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Showing 81 to 100 of 406297 Records
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2024 (5) TMI 326 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Levy of service tax - water charges paid by the appellant to the department in lieu of supply of water under the Agreement dated 05.01.2013 - transfer of right to use the water by the Government to the appellant - deemed sale - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the Agreement executed between the government of Madhya Pradesh and the appellant would indicate that the appellant had applied to the government for permission to draw water from the Rihand Reservoir for use in the power project and the government had agreed to grant the said permission on certain terms and conditions in consideration of the appellant making payment to the government. The said permission was granted for a term of 30 years subject to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act 1931 and the Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Rules 1974 as is clear from clause 1 of the Agreement.
The Title of the Agreement shows that it was for supply of water to the industrial power plant. The appellant was required to pay water charges to the government for the water drawn by it from the government water source at the rates fixed by the Water Department which would be Rs. 5.50/- per cubic meter. In addition, the appellant was also required to pay local fund cess or any other tax as may be fixed by the government. The appellant was required to make its own arrangement at its own cost for drawl of water from the water resource of the government to the plant - The appellant has to pay water rates/water charges depending on the quantity of water drawn by the appellant. The Agreement also deals with a situation where there can be reduction or shortage in the water supply. This clearly means that the Agreement is for supply of water and not mere access to water source.
It is, therefore, more than apparent that the Agreement is for supply of water by the government to the appellant and is not for assignment of any right to the appellant to use the natural resources of the government.
The appellant is justified in asserting that the Agreement executed between the appellant and the government is for supply of water for which charges are paid by the appellant on the basis of volume of water drawn and it is not a case of assignment of right to use natural resources of the government - no service was provided by the government to the appellant. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 325 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
Entitlement to Cenvat credit on the entire credit distributed by their head office despite the fact that the appellant company having three units - period April 2008 to March 2012 - HELD THAT:- In view of strict interpretation of Rule 7 prevailing prior to 01.04.2012, the entire credit distributed by the head office of the appellant to the appellant’s unit alone is absolutely in the order and the same cannot be disputed.
This issue has been considered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of THE COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL TAX, PUNE-I COMMISSIONERATE VERSUS M/S. OERLIKON BALZERS COATING INDIA P. LTD. [2018 (12) TMI 1300 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein it was held that 'our attention is invited to Rule 7 of the CENVAT credit Rules, 2004 as substituted w.e.f. 1.4.2016 which has made it mandatory for distribution of input services to the various units providing output services. This is evidence by the use of words “shall distribute the Cenvat Credit” in the substituted Rule 7 as Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 w.e.f. 1.4.2016. Therefore, on plain reading of Rule 7 as existing both pre and post amendment 2012 covering period involved in these proceedings, the respondent - assessee was entitled to utilize the CENVAT credit available at its Pune unit.'
Thus, the entire demand which is contrary to the Provision of Rule 7 and the various judgments given on this issue, the demand is not sustainable - the impugned order is set aside - appeal is allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 324 - CESTAT BANGALORE
Recovery of the cenvat credit wrongly availed along with interest and penalty - input services or not - Management Consultancy or Business Services - credit availed based on the invoices issued by M/s. Biocon Ltd. for mark-up fees / milestone fees against permanent services agreed to be provided - January 2009 to November 2012 - burden to prove on manufacturer.
The adjudicating authority has held that the permanent services include ineligible services like supply of electricity, back-up power, steam, supply of water, extending canteen facilities, Effluent Treatment Plant(ETP) charges, potable water supply charges, etc.; hence not input service; accordingly the mark-up fees / milestone fees paid to the Biocon Limited in connection with ineligible permanent services are not covered under the scope of Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
HELD THAT:- The reasoning of the adjudicating authority deserves to be rejected on two grounds: on going through the individual services i.e. supply of electricity, back-up power, steam, supply of water, extending canteen facilities, Effluent Treatment Plant(ETP) charges, potable water supply charges, etc. necessary for manufacturing activities and it cannot be said to have not been used in or in relation to the manufacture of finished excisable goods from the same premises, which was taken over by the appellant from Biocon Limited. Secondly, putting all these individual services under the taxable category of ‘Management Consultancy Services’ on which service tax paid by Biocon Limited and not objected to by the Department for the relevant period from 2009 to 2012 cannot be questioned in the hands of the receiver i.e. appellant while availing cenvat credit on the said taxable services.
