|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 208 Records
-
1980 (9) TMI 144 - ITAT MADRAS-B
... ...
... ... ..... was justified and that the addition was reasonable. The ld. counsel for the assessee relied upon the order of the first appellate authority. 5. We have carefully considered the facts as well as the arguments. We are not in a position to say that the bought notes do not offer adequate check over purchases in the absence of any positive finding to that effect. It is not reasonable to expect gradewise classification in bought-notes in matters like the purchase of bones from butchers. The gross profit and wastage cannot be constant. In the light of the stock particulars available in the books, we have to assume that there are ample checks in the accounts themselves. The variation both in wastages and gross profit are also not such as to warrant rejection of accounts, which are otherwise regularly maintained. We are of the view that no case is made out for rejection of accounts. The order of the appellate authority deserves to be upheld. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 143 - ITAT MADRAS-B
... ...
... ... ..... s as regards the inclusion of Rs. 13,000 being the aggregate amount gifted by the deceased to his son Makesh Kumar Mardia (Rs. 10,000), to his daughter-in-law Saroja Bai (Rs. 2,000) and to his grand-daughter Meerabai Rs. 1,000.) Here again the gifts were made by debiting the personal account of the deceased in the books of the firm and crediting the accounts of the donees. No doubt, the gited monies continued to remain in the firm of which the deceased was partner till his death but in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kantilal Trikamalal (1976) CTR (SC) 391 (1976) 105 ITR 92 (SC), there is no scope for the application of s. 10 because such enjoyment and benefit which the deceased had in respect thereof was not referable to the gift. We, therefore, hold that the inclusion of Rs. 13,000 is not justified and direct deletion of the same. We direct that the assessment be modified in accordance with the above directions. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
-
1980 (9) TMI 127 - ITAT MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... nst which the appeals had been filed to the Asstt. Commr. The Asstt. Commr. cannot say at that stage that the assessments had been completed under s. 17(4) which in effect would deny the opportunities available to the assessees to apply for cancellation of assessments under s. 19. This Tribunal has held in several cases such as ATA 169/70, 170/79 etc. dt. 16th Oct., 1979 that the authorities are at liberty to complete the assessments under s. 17(3) even though the appellants fail to comply with the terms of the notice issued under s. 17(2) of the Act. In these cases, it cannot be said that the assessments had been completed under s. 17(4) of the Act. In as much as the assessments had been completed without verifying the accounts, we feel that it is a fit case for remitting back to the Asstt. Commr. of Agrl. IT, for disposal according to law after verification of the accounts. 5. In the result, the appeals are accordingly remanded. 6. Institution fees will be refunded in full.
-
1980 (9) TMI 125 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ...
... ... ..... under the IT Act, 1961, IT Rules, 1962 and the forms prescribed, it is possible to combine more that one appeal. A composite appeal, like the one filed by the assessee in the present case before the AAC was competent. I hold likewise. 5. Since the AAC has not entertained the appeal by the assessee before him, to be one challenging the correctness of the order of the ITO refusing registration to it, I set aside the order in this behalf and restore the matter to his file for deciding afresh in accordance with law. 6. Having so decided, I need not decide the other ground raised by the assessee reading as under as the decision thereof is consequential to the above decision to be taken by the AAC That the learned AAC of IT has erred in withholding the interests charged under ss. 139(8) and 217 of the Act, which is quite arbitrary, illegal against the principles of natural justice, hence the same should be quashed. 7. For statistical purposes, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 124 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ...
... ... ..... ould be said in such circumstances that the assessee had property or interest in property which could be considered in the WT assessments. We could have understood if the assessee had held the properties in question on lease for a specified period. In that case the interest of the assessee in the properties could have been valued and included in the assessments. But where a property is held by an assessee on monthly tenancy, it cannot be said that the assessee has any interest in the property in terms of s. 2(c) of the WT Act which could be valued and assessed to tax. In such a case all that happened is that the assessee had been permitted to occupy the property on monthly basis for a fixed monthly consideration. Beyond residing in the property on those conditions the occupier has no interest of any kind in the property . 5. The finding of the Tribunal that properties were let out to the assessee as monthly basis is a finding of fact and, therefore, no question of law arises.
