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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 241 Records
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1984 (11) TMI 205 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Appeal - Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... hief Chemist was to be obtained. On both these points, the appellant failed to satisfy us that there is sufficient couse for condonation of delay and that the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The Learned Departmental Representative could not point out as to how the report of the Chief Chemist was required at the time when the matter has already been decided even at the appellate stage. The department has not given any detail as to how this touch time was taken for the study of the judgment which was communicated to the department as far back as 25-7-1983. The delay of 9 months shows that the departmental authorities were negligent and careless in not pursuing the matter promptly which has resulted in delay in filing this appeal. For want of any sufficient cause and for not explaining the delay of about 9 months, we are hereby rejecting this application for condonation of delay and on this account the appeal also fails and the same is hereby rejected as barred by time.
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1984 (11) TMI 204 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Printing powder ... ... ... ... ..... ess of application of the present substance is a post-printing operation. But it has to be remembered that the sprinkled powder fuses under heat and on to the tacky printed image which acquires an embossed effect. The process is thus, to be carried out in conjunction with printing process. Though it may not be a conventional printing ink it is akin to printing ink and Heading 32.13 which is not limited to ldquo writing ink and printing ink rdquo but covers also ldquo other inks rdquo would, in our view, be more specific and, therefore, more appropriate than Heading 32.04/12 (i). It must also be pointed out that this is a case of review and in the absence of further material or evidence, we are of the view that there are no grounds to modify the order of the Appellate Collector. As rightly pointed out in the Appellate order the process is something akin to printing. The classification given by the Appellate Collector is, therefore, justified. The appeal is therefore, rejected.
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1984 (11) TMI 197 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... the papers are not bonded to each other - they are bonded to the hessian. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is a judgment in which the final products are nothing but aluminium sheet and fibre/top, the exempted products. But in this case, we cannot say that the finished product for which exemption is demanded remains a paper/paper board bonded to another paper/paper board with bitumen. The product exempted is different from the product manufactured. We do not think that the judgments relied upon by the appellants can help them in obtaining the assessment under the notification. We agree with the learned counsel for the department that these goods cannot enjoy the exemption, and therefore, we rule that the action of the lower authorities was correct. We dismiss the appeal. 14. ensp The demands shall be recovered only for the six months preceding the demand because on the date of its issue, the time-limit for demand under Rule 10 was six months.
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1984 (11) TMI 196 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Film Processor ... ... ... ... ..... same Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay dated 16th August, 1982 bearing No. S-49/181/82 AIR and Order No. 44/82 BCH. This order was challenged in Appeal No. 107/82 before the Tribunal and the Tribunal by Order No. 472/83, dated 31-5-1983 decided in favour of the appellants. For doing so, the Tribunal relied on another decision in Appeal No. 728/80 parties M/s. Prasad Production Pvt. Ltd., Madras v. Collector of Customs, Madras. Smt. Krishnan submitted that the goods imported in the present case were squarely covered by the two decisions supra. 2. ensp On behalf of the respondents, Shri N.I. Ramanathan Departmental Representative agreed that the goods in the present case are covered by the two decisions supra. He had no further comments to make. 3. ensp In view of the foregoing, the appellants claim for concession would have to be accepted. We accept the appellant rsquo s claim, set aside the appellate order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (11) TMI 191 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Appeal - Order passed by the Special Secretary performing the role of Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... here this order is appellable. Moreover, Sub-section (2) of Section 129A authorises the Collector to file appeal/appeals where the order has been passed by the Appellate Collector of Customs under Section 128 (old) and Collector (Appeals) under Section 128A. Had there been any intention of the legislature to vest a right with the Collector to file an appeal against an order passed by a higher authority than him, a specific provision would have been incorporated in this section. The Collector cannot be treated as an aggrieved person in the absence of any such provision. In our opinion, any person aggrieved refers only to assessee and other persons other than revenue in such cases. We are in full agreement with the judgment of the West Regional Bench, Bombay in the case of Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Narendra P. Umrao reported in 1984 ECR 990 1984 (15) E.L.T. 275 (Tribunal). In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed.