This principle has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of SARVESH REFRACTORIES (P) LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. & CUSTOMS [2007 (11) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT] and COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS VERSUS MDS SWITCHGEAR LTD. [2008 (8) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT] which has been followed subsequently by this Tribunal in a series of cases - it was held in the case of MDS SWITCHGEAR LTD. that 'A quantum of duty already determined by the jurisdictional officers of the supplier unit cannot be con tested or challenged by the officers in charge of recipient unit.'
There are no reason to deny the cenvat credit availed by the appellant on Business Support Services received against Support Services Agreement dated 18.07.2007 on which service tax paid by M/s. Biocon Limited under the Management Consultancy Services during the said period - the impugned order is set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 323 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Computation/quantification of interest on the delayed refund in terms of Section 42 of Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2017 w.e.f. 01.06.2015 - Time Limitation - expiry of two months from the date of filing of refund of the application till 23.05.2023 when the refund was disbursed to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- Section 42 (1) of the Act mandates grant of simple interest at the annual rate notified by the Government from time to time, to a person who is found entitled to refund in case of any delayed payment.
In the instant case, refund has been sanctioned without any interest. It is an admitted position that annual rate notified by the Government for the purposes of Section 42 of the Act is simple interest @ 6% per annum.
The petition is disposed off.
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2024 (5) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
Dishonour of Cheque - Cheating - wrongful retention of hard-earned money of the complainant - Compoundable offences - frustration of settlement - appellant could not pay the complainant on the deadlines stipulated in the said settlement - HELD THAT:- As per section 147 of the NI Act, all offences punishable under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable. However, unlike Section 320 of CrPC, the NI Act does not elaborate upon the manner in which offences should be compounded. To fill up this legislative gap, three Judges Bench of this Court in DAMODAR S. PRABHU VERSUS SAYED BABALAL H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT], passed some guidelines under Article 142 of the Constitution of India regarding compounding of offence under Section 138 of NI Act. But most importantly, in that case, this Court discussed the importance of compounding offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and also the legislative intent behind making the dishonour of cheque a crime by enacting a special law.
This Court has time and again reiterated that in cases of section 138 of NI Act, the accused must try for compounding at the initial stages instead of the later stage, however, there is no bar to seek the compounding of the offence at later stages of criminal proceedings including after conviction, like the present case - In the case at hand, initially, both sides agreed to compound the offence at the appellate stage but the appellant could not pay the amount within the time stipulated in the agreement and the complainant now has shown her unwillingness towards compounding of the offence, despite receiving the entire amount. The appellant has paid the entire Rs.1.55 crore and further Rs.10 lacs as interest.
In the present case, the appellant has already been in jail for more than 1 year before being released on bail and has also compensated the complainant. Further, in compliance of the order dated 08.08.2023, the appellant has deposited an additional amount of Rs.10 lacs. There is no purpose now to keep the proceedings pending in appeal before the lower appellate court. Here, we would like to point out that quashing of a case is different from compounding - if the continuance of criminal appeals pending before Additional Sessions Judge against the appellant’s conviction, is allowed then it would defeat all the efforts of this Court in the last year where this Court had monitored this matter and ensured that the complainant gets her money back.
It is a fact that the appellant failed to procure and supply the ‘machine’ even after taking the advance money from the complainant but there is nothing on record to show that the appellant had any ill intention of cheating or defrauding the complainant from the very inception. The transaction between the parties was purely civil in nature which does not attract criminal law in any way - Even though complainant is unwilling to compound the case but, considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the present case which we have referred above, we are of the considered view that these proceedings must come to an end.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 321 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reopening of assessment - reason to believe - onus to prove - Reassess v/s review the income - waiver of loans granted by the BIFR - remission of liability was not even remitted in the tax audit report i.e., Form 3CD - HELD THAT:- The courts have taken a consistent view that once the assessee has disclosed all the material and primary facts, truly and fully before the AO, it is for the AO to draw the requisite inferences from those primary facts. The onus on the assessee cannot be extended beyond the true and full disclosure of such facts.
