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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 107 Records
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1966 (9) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ppropriate order on the application filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna, Bihar, is directed to file in this court, in this case, the original agreement dated the 6th July, 1956, within two weeks from this day. The difference which has arisen between the parties, in view of paragraph 6(ii) of the agreement, is referred to an arbitrator agreed upon by the parties. If the parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator within three weeks of the filing of the original agreement, an arbitrator will be appointed by this court. It is clarified that by parties are meant the Monghyr Electric Supply Company Limited (in liquidation) through the official liquidator on one side and the Bihar State Electricity Board on the other. In view of section 60(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act No. 54 of 1948), no order is passed against opposite party No. 2, which is the Government of Bihar, through the secretary. Electricity Department.
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1966 (9) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a true interpretation of section 10(1), section 10(2)(xi) and section 10(2) (XV) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the claims for the losses of ₹ 48,891 and ₹ 1,21,760 were permissible in the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 respectively?
Held that:- The settlements with the constituents and the consequent posting of entries in the books of account cannot be regarded as forbearance to enforce the claim of the bank to recover the loans advanced. The settlement consisted of two constituent elements---paying by the bank of the value of the jewellery pledged with it against receipt from the constituent the amount which was recoverable by the bank. The first element of the transaction would appropriately be deemed expenditure and such expenditure having been laid out for protecting and furthering the business of the bank was properly admissible under section 10(2) (XV) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
High Court, Tribunal's Order ... ... ... ... ..... opinion of the High Court. If the High Court finds that material facts are not stated in the statement of the case, or the Tribunal has not stated its conclusions on material facts, the High Court may call upon the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of case under section 66(4). But the High Court has no power to set aside the order of the Tribunal even if it is of the view that the Tribunal has not considered the question which, in the opinion of the High Court, should have been considered. The High Court must answer the question posed before it thereafter, it is the duty of the Tribunal to pass such orders as are necessary to give effect to the judgment of the High Court conformably to that judgment. We must, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct that this proceeding be remanded to the High Court to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals. Appeals allowed. Case remanded.
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1966 (9) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the payment of ₹ 42,480 by the assessee to the Travancore Government under the agreements dated Jane 18, 1937, and January 28, 1947, was allowable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- It is not, however, possible for us to finally determine this appeal because the High Court has not dealt with the other questions arising in this reference. Even if the payment of the commission to the Government by the assessee is not capital but revenue payment, certain other questions arise for consideration in this case.
It is necessary that the High Court should consider all these aspects of the case before furnishing an answer to the question of law referred to it. For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated August 20, 1963, and remand the case for being reheard and dealt with in accordance with the directions given in this judgment. Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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1966 (9) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Export - Foreign Exchange - Declaration, of value - Repeal, of Sea Customs Act ... ... ... ... ..... sed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 19.Unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any investigation, or legal proceeding and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted or continued as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (AIR 1955 S.C. 84) it was held at page 88 as follows Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion . This contention has, therefore, to be rejected. In the results all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner fail and this petition is dismissed with costs. For the reasons given in this judgment, Writ Petitions Nos. 1592 to 1594 of 1966 and 1601 of 1965 are also dismissed with costs.
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1966 (9) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... ained an order from him for the release of the truck. The order thus obtained is wholly illegal and cannot be allowed to stand. The matter was brought up in revision before the Sessions Judge who upheld the order of the Magistrate on the ground that the excise authorities had not taken steps to pass proper orders despite time having been granted to them to do so. However, the order passed by the Magistrate being illegal it is necessary that possession of the opposite party be regularised in accordance with law. 3. Learned Counsel for the Excise Department has given an undertaking that the vehicle will be released in favour of the opposite party pending adjudication on condition that the latter executes a personal bond and also furnishes security in the sum of Rs. 20,000 in the shape of immovable property. The opposite party prays for and is allowed two months time to execute the necessary bond in accordance with Rule 206(3). I allow this revision in terms of the above order.
