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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 168 Records
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1979 (10) TMI 91 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Tyres - Demand raised on finalisation of provisional assessment - Legality - Interpretation ... ... ... ... ..... s to make it applicable to new units is neither warranted nor justified. For this purpose the notification would have been worded differently and the word total appearing before value in column 3 would not be necessary. The plain meaning of the notification does not lead to the interpretation put on it by the petitioner. Since new units as a rule get several type of concessions it cannot be presumed this particular notification was meant to cover new units also. 4. The petitioner s reliance on a trade notice issued with the object of finalisation of provisional assessments so as to suggest that after three months these should be deemed to be finalised ipso facto, too, has no legal validity Therefore, the demand made on finalisation of provisional assessment cannot be assailed and held to be bad in law merely because the finalisation was done after a period of 3 months. In view of the above the order-in-appeal is correct in law. The revision application is therefore rejected.
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1979 (10) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Whether for the purpose of computing the turnover assessed to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 the sale price of goods is determined by including the amount paid by way of trade discount?
Held that:- The sale price which enters into the computation of the assessee's turnover for the purpose of assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act is obtained after deducting the trade discount from the catalogue price. The trade discount allowed by the assessee cannot be included in the turnover. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (10) TMI 89 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Refund - Compounded levy scheme ... ... ... ... ..... at the petitioner s claim for the amount of duty paid on sugar as advance of compounded levy is not hit by time bar of 3 months under the Central Excise law as the compounded levy having been withdrawn, the payment ceased to be in the nature of Central Excise duty. The amount should therefore have been returned suo motu if it was not adjusted against the Central Excise duty leviable under the normal procedure. The petitioners contention that he applied within 3 months of payments may or may not be true but the case could be decided without verification on this point. 4. Government observe that the impugned payment is in any case in the nature of double payment. Furthermore even if any time bar was to be computed that should have been done with reference to the date when RT-12 was finalised. 5. Whatever be the situation, refund is due to the petitioners and is not hit by time bar of 3 months as held by the Appellate Collector. 6. The revision application is therefore allowed.
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1979 (10) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Valuation - Brand name - Plastic footwear - Whether article of plastics - Exemption notifications - Determination of value of clearances - Post manufacturing expenses to be excluded - Criteria
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1979 (10) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Glass (Ballotine) beads - Exemption notifications - Canons of interpretation - Writ jurisdiction - Classification of goods
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1979 (10) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Valuation - Validity of Cryptic orders ... ... ... ... ..... The reason for doing so is that the order of the Superintendent is cryptic and has been passed without taking into account the various circumstances of the case and the terms of the agreement and the decisions recorded by the Supreme Court and this Court. Mr. Dalal is willing to reconsider the whole issue after giving the petitioners an opportunity to put forward their say. 3. In view of this, in my judgment, the proper course would be to set aside the impugned order and direct the Assistant Collector, Central Excise to reconsider the case afresh after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to put forward their contention and to arrive at a conclusion by taking into account the various circumstances including the agreement between the petitioners and M/s. Bajaj Electricals in question. The Assistant Collector will determine the issue within a period of three months from to-day. Rule absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (10) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Furniture - Connotation of ... ... ... ... ..... or irrigator stand or a metal container is not sufficient to describe them as an articles of furniture. It is obvious that the Assistant Collector was more impressed by the nomenclature given to the articles than to determine whether it is an item of a furniture. In my judgment, the view taken by the Assistant Collector is clearly erroneous and the reliance on the Notification was totally wrong. It is not in dispute that the expression steel furniture is known in common parlour as an article deviced for giving confront to a human being. The seven articles manufactured by the petitioners do not satisfy that test and the order of the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Authority holding contrary is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to the relief claimed in the petition. 6. Accordingly the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of paragraph 30 of the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (10) TMI 83 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Valuation - Exemption - Passing the benefit to the consumer - Trade Notice - Supplementary instructions cannot supply omissions - Exemption - Scope
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1979 (10) TMI 82 - GOVERNMENT OF INDLA
Nylon twine is not 'yarn' - Classification -I.S.I. definitions - Criteria for ... ... ... ... ..... uch an enquiry by the revisionary authority is neither possible nor practicable. Under the circumstances, it has been held by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Union Carbide - 1978 E.L.T. (J 180), that when any item of goods is specified by the ISI that is certainly evidence of its being known as such in the trade or commerce. Even the Supreme Court in. its well known pronouncement in D.C.M. case - 1977 E.L.T. (1) 1993 has taken a similar view. Recently, the Government of India itself in the case of U.K. Paints - 1978 E L.T. (J 590) has confirmed the utility of ISI specifications in classification of goods for Central Excise purposes. The Government of India s observations that the ISI specifications cannot be relied upon because they are being revised from time to time is a vague statement just to side-track this vital piece of evidence especially when Government of India s findings are not supported by any corroborative evidence or is the result of any proper enquiry.
