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1950 (1) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ... ... ... ..... The profits received prior to that date were received by the family and not by the assessee. For the reasons already stated by us, it is open to question whether the allotment of the business assets at the partition was liable to be apportioned as between capital and profit unless there was any such specific provision in the deed of partition. In any case, the learned Chief Justice who was a party to the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras V. Annamalai Chettiar, I.l.R. (1945) Mad. 125 A. I. R. 1914 Mad 398 and to the order in C. M. P. No. 3322 of 1945 directing this reference thought that the present case was distinguishable from his previous decision and it is unnecessary to discuss that case any further. 7. For the reasons already stated, we are of the opinion that the answer to the question referred to us must be in the negative and against the Commissioner of Income Tax. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 250/-.
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1950 (1) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e tenant for manufacture does not make the lease for manufacturing purpose within the meaning of Section 103, T. P. Act. It is necessary to emphasise that a lease or a tenancy must be by agreement, between the landlord & the tenant & both the parties must know that the lease is for manufacturing purpose at the time of the grant. If that not so then the nature of subsequent user of the premises by the tenant without agreement of the landlord will not convert such a lease into one for manufacturing purpose. 17. In those circumstances, there will be judgment for the plfs, in terms of prayer (a) of the plaint with mesne profits at the rate of rent from. 1 4-1948, until delivery of possession. The plffs. are entitled to the costs of the suit. Certified for two counsel. The deft, will go on paying mesne profits & send them to the plff's solicitor without prejudice to his rights & contentions. The decree is not to be executed for a fortnight after it is drawn up.
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1950 (1) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Tribunal's refusal to state a case on the ground that no question of law arises. Moreover, though it may in some ways be convenient to hear the application at the time of the disposing of the main reference, the learned advocate for the appellants has pointed out that the postponement of the consideration of the assessee application to that stage would necessitate an undue delay in the disposal of the whole reference. Whatever may be said as to the stage at which an application under Section 66 (2) should be heard, we are clearly of the opinion that Section 66 is self-contained with regard to the procedure to be adopted when an assessee or Commissioner is dissatisfied with the order of reference and that it does provide for the contingency when the statement of the case is incomplete, as well as for that when no reference has been made at all. Section 45, Specific Relief Act, has, therefore, no application. 5. The appeals are dismissed with costs. One Advocate's fee.
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1950 (1) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ated 27-6-1933, clearly mentions that the receiver was selling the disposing power of the father over the son's share, if any, of the Insolvent in the properties mentioned therein. As already stated, even in the plaint the plaintiff himself understood the transaction as conveying the entire property. We therefore hold that the entire properties including the son's shares were sold under Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-4. 13. In the memorandum of objections filed by the defendants 2 and 5, it is contended that the lower Court should have given a decree to them also in regard to their shares in the suit properties. In the view we have taken on the merits these defendants are not entitled to the relief. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the memorandum of objections is dismissed with costs. 15. In our view a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Act arises in this case. Leave granted under Section 205 of the Government of India Act.
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1950 (1) TMI 18 - FEDERAL COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ays been a “constitutional trade unionist.” It must therefore be taken, for the purposes of this case, that the said allegations are well-founded. If see membership of that party cannot be ruled out of consideration as material on which no satisfaction could rationally be grounded. There are also the allegations already referred to about the appellant assisting and associating with a prominent member of the party who has “gone underground” and about the likelihood of the appellant himself going underground and from there guiding the alleged subversive activities of the party. On these materials, which are relevant to the purpose of the Act, the Provincial Government say they are satisfied that the appellant is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, and it is not for the Court, with its strictly limited powers of interference under S. 4 of the Act, to say that they should not be satisfied on such materials. The appeal is dismissed.
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1950 (1) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nd gains accruing or arising to the resident either within or without British India are brought into charge. There is no question here of any apportionment under Section 42(1) and (3). For these reasons our answer to the first of the questions referred to us is that Section 42(1) and (3) of the Act have no application to the computation of income accruing or arising to the company in British India for the purposes of Section 4A(c)( b) even if the manufacturing process of the goods which were sold in British India took place outside British India. The answer to the second question is that the entire profits and gains arising to the company in British India should be taken into account for the purpose of applying the test laid down in Section 4A(c)( b), and not merely that part of the profits which could be attributed to the operations carried on in British India. In other words, Section 42(3) of the Act has no application to the computation of profits under Section 4A(c)( b).
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1950 (1) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the arrangement under which the managing agency rights were acquired. This position is not inconsistent with the view of Chagla, J., in Ramachandra v. Chinubhai AIR 1944 Bom. 76 , where the learned Judge observed " To my mind it is impossible to contend that the mere office of managing agent without any benefits attaching to it can ever be deemed to be joint family property." The learned Judge in that sentence must have been thinking of a case where no detriment to the family estate was involved in the acquisition of the office of managing agents and not a case like the one which was considered in Haridas Purushottam, In re 1947 15 ITR 124. For these reasons we are of opinion that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is wrong and that the first part of the question referred to us must be answered in the negative. On the second part of the reference we hold that the managing agency commission should have been treated as the individual income of Murugappa Chettiar.
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1950 (1) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... be part of the income of the assessee and does not support the contention urged on behalf of the assessee in the present case. The argument addressed on behalf of the assessee that the Income-tax Officer is bound to proceed to determine the question raised by the assessee under Section 24(3) and record the loss, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the notice under Section 34 and notwithstanding the fact that the Income-tax Officer declined to proceed further under Section 34 is not supported by any authority. Nor are we prepared to agree with the contention that under Section 34 the Income-tax Officer is bound to proceed to assess the total income afresh and is not confined or restricted to assess only the escaped income. The language of Section 34 and Section 24(3) of the Act is clear and admits of no doubt; and in our opinion, the view of the Appellate Tribunal is correct. The question referred to us must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative and against the assessee.
