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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 88 Records
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1977 (9) TMI 28 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Current Repairs, Expenditure Incurred, Manufacture And Sale, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... which was commercially expedient and demanded by the necessities of the business. The decision of the Bombay High Court in New Shorrock Spinning and Manufacturing Co. s case 1956 30 ITR 338, on which reliance has been placed by the Tribunal, fully applies to the facts of the case in hand. The decisions in Mahalakshmi Textile Mills case 1967 66 ITR 710 (SC) and Kanodia Cold Storage s case 1975 100 ITR 155 (All) also support the v iew put forth by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel on behalf of the assessee. The judgments on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Awasthy are clearly distinguishable and have no applicability to the facts of the case in Land. In this view of the matter, we are unable to find that the expenditure incurred by the assessee is an expenditure of a capital nature. Consequently, the question referred to us for our opinion is answered in the negative and against the department. The assessee shall have his costs from the department which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1977 (9) TMI 27 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he profits and loss in the ratio of the initial contribution of the parties. Initial contributions are, no doubt, shown and the working out of the ratio is left to a process of arithmetical calculation. In the circumstances, it is not strictly and technically correct for the officer to visit the party with a rejection of the application for non-specification of the ratio of the share of the profits in accordance with the deed of partnership. For this reason again, it appears to us, the conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner cannot be supported. In the result, we answer question No. 1, in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. Question No. 2-can admit of no doubt-we answer it in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment, under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court will be communicated to the Deputy Commissioner as provided by law.
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1977 (9) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Manufacture Or Processing Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... nufacturer but a mere contractor. The findings of the Tribunal in our opinion conclusively show that the assessee was carrying on the activity of manufacturing and also of processing of books which are also goods. The argument, namely, that the assessee was not mainly carrying on manufacturing or processing activities in view of the Tribunal s finding that the assessee s activity cannot be called purely a trading activity does not appeal to us. The assessee did not purchase any books from market or sell them at a profit. The assessee published books and sold them in the market. We also agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the assessee was also carrying on the processing activity inasmuch as the assessee had to do many things as stated in its order. In the premises, the arguments made on behalf of the revenue must fail and we answer the re-framed question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, make no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1977 (9) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Accumulated Loss, Substantially Interested, Super Tax On Undistributed Profits, Tax Liability
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1977 (9) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he High Court, though of a different State, so long as there is no contrary decision of any other High Court on that question. It is admitted before us that at the time when the Tribunal decided the question, no other High Court in the country had taken a contrary view on the question of constitutionality of section 140A(3). That being the position, it is not possible for us to take the view that the Tribunal in Bombay, when it set aside the order of penalty, went into the question of the constitutionality of that section and gave a finding that it is ultra vires following the decision of the Madras High Court. What the Tribunal really did was that in view of the law pronounced by the Madras High Court it proceeded on the footing that section 140A(3) was non-existent and so the order of penalty passed thereunder cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The revenue shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1977 (9) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Agricultural Land, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ion is the land itself which is requisitioned under the Act. Though it is a statutory liability, none the less it is a liability which arises directly from the requisition of the land itself. The requisitioned lands were used by the assessee for agricultural purposes in the accounting year and also in the earlier years. Those lands were under cultivation at the time of their requisition by the Government of Assam. The compensation was paid for the requisitioned lands which were used for agricultural purposes by the assessee. Those lands were also cultivated by the refugees after they were given to them by the State Government after requisition. In the premises, the conditions laid down by the highest authorities and enumerated above are fulfilled in the instant case before us and, therefore, the contentions of Mr. Pal must fail. