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Showing 61 to 76 of 76 Records
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1957 (9) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... aring the plaintiff. Mr. Chandrasekhara Sastry contends that this evidence cannot be acted upon as against the evidence (sic) deemed to have been passed before the expiry of the date fixed for the appearance of the plaintiff and as such invalid. I do not propose to deal with this argument in view of the fact that I have upheld the plaintiff s first contention. The assessment in so far as it relates to the turnover of Rs. 27,424-9-3 will be set aside. The case will therefore go back to the trial Court for ascertainment as above-indicated of the transactions of the plaintiff, as selling agent which are entitled to exemption under the terms of the licence. The amount to which those transactions aggregate will be deducted from the total turnover on which he paid the tax, excluding also the above sum of Rs. 27,424-9-3. The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this second appeal. As regards costs in the Courts below, they will abide and follow the result. No leave. Case remanded.
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1957 (9) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 16, which provide for the levy and collection of taxes. They indicate beyond any reasonable doubt that the levy of sales tax is on the turnover representing the price for which a licensed tanner or exporter purchases from a licensed dealer. Rule 16, therefore, fixes the stage and levies the tax, where there are a series of transactions between licensed dealers, on the last licensed dealer whether he is a tanner or exporter. In the present case, as a licensed tanner and a licensed exporter purchased goods from an unlicensed dealer, their purchase turnover is not liable to sales tax. Both the questions are answered in the negative. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, J.-I agree. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-I agree. These petitions came on for final hearing before the Division Bench consisting of Subba Rao, C.J., and Srinivasachari, J., and the Court made the following order. Order Following the opinion expressed by the Full Bench the revision petitions are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... eding is to be disposed of as if this Act had not been passed . In other words, it must be disposed of under the Act of 1946 and ignoring the provisions of the Act of 1953. The applicants before us, therefore, cannot invoke the ninety days period allowed to them by section 34 of the Act of 1953. They are governed by the sixty days period that was allowed under section 23 of the Act of 1946. If that is the correct period, it is obvious on the facts that even computing the period of time from the date when the applicants received the order on 15th May, 1956, the reference application was beyond time. It was, therefore, incompetent to the Tribunal to entertain such an application and to dispose of it. An application to us, therefore, cannot arise out of the refusal of the Tribunal to refer a case when the application to refer the case was itself barred by limitation. The result, therefore, is that this petition fails and will have to be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ntoxicating drug or article containing such liquor or drug, on the ground that such liquor, drug or article is required by such person or in respect of such institution for a bona fide medicinal, scientific, industrial or such like purpose and clause 6 of Form D-1-licence for possession and use of denatured spirit A licence fee at the rate of 12 annas per imperial gallon of denatured spirit shall be levied on the quantity actually used by the licensee in each quarter. These are the only provisions on which counsel for the petitioner relies in support of the contention. 5.. I am not prepared to say that a gallonage fee on denatured spirit used in the manufacture of French Polish will amount to a levy of a duty on French Polish under the Madras Prohibition Act, 1937, and it follows that section 4 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, cannot exonerate the petitioner from liability under that Act. 6.. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... t to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, including conditions as to licences and licence fees, raw tobacco, except country variety, shall be liable to tax only at the point of the first purchase effected in the State of Andhra by a dealer, who is not exempted under sub-section (3), section 3. Item (viii) gives the rate, the person to be taxed, the first point at which he is taxed and the transaction with reference to which the tax is imposed. Having regard to the charging section and the definition of dealer there is absolutely no vagueness in the matter of the imposition of tax. A dealer, who purchases raw tobacco of the Virginia type, shall be liable to tax at the point of time when his purchase is effected in the Andhra State. We do not, therefore, see any ambiguity in the provision. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the applications are liable to be dismissed and we accordingly do so with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Applications dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... id not reach even the minimum figure prescribed under the rules, it cannot be said that on the petitioners failure to comply with an obligatory rule validly framed in the exercise of the powers conferred under section 19 of the Act, the conviction and sentence could be said to be illegal and unwarranted. A point was also raised that the sum of Rs. 150 recovered from the petitioners, as if it were a fine was not legal. We do not find any substance in that contention. The rule is clear on the point that in addition to any fine imposed, the Court is entitled also to direct the recovery of the licence fee payable as if it were a fine. If such power is exercised by the Court, it cannot be said that there has been any illegality about the direction to recover the licence fee, as if it were a fine. In the result we do not think that there is any merit in this revision petition. We therefore have no hesitation in dismissing the same, and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 33 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Act or any Order in Council made under the Act, and that expression has also come in for interpretation and the interpretation put upon section 205 has been that the judgment there means a final declaration or deter- mination of rights of parties, and it is difficult to hold that our Consti- tution-makers with section 205 before them when they used the same language that was used in section 205 used it with a different meaning in Article 133(1). 7.. We entertain no doubt that a judgment delivered under sec- tion 24(5) of the Cochin Sales Tax Act (XV of 1121) is not a judgment, decree or final order as contemplated by Article 133 of the Constitu- tion, and that this petition should fail. 8.. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to decide the second of the two questions mentioned in paragraph 2 above and it is not con- sidered in this judgment. 