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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 258 Records
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1995 (8) TMI 284 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as included within the entry No. 4 of the notification dated September 7, 1981 (supra) and as such the glass shells have been rightly declared as unclassified item attracting a lower rate of tax at 8 per cent. The Tribunal has followed the well-settled principle of interpretation as laid down by the honourable Supreme Court and by various decisions of this Court. I do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal. I answer the question that the glass shells manufactured and sold in semi-finished form by the opposite party to other manufacturers for manufacturing the bulbs are not included in entry No. 4 of the notification dated September 7, 1981 (supra) and are treated as unclassified item. The opposite party is liable to pay tax on glass shells only as unclassified item. The Tribunal has rightly given the benefit of lower rate of tax. No interference is called for in this revision. In the result the revision is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (8) TMI 283 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts of Rs. 8,000 beginning with September 1, 1995, till the whole amount of tax is deposited. However in case the assessee fails to deposit a particular instalment on the due date, an interest will be charged in respect of that amount of instalment only from the due date till it is paid. Consequently this revision is hereby disposed of with the direction that the assessee shall deposit only amount of tax in monthly instalments of Rs. 8,000 each beginning with September 1, 1995, till the whole amount of tax is deposited and if the assessee fails to deposit any monthly instalment on the due date an interest at the rate of 18 per cent shall be charged only in respect of the amount of that instalment from the due date till it is paid but no interest shall be charged on the amount of tax being paid in monthly instalments. The amount, if any, deposited earlier towards the tax for the assessment year 1974-75 shall be adjusted in the last instalments without payment of any interest.
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1995 (8) TMI 282 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nsidered opinion that in the instant case the amount of advance invested before the date of production is liable to be included in the capital investment of petitioner and thus, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of eligibility certificate of tax exemption for a period of 5 years instead of 3 years from the date of first sale, i.e., June 1, 1985 as his capital investment including the advance paid before June 1, 1985 exceeds to Rs. 3,00,000. In the result petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated January 19, 1989 passed by the respondent No. 2 (contained in annexure 9 to the writ petition) is quashed. The respondent No. 2 is directed to pass appropriate orders accordingly for granting eligibility certificate in consonance with the foregoing conclusions arrived at by this Court within a reasonable time preferably within a month from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (8) TMI 281 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Packing of cigarettes ... ... ... ... ..... ught under sub-heading 4818.12/4818.13 which covers other printed cartons, boxes, and cases. Printed racks are in the nature of trays used in match boxes and are only parts of cigarette packets. They would, therefore, not be covered by sub-heading 4818.12 under which only complete printed cartons, boxes, containers and cases made of paper or paperboard are classifiable. Hence we do not find any merit in the appeal filed by the Revenue. 12. emsp In view of the foregoing we hold that all the disputed items were classifiable under sub-heading 4818.90 up to 29-2-88 and under sub-heading 4823.90 from 1-3-88 onwards. In the result the appeal filed by the Revenue is rejected and the impugned orders are modified to this extent. The appeals filed by M/s. I.T.C. Ltd. against the orders passed by the Collector (Appeals), Central Excise, Calcutta and M/s. V.S.T. Industries against the order passed by the Collector (Appeals), Central Excise, Madras are also disposed of in the above terms.
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1995 (8) TMI 280 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Appeal against Trade Notice - Whether maintainable ... ... ... ... ..... ence to the procedure and instructions providing for any supplemental matters arising out of Central Excise Rules. Hence, trade notices are issued at and not an order of adjudication with reference to particular assessee and as such question of filing an appeal to the Tribunal against the provisions of Section 35B(1)(a) does not arise. We are not convinced with the arguments advanced on behalf of appellant that this Tribunal should exercise inherent power in entertaining on appeal against trade notice. Appeal is neither a fundamental right nor inherent right but only a statutory right. Statutory right should be exercised as prescribed under the provisions of the Statute. Once we hold that trade notice is not an appealable order and any communication or correspondence with reference to such trade notice cannot be said to be an order of adjudication. In the circumstances, we are of the view that appeal is not maintainable and accordingly appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.
