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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 187 Records
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1988 (6) TMI 162 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... entral Excise law an Additional Collector of Central Excise is equated with the Collector of Central Excise and under the Customs Act an Additional Collector of Customs is equated with the Collector of Customs. It is precisely for this reason we feel that in Notification No. 251-Cus., dated 27-8-1983 there is no appointment of Addl. Collector of Customs for various Customs Ports and Customs areas although that notification appoints various Collectors of Customs, Deputy Collector of Customs and Assistant Collector of Customs working under them as Collectors of Customs, Deputy Collector of Customs and Assistant Collector of Customs respectively for various ports. Airports and areas. Additional Collector of Customs by virtue of the statutory provisions of the Act would automatically be the Collector of Customs. 5. Hence we over-rule the preliminary point raised by the learned advocate for the appellants. The appeals should, therefore, be listed for final hearing by the Registry.
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1988 (6) TMI 161 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... the procedure had not. been complied with because the appellants were, till the receipt of the notice, under the bona fide impression that no duty was payable and, therefore, there was no need to observe the procedural requirements of this notification. We, therefore, hold that in quantifying and demanding the duty the benefit of Notification No. 201/79 so far as could be made out by acceptable evidence ought to be granted. 13. In the result we uphold the order of the Collector as to the excisability of the goods in issue but modify his order by setting aside the penalty and confining the demand for duty to the period of six months preceding the date of service of the show cause notice and further directing that in quantifying the duty, benefit under Notification No. 201/79 to the extent permissible, on the evidence that may be produced, ought to be granted. The matter shall accordingly be remitted to the Collector for passing fresh order in the light of the directions supra.
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1988 (6) TMI 160 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Mis-declaration of goods ... ... ... ... ..... cription of the goods has been mis-declared and his decision on the point whether there is under-valuation of the goods, lsquo but such redemption fine and penalty should not exceed the find and penalty imposed in the impugned order. 8. As we are remanding the matter for de-novo examination of the valuation of the goods, we do not consider it necessary to discuss about the case laws cited by the learned advocate. We, however, make it clear that the remand is confined to the valuation aspect and the quantum of redemption fine and penalty, and not in respect of mis-declaration of description of the goods. We have held in paragraph 5 of this order that there is mis-declaration of the description of the goods. 9. Duty on the imported goods should be charged at the rate applicable to the goods found on test of the samples by the Customs House Laboratory which has been accepted by the learned advocate during his arguments before us. 10. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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1988 (6) TMI 159 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
... ...
... ... ..... t aside the order appealed against and allow the appeal. Before partaking with this appeal we would like to observe that having regard to the trade notices issued by the various Collectorates permitting bank guarantees as one of the modes of security it is permissible for respondent to approach the proper authority and seek redress. The learned departmental representative at this stage informs us that, even without furnishing a bank guarantee and not complying with the order of the original authority the respondent has been clearing the goods, and if that is so, it is certainly open to the authorities to take such action as is open to them under the law. Likewise we would like to observe that in respect of shells and slides the same lower appellate authority by his order dated 11.3.1983 has taken the view that the goods are not excisable at all, the correctness of which has been questioned by the department by way of an appeal before the Special Bench where it is now pending.
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1988 (6) TMI 158 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Confiscation of - Conveyance ... ... ... ... ..... 1962, no mens rea is required. In paragraph 4 of the said decision, the Tribunal considered the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Garware Shipping Corporation, reported in 1984 (15) E.L.T. 375, and observed that the said judgment of Bombay High Court had been superseded by the decision of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Mogul Lines Ltd. and Others v. A.K. Dutta and Another vide decision in Appeal No. 57/1979 dated 5.10.1982. The Bombay High Court decision in Garware Shipping Corporation case was not, therefore, followed by the West Regional Bench of the Tribunal in the case reported in 1986 (25) E.L.T. 962 (Tribunal). 6. I n view of the foregoing discussions, I do not find any reason or justification for interfering with the order of the lower authority. Accordingly, I uphold the impugned order and dismiss this appeal. I do not also find any justification to reduce the redemption fine of Rs. 10.000/- as the same is not found to be excessive.