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1984 (11) TMI 190 - CEGAT, MADRAS
Rebate of duty on export goods ... ... ... ... ..... s to condone minor procedural lapses and the Collector Seems to have exercised the discretion in accordance with the aforesaid instructions. Coming to the provisions of law, it is seen that proviso to Rule 12 gives the legal authority to the Collector to condone minor lapses. Since Rule 173PP has been enacted much subsequently and for a special purpose, it is legitimate to assume that the discretion vested in the Collector under Rule 12 would also apply to cases covered under Rule 473PP. In this view, we find that the Collector rsquo s order is quite fair and equitous. We would loathe to set aside such a just order merely on the grounds of technicalities. In this view we find that we have no reasons to interfere with the order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal filed by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I. rdquo Following the rationale of the decision of the West Regional Bench, the present appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (11) TMI 183 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Excess Production incentive granted but not passed on to the consumer by the assessee ... ... ... ... ..... ose an Order allowing the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants. But then, in accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal fails. EDITOR rsquo S COMMENTS In cases where there are statutory control prices they are the assessable values for the purpose of Central Excise in view of the provision of Section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. There is no authorisation under Section 4 or elsewhere for making any add on to such statutory control price except for packing charges under Section 4(4)(d)(i). The majority judgment seems to have confused between lsquo tariff values rsquo and lsquo control prices rsquo and ignored that the control price fixed in this case was exclusive of excise duty. The control price in other words is not a cum-duty price. There is no question therefore of re-computing the assessable value in terms of the Explanation to Section 4(4)(d). The minority view is therefore correct and majority decision needs reconsideration.
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1984 (11) TMI 179 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
Appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... gwith the appeal. Apparently, it could not have been sent. If it had been sent that would have been also returned to the applicants. This fact again exhibits ignorance of the basic requirement of law. 7. emsp Though there is much to be said against the manner in which this firm of Solicitors handled the case, I cannot accept the contention of Shri Gidwani that the applicants should have made enquiries with the Solicitors firm as to the filing of the appeal. Shri Taraporevala frankly conceded that the Solicitors firm did commit a sin, but he pleaded that the sin committed by them may not be allowed to be visited upon the innocent applicants. The observation of the Supreme Court in Rafiq v. Munshilal equally applies to the facts of the present case. Merely because the applicants rsquo chosen Advocates were guilty of indifference the innocent applicants should not suffer injustice. I, therefore, allow this application and condone the delay and direct that the appeal be admitted.
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1984 (11) TMI 176 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
CLASSIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... at it is not suggested that an advertisement given by a manufacturer can be decisive in a matter of classification, but it can be considered with other relevant factors. 11. emsp In our view, for the reasons which we have discussed earlier, Forbina powder must be regarded as an article of toilet and not a medicine. 12. emsp The questions referred to us are answered as follows ldquo Q. (a) In the affirmative, that is in favour of the respondent-dealer. Q. (b) On a true and correct interpretation of entries 7, 19 and 22 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and entry 38 of the notification dated 14th August, 1965 Forbina powder is an article of toilet covered by entry 7 of Schedule E. The Tribunal was not right in holding that Forbina powder was covered by entry 22 of Schedule E and eligible to the benefit of entry 38 of the aforesaid notification. 13. emsp In view of the divided success attained by the parties, there will be no order as to the costs of the reference.
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1984 (11) TMI 173 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... ced before the IT authorities. Whilst there is no doubt that the book entry in the form of expenditure has to be believed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, in view of the case law relied upon by the Departmental Representative, it cannot be said that the entire expenditure partakes the character of expenditure allowable under s. 37. On account of the failure of the assessee to produce particulars, we also hold that a reasonable disallowance of Rs. 5,000 in place of Rs. 10,000 would meet the requirements of the case. Accordingly the income is reduced by Rs. 5,000 on this count. 15. The last ground of appeal is regarding the disallowance of Rs. 1,250 out of purchases. At the time of hearing, we pointed out to the assessee that this issue does not arise out of the order of the CIT(A). Possibly the ground was raised before the CIT(A). At this stage of the hearing Shri Gujarathi did not press his contention. Accordingly this ground is rejected. 16. Appeal is partly allowed.