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1995 (8) TMI 275 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an exemption notification published under section 7(3) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 will also cover exemption from charge of additional tax levied under section 6 of the Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. From a careful reading of section 6, it would be crystal clear that so far as charge of additional tax is concerned, this section is self-contained not only for charging additional tax but also for its exemption. Therefore, the exemption notifications specifically issued under section 7(3) will not cover charge of additional tax to enable the appellants to claim exemption from payment of additional tax. The non obstante clause in section 6 also overrides section 7(3) and section 21 expressly. The position is, therefore, clear in this Act.
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1995 (8) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
Effect of notification - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The appellant has been entirely unable to make out any factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel. The appellant cannot claim that merely because it had set up its industrial unit at Junagadh at a certain point of time, the fiscal laws of the State must remain unaltered from that date. The appellant has not been able to show that some definite promise was made by or on behalf of the Government and the appellant had acted upon that promise to its detriment and thereafter the changes effected by the notification dated July 17, 1971, have caused great prejudice to the appellant.
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1995 (8) TMI 263 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Power of court to declare dissolution of company void ... ... ... ... ..... years, the present attempt of the shareholders of the company to restore the name of the company in the Register of Companies is also barred by limitation. Learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, would argue that the Regional Director has not taken the plea of bar by period of limitation as one of the grounds for the revival of the company in his report and, therefore, the argument of learned standing counsel for Company Affairs on this ground has to be rejected. I am of the opinion that the objection to the revival of the company taken by the Regional Director being a question of law, it can be raised at any time and it cannot be rejected on the ground that it has not been raised in the report filed by the Regional Director. Considering these aspects, I am of the opinion that the permission sought for by the applicant for revival of the company cannot be granted. In the result, the permission sought for by the applicant-company for revival of the same is not granted.
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1995 (8) TMI 262 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Meetings -Demand for poll, Further issue of capital ... ... ... ... ..... 1 All ER 1126, where directors were proposing to make an allotment, and had made an allotment, which was directly beneficial to the company which needed the money, and yet were held to have made the allotment improperly and in breach of their duty because they had yet a third motive, which was to enable a take-over bid to be made, seems to me to be one which might lead a Judge on sufficient evidence to find that the proposals here were unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Lewis. It seems to me thus that there is an arguable case that jurisdiction exists under section 75 to restrain a proposed pari passu rights issue, and, if that is so, then there must be jurisdiction upon this motion pending the hearing of the petition. In these circumstances, the 2nd contention of Mr. Cooper also fails. In the result, company application is dismissed with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief to continue for a period of four weeks. Certified copy expedited. Application dismissed. SCL q APRIL, 1997
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1995 (8) TMI 261 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Place of suit - Territorial jurisdiction of court ... ... ... ... ..... judgment does not interpret section 20. Bakhtawar Singh Balkrishan s case (supra) and Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund s case (supra) also do not deal with the interpretation of section 20. The said decisions cannot be applied to the present case. The Full Bench decision in Shriram Rattan Bhartia s case (supra), deals with the section as it stood prior to 1976 and is not relevant. We then come to the Full Bench decision in Gupta Sanitary Stores case (supra). That decision relates to the question as to where the State can be said to be carrying on business, and therefore, is not again relevant. 12. Following the decision in Patel Roadways Ltd. s case (supra) we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and direct the registry to return the award and other papers to the arbitrator for filing the same before the appropriate court within whose jurisdiction Korba is located. This will be done before 28-8-1995. 13. Appeal allowed. No costs. SCL q APRIL, 1997
