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Showing 81 to 100 of 126 Records
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1975 (11) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Bond - Security for proper working of warehouse ... ... ... ... ..... cutes a bond to secure the proper working of the warehouse to the value of Rs. 50,000/- the security being tested. Such security may be offered by the firm itself on the basis of its assets and if these assets of the firm will suffice to secure that amount, there is no need whatever to ask for solvency certificate of each of the partners separately. The Department could proceed on those lines. There will be a direction accordingly. 3. The appeal is allowed in those terms. No. costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Sago - Whether dutiable ... ... ... ... ..... by the petitioners. 2. This petition coming on for hearing upon perusing the petition and the writ petition and the interim order of the High Court dated 21-4-1975 and made herein and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. Chundu Apparao, Advocate for the petitioners, and of Mr. K. Subrahmanya Reddy, Standing Counsel for Central Government on behalf of the respondents, the Court made the following order - 3. It is not disputed that sago is a food product and therefore no Excise Duty shall be collected thereon. However, if any product other than the food product including starch is manufactured, the respondent will be at liberty to collect Excise Duty thereon.
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1975 (11) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Refund - Exemption notification based on annual turnover - Steel Furniture ... ... ... ... ..... of limitation for claiming refund during different periods between 2-4-1969 and 24-9-1969 will start from different dates. For example to claim refund for payment of excise duty on 2-4-1969 the period of limitation will commence from 2-4-1969 and so on. I do not think that Ex. Pl contemplates that. 7. The period of limitation will only commence from the last date of the year and in that view the petitioner s application should not have been rejected as time barred. 8. Therefore, I allow this O.P. and declare that Exs. P6 and P4 order of the third and 2nd respondents respectively and order No. 7/40/18/32/72 dated 30-11-1972 of the 1st respondent are illegal and that the claim petition filed by the petitioner is within the period of limitation and would direct the 1st respondent to consider the petitioner s claim for refund in accordance with law on the basis that it has been filed within the period of limitation. O.P. is disposed of as above, but I make no order as to costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERA
Stay- Whether appellate authority is authorised to grant ... ... ... ... ..... Counsel for the petitioners. 12. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Appellate Authority have not communicated any order on the stay petition filed by the petitioners instead they have chosen to take steps under the Revenue Recovery Act, to recover the duty. 13. In the counter affidavit filed by the excise authorities, it is not clearly stated that the Appellate Authority has dismissed the stay petition and communicated its order to the petitioners. In case, they have not disposed of the stay petition, they should do so immediately and communicate the order to the petitioners. If they have already disposed it of, they should communicate the order to the petitioners. It is not in dispute that even if the petitioners have failed to pay the duty still the appeal should be disposed of on merits by the Appellate Authority under Section 35 of the Act. 14. In the result, this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fees Rs. 100/-.
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1975 (11) TMI 42 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Same Business ... ... ... ... ..... revenue asset or a capital asset, because the act of borrowing capital is distinct from the act of investment of that capital to acquire an asset. (3) However, the business for which an asset of enduring nature is purchased with the borrowed capital should not be separate or distinct from the business for the purposes of which the capital is borrowed if deduction under section 10(2)(iii) is to be allowed. (4) If there is no existing business with reference to which the capital is borrowed and the borrowed capital is invested to purchase a new asset of enduring nature, then the interest paid on such borrowing till the asset so purchased goes into production, increases the cost of the installation of the said asset, and hence should be treated as capital expenditure not covered by section 10(2)(iii) of the Act of 1922 or section 36(1)(iii) of the Act of 1961. In view of this we find on question No. 2 that in this case the amounts of interest are allowable as revenue expenses.
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1975 (11) TMI 41 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Return, Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... ssee and it was concealed. The decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Ali s case applies. So far as the failure to disclose income of the wife or the minor child, we are not in a position to take a different view. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. D. M. HM. M. HM. Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, and of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Radheshyam Ladia v. Income-tax Officer do clearly support the assessee s stand. The question which has been posed does not cover the other two items of income, concealment whereof had led to imposition of penalty in the hands of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Assessee s counsel is, therefore, justified in contending that we need not examine the correctness of the Tribunal s decision in regard to those items relying on the Supreme Court decision in Anwar Ali s case. In this view of the matter, the application is groundless and must be rejected. We make no order as to costs. K. B. PANDA J.--I agree.