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1984 (11) TMI 170 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... this appeal relates to the treatment of the firm as an unregistered firm for the purposes of levy of interest under s. 139(8) This is in pursuance of Explanation 2 to s. 139(8) which lays down, that, for the purposes of this sub-section, where the assessee is a registered firm. the tax payable on the total income shall be the amount of tax which would have been payable if the firm had been assessed as an unregistered firm. Sec. 139(8) lays down that, interest payable shall be calculated with reference to the tax payable on the total income as determined on regular assessment Reading this Explanation with the sub-section, it is clear, that the interest has to be charged on the tax payable treating the firm as an unregistered firm. This Tribunal cannot also sit in judgment over the vires of this section We, therefore, agree with the AAC and confirm the order of the ITO in this behalf. 9. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee.
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1984 (11) TMI 169 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... alf and allow deduction to the extent supported by evidences in this behalf. In the event of evidence not being available, guidelines issued in the Board rsquo s Circular may be availed of for regulating the deduction. 9. As regards the claim for depreciation, the ITO may regulate the deduction in this behalf on the basis of the above directions. 10. As regards the claim for exemption under s. 10(1A) in respect of the conveyance allowance and additional conveyance allowance, we uphold the claim of the assessee in this behalf particularly in view of the certificate given by LIC, that the same was reimbursement of expenses incurred wholly, necessarily and exclusively in the performance of the duties of office as Development Officer. Hence we direct, that the sum of Rs. 18,936, should be fully exempted. 11. As regards interest, the ITO is directed to make consequential change in the same line in the light of the above directions. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1984 (11) TMI 168 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... ied forward to the subsequent year. To our pointed question whether there was any reversal entry in this behalf, the appellant rsquo s representative admitted, that, there was no such entry. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that the reduction in the liability to the extent of Rs. 1,04,514 was brought about by means of settlement as the narration clearly indicates and, therefore, the adjustment entry in this behalf was made not as a result of any unilateral act on the part of the assessee as the narration itself indicates. That the adjustment was a bilateral transaction and, therefore, all the other arguments of the learned representative are not available as far as this transaction is concerned. The claim, that the entry was made by mistake is not borne out by subsequent facts. We therefore, agree with the CIT in treating the same as chargeable under s. 41(1). 11. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed and the order of the CIT under s. 263 is confirmed.
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1984 (11) TMI 166 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... case, the termination was as a result of voluntary retirement brought about in pursuance of a scheme of voluntary retirement which in other words, is a contractual termination. Once the compensation received is to be treated as profits in lieu of salary as per the definition in s. 17(3), s. 89 would automatically be attracted, as the same is made applicable to a payment which is treated as profits in lieu of salary under s. 17(3). Once this premise is granted, the provisions of r. 21A(c) and sub-r. (4) would automatically apply. Moreover, all these requirements specified in r. 21A(c) are satisfied in the present case. We have, therefore, absolutely no doubts in our mind, that the compensation received by the assessee at the time of his voluntary retirement is includible under the head profits in lieu of salary and, therefore, the same is eligible for relief under s. 89 read with r. 21A. We, therefore, confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss the appal filed by the department.
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1984 (11) TMI 164 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... nder s. 80HH is admissible, even otherwise we find, that the same represents an integral part of the industrial undertaking being a bye product in the course of manufacture of planks and, therefore, following the decision of the Tribunal, Madras Bench A (1984) 8 ITD 39 (Mad), we would hold, that even sale of firewood would be eligible for deduction under s. 80HH. It is needless for us to refer to (1980) 121 ITR 212 (Ori). In the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion, that the activities of the assessee can be taken to be manufacturing activities inasmuch as, commercially viable commodities have emerged out of the same and, therefore, there was an industrial undertaking as required for the purpose of the deduction under s. 80HH. In this view of the matter, we uphold the claim for deduction under s. 80HH in respect of the profits of the industrial undertaking and cancel the orders of the CIT under s. 263. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee are allowed.