Also, the power of the AO to reassess an income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment is strikingly different from the authority to review the decision taken during the original proceedings. While the former is permissible in light of the pith and substance enshrined in Section 147 of the Act, allowing the latter would be a violence with the mandate of the said Section
Applying the principles laid down in Usha International Ltd. (2012 (9) TMI 767 - DELHI HIGH COURT] in the instant case, it is clearly seen that not only the aspects relating to the issue at hand had been fully disclosed by the petitioner before the AO but by recording the submissions and comments in the assessment order, it can be reasonably inferred that the AO has formed an opinion on the said issues. Thus, allowing the reassessment proceedings to continue in the present case would be contrary to the mandate expounded in Usha International Ltd. (supra).
We are also mindful of the note of caution as articulated in the case of Techspan India P. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer [2006 (2) TMI 88 - DELHI HIGH COURT] whereby, this Court, while relying upon Gruh Finance Ltd. v. [2000 (2) TMI 86 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has held that every attempt to bring to tax income that has escaped assessment cannot be aborted by judicial intervention on an assumed change of opinion.
Thus non-disclosure of full material cannot be attributed to the petitioner in the instant case. Rather, the AO had omitted to make any addition qua the issue at hand, despite noting the submissions and forming an opinion on the same. Reopening notice set aside - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (5) TMI 320 - ITAT DELHI
Assessment completed u/s 153A - addition on account of peak balance maintained by the assessee with HSBC Bank, Geneva - validity of second round of the quantum proceedings - HELD THAT:- As the original assessment order made in the first round stands quashed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court [2024 (2) TMI 401 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein as held no incriminating material was found during the course of search carried out on the assessee and further that the Revenue was unable to place on record any reliable material to establish that the assessee was indeed the owner of alleged foreign bank account in HSBC Bank, Geneva.
Therefore, the orders of Ld. AO/CIT(A) do not have any legs to stand. Accordingly, the orders of Ld. AO/CIT(A) made by them in the second round of proceedings are hereby quashed as a consequence. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 319 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Time Limitation for filing appeal - condonation of delay - Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction and/or competence to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of one month provided for filing an appeal under Section 107(4) of the said Act? - HELD THAT:- It is found that the observations made by the Appellate Authority that there is no scope under the provisions of the said Act read with corresponding Chapter and Section of the said Act for condoning the delay beyond four month cannot be sustained. Such finding is set aside.
It may be noticed that the petitioner did not file any application for condonation of delay before the Appellate Authority. The petitioner, however, says that before the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be filed the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation without giving an opportunity to the petitioner - Be that as it may, since the petitioner has not filed an application for condonation of delay, this Court cannot consider whether there is any sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
Thus, no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner at this stage - The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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2024 (5) TMI 318 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Time Limitation - Refusal on the part of the appellate authority to condone the delay in maintaining the appeal under Section 107 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - determination under Section 73 of the said Act.
Whether the appellate authority had failed to exercise jurisdiction in rejecting the application for condonation of delay, inter alia, on the ground that the same was filed beyond the maximum period of four months from the date of communication of the order?
HELD THAT:- An identical issue had fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.K. CHAKRABORTY & SONS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. [2023 (12) TMI 290 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]. The Division Bench of this Court, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 107 of the said Act and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963, and by placing reliance on the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER/ DEHAR POWER HOUSE CIRCLE BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD (PW) SLAPPER & ANOTHER VERSUS EXCISE AND TAXATION OFFICER, SUNDER NAGAR/ASSESSING AUTHORITY [2019 (11) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT]], had concluded that in absence of non obstante clause rendering Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963, non applicable and in absence of specific exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it would be improper to read implied exclusion thereof.