-
1980 (9) TMI 123 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ...
... ... ..... ve share income can be said to have remained with a retiring partner. This issue has been fully answered by Madras High Court in the case of the Addl. CGT, Madras-II vs. P. Krishnamoorthy and other (1). The High Court held that the moment a partner retired from the partnership, he had no right to receive any future profits in the said firm and hence there was no question of his giving up any such right to share the future profits. We respectfully follow the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Addl. CGT, Madras vs. P.Krishna moorthy and others. There is no question of a retiring partner having a right to share the future profits. If so, such non-existent right cannot be property as contemplated by the statute. There is no substance in the contention of the Revenue that the assessee on retirement had a right to share the future profits. There being no such right with the assessee, the question of gifting the same does not arise. 3. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 122 - ITAT INDORE
... ...
... ... ..... er own disclosure under the voluntary disclosure scheme, but this fact does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the explanation was false to the knowledge of the assessee. it may be that the lady omitted to mention this amount and for that if anybody is responsible it is Smt. Tusibai. The fact remains that the swore an affidavit in the assessment proceedings themselves that this money belonged to her and our discussion above shows that it is not wholly impossible. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it would not be safe to maintain any penalty upon the assessee in the circumstances of the case. we accordingly accept the appeal and cancel the penalty. 4. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of the case, since the finding given by the Tribunal is based on the appreciation of evidence of evidence on record and being a finding of fact, on question of law could be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal. 5. Hence, the application filed by the Revenue is rejected.
-
1980 (9) TMI 121 - ITAT INDORE
... ...
... ... ..... der dt. 11th Oct., 1979, treated the explanation as satisfactory and held that the assessee was prevented by a sufficient cause from filing the return within the time prescribed for the asst. yr. 1973-74. The said order of the Tribunal appears to have been accepted by the Department. As already stated, the return for the assessment year under appeal was also filed on the same date and, therefore, the delay in this year was comparatively less than the delay in filing the return for the asst. yr. 1973-74. In the circumstances, for the reasons given by the Tribunal in its order for the asst. yr. 1973-74, there was good and sufficient cause with a stronger reason for the delay in filing the return for the year under appeal. Considering all these facts, I hold that the assessee was prevented by a reasonable cause from filing the return for this assessment year within the time prescribed by Law. The impugned penalty is accordingly cancelled. 2. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 120 - ITAT GAUHATI
... ...
... ... ..... n. The assessee has explained that the capital formation at Rs. 3,89,317 represented agricultural income viz production and sale of green tea and the assessee claimed that the garden was being run without factory. The explanation of the assessee has not been accepted and mere non-acceptance of the assessee s explanation does not give right to the lower authorities to treat the amount of Rs. 17,845 as income of the assessee AOP for the assessment year under appeal. The Revenue has not placed any material on record to prove that the said amount of Rs. 17,845 represented income in the hands of the assessee and the said income was income in real sense and a receipt thereof during the accounting period relevant to the assessment year under appeal. The addition, as such, made and sustained by the lower authorities cannot be upheld. The amount of Rs. 17,845 merits to be deleted. We order accordingly. 6. In the result, the appeal by the assessee partly succeeds and is partly allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 119 - ITAT DELHI-D
... ...
... ... ..... ch was not bona fide. 3. After hearing both the parties, we are of the view that the ITO should have condoned the delay. It does happen sometime that the application on Form No. 11 is delayed unavoidable either of a wrong legal advice or by an impression that the application has to filed alongwith the return. It this case, we find that the assessee had filed the application alongwith the Return. Normally a person of reasonable intelligence would not deprive himself of a benefit under the law unnecessarily. As we find that the application was filed alongwith the Return which could be under a bona fide impression giving the benefit of doubt, we direct the ITO to condone the delay in the filing of the application and thereafter dispose of the matter on merits in accordance with law. The order of the authorities below are set aside and the matter is restored to the file of ITO with the directions as above. 4. The appeal shall be treated as partly allowed for statistical purposes.
-
1980 (9) TMI 118 - ITAT DELHI-B
... ...
