authorities were not, therefore, in our opinion, justified in refusing registration sought by the assessee. The defects pointed out by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the penultimate paragraph of his order about the form or the incorporation therein of the shares or the copy of the instrument of partnership were not fatal. They could easily be rectified if a demand in that behalf had been made in terms of section 185(2) of the Act. Moreover, the Income-tax Officer does not seem to have attached any importance to them as he does not appear to have refused the registration in view of any of these so-called defects. For the foregoing reasons, we would answer the question referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in the negative. WASI-UD-DIN J.-I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (7) TMI 49 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Commercial Profit ... ... ... ... ..... r the assessee that additional super-tax ought not to have been imposed on the balance of the income as assessed. Under the statute, super-tax has to be imposed at a specified rate on the balance of the income which remains after deducting the taxes from the assessed income and not after deducting the tax from the commercial profit as was argued on behalf of the assessee. For the reasons stated above, the question of law must be answered in the affirmative in both the cases against the assessee-company and in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax. It is held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, dividend could reasonably be distributed within the meaning of section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the provisions of the said section were rightly applied in law in the case of the assessee for both the years. The Commissioner must have the costs of these references. One consolidated hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only. S. K. JHA J.--I agree.
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1973 (7) TMI 48 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Powers Of Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... as it thinks fit . There is nothing in the Income-tax Act which restricts the Tribunal to the determination of questions raised before the departmental authorities. All questions, whether of law or of facts, which relate to the assessment of the assessee may be raised before the Tribunal. If for reasons recorded by the departmental authorities in respect of a contention raised by the assessee, grant of relief to him on another ground is justified it would be open to the departmental authorities and the Tribunal, and indeed they would be under a duty, to grant that relief. The right of the assessee to relief is not restricted to the plea raised by him. In view of the clear statement of law by the Supreme Court there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the department. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (7) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Additional Evidence ... ... ... ... ..... se of valuing the rent-free residential accommodation under rule 3 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and rule 24A of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922. Our view also finds support from the two decisions of the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. C. W. Steel (No. 1) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. C. W. Steel (No. 2). These two cases were also concerned with the interpretation of rule 24A of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, and rule 3 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. There also the question for consideration was whether the tax borne by the employer was includible in the total amount of salary for the purpose of computing the rent-free accommodation given to the assessee. It was held that the income-tax paid by the employer is part of the salary and that, in any case, it is part of the pay of the assessee. The references are accordingly answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 in each.
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1973 (7) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Immovable Property, Movable Property, Partner In Firm, Partnership Firm, Set Off
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1973 (7) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Land Whether Agricultural ... ... ... ... ..... ing section and the words therein contained have to be interpreted having regard to the normal canons of construction which apply to words which are clear and unambiguous and not susceptible to any doubt. Reference was also made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kalicharan Jagannath. If regard be had to the facts of this case, in our opinion, it has not any relevance to the issue to be decided in this case and, in our opinion, this decision cannot be of any assistance to the assessee. In the result, we answer the question referred to us as under Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the income derived by the assessee as a superior holder from the lands, which were used by the tenants for agricultural purposes, was not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a) and was not exempt from tax under section 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference.
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1973 (7) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Minor Child, Refund Of Tax, Tax Deducted At Source, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... the hotchpot of the family does not amount to any transfer of such property to the assessee s wife or son. In view of this decision it is not possible to take the view that there is a transfer within the meaning of section 16(3)(b). Even while interpreting the word transfer under the provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, in Goli Eswariah v. Commissioner of Gift-tax the Supreme Court has taken the view that the unilateral declaration of a Hindu coparcener, whereby he throws his self-acquired property into the common stock of the joint family property, does not amount to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958. In view of these decisions, the questions that arise for consideration in the present reference are concluded by the decisions which are binding on us, and we, accordingly, answer the questions as under Question No. 1 is answered in the negative. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assesses.
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1973 (7) TMI 43 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... N. A. Palkhivala, 6th edition, volume I, and submitted that no fresh facts have come to light, that the earlier decisions have been rendered after taking into consideration all material evidence and that, therefore, the departure made by the department from the old practice was arbitrary and was merely based on the opinion of the officer who differed from the view that had been earlier accepted. We do not think that we should deal with this aspect either in these tax referred cases. We answer question No. 1 referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In view of our answer to question No. 1 based on our finding that section 4(1)(a)(iii) is not attracted, we consider it unnecessary to answer the second question. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1973 (7) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... ssistance to Dawoodi Bohras to start business, assistance on marriage, the maintenance of schools, the repairs of mosques and other Dawat property and assistance to pilgrims and this court has further taken the view that the Mullaji Saheb holds the properties belonging to the Dawat as a trustee by virtue of his office as Dai and on his death these properties could pass to his successors-in-office and not to his heirs. In the latter decision it has been stated very clearly that Dai is the religious ruler and trustee of the properties of the community and he has to act in a constitutional manner. In other words, as the religious ruler and trustee of the community he cannot use or spend the income thereof for the purposes other than the purposes for which the trust has been created. Having regard to the above discussion, we answer the question in the affirmative. Department will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Notice of motion is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1973 (7) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Accounting Year ... ... ... ... ..... s made any loss and if so to what extent and the loss would really arise in the year in which that eventuality occurs. In the circumstances, it would be really difficult for any taxing authority to come to a definite conclusion as to whether the irrecoverable amount which was being claimed by the assessee could be said to be a loss referable to the accounting year. Placed in that situation, the Tribunal, in our view, correctly observed that the irrecoverable amount had also not been identifiably made during the previous year and that it represented the balance in an account running into other years as well. Having regard to the above discussion, we feel that the allowance was rightly rejected by the taxing authorities and by the Tribunal by recording a finding of fact which was passed on an appreciation of evidence. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the affirmative against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the department.