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1975 (11) TMI 40 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... enditure as well, but as we have pointed out on the facts of this case, it is not necessary for us to enter into that controversy. The result, therefore, is that in Income-tax Reference No. 14 of 1974, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) The payment was not in the nature of penalty and was incidental to the carrying on of the assessee s business. Question No. (2). The payment was business expenditure allowable under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. In Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1974 also the questions referred to us are answered on the same lines, that is-- Question No. (1). The payment was not in the nature of penalty and was incidental to the carrying on of the assessee s business. Question No. (2). The payments were business expenditure allowable under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1975 (11) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Payments In Cash ... ... ... ... ..... n 40A(3). The rule provides that an assessee can be exempted from the requirements of payment by a crossed cheque or a bank draft where the purchases are made of certain agricultural or horticultural commodities or from a village where there is no banking facility. It also provides for the cases where an assessee is able to satisfy the Income-tax Officer that due to exceptional and unavoidable circumstances, payment could not be made by cheque, etc., and also furnishes evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer as to the genuineness of the payments and the identity of the payee. It has been found in the instant case that the assessee s case was not covered by any of the exceptions provided under rule 6DD and, as such, the disallowance was proper. We, accordingly, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... r proceedings it was contended by the revenue that in the facts and circumstances the penalty imposed was justified. The Tribunal has found that facts were before the Income-tax Officer to support the assessee s case that it was not in a position to deposit the tax on the basis of the self-assessment. The officer soon accepted the assessee s request to make a provisional assessment, and the assessee paid the demand on the basis of such provisional assessment. The Tribunal has found that in the facts and circumstances the penalty was not justified, which finding is not challenged as perverse or based on no evidence. The revenue all along proceeded on the sole basis that penalty was imposable in the instant case only by reason of the language of the section and on no other ground. In this view of the matter we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 37 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty For Delay In Furnishing Return ... ... ... ... ..... v. Income-tax Officer. In the light of these, there is no scope for any imposition of a double penalty for the same default. Penalty provisions in Chapter XXI are different from penalty provisions in Chapter XXII, relating to offences and prosecutions. Violation of section 139(1) is not made an offence under section 276 and though by amendment in 1971 a wilful failure to submit a return is made an offence under section 276(c) that provision has no application here. Therefore, there is no question of any violation of the provisions of article 20 of the Constitution also. In the result, the questions referred to us for decision are answered as follows Question No. I is answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. Question No. 2 does not call for an answer in the light of our answer on the first question. The parties shall bear their costs. A copy of this decision will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as provided for in the Act.
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1975 (11) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... n the property of the Hindu undivided family becomes the property of the partnership ceases to hold the property. In the first case, the individual ceases to hold the property as his individual property and in the other case, the Hindu undivided family ceases to hold the property as Hindu undivided family property, but the members of the Hindu undivided family hold the property as partners. We are of the view that the ratio or the principle applicable to the case of a proprietary concern being converted into a partnership must also apply to the instant case. We, accordingly, hold that there was no transfer within the meaning of section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to the first question, the other two questions do not arise for consideration. We, accordingly, give no answer to those two questions. The assessee will entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (11) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Same Business ... ... ... ... ..... wide the scope of the expression for the purpose of the business may be, there are. in-built limitations in section 10(2)(xv) itself. The limitations are (1) the expenditure shall be for the purpose of the business, that is to say, that the expenditure incurred shall be for the carrying on of the business and (2) the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business. In this case, the payment made has nothing to do with the conduct of the business by the company or its reputation. The mere fact that the articles of association authorised such payment does not make the expenditure any more the expenditure incurred for the conduct of the business. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal is in error in holding that the amount in question is an allowable deduction under section 10(2)(xv). The reference is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will have its costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (11) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Additional Grounds ... ... ... ... ..... e assessment year 1959-60 but allowable only in the assessment year 1961-62. On the said inferential finding the assessee, at the time of his filing the appeal in respect of the assessment year 1959-60, could have raised a ground of appeal that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have held that this item is an allowable expenditure in the assessment year 1959-60 and not in the year 1961-62. If that is so, we do not see any reason as to why the assessee cannot raise the additional grounds of appeal before the Tribunal relating to this question of deduction, having regard to the subsequent events that had taken place in that the department challenged the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that it is an allowable expenditure in the assessment year 1961-62. The result is, the question referred is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 33 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Assessment Proceedings, Income Tax Act, Notice Of Reassessment, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings, Supreme Court