... ... ..... nal was, therefore, wrong in holding that the absence of the signature of the appellant at the proper places in the memorandum of appeal was a material defect which prevented them from accepting the document as good and that although the defects had subsequently been removed the period of limitation having meanwhile expired the removal was of no assistance to the assessee. 12. So, from the above two decision of the Hon ble High Court it is clear to us that if there is any defect in the memorandum of appeal then it can be removed and no sooner the defect is removed then the appeal is in order from the date it was filed before the appellate authority. 13. Therefore, in view of our discussion and facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the CIT (A) was not justified in dismissing the appeal of the assessee in limine hence, we set aside his order and direct him to admit the appeal and decide it on merits. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
-
1980 (9) TMI 117 - ITAT DELHI-A
... ...
... ... ..... the ITO and that thus, the ITO could not scrutinise the factual position. We are unable to agree with the assessee s contention that because he owned money to some other creditors also, he was justified in not paying on time the self-assessed tax even though it did have liquid cash exceeding Rs. 12,000 as aforesaid. 5. Second contention of the assessee before us was that in 90 ITO 116, Madras High Court has struck down the provisions as contained in s. 140A(3) as ultre-vires. As IT Act is an allIndiaenactment, the said ruling has to be taken note of. It is true that the Tribunal being a creature of the IT Act itself is not competent to pronounce on the constitutionality of any provision of the IT Act all the same as the Madras High Court has struck down s. 140A(3), the said provision can legitimately be treated by Tribunal as non-existent. In that view of the matter, we hold that the penalty in question could not be sustained. The same is hereby deleted. 6. Appeal is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 116 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... al Board of Direct Taxes reads as under On a careful consideration of the facts involved, the Board is of the opinion that the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society would be an educational institution existing solely for the purpose of education within the meaning of s. 10(22) of the IT Act. We are told that the assessee has also applied for a similar exemption to the Central Board of Direct Taxes but the application is pending. Be that as it may, since similar society in Tamil Nadu has been granted exemption under s. 10(22) we see no reason why the benefit of exemption should be denied to the assessee. We thus hold that the CIT (A) has rightly held that the assessee was entitled to exemption under s. 10(22). For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the society is entitled to exemption under s. 11 r/w s. 2(15) and is also entitled to exemption under s. 10(22). We thus confirm the orders of CIT (A) and dismiss the Departmental appeals. 15. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 115 - ITAT COCHIN
... ...
... ... ..... (AP) of the Madras High Court in (1979) 119 ITR 925 (Mad) and of the Allahabad High Court in (1979) 120 ITR 354 (All). The Tribunal following these decisions upheld the contention of the assessee and allowed the appeal holding that the debt which had been taken into account in computing the income of the predecessor firm if it became bad subsequently when the business was owned by the successor, could be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the successor. 7. According to the Commr. from the finding of the Tribunal the specified question of law arises for being referred to the High Court. We, however, find that the finding of the Tribunal is based on the preponderance of authorities in favour of the assessee. No contrary decision has been referred to or brought to the notice of the Tribunal. It is, therefore, a concluded question of law and as such no referable question of law arises from the finding of the Tribunal. 8. This application is accordingly dismissed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 114 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
... ...
... ... ..... eported as (1975) 98 ITR 343, Held that the provisions of ss. 271 and 273 are in pari materia and the ratio of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Anwar Ali reported as (1970) 76 ITR 696 would apply for coming to the conclusion that the burden to prove is on the Department in view of the nature of penalty provisions. If imposition of penalty under s. 271 is of a penal nature so is the penalty which is imposed under s. 273. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Ali s case fully applied to the imposition of penalty under s. 273. 6. Therefore, we uphold the CIT(A) s order on the following grounds, independent of each other (a) On the facts of the case, as noted by us, the assessee company fully justified before the ITO regarding its estimate of income from unit No. 4 at Rs. 50,000. (b) The assessee had not furnished estimate of advance-tax which it knew or had reason to believe to be untrue. 7. In the result, the Revenue s appeal is dismissed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 113 - ITAT CALCUTTA-E
... ...