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1995 (8) TMI 260 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Sale to be subject to confirmation by court ... ... ... ... ..... the part of the purchaser, it was stipulated that he should pay at 18 per cent, and refund should also be at the same rate of interest. We are unable to agree with this contention. We are of the view that the grant of 12 per cent interest was a proper exercise of discretion which does not warrant any interference. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is dismissed. This order of ours has to be placed before the Secretary to the Government of India, Company Affairs, for the purpose of finding out whether any action needs to be taken against Mr. Arvind Shukla, Assistant Official Liquidator (and we express no opinion on that matter) who was in charge of the case and at whose instance a representation that there was an income-tax valuation of Rs. 11,07,000 regarding the property was made by his counsel, Mr. B, N. Nayyar, to the court. So far as counsel, Mr. Nayyar, is concerned, we are accepting that he implicitly believed the instructions given by Mr. Shukla. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (8) TMI 259 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Court - Jurisdiction of ... ... ... ... ..... as also who hires any service for consideration. Taking these premise into consider-ation it was observed that there is no purchase of goods for a consider- ation nor again could he be called the hirer of the services of the company for a consideration. In order to satisfy the requirement of above definition of consumer, it is clear that there must be a transaction of buying goods for consideration under section 2(i). The definition contemplates the pre- existence of a completed transaction of a sale and purchase. If regard is had to the definition of complaint under the Act, it will be clear that no prospective investor could fall under the Act. 16. So far as the order passed by the Consumer Court is concerned, it may be observed that the remedy of appeal is provided against any order passed under that Act. 17. In view of the above position of law, I feel that this Court do not have the jurisdiction under section 10 and the petitions accordingly dismissed. SCL q AUGUST, 1996
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1995 (8) TMI 258 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... ness and unreasonableness in the proposed merger. It is needless to quote the principles laid down from time to time in the matter of granting permission for such amalgamation. They are pretty well-settled and I have extracted them in brief already. 8. In my view, therefore, the amalgamation proposed deserves to be granted or rather permitted. 9. In the result, I make both the company petitions absolute in terms of the prayers thereof. The orders be communicated by the petitioners to the Registrar of Companies within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The transferor-company shall stand dissolved in consequence of the sanction order of amalgamation. The scheme pro- posed would take effect from 31-12-1993. The Registrar of Companies shall preserve all documents relating to the transferor-company and shall tag them with the transferee-company and consolidate the same. In the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. SCL q OCTOBER, 1997
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1995 (8) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the conviction under section 630 of the Companies Act (is) sustainable ?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. It cannot be held that the appellant has been in wrongful possession of the property entailing his conviction and punishment under section 630 and requiring handing over of the possession of the flat.
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1995 (8) TMI 233 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Directors - Vacation of office ... ... ... ... ..... mpany, and it is not possible to do so. In our judgment, the contention that defendant No. 3 could not have participated in discussion or vote on the resolution to appoint defendant No. 2 as additional Director in view of prohibition of section 300(1), therefore, cannot be accepted. (p. 27) 9. In my view, the statement of law is unexceptionable and I am in respectful agreement with the same. The decision taken to accord sanc- tion for the transfer of shares in the names of relations of the fourth appellant did not attract the mischief of section 299 to result in either his disqualification or of appellants 2 and 3. The contentions raised in this behalf in my view are untenable. Indeed, there was the required quorum of 3 directors when the impugned decision was taken. The court below has gone wrong in its conclusions. I am unable to sustain the impugned order and it is accordingly set aside. LA. No. 4552 of 1994 shall stand dismissed. The civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed.
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1995 (8) TMI 232 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case?
Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff?
Whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed?
