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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 223 Records
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1983 (2) TMI 224 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1983 (2) TMI 215 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... een the parties. If it is held that Col. Dhillon had been removed from the managing directorship, he, on behalf of the petitioner company, has no locus standi to continue the petition if, on the other hand, it is held that the meeting dated April 21, 1982, was invalid, then Amar Singh, who has moved an application for withdrawal of the petition, will be deemed to have no such authority. In case the petition is decided, then some observations shall have to be made regarding the meeting and resolution, which will be prejudicial to the interests of the parties in the civil suit. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid circumstances, I partly accept Company Application No. 83 of 1982, and dismiss Company Petition No. 113 of 1981, with the observation that if it is held in the suit between the parties that resolution dated April 21, 1982, was illegal and invalid, the petitioner shall be entitled to file a fresh petition under section 155 of the Act. No order as to costs.
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1983 (2) TMI 214 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... p, except with the leave of the court. The leave can be granted after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, as already stated, the claim of the petitioner is not only against respondent No. 1 but also against the directors who became guarantors for repayment of loan. Two of the respondents even mortgaged their properties with the petitioner. It is well settled that where the claim is made against other persons along with the company, the court should generally grant permission to sue (See Purushottatm and Co. v. Provisional Liquidator, Subhodaya Publications Ltd. 1955 25 Comp. Cas. 49 (Mad.)). In the case on hand, the other additional circumstance to grant leave is that another claim petition between the said parties regarding a similar claim is pending in this court and the points of law and fact in both the cases are the same. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid circumstances, I grant the requisite permission.
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1983 (2) TMI 213 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... he petitioner as an ex-director of the company is liable to submit the statement of affairs of the company, it still remains for consideration whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, there is any reasonable excuse for not filing a statement of affairs as required by section 454(1) of the Act. It appears from the winding-up order passed in Companies Act Case No. 5 of 1957 that the company did not commence its business. It was not at all functioning or capable of functioning. No general body meeting was held at any time and no statutory return was ever filed. Thus, it appears, the company really ceased to exist, except on the records, and there was no question of maintaining any accounts or any other records. That being so, the petitioner would be unable to submit a statement of affairs of the company containing the particulars mentioned in section 454(1) of the Act, after a period of about twenty-three years since the company was wound-up. The petition is allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 212 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Company – Change of name, Amalgamation, Shares of shareholders dissenting from scheme or contract approved by majority – Power and duty to acquire
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1983 (2) TMI 211 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Transfer to shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal
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1983 (2) TMI 210 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Inspection of books of account, etc., of companies ... ... ... ... ..... ntly different from the provisions of the Minimum. Wages Act or the Employees Provident Funds Act and the provisions of section 209A cast an unqualified duty on any director of the company to permit inspection of books of account by an authorised officer at the appointed place and time and default in compliance with such requisition is to be visited with penalty. (Section 209A does not ?) require the company to be prosecuted nor does it require that directors or persons actually responsible for maintenance of books of account can only be prosecuted. In the aforesaid premises, the contention of Mr. Sen fails. In the result, the petition under consideration fails and is liable to be dismissed. So it is ordered that the petition under consideration be dismissed on contest and rule discharged. The interim order of stay already issued is withdrawn and vacated. The records of the court below be sent back forthwith with directions to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible.
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1983 (2) TMI 176 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Restriction on the Transfer of shares, Offences against the act to be cognizable only on complaints by registrar, etc.
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1983 (2) TMI 167 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Gold extracted from gold ... ... ... ... ..... r dated 29-3-1977 from the Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, Bangalore, to the aforesaid Commissioner and Secretary to the effect that the premises at Hatti where gold is extracted from the gold bearing quartz is not a factory as per the Factories Act, 1948 and that at no time it has been subjected to the operation of the said Act. The appellants rsquo contention that the mill in which gold is recovered from the gold bearing ore is not a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act and that, therefore, the gold produced from there would not attract excise duty under Item 68 of the CET is tenable. In fact we notice that the Government of India in Revision Order No. 712/79 has accepted the position. 5. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we set aside the order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras and allow the appeal and direct that the consequential relief be granted to the appellant within 60 days from the date of communication of this order.