... ... ..... case of Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam vs. K.I. Abraham (1967) 20 STC 367 (SC). That decision interpreted the words in the prescribed manner occurring in the Central ST Act. It was held by the Supreme Court that the phrase in the prescribed manner in the appropriate section does not take in the time element. That is an interpretation of the words in the prescribed manner . From that point of view it cannot be said that the decision though it held ultra vires, did not deal with the interpretation of s.11(2)(a). Sec. 11(2)(a) also requires a person claiming exemption under s. 11 to give a notice in writing in the prescribed manner. In interpreting the words in the prescribed manner as found in that case it has to be held that the time element was not the essence of that phrase. If so it would be open to the ITO to accept an application beyond the time. In view of this we also direct the ITO to take note of that application and process it. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 112 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ...
... ... ..... the cases cited by the Revenue-Muthuwappy vs. CIT 46 ITR 1107 (Mad) and Girdhar Zavar vs. CIT 24 ITR 540 (Bombay), we partly agreed with the Commissioner (A). The latter had reasoned well in setting aside the assessment because the computation of total income at Rs. 5 lacs had no basis. The past assessment reflected a contrary picture. The CIT (A) was also correct in directing the ITO to raise a fresh assessment after proper investigation, enquiry etc. But he should not have ordered the ITO to allow reasonable opportunity to the assessee for production of evidence and material on which the latter might rely. In this regard he violated the principles for raising an ex parte assessment under s. 144 and had indirectly given the assessee the benefit of the provisions of s. 146. The authorities cited by the Revenue would support us. Accordingly, we delete the last sentence of the first appellate order which is accordingly modified. 5. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 111 - ITAT AMRITSAR
... ...
... ... ..... atter we are unable to draw for guidance on the decision Seth Gopal Dass in preference to the clear verdict of Supreme Court available in the case of Charan Das Hari Dass. 20. In this view of the matter we are unable to agree with Revenue that CIT was correctly advised in cancelling the finding recorded under s. 171 about partial partition. Taking guidance from the decision of Supreme Court in Charan Das Hari Dass 39 ITR 202 we hold that finding of partial partition of Panna Lal, HUF was correctly recorded by ITO. The CIT was misdirected in disregarding the authority of Supreme Court in the said case and in holding that the finding of the ITO recorded under s. 171 was erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. We set aside his order passed under s. 263(1) and restore the finding of the ITO recorded under s. 171. 21. For the same reasons we set aside orders passed by CIT under s. 263(1) against assessment order for year 1975-76 and 1976-77 and restore the orders of the IT Officer.
-
1980 (9) TMI 110 - ITAT AMRITSAR
... ...
... ... ..... re any material repair or renovation. This is what has not happened in the present case. The building was acquired to be dismantled. Looked at from this point of view also we find force in the contention raised on behalf of the assessee that the sale transaction was not a normal deal where normal price for the building could be realized. WTO s determination of the value of the property on the basis of the sale proceeds of the building was, therefore, an error. What he was required was to determine the value of the property which a normal buyer would have offered him on sale. Accordingly, we do not find any justification for the addition made in the valuation of the said property and hold that the addition of Rs. 1,89,163 made by the WTO, was liable to be deleted. 6. In this view of the matter we cannot sustain the reassessment by the WTO. We vacate the finding of the AAC and quash the assessment. Appeal filed by the assessee succeeds and is allowed. 7. The appeal is allowed.
-
1980 (9) TMI 109 - ITAT AMRITSAR
... ...
... ... ..... ve been imposed in the status of Individual. The assessee s counsel also relied on two decisions of Madras and Allahabad High Courts in 75 ITR 65 and 106 ITR 817. The AAC has conveniently not dealt with this aspect of the matter. We notice from the penalty orders under appeal that they are based in the status of Individual. The penalties are now sought to be imposed by taking a different status of HUF. This change of status is neither open to AAC nor to the WTO to make. Such penalties, in our opinion, are, therefore, not sustainable in the eye of law and the authorities cited by the assessee support his case. Accordingly, we delete the penalties sustained after order of the AAC and allow the assessee s appeals. 4. The assessee s counsel also had referred to the plea of reasonable cause but we do not consider it necessary to go into that at this stage as the appeals are already decided in assessee s favour on the other ground considered above. 5. Both the appeals are allowed.
........
|