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1984 (11) TMI 163 - ITAT NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... int, it is debatable point and, therefore, the matter is not covered by s. 154 of the IT Act. In our opinion, since there is no judicial divergence of opinion on this point and simply because there is not decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it cannot be said that the point is highly debatable and that the matter is not covered by s. 154. Further from a note made in the issue of November, 1983 of the Bombay Chartered Accountants Journal, it is seen that the Supreme Court has dismissed the S. L. P. of the department on the point whether interest under s. 214 of the IT Act was not payable on refund of advance tax as a result of th order of the AAC. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ITO in not allowing interest under s. 214(2) is purely a mistake apparent from record. We, therefore, fully agree with the order passed by the AAC in directing the ITO to grant interest to the assessee under s. 214. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is hereby dismissed.
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1984 (11) TMI 156 - ITAT NAGPUR
Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... y clause (e) of section 246 and in such an appeal, there is no restriction or limitation as to the raising of any ground. Thus, the preliminary objection raised by the learned departmental representative is rejected. 8. Coming to the merits, the ITO himself has mentioned in the order the section under which he has passed the order. When once a notice is issued, the ITO assumes jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is not lost by filing of the return by the assessee. Be that as it may, it is too late for us to consider at this stage that the order was not passed by the ITO under section 147(a) when he himself has quoted the section under which he has passed the order. When once it is held that the assessment is framed under section 147(a), the case of the assessee is fully covered by the Bombay High Court s decision in Gammon India Ltd. s case and the view that the Tribunal has taken in the case of H.N. Malak. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue is hereby dismissed.
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1984 (11) TMI 153 - ITAT NAGPUR
Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... that the income accrued only on the day when the special resolution was ratified at the general meeting held on 17-5-1980. Moreover, under sub-section (3) of section 314, any office or place of profit will obviously include only selling and buying agents, receiving commission and/or salary. In the present case, the services, for which the payment was sanctioned, were rendered by Shri Sanyal during his life time, namely, during the previous year. The accrual of the income will be simultaneous with the completion of the services. It cannot be made dependant on the ratification of the special resolution at a much later date. Even otherwise, the ratification will only relate back to the date of the resolution by the board of directors on 23-7-1979, by virtue of which the services were rendered. We, accordingly, uphold the decision of the AAC that the income has been rightly included in the assessment for this year. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
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1984 (11) TMI 152 - ITAT NAGPUR
Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... re us, on merits, that under the bona fide impression that income from house property is not assessable in its hands as it being a lessee, the income returned by the assessee originally at Rs. 3,08,890 was revised by it to Rs. 1,49,000. He, therefore, contended that the statement of advance tax revised by it on 14-12-1978, cannot be said to be the estimate which the assessee knew or had reason to believe to be untrue. Since the ITO has not given an opportunity to the assessee to furnish its explanation, the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is vacated and the matter is restored to the file of the ITO to give a notice to the assessee, mentioning the correct provision of law, giving an opportunity to the assessee to file its explanation and decide the case on merits according to law in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Guduthur Bros. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is deemed to have been allowed for statistical purposes.
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1984 (11) TMI 151 - ITAT NAGPUR
Backward Area, Industrial Undertaking, Profits And Gains ... ... ... ... ..... , even otherwise we find, that the same represents an integral part of the industrial undertaking, being a byproduct in the course of manufacture of planks and, therefore, following the decision of the Tribunal in Pondicherry Distilleries Ltd. s case, we would hold that even sale of firewood would be eligible for deduction under section 80HH. It is needless for us to refer to N.C. Budharaja s case. In the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the activities of the assessee can be taken to be manufacturing activities inasmuch as, commercially viable commodities have emerged out of the same and, therefore, there was an industrial undertaking as required for the purpose of the deduction under section 80HH. In this view of the matter, we uphold the claim for deduction under section 80HH in respect of the profits of the industrial undertaking and cancel the orders of the Commissioner under section 263. 9. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed.
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