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1977 (9) TMI 22 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Entire Exclusion, Estate Duty Act, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... rice mills was shown by the accountable person in the income-tax returns filed by her. It cannot, therefore, be said that, merely by reason of the fact that the deceased was collecting the rents on behalf of his wife, the donee was not in possession and enjoyment of the property to the entire exclusion of the donor. This is only a case where the donor had only managed the property on behalf of his wife and nothing more and that is common in ordinary Hindu families. We can understand the arguments of the learned counsel for the revenue that section 10 applies to the facts of the present case, if there is anything to suggest that there was appropriation of the income by the donor as in the case of Controller of Estate Duty v. Estate of Late V. Ramaiah Sreshti 1976 104 ITR 195 (AP). We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was not in error in directing deletion of the amount of Rs. 2,25,000 from the principal value of the estate. The application is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Acquisition Proceedings, Income Tax Act, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... e legal representatives would be notice to all the legal representatives. The Supreme Court found fault with the Income-tax Officer for coming to the conclusion that the daughters of the deceased-testator alone were his legal representatives. Therefore, that decision renders no assistance to the proposition sought to be canvassed, viz., that Ashrafunnisa Begum was acting on behalf of her two sons. The fact that she did not choose to file objections does not by itself establish that the other two transferors had no objections to file in response to the proceedings initiated by the competent authority. We are of the opinion that a valuable right given by the statute to file their objections questioning the commencement of the proceedings for acquisition has been denied to them and this denial of statutory right vitiates the entire proceedings and renders them illegal and void. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and allow the appeal with costs, Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (9) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Family Hotchpot, Individual Property ... ... ... ... ..... d not be said to be that of a Hindu undivided family. There was nothing in the Indian income-tax law or the law of partnership which prevented the members of a Hindu joint family from dividing any asset. Such division must, of course, be effective so as to bind the members. The above view was endorsed again by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bagyalakshmi and Co. 1965 55 ITR 660. It, thereore, follows that when once a member of the Hindu undivided family throws his interest or asset in the hotchpot, it gets blended by operation of the Hindu law and becomes an asset of the Hindu undivided family. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax was in error in treating the share income arising from the partnership firm as income of an individual assessable in the hands of the assessee. For the reasons recorded, we are unable to direct reference of the questions raised for our opinion. The applications are dismissed. No costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 19 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... gh it is limited in its extent to the value of the estate actually inherited from the deceased. In reaching the said conclusion the Division Bench has expressed its agreement with the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mrs. Indumati Ratanlal 1968 70 ITR 353, and also a later ruling of the Allahabad High Court reported in Vijay Kumar Kedia v. Controller of Estate Duty 1976 104 ITR 302. We are in respectful agreement with the above dictum laid down by the Division Bench. It then follows that the contention put forward by the appellant that for realisation of the estate duty the department is entitled to proceed only against the assets that have actually come into the hands of the accountable persons as part of the estate inherited from the deceased and not against their other properties is devoid of merit and has only to be rejected. The writ appeal, therefore, fails and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 18 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... (2) of section 255 in section 24(11) of the Act, yet, the Bench to comply with the requirement of section 255(2), must consist of one judicial member and one accountant member. Bench , when read in the light of the definition, in the rules and sub-section (2) of section 255, can only mean, a Bench of two members, i.e., one judicial member and one accountant member. Sub-section (3) of section 255 which has been relied upon by the Tribunal has absolutely no relevance in the matter of disposal of appeals preferred under section 24 of the Act. The scope of sub-section (3) of section 255 cannot be enlarged so as to bring in an assessee as defined in section 2(c) of the Act and entitle a member sitting singly to dispose of an appeal preferred to the Appellate Tribunal under section 24 of the Act. The question, therefore, is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The matter is remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal afresh. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (9) TMI 17 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Actual User, Agricultural Land, Applied To, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... tural land from the correct angle, that is, has not considered the question whether the land under consideration was agricultural land or not from the proper perspective and the proper angle and has not applied the correct law to this point and its whole approach was erroneous in the light of the law as explained by this court in Manilal Somnath s case 1977 106 ITR 917 (Guj) and by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Officer-in-Charge (Court of wards) 1976 105 ITR 133, and the Tribunal has not considered all appropriate provisions of law applicable to this question. It would be open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal under section 260, sub-section (1), of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the light of the observations made by us in this decision after approaching the question from the correct angle as explained by us Vide Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474, 482 (SC) . There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1977 (9) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Account Books, Business Income, Income Returned, Income Tax Act, Previous Year, Rejection Of Accounts, Transport Business
