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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 92 of 92 Records
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1980 (6) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... 255 followed the principles reiterated by it in the previous judgment. Lindley on Partnership, 13th Edn., Chap. XV, has described the nature of the share of a partner in a firm in which there was dissolution. Keeping that in view in the background of the nature of the payments on the basis of the facts as found by the Tribunal in the light of the provisions of the Act in this case, as account was taken and in view of the principles that we have mentioned before, that is to say, the outgoing partner, on retirement, got his monetary value that was represented by his share in the partnership, in our opinion, there was no element of transfer which attracted the provisions of s. 45 of the I.T. Act, 1961. For the reasons mentioned aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (6) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... ld appear from the application made by the department before the Tribunal for making a reference that the point raised by Mr. Bagchi was clearly stated in question No. 1 of the three questions suggested by the department. But the Tribunal referred only question No. 2 of the application filed by the department. Thereafter, the department does not appear to have pursued further or in other words there was no application under s. 256(2) of the Act before this court requiring the Tribunal to refer question No. 1 On the matters before us, it cannot be said that the question referred to us is wide enough to include the point raised by Mr. Bagchi. His argument on this point, therefore, cannot be accepted. In the result, we are to answer the question which has been referred to us and in view of the findings arrived at by the Tribunal, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1980 (6) TMI 10 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... n of ours, question No. 2 arising in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1979 is not required to be answered. Under the circumstances, it is obvious that as a matter of fact it has not been established that the amount of Rs. 36,000 did in fact reach the hands of the assessee, Amitbhai. If the benefit of the supplementary award in the shape of reduction in the price from Rs. 80 per share to Rs. 50 per share had not been passed on to the assessee, Amitbhai, and has not in fact reached him, then question No. (2) in Income-tax Reference No. 104 of 1974 must be decided in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. So far as question No. (1) in Incometax Reference No. 104 of 1974 is concerned, it has now become academic because it has not been shown that the amount of Rs. 36,000 had in fact been received by the assessee. Under these circumstances, both these references are disposed of. The revenue will pay the costs of these two references to the assessee.
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1980 (6) TMI 9 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Firm
... ... ... ... ..... rder of the court declaring any provision of statute must be specific and the offending portion of a section when it is severable from the rest should be struck down. (See Anandji Haridas 1968 21 STC 326 (SC), relevant portion of which is extracted earlier, and Railway Board v. Pitchumani, AIR 1972 SC 508). In the present case, the discriminatory portion of the impugned provision is severable from the rest of the provision and its striking down does not affect the implementation of the clauses in other respects and the object of s. 139 of the Act. Accordingly, we make the following order (i) The appeals are dismissed. (ii) The words a registered firm or in sub-clause (a) of clause (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as it stood before it was amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, with effect from 1st April, 1971, are struck down. (iii) The consequential orders made in the writ petitions are affirmed. (iv) No costs.
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1980 (6) TMI 8 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... lars if it was settled by getting money then it might result in capital gains and reliance was placed on the case of Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. IRC 1943 25 TC 292 (CA), and the observation of Lord Greene M.R. at p. 300 of the report. But in the view we have taken of the nature of the transactions we are of the opinion that the said decision cannot be of much assistance to us. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd. 1966 60 ITR 405. In the view we have taken of the nature of the rights in the instant case we do not think the said decision can also help us much. We, therefore, answer the question as reframed by saying that the receipt of inch money cannot be considered to be capital gains in terms of s. 45 of the Act. The question as reframed is answered in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (6) TMI 7 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... unable to uphold this contention on a true and proper construction of s. 54 as indicated above. It might be mentioned that the assessee relied upon the decision of this court in CIT v. Natu Hansraj 1976 105 ITR 43. The said decision, however, is of no assistance to the assessee on the point in controversy herein. It deals with an altogether different point which does not arise for our consideration herein. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the provisions of s. 54 were not attracted in the instant case inasmuch as the assessee could not be said to have constructed the new house property within a period of two years after the date of the transfer of the capital asset which has resulted in the capital gains. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the revenue.