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1983 (2) TMI 166 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Appeal dismissed for default ... ... ... ... ..... ufficient cause for non-attendance on the 18th day of November, 1983. Here I am referring to two judgments in the cases of R.E. Govindram Sekhsaria 11 ITR 104, 123 Sadaram Puranchand v. CIT 5 ITC 459 wherein it was held that lsquo if the notice does not give the assessee a reasonable time within which to comply its terms, it would be a sufficient cause for non-compliance or would amount to lack of a reasonable opportunity for compliance within the meaning of this section rsquo . Extracts taken from the Law and Practice Income Tax by Kanga and Palkhivala, 7th Edition Page 889 (Not cited by parties). Since I am holding that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause for non-attendance I hereby set aside the order under proviso to Rule 20 of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1982. Both the parties are hereby directed to appear in this court on the 8th day of March 1984. In the result the appellant rsquo s misc. application is accepted.
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1983 (2) TMI 162 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Oil used in soap - Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... dismissed. 6. emsp Incidentally, it would appear that this is not a case where either the rate of duty or value for the purposes of assessment, is one of the issues raised. It is the quantum of duty that is in issue, the rate of duty and the limit of exemption having been admitted. It could have been, therefore, heard and decided by a Division Bench of this Tribunal and not necessarily by the Special Bench. However, since the matter was placed before us in the Special Bench and we are not without jurisdiction to deal with it we have disposed it of. 7. emsp Per S. Grover and H.R. Syiem . - For the reasons recorded vide our majority judgment in Appeal No. ED(SB)(T)(A), 19/77-C and 45 to 48/77-C and making the majority view there as the basis, we hold that the observations expressed by our learned Brother. Shri M. Gouri Shankar Murthy in Para 6 of his proposed Order cannot be valid. Since we are in agreement with him that there are no merits in the appeal, the same is dismissed.
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1983 (2) TMI 161 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... no good reason to exclude these from the scope of the tariff entry. Nor is there any force in the appellant rsquo s contention that the conversion of copper chromium rods does not amount to ldquo manufacture rdquo within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. Copper rods are, as admitted by the appellants, cut into the required sizes and chamferred, i.e. cut or ground off bevel-wise as a corner. This results in a product known as copper inserts used in the welding machine. In our opinion, there is ldquo manufacture rdquo . If these copper inserts are welding electrodes, as we have held, the fact that they may be known in the trade by the description copper inserts and not welding electrodes would not detract from their excisability as welding electrodes under Item No. 50 of the CET. In this view of the matter, the ratios of the judgment cited by the appellants do not, in our opinion, apply to the facts of the present case. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is rejected.
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1983 (2) TMI 160 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Customs Valuation ... ... ... ... ..... ed those details, there would have been no difficulty in considering their refund claim favourably. But the appellant failed to supply the required information to the Assistant Collector as well as to the Appellate Collector. 4. emsp We also observe from the records that the assessing officer had made an ad hoc addition at the rate of Rs. 30/- per MT towards stevedoring charges, even though the appellant had declared the actual amount incurred as stevedoring charges. We are not satisfied about the basis of this rate. Since the Appellants are in a position now to satisfy the Assistant Collector about the break-up details of the total amount declared by them, for ends of justice we would like that the matter be examined afresh and the contentions of the appellant be duly considered. 5. emsp In the result, we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned order and send back the case for fresh decision after the appellant has produced his evidence asked for within a reasonable time.
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1983 (2) TMI 159 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Penalty and redemption fine ... ... ... ... ..... order. 8. The Tribunal, however, takes note of the fact that lenses are not notified goods under Chapter IV-A of the Customs Act requiring meticulous accounting at every stage. There is evidence that this party had access to 3000 ldquo bifocal rdquo lenses being part of 5000 lenses covered by a Bill of Entry, dated 20-3-71 and cleared on payment of Customs duty totaling Rs. 9163/- and a fine of Rs. 5000/- after adjudication at Bombay. All the seized bifocal lenses might not, therefore, be tarred with the brush of illegal import. The Department had also not been able to establish where and when the illegal import of the lenses took place and whether it was by air, sea or land. The case does not, therefore, appear to call for the maximum redemption fine prescribed in Section 125 of the Customs Act, which is what has been imposed by the Appellate Collector. The ends of justice would be met if the fine and penalty are reduced by fifty per cent and the Tribunal orders accordingly.