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1988 (6) TMI 157 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... R 1 (CEGAT SB-A) will be applicable on all fours with reference to the finality of the order passed by a proper officer in the classification list. We, therefore, hold that the Supdt. would not have any authority at all to go into the question and, therefore, the appellant would not stand to benefit by hearing before the Supdt. in respect of this question. Since the grievances of the appellant in regard to the benefit of the notification cannot be redressed by the Supdt. of Central Excise, who has no power of authority under the law, the question of the appellant being heard in that regard does not arise. The plea of the learned counsel that the Supdt. ante-dated RT-12 return is a matter to be urged administratively before the concerned authorities. Therefore, on consideration of the entire evidence on record, we hold that the impugned order is sustainable in law, and in this view of the matter we do not find any substance in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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1988 (6) TMI 156 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Measuring Machines ... ... ... ... ..... able of making all the measurements listed at Sl. No. 9 of the catalogue. He further confirmed that all the universal measuring machines have accessories without which they could not do the measurements. 5. We note the arguments of Shri Deshpandey that as the present importer rsquo s needs are limited he did not import all the accessories. As the machine needs accessories to do all the measurements, the entry at Sl. No. 9 of the notification has to be interpreted to mean that the machine should be capable, with the help of accessories, If necessary, of conducting the measurement listed therein. It is the imported machine rsquo s design and capacity for measurement that matters not the presence or absence of accessories where such accessories are needed and used for measurements listed in the notification. In this view we hold that the imported goods are entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 49/78-Cus. We order accordingly and allow this appeal with consequential relief.
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1988 (6) TMI 155 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Additional ground for appeal ... ... ... ... ..... nd on any new evidence of fact not already available on record. In fact, the learned JDR rsquo s request was a stage earlier to raising the additional ground itself. He was merely seeking permission to get in touch with the appellant-Collector whether the new ground of appeal which he had in mind and as set out above, is appropriate to be raised or not. In my view in the interest of justice and for proper determination of the question that falls for consideration before the Bench whether the Notification 66/82, dated 1.3.1982 is applicable to the goods manufactured by the respondent firm herein, the learned JDR should be given the permission he has sought. After he has sought the necessary permission from the appellant-Collector he would no doubt make a proper application with adequate reasons as to why he should be allowed to raise the additional ground in the memo of appeal. Accordingly, I allow the JDR to seek the permission from the appellant-Collector as mentioned supra.
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1988 (6) TMI 154 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Clasification ... ... ... ... ..... as if its principal purpose were its sole purpose. rdquo This point made by the learned Counsel is well taken. If there is any doubt as to whether, though the principal function of this machine is drying, it may aid the cooking of the food either directly or indirectly, such a doubt is cleared by the Chapter Note. One thing which is not in dispute is that the principal purpose of this machine is drying. Once this position is accepted, then according to the Chapter Note 7, the machine was to be treated as if the principal purpose were the sole purpose. Therefore, I hold that the machine is classifiable rightly under Heading 84.39 and not under Heading 8419.81 as decided by the lower authorities. I therefore allow the appeal with consequential relief. 8. Order per Shri K.P. Anand, Member (T) . - For the reasons stated in the order of Shri I.J. Rao, I agree with him. Accordingly, I allow the appeal. FINAL ORDER In accordance with the views of the majority, the appeal is allowed.
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1988 (6) TMI 127 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Preventive detention ... ... ... ... ..... es of this Court have taken a consistent view and though it is undoubtedly true that the Division Bench at Nagpur has sounded a differing note, in our judgment, it is not desirable to refer the matter to a larger Bench. In detention matters, it is desirable that the view taken by the several Division Benches is followed, unless the reasons for differing are so demanding and absolute that the view propounded and accepted by several Division Benches cannot be sustained. We have perused several judgments delivered by this Court and we are unable to hold that the view taken consistently is grossly erroneous that it demands reconsideration. We are not inclined to keep the detenu in jail for longer time by referring the present petition to the larger Bench. We respectfully prefer to follow the view taken by several Division Benches. 4. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith.