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1980 (6) TMI 6 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... n. It is significant to note that the provisions contained in s. 282(2) are permissive in nature and not mandatory. The word used therein is may and not shall . See CIT v. Devidayal and Sons 1968 68 ITR 425 (Bom). In the case of Sonu Lal v. CIT 1938 6 ITR 94 (Pat), it has been held that in a case where the HUF continued to carry on business in the name of certain members who had been dead for some years, notice addressed to the family in such trading name and served upon the karta was quite valid. On the same principle, a notice addressed in the firm s name if served upon a partner would also be quite valid. The proceedings, in our opinion, are, therefore, not vitiated on the ground that they were addressed to the firm, M/s. Ganeshi Lal and Sons, and not to one of such persons who was its partner in the year relevant to the year 1967-68. As none of the submissions made on behalf the petitioners has been found to have any merit, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1980 (6) TMI 5 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... swer the two questions referred to us in ITR. No. 37 of 1976, thus 1. That on the facts and circumstances of the case, the underwriting commission accrued with the opening of the banking hours and ceased to accrue on the close of the banking hours during the period when the subscription list was open, and 2. That on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the underwriting commission earned by the corporation on the shares subscribed by the public is taxable. The question referred to us in I.T.R. Nos. 31 and 137 of 1976 is answered thus That, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the underwriting commission in the case of shares held by the assessee itself and not actually subscribed by others went to reduce the cost of the shares in the hands of the assessee and was not separately taxable as the assessee s income of that year. In view of the divided success of the parties, we direct them to bear their own costs.
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1980 (6) TMI 4 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Domestic Company, Relevant Amount Of Distributions Of Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... follows that applicability of the provision contained in subcl. (B) for the levy of additional tax of 7.5 is restricted to cases where the company concerned had earned a taxable income during the period relevant to the assessment years 1964-65 and 1965-66, and there is no scope for the levy of such additional tax where the company had no taxable income at all during those years, but had, none the less, distributed amounts by way of dividends on equity shares. The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee-company was not liable to be subjected to the levy of additional tax for the year 1966-67. The question referred is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. There will be no direction regarding costs. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar, will be forwarded to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (6) TMI 3 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... there are no two classes of assessees who have been treated differently. Regarding every assessee against whom no action was taken within the period prescribed under s. 147(b) of the Act and whose case falls under s. 35, action is possible under that section within the period prescribed therein. Further, unlike the provisions considered in Anandji s case 1968 21 STC 326 (SC), there is a period of limitation prescribed both under s. 35 of the 1922 Act and s. 147(b) of the 1961 Act and which is applicable to all persons equally. Therefore, in our opinion, the specification of different time-limits in s. 35 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and s. 147(b) of the I.T. Act, 1961, brings about no discrimination justifying any conclusion that s. 35 offends art. 14. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is entitled to succeed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and in reversal of the judgment of the learned single judge, the writ petition is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1980 (6) TMI 2 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... x case. Learned advocate for the assessee, however, drew our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Commr. of Agrl. I.T. v. Lucy Kochuvareed 1976 103 ITR 799 and emphasised that it was only the escaped income that could be brought to tax. That is true. Once the information was valid for one item it would be valid in respect of all the items which had escaped assessment. If there had been underassessment, that is to say, there had been deductions which were not warranted, then such deductions would be escapement of tax. But that enquiry has not been made in this case nor the AAC had directed to enquire in this regard. He had, in our opinion, the jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error in its finding on this aspect of the matter. Therefore, question No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (6) TMI 1 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... here was a reference to this fact in the order of assessment itself. Even after noticing that the business of the assessee commenced on January 26, 1968, the ITO allowed the expenditure incurred towards the commencement of the business even prior to the said date. This point for the petitioner is covered in his favour by the decision of the Supreme Court in Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO 1975 100 ITR 1. Further in the case of C. T. Desai v. CIT 1979 120 ITR 240, this court has held that business expenditure incurred prior to the commencement of the business, which was clearly attributable to the business was an allowable expenditure. In view of the said decision, it is clear that even on merits, it cannot be said that deduction in question was wrongly allowed. For the reasons stated above, the impugned notice is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, I make the following order (i) Rule made absolute. (ii) The impugned notice dated July 24, 1975. (Ex. D) is quashed. (iii) No costs.
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