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1979 (10) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Natural Justice - Evidence used without disclosing contents to petitioner - Effect ... ... ... ... ..... 2nd July 1975 and 3rd January 1976 cannot be sustained and must be set aside, which I hereby do. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed in terms of prayer (b) with no order as to costs. The concerned authority shall be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry in the light of the observations made earlier. It shall, however, not be necessary to issue a fresh show cause notice upon the petitioner. The authority shall give not less than four weeks written intimation to the petitioner of the date of hearing of the fresh enquiry and shall, with such intimation, furnish to the petitioner a copy of the Tindal s telegram with liberty to the petitioner to take inspection of the original telegram lying with the authority. Mr. Dalal states that the authority will also furnish to the petitioner a copy of the Tindal s statement. The amount of fine and duty paid by the petitioner shall be retained by the authority until the disposal of the fresh enquiry. 6. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
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1979 (10) TMI 80 - JUDICATURE ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Coffee-chicory blend ... ... ... ... ..... , did not constitute meal . It was held that fall within the meaning of the expression cooked food and are, therefore, exempt from the payment of sales-tax. The said decision turned upon the language of the particular Entry concerned therein, and cannot be an authority for the general proposition that coffee must be treated as food under each and every enactment. 37. It should also be noticed that what is exempted under the exemption notification is not food as such, but food products and food preparations . Mr. Waghray agrees that food is different from food products and food preparation . I see some force in the said contention in the context of the very Item 68, which deals only with articles manufactured in a factory. But nothing much turns on this aspect, because I have already held that coffee chicory blend is an article manufactured in a factory. 38. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250/-.
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1979 (10) TMI 79 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Cinema chairs are not furniture - B.T.N. - Applicability ... ... ... ... ..... idered to be movable furniture even if they are designed for bolting, etc., to the floor, e.g., chairs for use on ships. Similar articles (seats, chairs, etc.) are used in gardens, squares, promenades, etc., are also included in this category is specifically included in Chapter 94 of the B.T.N. 80 as to bring the type of goods under consideration within the scope of the term furniture . 8. Government of India see considerable force in the arguments advanced by the party that in the absence of such an explanation in the tariff entry No. 40 of the C.E.T., other points urged in support and in the light of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jeevan Singh v. The Superintendent of Central Excise there is no justification to interfere with the decision taken by the Appellate Collector. The Government accept those contentions without going into the merits of other arguments put forth in this case and accordingly drop the review proceedings in the matter.
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1979 (10) TMI 78 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Revision petition ... ... ... ... ..... It is also not the case where duty of customs has been either levied or enhanced by the Board and consequently the case does not fall in the second proviso either. The result is that the petitioners case does not fall in either of the provisos to sub-section (1) of Section 130 and in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 131 the petitioners have got no right to file a revision application under Section 131 against an order passed by the Board in exercise of the powers of revision vested in it under Section 130. 5. The result of the aforesaid legal position is that the revision application filed by the petitioners is not maintainable under Section 131 and consequently there is no need for Government to go into the merits of the case. The petitioners had also requested for a personal hearing but since the legal position is beyond doubt, Government do not consider it necessary. 6. In the circumstances, the revision application fails and is dismissed as incompetent.
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1979 (10) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a lease of a premises for carrying on the business of retreading of tyres is a lease for "manufacturing purposes" within the contemplation of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act?