Held that:- Appeal rejected. The interim injunction granted by the High Court is in very wide terms because not only GBC but also those to whom the shares have been sold and also subsequent transferees, their servants, agents, nominees, employees, subsidiary companies, controlled companies, affiliates or associate companies or any person acting for and on their behalf are restrained by the interim injunction from using the plants of GBC. It is no doubt true that the interim injunction is widely worded to cover the persons aforementioned but in its operation the order only restrains them from using the plants of GBC at Ahmedabad and Rajkot for manufacturing, bottling or selling or dealing with or being concerned in any manner whatsoever with the beverages of any person till January 25, 1996, the expiry of the period of one year from the date of notice dated January 25, 1995. The interim injunction is thus confined to the use of the plants at Ahmedabad and Rajkot by any of these persons and it is in consonance with the negative stipulation contained in paragraph 14 of the agreement dated September 20, 1993.
For the reasons aforementioned no infirmity in the impugned order of the High Court dated March 31, 1995, granting an interim injunction in terms of prayers (a)( ii) and (a)( iii) of the notice of motion as amended.
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1995 (8) TMI 212 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... particular article, the question of giving the benefit would not arise. The DGTD cannot legislate the concession. Obviously, the DGTD has not appreciated the scope of the amended notification and appears to have approved the appellant rsquo s application for the purpose of benefit of notification in a routine manner. In regard to the earlier releases made, we may mention that there is no specific order in respect of any of the earlier imports in the context of the issues posed before us. There apparently is an error in the assessment of the Bill of Entry under which the earlier imports were made by extending the concession of Notification No. 172/92. The mistake earlier made cannot create any right for the appellants. In view of the above, we hold that the appellants are not eligible to the benefit of notification in question and the appeal of the Revenue has to be allowed. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned lower authority and allow the appeal of the Revenue.
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1995 (8) TMI 203 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Manufacturer - Dummy ... ... ... ... ..... ship does not make a man a manufacturer any more than giving a piece of cloth to be made into a shirt turns one into a tailor. These two activities must not be mistaken as they are separate even when they coverage on the same person, owning and manufacturing are distinct roles rdquo . Therefore, adopting the ratio of the above decision in the present case, the Principal Collector rsquo s conclusion that the job working units are dummies of the appellants, is not sustainable. As for the Principal Collector rsquo s findings that no declaration had been filed by the job working units, as manufacturers, the ld. Counsel has rightly drawn our attention to the Tribunal rsquo s decision in the case of Tufail Ahmed (supra) that exemption from duty is not to be affected by non-filing of declaration from licensing control. In the circumstances, having regard to the totality of evidence and the legal pronouncement on the subject and for the reasons discussed above, the appeal is allowed.
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1995 (8) TMI 198 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Penalty - Clandestine removal ... ... ... ... ..... r Load Relays and Motor Starters under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and demanded duty under Rule 9(2). He added that the penalty of Rs. 2,000/- having been imposed on appellants under Rule 173Q was rightly confirmed by the impugned order. 3. emsp I have considered the submissions made on behalf of both sides. It is seen that the Collector (Appeals) had arrived at a finding that there was no evidence to show that the goods produced were not accounted for with an ulterior motive and the items in question were found lying in the bonded store room. He had also held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of removal of any goods clandestinely. In view of the finding of the Collector (Appeals), I am inclined to agree with the ld. Consultant on behalf of the appellant that the order imposing penalty of Rs. 2,000/- under Rule 173Q is not sustainable. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1995 (8) TMI 196 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
Reference to High Court - Refund ... ... ... ... ..... ow - ldquo Whether Tribunal have jurisdiction to allow appeal when accounts as per sub-rule (2) of Rule 173L of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 have not been maintained? rdquo On a query by this Bench, Shri Gurdeep Singh, the ld. JDR, states that there is no dispute regarding receipt of the defective goods under D-3 declaration and there is no dispute that these goods were put to reprocessing by mixing in the running lot. They are also maintaining account in respect of such reprocessed goods. In view of the aforesaid factual position, the question framed is misconceived and account is maintained regarding receipt of returned goods and also the date on which it is mixed with running lot is also given. The only omission is that they have not done reprocessing separately which is not possible in this case without stopping the main process of manufacture. Hence the question of law framed does not call for a reference in the High Court. Reference Application is therefore dismissed.
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