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1988 (6) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Preventive detention ... ... ... ... ..... Detaining Authority could also ascertain by perusal of the passport the date of departure and the date of arrival. It is, therefore, clear that while the detenu was claiming that he had visited on eight occasions the Detaining Authority concluded that the visits were on eleven occasions. It is, therefore, obvious that the detenu did not admit the visits on eleven occasions and, therefore, was entitled to make representation against the conclusion made by the Detaining Authority. The detenu could not make effective representation because the copies supplied to him were illegible. In these circumstances, the reliance placed on the unreported decision of the Division Bench is totally inappropriate. In our judgment, the order of detention cannot be sustained and the petition must be allowed. 4. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and the impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 125 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Preventive detention ... ... ... ... ..... as searched on January 25, 1987 and it was noticed that there were 16 crew members on the craft and 100 contraband gold bars were recovered, the detaining authority recites that some of the reasons for passing order of detention are as follows. We fail to appreciate how the detaining authority can set out only some of the reasons and thereby indicating that there are other reasons which the detaining authority had in mind but which are not set out in the grounds of detention. Reading the grounds of detention, it is clear that the detaining authority was writing a thesis and giving advice to the detenu and was not setting out the facts which were taken into consideration for arriving at subjective satisfaction. In our judgment, the order of detention suffers from serious infirmity and cannot be sustained. 4. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the impugned order of detention is set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith. 5. There will be no order as to costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 124 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... Andhra Pradesh v. Commercial Tax Officer and Another -1988 (Vol. 63) Company Cases 273 . 12. Again, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Singh and Sons Engineering Works and Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another -1977 STC (Vol. 39) 424 rejected the contention that since its judgment was under appeal before the Supreme Court, it could not be said that there was any final enunciation of law on the question involved. The Court held - ldquo The mere fact that the decision of this court is under appeal does not make it any less binding on courts, tribunals and other authorities within this State until it (that decision) is reversed by the Supreme Court. rdquo 13. The above cited pronouncements are equally applicable to the decisions of this Tribunal insofar as their binding effect on the quasi-judicial authorities functioning within its jurisdiction are concerned. 14. We do hope that we will not have any further occasion to revert to and expatiate on, the theme.
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1988 (6) TMI 123 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Demand for duty erroneously refunded ... ... ... ... ..... would be the date when the refund voucher was prepared and issued, the date of refund in cases where refund is by ordering credit to be taken in the PLA would be the date when credit is actually taken in the PLA. 13. The contention for the Department in the present instance is that the date when credit was actually taken was 9-1-1979 and if limitation is computed from that date the notice, dated 1-6-1979 was within time, the subsequent notice merely altering the amount demanded. We find that no evidence is available to us at present as to the date when credit was actually taken. This matter had not been raised in this form before the lower authorities. That is why they did not go into this particular date. The order of the Collector (Appeals) will therefore have to be set aside and the matter will have to be remitted to him in order to go into this question of limitation in the light of the observations above and thereafter decide the issue appropriately. Ordered accordingly.
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1988 (6) TMI 122 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Dutiablity - Hardboard ... ... ... ... ..... e ratio and principle of the Supreme Court judgment squarely applies to untrimmed hardboard also. The Department has not even at this stage, produced any evidence before us to show that untrimmed hardboard is not a marketable commodity. The evidence produced by the appellants before the Revisional Authority, namely, a certificate issued by Mac-Wood Agencies of Calcutta to the effect that they have been receiving untrimmed hardboard from the appellants and that they were regular buyers of the same for several years remains unrebutted. 10. In the circumstances and following the Supreme Court Judgment in the Oriental Timber Industries case, we hold that, in the present case so, the stock of untrimmed hardboard which was lying in the factory premises prior to the imposition of excise levy on hardboard was not liable to be charged to the new levy. In the result, the orders of the lower authorities are set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1988 (6) TMI 121 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Manufacture - Scantlings ... ... ... ... ..... to us that so far as the second, third and fourth appeals above mentioned are concerned this question of payment under protest will have to be looked into by the lower authorities before any decision is taken on the question of the refund claims being barred by time. 10. Accordingly Excise Appeal No. 1434/85-D is allowed and orders of the lower authorities are set aside. Excise appeal Nos. 1437 to 1439/85-D are also allowed and the orders of the lower authorities are set aside. But in these cases the matter in issue in each of these cases is remitted to the Assistant Collector for considering the refund claims with reference to the contention of payments of duty having been made under protest and thereafter dispose of the refund claims with reference to the said findings and observations of this Tribunal in this order in the earlier portions. 11. Accordingly Excise Appeal No. 1434/85-D is allowed in full and the other 3 appeals are allowed by way of remand as mentioned supra.