9.. The petition is hereby dismissed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... dings for the recovery is without substance. No other points arise in these petitions which accordingly fail and are dismissed. The Rules are discharged. There will however be no order as to costs. W.P. No. 1437 of 1956-The petitioner here is one A. Abdul Shukoor and Co., also a dealer in hides and skins. The assessment to sales tax which is the subject of the petition was for the year 1950-51. The tax payable was determined at Rs. 7,675-10-2. The petitioner paid the sum of Rs. 1,891-6-6 leaving Rs. 5,784-3-10 unpaid. The proceedings which were sought to be injuncted by the writ of prohibition related to the recovery of this balance of Rs. 5,784-3-10. Two contentions were raised by the assessee petitioner in this petition which were identical with those raised in W.P. Nos. 1230 to 1232 of 1956 which I have dealt with. For the reasons contained in that judgment W.P. No. 1437 of 1956 is dismissed and the rule discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 31 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ning of the previous assessment may be justified. The reason may transpire only after close scrutiny of the accounts afresh. Following the dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mahaliram Ramjidas(1), which was in a case arising under the provisions of escapement under the Income-tax Act, we are of the view that the Taxing Officer is not required by this section to convene the assessee or to intimate to him the nature of the alleged escapement. 6.. We therefore feel convinced that the petition before us at this stage is too premature, and without discussing the matter any further we dismiss the petition with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred). This order will govern O.J.C. Nos. 395, 396, 397, 398 and 399 of 1955 and 440 of 1956, which involve the same questions. They are accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n this case was made after the conciliation board had fixed the amount of bonus. Obviously, this amount of Rs. 1,80,000 is an allowable expense. Obviously, again, it has not been charged in arriving at the figure of profits according to the profit and loss account. Therefore, it was an amount that could legitimately be shown as a deduction under this part of the statutory form of return, and the assessee were, in our opinion, entitled to have this deduction or allowance. There is no dispute, and there can be none, as to the reasonableness of the quantum which might have been material if there had been no conciliation and an award in regard to the bonus. The only dispute relates to the year in which the amount should be allowed. In our opinion, the amount was rightly allowable in the assessment year 1952-53 and the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion. Our answer to the issue is in the affirmative. Income-tax Commissioner to pay costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (9) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Delivery of property to liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... e company or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the company. Now, as already stated, the appellants did not come by the money which is now sought to be recovered from them in their capacity as directors. Being creditors they were paid, though perhaps wrongly, what was due to them, by the former liquidator and could not, therefore, be said to be in possession of any funds as such of the company. They only received repayment of the loans advanced by them. Therefore there could be no question of their having misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable in any way for any money or property of the company or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of trust. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how they can be asked under section 235 to refund what they have received. 5. Upon this view, I set aside the order of the District Judge and dismiss the application of the liquidator. Costs in both the courts will be borne by the liquidator.
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1957 (9) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... by the liquidator. They only want leave to file a suit for obtaining possession of the land leased by them. This land is not in the possession of the company at present. It is in the possession of Patwardhan, to whom the leasehold rights had been assigned by the company. The right of the appellants to obtain possession cannot also be adjudicated upon by the liquidator in the winding up proceedings. Leave to file a suit should ordinarily be granted, where the question at issue is one which cannot be gone into and decided in the winding up proceedings. We, therefore, think that the appellants should be granted the permission asked for by them. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the District Judge and grant permission to the appellants to file a suit against the respondent company in order to obtain possession of the land given by them on lease to the respondent company. The appellants will be entitled to recover their costs of the appeal from the respondent company.
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1957 (9) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Shares warrants and entries in register of members and Power of court to rectify register of members
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1957 (9) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Company – Membership of, Meetings and proceedings - Annual General Meeting and Principles for interpretation of statutes
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1957 (9) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the trustees can be said to be holding land on behalf of beneficiaries and can the beneficiaries be said to be jointly interested in the land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom within the meaning of section 11(1) of the U.P Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948 ?
Held that:- The learned Judges of the High Court were therefore in error in answering the first part of the question referred to them in the affirmative, though their answer to the latter part in the negative was correct. We are of opinion that both the parts of the question should have been answered by them in the negative. The ultimate result however is the same and this appeal of the appellants is therefore bound to fail. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (9) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ Petition - Delay ... ... ... ... ..... he petitioners could have come for relief under a writ would have been within two weeks or so of the order of the Central Board of Revenue. It must be remembered that although the petitioners rely upon their representation to the Central Government dated, the 18th January 1957 even though that was preferred six months after the decision of the Central Board. It is not for a party to choose to delay a matter by preferring an appeal six months later and then come to the court and say that I have come to the Court within three months of the final decision. It cannot lie in the mouth of such a party to say that his own default in not prosecuting the statutory appeal in time should be construed in his favour. 9.In these circumstances I am definitely of the opinion that there has been gross delay and on the preliminary point. I hold on account of this gross delay that the petition should not be entertained. The Rule is therefore discharged. The petition stands dismissed with costs.
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