The appellate authority is not denude of its power to condone the delay beyond one month from the prescribed period of limitation as provided for in Section 107(4) of the said Act.
The appellate authority had failed to exercise jurisdiction in refusing to consider the application for condonation of delay in its proper perspective, since the same was filed beyond the prescribed period of four months from the date of communication of the order appealed against - order passed by the Appellate Authority in rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay is set aside - petition disposed off.
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2024 (5) TMI 317 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Violation of principles of natural justice - notice under Section 46 of the Act has not been given to the petitioner - primary contention of petitioner is that provisions of Section 46 of the Act was not complied with and notice was not given to the petitioner who was a registered person - HELD THAT:- Since there is non-obstante clause under Section 62 of the Act, no proceedings could have taken place under Section 74 of the Act. It is not required to accept the said arguments for the very reason that this is not a case where the registered person failed to furnish the return rather, the petitioner has filed the NIL return. Therefore, there was no requirement to give notice to the petitioner under Section 46 of the Act. The present is a case where search and seizure had taken placed under Chapter XIV of the Act and in pursuance of search and seizure, summons were given under Section 70 of the Act to the petitioner to give evidence.
Consequently, thereupon the evidence of petitioner was recorded and after recording of evidence, petitioner was afforded three opportunities of personal hearing and thereafter, the present assessment order has been passed - there are no violation of principles of natural justice as the petitioner himself has admitted his GST liability in evidence given by him and the person who has himself given evidence, cannot be permitted to be cross-examined by his own counsel.
Since present is a case where there is no violation of principles of natural justice, it is not inclined to entertain the writ petition and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 316 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Validity of assessment order - Utilization of Input Tax Credit - dismissed on the ground that it is an appealable order - Applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - impugned assessment order in the writ petition was stayed subject to the condition that the appellant/assessee deposits 10% of the disputed tax within a time frame - HELD THAT:- The stand taken by the Department of Commercial Taxes, Government of West Bengal, the amount of Rs. 63,71,353/- has been transferred to the Government of West Bengal - the assessment order, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition can no longer survive.
The appeal is allowed, the order passed in the writ petition is set aside and the writ petition is allowed and the impugned assessment order dated 21st August, 2023 is set aside - the respondent/department is directed to refund the 10% pre-deposit made by the appellant pursuant to the interim order granted by this Court within eight weeks from the date of receipt of server copy of this order.
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2024 (5) TMI 315 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the appellate authority - Appeal u/s 107 of the WBGST Act, 2017 - appellate authority failed to exercise jurisdiction in rejecting the application for condonation of delay, inter alia, on the ground that the same was filed beyond one month from the prescribed period of limitation, as provided in Section 107(4) of the said Act - HELD THAT:- An identical issue had fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.K. Chakraborty & Sons [2023 (12) TMI 290 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]. The Division Bench of this Court, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 107 of the said Act and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 and by placing reliance on the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and another versus Excise and Taxation Officer Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority [2019 (11) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT], had concluded that in absence of non obstante clause rendering Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963, non-applicable and in absence of specific exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it would be improper to read implied exclusion thereof. Having regard to the above, in my view the appellate authority is not denude of its power to condone the delay beyond one month from the prescribed period of limitation as provided for in Section 107(4) of the said Act.
The appellate authority had failed to exercise jurisdiction in refusing to entertain the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, since the same was filed beyond one month, beyond the prescribed period of Limitation as provided for in Section 107(4) of the said Act.
The explanation provided by the petitioner in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation act is satisfactory and delay has been sufficiently explained. Having regard thereof the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 107 of the said Act is condoned and appeal is restored to its original file and number.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (5) TMI 314 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Time Limitation for filing refund claim - Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic - whether refund claim has to be filed by the exporter two years from the date of shipment? - HELD THAT:- In this case, the exports were made by the petitioner between 24.04.2018 to 25.02.2019. It is evident that the last date for filing the refund claim would have expired at the time when the country was under partial/intermittent/full lockdown due to outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic from third week of March 2020. The Hon'ble Supreme Court taking note of this earlier extended the period of limitation. Taking note of the same, the Central Government also promulgated an ordinance called Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Ordinary 2020, which was replaced by TOLA Act 2020. The Central Government has now issued notification No.13/2022-Central Tax dated 15.07.2022. By virtue of the above notification, the period from 1st day of March 2020 to 28th of February 2022 for computation for period of limitation for filing refund claim U/s.54 or under 55 of the CGST Act 2017 has been excluded.