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1988 (6) TMI 106 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Valuation for cess duty ... ... ... ... ..... , there is no basis on which the word can be altered to read as ldquo Cess rdquo . Besides, Rule 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules makes it clear that the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act are to be applied for the levy and collection of Cess. Besides, in this context, reading the word ldquo duty rdquo as ldquo Cess rdquo will lead to an anomalous situation in as much as if Cess is to be calculated on the wholesale price (less discount) there is no question again of deducting Cess for the purpose of calculating Cess. 11. In this view, we hold that for the purpose of calculating Cess, the Central Excise duty and Sales-tax, if leviable and included in the wholesale cash price should be deducted. As a result, the appellants rsquo pleas are accepted. In view of this finding, we need not go into other case law cited as the said judgments are not relevant to the present issue. We have referred to the cases which have a bearing on the question. 12. The appeals are allowed.
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1988 (6) TMI 103 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... d before the ITO, 7/12 extracts right from 1964 to 1978-79 showing details of the crops grown and reaped. Copies for vouchers of expenses incurred for cultivation were also produced. Copies of memos of sale proceeds of fodder and other crops and the photos taken on 11th Sept., 1976 of the agricultural lands showing standing crops were also produced. All these evidence show that the land in question was agricultural land. If this fact is proved, then the appellants are entitled to get exemption of the capital gain on the sale of the land. 14. To deny exemption of, merely on the ground that the judgment of the Bombay High Court was delivered later, it has no retrospective application, would be incorrect. We have held in the case of Smt. Prema M. Wadke that the Bombay High Court judgment is applicable retrospectively and we do not see any good reason to depart from our own view. In the result, we allow the appellants claim. 15. The appellants succeed and the appeals are allowed.
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1988 (6) TMI 100 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Valuation Of Assets, Residential House ... ... ... ... ..... by him to his spouse and it was sought to be contended that she was not having exclusive use of the property. In the picturesque words of Justice Mukherji as observed in the case of Mrs. Shamsun Nehar Mansur v. CED 1969 71 ITR 301, 307 (Cal.) No construction should be put on the Estate Duty Act so as to be against the public policy to the extent that whenever a husband makes a gift of a property to his wife he should lose both the property and the wife. We are of the opinion that on the facts of this case also we should not accept a construction which requires that a minor child, who is the other co-owner, has to be kept our of residence for purpose of the assessee-mother, who is a co-owner of the house, being given the benefit of section 7(4) of the Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that the AAC was right in holding that the conditions prescribed have been fulfilled and the assessee was entitled to be assessed u/s 7(4) of the Act. 3. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1988 (6) TMI 98 - ITAT MADRAS-B
... ...
... ... ..... ho had purchased an undivided share in the land and they would, therefore, be persons interested in the property. Were we to have held that the acquisition was otherwise in order, the point that would have arisen for consideration is whether when over 80 tenants had each purchased an undivided share of the land and no notice at all was issued to any of them under s. 269-D(2)(a), the case should at least have been remitted back for issue of notice on each such person, who Ex-facie had to be considered to be a person interested in the property. We do not go into that question further in the present case, because the order of acquisition stands quashed otherwise. In the view that we have taken, we also do not think it necessary to go into cases stated to be comparable sought to be relied on behalf of the transferees before us, which given a value ex-facie of only about 1/2 the value per ground on the date the present transfer was made. 18. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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