Held that:- The retreading of old tyres does not bring into being a commercially distinct or different entity. The old tyre retains its original character, or identity as a tyre. Retreading does not completely transform it into another commercial article, although it improves its performance and serviceability as a tyre. Retreading of old tyres is just like resoling of old shoes. Just as resoling of old shoes, does not produce a commercially different entity having a different identity, so from retreading no new or distinct article emerges. The old tyre retains its basic structure and identity. The courts below were therefore, right in holding that the lease in the present case was not for manufacturing purposes, and the tenancy had been rightly terminated by thirty days notice. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (10) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Provisional Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... nd the Calcutta High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessment should be treated as one under s. 144 on the basis that the assessee had not filed a proper return. The learned judges held There has been a return, though an invalid return, on the basis of which an assessment order under s. 143(3) of the Act has been made. This cannot be treated as best judgment assessment as if no return has been filed. This decision lays down that even an invalid return or a return in a wrong form was a proper return. If in a case where the assessee filed the return in a wrong form prescribed by a different statute that return cannot be said to be a non-existent return, the position would be a fortiori where the assessee files a return by using a wrong form prescribed by the same statute. For the above reasons, the question referred is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Tile assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (10) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Coparcenary Property, Estate Duty, Hindu Succession Act, Rate Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... d once rent has been agreed between the landlord and the tenant, it cannot be varied unless the transaction is unfair. The provisions of the U.P. Rent Control Act being dissimilar to the provisions of the Rent Control Act of West Bengal, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Padma Debi s case, AIR 1962 SC 151, cannot be made applicable for purposes of valuing the Neel Bagh Palace. We, accordingly, answer the first two questions in the affirmative, and the third question by saying that the Tribunal is correct in holding that the self-occupied properties constructed prior to 1st January, 1951, were governed by the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, but the value could not be determined on the basis of the municipal assessment by applying a multiple to its net annual letting value calculated for the purposes of municipal assessment. The department is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. The counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (10) TMI 73 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Attributable To ... ... ... ... ..... ager managed the property which produced agricultural income, the clear meaning of section 10(1)(a) is that the income of each one of the persons on whose behalf there was such management is what could be assessed. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of this court, it is clear that what the Agri. ITO has done in this case, namely, to proceed on the basis that the entire income from all the lands managed by the power-of-attorney holder should be the basis for the purposes of assessment and/or composition, is erroneous. Accordingly, the orders made by the Agrl. ITO are quashed. He shall be at liberty to consider the application for composition filed by the petitioners on the basis that what would be assessable is the individual share of each of the petitioners, and in the light of the observations made above. Sri Rajendra Babu, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance in Writ Petition No. 12180 of 1978 within four weeks from today.
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1979 (10) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... e of the assessee or of the department. Before a reference can be made an application stating the question of law, in respect of which, either the assessee or the department seeks a reference, has to be moved before the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not have any suo motu powers of referring any question of law in the absence of any application for a reference. This being so, the questions which the Tribunal can refer are only such questions in respect of which a reference application under s. 256(1) has been made. In the present case as the question relating to r. 6DD had been decided in favour of the department and as no application for a reference of this question had been moved by the department, it was erroneous on the part of the Tribunal to have referred the second question for the opinion of this court. We accordingly return the Second question unanswered. The department is entitled to its costs which is assessed at Rs. 200, Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (10) TMI 71 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Levy Of Penalty, Net Wealth, Waiver Of Penalty, Wealth Tax Act, Wealth Tax Penalty
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1979 (10) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... port for my above view from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Merla Sitarama Prasad s case 1971 80 ITR 672 referred to above. In that case, a contention had been raised that because the accountable person had preferred an appeal, the period of three years should be computed from the date of the appellate order. This was rejected by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their Lordships said that the expression the date of assessment in s. 73A(b) meant the date of completion of the initial assessment. For the reasons stated above I hold that the notice, Ex. N , issued by the respondent dated September 6, 1974, is beyond the period prescribed under s. 73A(b) of the Act and he could not commence any proceedings for reassessment as three years had elapsed from the date of first assessment. Accordingly, the notice dated September 6, 1974, is quashed and the respondent is restrained from taking any proceedings pursuant to the said notice. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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