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1975 (11) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... o these different decisions which touch on the question before us only incidentally. Under these circumstances we hold that the amount of damages paid for delay in the payment of provident fund contribution was not allowable as business expenditure and the Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in law in arriving at its conclusion on this aspect of the assessee s case. Question No. (3) must, therefore, be answered in the negative and against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the questions referred to us as under Question No. (1). In the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Question No. (2). In the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Question No. (3). In the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Question No. (4). In the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1975 (11) TMI 31 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... y and the harbour authorities contributed, the company s contribution being the greater. If this expenditure had not been incurred by the company it would have been impossible for them to deliver a battle cruiser which was then in course of completion at their works. The company claimed that this expenditure should be deducted in ascertaining their liability under Schedule D. It was held that the expenditure was capital expenditure and was not an allowable deduction in the computation of the company s profits for income-tax purposes. Looking to these decisions, therefore, we have no doubt in our mind that the Tribunal was not justified in treating the payment of betterment charges as revenue expenditure. Our answer to the question, which is posed to us in all these references is in the negative and in favour of the revenue. These references are accordingly disposed of. It is ordered that the respondent-assessees shall bear their own costs and pay the costs of the department.
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1975 (11) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Earned Income, Managing Agent ... ... ... ... ..... cal payment made to an assessee and not of payment in the nature of pension or superannuation allowance. Certainly, payments made under the agreement dated April 8, 1946, is in respect of past services rendered by H. D. Rajah to M/s. Essen (P.) Ltd. Clearly, therefore, the sum in question will come under section 2(6AA)(c). We are, accordingly, of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the petitioner was entitled to treat the income as earned income . It may be mentioned that section 2(6AA)(c) was the provision applicable for the assessment year 1959-60, but in respect of 1961-62 and 1962-63 years also the Finance Act of 1961 and the Finance Act of 1962 had made similar provision and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to consider this income as earned income in his returns. For all the assessment years in question we, accordingly, answer the reference in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (11) TMI 29 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Proof On Revenue, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... pending. As regards the mental element of fraud contained in the main part of the section, the burden was upon the revenue. It was only after such burden was discharged that the officer could call upon the transferee to prove that he had given valuable consideration without notice of the pendency of any proceeding under the Act. These aspects have not been considered by the officer. Exhibit P-1 is, therefore, vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and it is null and void and of no effect as against the transferee. Consequently, I quash exhibit P-1. The officer is, however, free to investigate the claims or objections afresh after giving the parties concerned proper notice and an effective opportunity of being heard. Subject to what is stated above, the original petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. A carbon copy of this judgment may be handed over to the counsel for the revenue as well as for the petitioner on payment of the usual charges.
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1975 (11) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Annual Value, House Property, Retrospective Operation ... ... ... ... ..... if each such person is individually entitled to the relief provided in that sub-section. Under well-known principles of construction of statutes when an Act is passed for the express purposes of explaining or clearing up issues as to the meaning of the previous Acts and is called an Act of Explanation the Explanation should normally govern the earlier Act. Such explanatory Act is prima facie confined to the subject-matter of the prior enactment and governs the same. The presumption is that such an explanatory Act is retrospective. See Craies on Statute Law, sixth edition, pages 146, 360 and 394. It appears to us that in view of the Explanation which was enacted subsequently the same should govern the meaning of the earlier sections, particularly when the meaning is not unambiguous and is open to different interpretations. For the reasons stated above we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1975 (11) TMI 27 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, General Public Utility, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... under trust and since the coal business done by the respondent-association was not the property of the trust, section 11 has no application so far as profit from coal business is concerned. But here we find that, according to section 11(4), a property held under trust includes even a business undertaking so held. Now, if it is found from the facts of the case that the coal business which the respondent-association had undertaken during the accounting period, was an undertaking held by the respondent-association in trust for others, then the said business can be legitimately considered to be a property held in trust. Therefore, the income which the respondent-association has derived from this coal business can be legitimately dealt with as per the provisions contained in section 11 if that business is found to be a trust property. Therefore, the convention of Shri Kaji that income from coal business cannot be a subject-matter of treatment under section 11, cannot be accepted.
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