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1977 (9) TMI 15 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Penal Interest, Right To Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... m to state that the levy of penal interest under section 139(1) as also under section 217 was not justified on the facts and circumstances of this case and hence it is obvious that even in the light of the principles which we have culled out above it will not be open to the assessee to challenge before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner any question regarding the quantum of penal interest or regarding waiver of penal interest or reduction of penal interest under either of these two sections. Therefore, so far as the facts of this case are concerned, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the asseessee but only because of this statement which Mr. Patel has made before us. We wish to make it clear that nothing that we have stated in this judgment will preclude the assessee from moving the appropriate authorities, if so advised, for reduction or waiver of penal interest. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Flat Rate, Higher Rate, Rejection Of Accounts ... ... ... ... ..... he Tribunal and contended that in the earlier year the yield was not determined at 36 but at a lower figure. The Tribunal rejected the said application for the reasons recorded in its order. Mr. Sanjay Bhattacharyya, learned advocate for the assessee, argues before us that the Tribunal, in conformity with its order in the earlier year, should have taken into consideration the wastage of 2 and not having done so its decision is not correct. But in the accounting year it was not the case of the assessee that there was a wastage of 2 . On the other hand, its case was that the wastage was 0.85 . His arguments must, therefore, fail. It may be noted here that no other contention has been made before us on behalf of the assessee. In the premises, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In view of our aforesaid answer, question No. 2 does not call for any answer and we decline to answer it. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1977 (9) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
A Partner, Accounting Year, Capital Gains, Dissolution Of Firm, Income Tax Act, Retirement Of Partner
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1977 (9) TMI 12 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Agricultural Land, Application For Reference, Capital Gains, Computation Of Capital, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Land Whether Agricultural, Movable Property
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1977 (9) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... , gross negligence, dishonesty, wilful default and the like causes. In the premises, the contentions of Dr. Pal must fail and we hold that the assessee is an employee of Aminchand Pyarelal (Calcutta) Ltd. and his remuneration is taxable under s. 7 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. Our above conclusion also disposes of question No. 2 and we accordingly answer the questions as follows Question No. 1.--With regard to Surrendra (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd., it is in the negative and in favour of the assessee and with regard to Aminchand Pyarelal (Calcutta) Ltd., it is in the affirmative and against the assessee. Question No. 2.--With regard to Surrendra (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd., it is in the negative and in favour of the assessee and with regard to Aminchand Pyarelal (Calcutta) Ltd., it is in the affirmative and against the assessee. This case has been well argued by the learned counsel for the parties and in view of their divided success we make no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1977 (9) TMI 10 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Rules, Sugar Manufacturing Company ... ... ... ... ..... e to the expenditure incurred by the assessee as a cultivator mentioned in r. 23 applies to the process ordinarily employed by a cultivator in raising the crops. In CIT v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy 1957 32 ITR 466, the Supreme Court also said that agriculture in its primary sense denotes the cultivation of the field and is restricted to cultivation of the land in the strict sense of the term, meaning thereby tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land. Therefore, it is only the money actually spent for agricultural operations like those mentioned above that can be said to be expenditure incurred by the assessee as a cultivator within the meaning of r. 7. We have no doubt that the assessee is entitled to a deduction of the interest he paid on the borrowings, though they were utilised for the purpose of raising sugarcane. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the revenue, with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (9) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains Tax ... ... ... ... ..... quisition in 1949. Those lands were being used by the landless people after requisition for agricultural purposes who were also deriving agricultural income from those lands at the time of their acquisition in 1959. Therefore, at all material times those lands were agricultural lands and they were held by the assessee as their owner although it lost their physical possession in 1949 by requisition. Though the assessee was prevented from earning any agricultural income from those lands due to the aforesaid requisition, those landless people by using those lands for agricultural purposes actually derived agricultural income from those lands in 1949. In these circumstances, at no point of time those agricultural lands became capital assets in the hands of the assessee and, accordingly, the contentions of Mr. Sengupta must fail. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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