It is noticed that neither the 1st respondent nor the 2nd respondent had the benefit of the above notification when the orders were passed. Under these circumstances, impugned order upholding the rejection of the refund claim of the 2nd respondent are set aside and the case is remitted back to the 2nd respondent to reconsider the petitioner's refund claim afresh in the light of the above mentioned notification.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2024 (5) TMI 313 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Rejection of refund claim - Export of services - Export of software development services - petitioner submitted that the first respondent has wrongly affirmed the order of the second respondent by confusing the status of the subsidiary as a distinct person in accordance with explanation 1 in Section 8 of IGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- The impugned order passed by the first respondent fairly concludes that the petitioner has satisfied the requirements of Section 2(6)(i) to (iv) of IGST Act, 2017.
Admittedly, the petitioner and its subsidiary are two distinct entities and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of Section 2(6)(v) of IGST Act, 2017. The doctrine of the authority for advance Ruling IN RE: SEGOMA IMAGING TECHNOLOGIES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED [2018 (12) TMI 650 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING, MAHARASHTRA] cannot be applied to the facts of this case - It cannot be said that the petitioner and its subsidiary are not merely establishment of a distinct person in accordance with the explanation I in Section 8 of the IGST Act, 2017.
The second respondent is directed to process the re-fund claim of the petitioner together with interest payable in accordance with the provisions of the Act as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The writ petition is allowed.
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2024 (5) TMI 312 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Time limitation for filing appeal - petitioner did not file any appeal either within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017 or within the maximum period thereafter which could be condoned - liability of tax with interest and penalty on royalty - HELD THAT:- Present is a case where the petitioner did not even file appeal and allowed the order passed in assessment proceedings to become final and thereafter approached this Court by filing writ petition seeking to challenge the determination of tax, interest and penalty by the competent authority vide order dated 09.02.2023. Present is not a case where the order under Section 74 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017 levying tax along with interest and penalty was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even according to the petitioner, he was issued show cause notice and thereafter, impugned order was passed. In the writ petition, no plausible explanation has been offered as to why the petitioner did not take recourse to the remedy of statutory appeal.
It, therefore, appears that the petitioner consciously did not choose to take recourse to the remedy of appeal as provided under Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/the CGST Act, 2017, but waited for the expiry of the period of limitation for filing appeal as also the maximum period of delay which could be condoned in the exercise of powers conferred upon the appellate authority under the provisions of Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017.
Having not preferred an appeal, the petition in the present case, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (CT) LTU, KAKINADA & ORS. VERSUS M/S. GLAXO SMITH KLINE CONSUMER HEALTH CARE LIMITED [2020 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT] is not maintainable.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 311 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Time limitation - appeal not filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017 - Challenge to Show Cause Notice - Levy of tax liability along with interest and penalty on Royalty - HELD THAT:- Present is a case where the petitioner did not even file appeal and allowed the order passed in assessment proceedings to become final and thereafter approached this Court by filing writ petition seeking to challenge the determination of tax, interest and penalty by the competent authority vide order dated 13.03.2023. Present is not a case where the order u/s 74 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017 levying tax along with interest and penalty was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even according to the petitioner, he was issued show cause notice and thereafter, impugned order was passed.
In the writ petition, no plausible explanation has been offered as to why the petitioner did not take recourse to the remedy of statutory appeal. It, therefore, appears that the petitioner consciously did not choose to take recourse to the remedy of appeal as provided under Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/the CGST Act, 2017, but waited for the expiry of the period of limitation for filing appeal as also the maximum period of delay which could be condoned in the exercise of powers conferred upon the appellate authority under the provisions of Section 107 of the RGST Act, 2017/ the CGST Act, 2017.