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1966 (9) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Jurisdiction - Confiscation - Penalty - Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... se, Madras, stated that the concerned cases are being transferred to the Collector of Central Excise, West Bengal, Calcutta. It is true the Collector of Customs, Madras, has no right to transfer the cases that are within his jurisdiction to the Collector having jurisdiction in some other area. But obviously what the Collector of Customs, Madras, meant was that he was handing over the files to the Collector having jurisdiction. There is no transfer in the sense that the Madras Collector was transferring to the Collector, Calcutta who had no jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to consider at this stage whether the Collector of Customs, Madras, has jurisdiction over these goods for that will depend on the facts that may be disclosed in the investigation. It is sufficient to state that the contention of the learned counsel that the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, has no jurisdiction cannot be accepted. 5.On this finding, the Writ petitions will have to be dismissed and are dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Penalty - Mens rea - Evasion of duty (Central Excise) ... ... ... ... ..... er the respondent can be held guilty for evasion of payment of duty on the shortages under Sec. 9 (b) of the Act. In my view on the finding recorded by me above, to wit, that the respondent is not liable for the breach of Rule 151, he clearly, cannot be held guilty for evading the payment of duty on the goods removed by his servant without his knowledge or connivance, obviously because, before he is held responsible for the removal of the goods on which the duty was payable or was at least aware of the said removal either of which is proved in this case. It follows, therefore, that, whatever the liability of the respondent in regard to the payment of duty on the shortages in question in a civil action might be, he is criminally not liable for the same. The acquittal of the respondent under Section 9(b) of the Act was also, therefore, correct. The result therefore is that the order of acquittal under all the counts must be upheld. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the salary paid or credited to a karta of the family for looking after the family's business was a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) in computing the income of the family business?
Held that:- If a remuneration is paid to the karta of the family under a valid agreement which is bona fide and in the interest of, and expedient for, the business of the family and the payment is genuine and not excessive, such remuneration must be held to be an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the family and must be allowed as an expenditure under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act.
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1966 (9) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal was not competent to go into the question whether the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws?
Held that:- It was certainly open to the department, in the appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal, to support the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with regard to the written down value on any of the grounds decided against it. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the action of the Tribunal in remanding the case is not strictly justified by the language of rule 27 or rule 12. Even assuming that rules 12 and 27 are not strictly applicable, we are of opinion that the Tribunal has got sufficient power under section 33(4) of the Act to entertain the argument of the department with regard to the application of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws Order and remand the case to the Income-tax Officer in the manner it has done. It is necessary to state that rules 12 and 27 are not exhaustive of the powers of the Appellate Tribunal.
We are accordingly of the opinion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the argument of the department in this case and to direct the Income-tax Officer to find whether any depreciation was actually allowed under the Industrial Tax Rules and whether such depreciation should be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the written down value. Appeals dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rupees forty thousand two hundred and forty-seven could not be deemed to be profits of the assessee-company under the second proviso to section 10(2)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- In the present case it is true that the entire assets of the appellant-company were sold to Messrs. Phelps & Co. Ltd. There was no separate sale of different items, but the consideration of each item of property sold was expressly mentioned in the agreement of sale. The contention that the transaction of sale was a mere attempt to readjust the business position of the transferor was never raised before the Tribunal and does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal.
We decide this appeal on the narrow ground that the appellant-company sold the property in the second schedule for a stated consideration which was not shown to be notional, and since the consideration was in excess of the original cost of the building, the difference was profit within the meaning of section 10(2)(vii), second proviso. Appeal dismissed
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1966 (9) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for the assessment year 1951-52 under the provisions of section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 ?
Held that:- The Tribunal has found that there was direct connection or nexus between the assessee's omission or failure to make a return and the under-assessment made by the Income-tax Officer for the year 1951-52. The High Court has affirmed this finding and concluded that the proceedings under section 34(1)(a) of the Act were not defective in law. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of rule 13 framed by the U. P. Government in exercise of the rule-making power under the Act, the assessing authority was incompetent to allow as expenses any amount other than the amounts actually paid by the assessee on account of agricultural operations metioned in that rule?
Held that:- The expenses by the respondent had been claimed on the basis of a yield which, according to the assessing authority, was lower than the actual yield. The assessing authority, therefore, estimated the produce at a higher figure, and we do not see any reason why, when the assessing authority estimated that the produce was higher than that shown by the respondent, he could not also estimate that the expenses incurred in respect of that higher produce must have been larger than the amount actually shown by the respondent. The assessing authority, in thus estimating the allowable expenditure at a figure higher than the amount claimed by the respondent, had full justification in the circumstance that he had estimated the produce also at a higher figure. The answer returned by the High Court was, therefore, perfectly correct. The appeal fails
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1966 (9) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the expenses of ₹ 20,035 incurred in the assessment year 1949-50 and ₹ 5,912 (relating to the assessment year 1950-51) being the cost paid to Government as directed by the Privy Council were expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business and allowable as deductions ?