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1973 (7) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Delay In Filing
... ... ... ... ..... e to be read as the date on which the order complained of was communicated . It has been the practice of the income-tax authorities--Central as well as State--to accept the copy of the order communicated to the assessee as certified copy and reckon the period of limitation from the date of service of that copy on the assessee. This is a commendable practice from all points of view and it is necessary in the light of that practice to consider whether a provision like section 69 of the Act is at all necessary, and if so to make the requisite amendments in that section, and also in Form B(T) prescribed for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it provides that the appeal petition shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed from. In the result, I quash the impugned orders, exhibits P-2 and P-4, direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore the two appeals to its file, and dispose of them on the merits according to law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (7) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Income, Income From Business, Income Tax Act, Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... ently filed an appeal against their assessment made under the Sales Tax Act and this appeal was allowed, 24,341 was remitted. Consequently, Messrs. Mohanlal Hargovindas refunded that amount to the assessee by means of a draft dated October 31, 1961. The Income-tax Officer, sought to include this amount under the provisions of section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which is in pari materia to section 10(2A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It was held by the Supreme Court that the successor in business or a legal representative of the assessee to whom an allowance had been granted, is not liable to tax under section 41(1) in respect of an amount remitted and received. This decision squarely applies to the facts of this case. We, accordingly, answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The department shall pay costs to the assessee which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (7) TMI 38 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... found that in the assessment year 1952-53 there was an apparent arithmetical mistake in the account of the written down value of the properties which resulted in a corresponding mistake in the assessment of the year in controversy, could he not take the corrected figure for the purposes of the assessment and coud it be said that the mistake was not apparent from the record. A fortiori if he discovered that the very basis of the different assessments was erroneous because of an initial mistake in determining the written down value, could it be said that this would not be a mistake apparent from the record. And if in order to determine the correct written down value the Income-tax Officer makes correct calculations, can it be said that that is not rectifying a mistake apparent from the record but is de hors it. No other point was urged. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question in the affirmative but make no order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (7) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Assessment Proceedings, Reassessment Proceedings, Regular Assessment, Taxing Statutes
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1973 (7) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ed any service to Paterson for which they received the amount. Though in the eye of law the partnership is not a legal entity, for the purpose of assessment to income-tax it is a separate legal entity apart from its partners and there is nothing wrong in a partner having business of his own. The assessees as individuals brought the purchasers, the partnership firm, and Binny and Co., together to enter into a sale and purchase of the property and it is that assistance which was recognised by Paterson when he shared the income. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assessees were not entitled to exemption under section 4(3)(vii) of the Act in respect of the share received by them from Paterson. We accordingly answer T.Cs. Nos. 255 and 256 of 1967 in the negative and in favour of the revenue and T.C. No. 114 of 1968 in the affirmative and against the assessee, Kiffin Paterson. The revenue will be entitled to its costs in all the three petitions. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 each.
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1973 (7) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Return, Penal Interest ... ... ... ... ..... iscretion to extend time for furnishing the returns as provided in clauses (i) and (ii). But clause (iii) of the proviso has to be read with sub-section (4) of section 139 of the Act. If clause (iii) of the proviso is read with sub-section (4) of section 139, then the position becomes clear that any person who has not furnished returns within the time allowed to him under sub-section (1) will come within the mischief of clause (iii) of the proviso to section 139(1). Therefore, the fact that no application was made by the petitioner for extension of time is not relevant at all in view of sub-section (4) of section 139(1) of the Act. That is how the present case differs from the one in Kishanlal Haricharan v. Income-tax Officer . It is, however, open to the petitioner to move the Income-tax Officer under rule 117A for reduction or waiver of interest payable under section 139. For the reasons recorded, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each.
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1973 (7) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... partner will be entitled to a fair value of the share calculated on the basis of the capital standing to his or her credit, the share of undistributed profits and losses and the fraction of the goodwill arrived at in terms of clause 6(c). Besides, under the terms of the partnership deed, the 1st partner, Narayana Pillai, continued to have complete and overall control of the business. In any case, so far as the gifts in favour of the daughters are concerned there is absolutely no material to come to the conclusion that these gifts were necessary and justified in order to carry on the business, or that they were made truly and really for the purpose of the business. Our answer to the question is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference including advocate s fee Rs. 250. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal.
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1973 (7) TMI 33 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
A Firm, Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... ssioner of Income-tax 1970 78 ITR 503 (Cal) we do not consider it necessary to set out the facts in any detail. We also note that the view expressed by this court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Pioneer Trading Company Private Ltd. 1968 70 ITR 347 (Cal) draws clear support to the decision of this court taken in the case of Daulatram Rawatmull v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1970 78 ITR 503 (Cal), Following the decision of this court in the aforesaid two cases we answer the question No.1 in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of our answer to the first question, the second question as framed really does not call for any answer. We may, however, only add that Mr. Bajoria, learned counsel for the assessee, has fairly conceded that the answer to the said question is concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court and that is against the assessee. In the facts of this case, each party will pay and bears its own costs. HAZRA J.--I agree.
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1973 (7) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act. It appears to us to be quite plain that when in the earlier part of the section reference is to the income by way of dividends included in the gross total income which could only be dividend and as determined under s. 57, and when the latter part of the section provides for deduction of 60 per cent. of such income by way of dividends this could necessarily refer only to the dividend income which is included in the gross total income which, in turn, is the income determined under s. 57. We find no ambiguity in this section. The view taken by the I.T. authorities appears to us to be quite proper. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Parties will suffer costs in this reference. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the High Court will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act. 1961.
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