Having not preferred an appeal, the petition in the present case, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (CT) LTU, KAKINADA & ORS. VERSUS M/S. GLAXO SMITH KLINE CONSUMER HEALTH CARE LIMITED [2020 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT], is not maintainable.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 310 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Validity of assessment order - denial of input tax credit - demand of differential input tax - input tax credit based on the wrong GSTIN wrongly availed - HELD THAT:- As far as the denial of input tax credit is concerned, there appears to be discrepancy in the GST and the number given by the Supplier in the invoice raised by the Supplier on the petitioner. The petitioner can get suitable certificate from the supplier that the sale was indeed made to the petitioner.
It is noticed that the petitioner had filed returns for the assessment year 2017-2018 on 30.04.2022, which is the belated returns filed by the petitioner. In the return that was filed belatedly by the petitioner, the petitioner has accepted the short payment declared as the taxable turnover and yet had failed to pay the tax in time. The petitioner paid the tax only on 04.06.2022 - There is an inordinate delay in payment admitted tax liability in the return that was filed on 30.04.2022 for the assessment year 2017-2018. The petitioner cannot take advantage of its own mistake and state that the petitioner is not liable to pay penalty on account of belated filing of returns in GSTR 9 on 30.04.2022.
There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, inasmuch as tax was belatedly paid on 04.06.2022. The interest on belated payment of tax for the month of July, 2017, was remitted by the petitioner only on 27.12.2022. The payment was not within 30 days from the date of issuance of the Show Cause Notice dated 22.09.2022. The Show Cause Notice dated 22.09.2022 preceded an audit, issuance of audit report in GST ADT-02 on 19.08.2022 - the Writ Petition is not maintainable. It is therefore liable to be dismissed.
The petitioner can give proper explanation for the discrepancy in the GST number and in the invoices raised by the supplier, namely Vinvent Chemilab Private Limited and Moorthy Industries - Petition dismissed.
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2024 (5) TMI 309 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Refund claim of encashed amount by the revenue - Direction to withdraw recovery proceedings by issuing a demand draft equivalent to the Bank Guarantee - circular dated 18.03.2020 - HELD THAT:- It is deemed just and appropriate to dispose of this petition by directing the respondent to refund the aforesaid amount of Rs.11,21,840/- encashed by the respondent on 01.02.2024 within a period of one month from today. It is further directed that immediately upon the respondent refunding the aforesaid amount back to the petitioner, petitioner would furnish a fresh bank guarantee within a period of one week thereafter which would be valid for a period of one year.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (5) TMI 308 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Validity of assessment order - order challenged on the ground that the petitioner's reply was disregarded - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The petitioner's reply was disregarded by categorising such reply as an unauthorised reply. It is unclear as to why the reply was described as unauthorised. In any event, the impugned order is vitiated by non consideration of the petitioner's reply. Consequently, such order is unsustainable.
The impugned order dated 29.12.2023 is set aside and the matter is remanded for reconsideration. The respondent is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, including a personal hearing, and thereafter issue a fresh order within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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2024 (5) TMI 307 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Wrong availment of transitional Input Tax Credit - request for an adjournment was not responded to and that a personal hearing was not provided in breach of sub-section (4) of Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The reply dated 20.12.2023 of the petitioner refers to the death of the mother of one of the partners on 11.12.2023. On account of the same, the petitioner requested for further time to reply to the show cause notice. The respondent did not respond to the request for adjournment and instead issued the impugned order. While a personal hearing was offered under the reminder dated 16.12.2023, the order is unsustainable because the request of the petitioner for an adjournment was not considered and no personal hearing was offered pursuant to such reply.
The impugned order is quashed and the matter is remanded for re-consideration. The petitioner is permitted to submit a reply to the show cause notice within fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Upon receipt thereof, the respondent is directed to provide a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing, and thereafter issue a fresh order within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the petitioner's reply.
Petition disposed off.
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