Held that:- Expenditure incurred to resist in a civil proceeding the enforcement of a measure--legislative or executive--which imposes restrictions on the carrying on of a business, or to obtain a declaration that the measure is invalid would, if other conditions are satisfied, be admissible, in our judgment, under section 10(2)(xv) as a permissible deduction in the computation of taxable income.
The appeals are therefore allowed in favour of assessee.
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1966 (9) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had evidence or material for the finding that there was deliberate fabrication of the accounts by the assessee-company in order to claim the loss in the return and the imposition of penalty upon the company under section 28(1)(c) of the Act is proper and valid ?
Whether in view of the finding of the Tribunal, in the appeal against the assessment, that the transaction was not a trading transaction of the company, the company could be made liable for penalty under section 28(1)(c) of the Act ?
Held that:- The question on which a reference to the High Court was sought was a limited question and the Tribunal declined to refer the question because it did not arise out of its order, the question not having been raised before or decided by the Tribunal. The question sought to be raised before the High Court in a reference under section 66(2) was not an aspect of a question raised before the Tribunal : it was a new question which was never raised before the Tribunal. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the prayer for an order under section 66(2) of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Capital Expenditure, Revenue Expenditure, Textile Machinery ... ... ... ... ..... -company. Such a payment made is clearly in the nature of a capital expenditure and not an expenditure incurred wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. The payment was neither made for the purpose of earning profits, nor for the purpose of furthering, protecting or continuing its business which was to be carried on from day to day. The payment was made with the object of avoiding an unnecessary investment in capital assets, and was an amount which was altogether outside the account of profits and gains, in the computation of which deductions are allowable for expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for earning those profits and gains. It is, therefore, clear that this amount could not have been claimed as a legitimate deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. Our view is supported by the observations of Rowlatt J. in Countess Warwick Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Ogg. The appeal consequently has no force and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of ₹ 25,700 paid by the assessee by way of penalty to the Government of Orissa shall be an admissible deduction under section 10(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ?
Held that:- What the appellant had claimed was that, in the computation of profits and gains of business, profession or vocation under section 10(1) of the Act, this amount should be deducted, which was intended to mean that this amount should not be included in the computation of the profits and gains of the business. The word " deduction " appears to have been used by the appellant as well as by the Tribunal only because the dispute related to a sum which had been deducted by the Government of Orissa as a penalty from the amount due to the appellant for the supplies made by him in pursuance of the agreement. The High Court, therefore, in answering the question referred to it, should not have gone into the question of the applicability of section 10(2)(xv) of the Act at all, and should have confined itself to deciding whether this amount deducted from the claims of the assessee by the Government of Orissa was liable to be excluded when computing the income under section 10(1) of the Act. The decision given by the High Court is, therefore, liable to be quashed and a direction is necessary to the High Court to answer the question really referred to it. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (9) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 1,11,090 paid as remuneration to the five directors of the assessee-company during the relevant previous year was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The payment of the commission was made to the directors for extra-commercial reasons and was not wholly and exclusively made for the purpose of the business. the expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the appellant-company thus the appellant was not entitled to claim deduction of this expenditure under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (9) TMI 29 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty - gift - computation of the estate left by the deceased ... ... ... ... ..... t in order that the property could deem to pass and estate duty could be leviable in such cases, the benefit of the donor must be a benefit referable to the gift and not a benefit referable to his own property. The view, that if it is once found that the deceased had some benefit in the property, that in itself was sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of section 10 irrespective of the question whether that benefit was referable or not referable to the gift, in our opinion, is erroneous, For the reasons mentioned above, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the gifts with which we are concerned in this case do not come within the ambit of section 10 of the Act. That being so, our answer to the question referred is that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 73,695 is not to be included in the computation of the estate left by the deceased. The assessee is entitled to his costs of these proceedings from the department. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1966 (9) TMI 28 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Undisclosed profit - In the return filed by assessee showed a loss and after making certain adjustments the registered accountant of the assessee admitted a loss - held that there was no material for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the sum of Rs. 8,050 was an undisclosed profit and assessable as such in her account
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