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1983 (2) TMI 146 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... as come to a finding that goodwill alone was not properly matched with consideration. There is therefore a very cogent reason for the department to say why one asset has to be taken into account. This case relied on by Mr. Bhide is easily distinguishable. 11. As Shri Trimal, departmental representative pointed out, the decision of the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Babulal Ratilal Shah is easily distinguishable. Unlike that case the deceased here was at one time the full owner of the business and at the time of dissolution she had 60 share therein. 12. On these facts, we therefore, hold that the addition of Rs. 34,500 was correctly made by the Asstt. Controller. This will be restored. 13. In ground No. 2 objection has been taken for exemption u/s. 33(1)(n) in respect of garage of Rs. 2000. We find this point has been adequately dealt with by the Appellate Controller and for those reasons, we will uphold his findings. 14. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 143 - ITAT PUNE
Income From Other Sources, Let Out, Rental Income ... ... ... ... ..... nvestigation to be done without being prodded by any of the parties . As such we give the directions as referred to earlier in para 13 which we reproduce once again as under. We direct the Assistant Controller to properly include in the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased on 25-7-1977, deceased s right, title and interest in the property of the firm as evidenced by the partnership books of accounts and the transactions in the light of the terms of the partnership deed dated 1-4-1971. We further direct that the Assistant Controller should value the deceased s right, title and interest in the property of the firm as evidenced by all the transactions of the firm up to the date of the death and in the light of the partnership deed dated 1-4-1971 taking into consideration the principles enunciated by the Bombay High Court and more particularly in the two decisions, viz., in the case of Fakirchand and Malhotra s case. 17. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 140 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... e CIT to reject the claim made by the assessee, insofar as the payment is made only for rendering services to the respective HUFs only. As regards the payment, there is no dispute that it was made but on the other hand, it was held to be not for the services rendered to the HUF in the absence of any contemporaneous record to show that the assessee was serving on behalf of the family only in those two firms. Therefore, there is no question as to the liability or obligation to pay the amount under consideration. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the CIT(A) was not justified in holding that the orders passed by the ITO were erroneous insofar as they were prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and consequently setting aside the orders with a direction to modify the assessment by disallowing the payment or remuneration made to the appellant Karta. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of the CIT and restore that of the ITO. 5. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 139 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... nt to the asst. yr. 1973-74 it is reasonably a possible interpretation to say that the conditions required in cl. (ii) will not apply and cl. (i) will govern the liability thereof. 6. From the foregoing discussions it will be seen that it is not possible to hold that the deduction allowed by the ITO earlier of the entire amount of liability provided is an obvious and apparent mistake capable of rectification u/s 154 as it is a highly debatable question on which more than the one view is possible. We, therefore, hold that there is no justification for the ITO to seek to rectify the earlier order. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to consider the assessee rsquo s is entitled only to the deduction of Rs. 29,748 in respect of asst. yr. 1973-74 or to the entire amount originally allowed by the ITO. We therefore modify the order of the CIT(A) and therefore modify the order of the CIT(A) and restore the original allowance granted by the ITO. The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 138 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... ers. Further in the departmental ground before us it is stated that even if the order of the ITO had not brought out the facts relevant to the issue, it could be confirmed or sustained on entirely different considerations and facts. That statement clearly shows that the ITO had not proceeded on such facts of interlocking and interlacing. In (1980) 14 CTR (AP) 334 (FB) (1980) 121 ITR 97 (AP) (FB), it is stated that if there is interlocking and interlacing of funds between the two firms, then it is permissible to make one assessment. This allegation in department ground that this interlocking and interlacing is, therefore, only to confirm that dictum laid down in the judgment. It has no other basis. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of interlocking and interlacing. The clubbing was made, we repeat again, solely on the basis of legal proposition which no longer is good law. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the AAC. 3. Three departmental appeals dismissed.
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1983 (2) TMI 134 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Original Assessment, Provision For Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... possible interpretation to say that the conditions required in sub-clause (ii) will not apply and sub-clause (i) will govern the liability thereof. 6. From the foregoing discussion, it will be seen that it is not possible to hold that the deduction allowed by the ITO earlier, of the entire amount of liability provided, is an obvious and apparent mistake capable of rectification under section 154 as it is a highly debatable question on which more than one view is possible. We, therefore, hold that there is no justification for the ITO to seek to rectify the earlier order. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to consider the assessee s contention on merits as to whether the assessee is entitled only to the deduction of Rs. 29,748 in respect of the assessment year 1973-74 or to the entire amount originally allowed by the ITO. We, therefore, modify the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore the original allowance granted by the ITO. The appeal is allowed.
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