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1950 (1) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 15 Abkari Act punishable under Section 55 because the unlicensed partner, by himself, or through his agent the other partner, sells without a license, The learned Judges also held that even though a partnership was lawful at its inception because it was not intended to infringe any of the provisions of the Contract Act, it nevertheless, became unlawful when it intended to conduct the business jointly on a licence granted to one only of the partners In view of this opinion we must hold that the object of the partnership was illegal and therefore the partnership contract itself was void ab initio. That being the case it was open to the Income Tax Officer to refuse to register a firm whose object was unlawful and the partnership contract under which the firm was constituted was wholly void. We therefore answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessees. The Commissioner of Income Tax will get his costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 250.
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1950 (1) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ere fact that money was made available or a deposit partakes the character of a loan on an ultimate analysis would not convert the money made available by the customers to the assessees as security deposit a borrowing or make the money "borrowed money" within the meaning of the rule. The transaction itself is described as a security deposit and in law a distinction is drawn always between a loan simpliciter and a deposit. In the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal and in view of the facts and circumstances of this case we have no hesitation in agreeing with the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that these security deposits are not borrowed money within the meaning of Rule 2A of Schedule II of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the negative and against the assessees and the Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (1) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ... ... ... ..... s the exemption itself excludes from its ambit incomes chargeable by reason of Section 42. As already stated, this case itself furnishes an instance where Section 42 of the Act may be applied to residents in British India with reference to profits earned by them in Native States, if there is a business connection, The effect of the application of Section 42 to such cases is to take away the exemption from liability granted by Section 14(2)(c) of the Act in respect of profits earned by residents of British India in Native States, if such profits are earned in consequence of a business connection with British India. For these reasons we are unable to follow the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Western India Life Insurance Company Ltd. 1945 13 ITR 405 and we hold that Section 42(1) of the Income-tax Act as amended in 1939 applies to residents as well as non-residents. The question referred to us is therefore answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1950 (1) TMI 11 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Magistrate to take up the case the proceeding shall be deemed to be based upon the complaint which has been duly filed within the period of limitation prescribed in the section. He shall, and I consider it is imperative, that he should allow the parties to adduce fresh evidence as the proceeding before the Honorary Magistrate, which includes examining and recording the evidence of witnesses, is bad in law. In case he is not a Magistrate competent, it is all hopeless for the complainant. He has absolutely no remedy. I invited the parties to settle their differences, so that some amount of compensation could have been awarded to the complainant, who, I have no doubt, has suffered losses on account of the illegal seizure. The matter of illegality of seizure is also in dispute and the petitioners stand on their right to have the case retried if the case does lie before a competent Magistrate. 7. In the result the petition is allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside.
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1950 (1) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e profits from the sale of all the gold bars became determinable." I am further of opinion that the assessee should get his costs from the department and I would assess them at ₹ 500. BY THE COURT.--Our answers to the two questions are, therefore, as follows - (1) In the circumstances of the case, the profits from the sale of the three gold bars sold on the 27th of April, 1943, have not been proved to have arisen from an "adventure in the nature of a trade" within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act and they are, therefore, not liable to income-tax. (2) If the profits arising from the sale of the gold bars made on the 27th of April, 1943, were profits which had arisen from an "adventure in the nature of a trade", they could be taxed before the entire profits from the sale of the gold bars became determinable. The assessee shall get his costs from the department which we assess at ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (1) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 573. /casereference In the last case judge Lord Greene /judge stated the position quite concisely in these terms "There is no definition of that expression (capital expenditure) which must, in their Lordships' opinion, be construed in a business sense save in so far as there may be rules of construction applicable to it. Their Lordships feel no doubt that in a business sense this expenditure is expenditure on revenue account and not on capital account.....". Applying the test laid down in that case we are of the opinion that the sum of ₹ 18,911-12-0 paid to the old partners by the new firm was an item of revenue expenditure and an admissible deduction in computing the profits of the new firm, the applicant in this reference. The second question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee having succeeded in this reference would be entitled to his costs which we fix at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (1) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nd therefore no question of deduction in respect of the sum of ₹ 4,500 allowed by Section 4(1)(c), third proviso, arose in the case. On the question whether Section 42 (1) applied to residents or whether it was confined in its application to non-residents as held by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, the Judicial Committee expressly reserved their opinion. The Bombay case has therefore no bearing on the present question. For these reasons, we answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. It follows from our answer to the first question that a portion of the profits, that is to say such portion as the Income-tax Officer thinks just and reasonable in the circumstances of the case, is attributable to the purchase of cotton made in British India by the agents of the assessee and such profits could be apportioned under Section 42(3) of the Act. The second question also is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1950 (1) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of Section 25(4) by reading the words "end of the previous year" as if they ran "end of the last year whose profits have been assessed to tax", or "the end of the year of account preceding the assessment year in which there has been a succession" and (6) to the anomalous and arbitrary consequences resulting from an acceptance of the construction contended for by the assessee in the imposition of different burdens and the grant of different standards of relief for taxpayers occupying the same position and falling within the same category, I am unable, with respect, to accept the contention of the assessee's learned advocate. I would therefore answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. As my learned brother holds a contrary opinion, his judgment which agrees with the view of the Appellate Tribunal and his direction for costs would prevail under Section 66A of the Income-tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (1) TMI 6 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Penalty for wrongful with holding of property ... ... ... ... ..... view that the non-summoning of the original notice would make a copy of it inadmissible cannot be right. Even otherwise the petitioner filed O.S. No. 193 of 1949 on the file of the District Munsif s Court, Kumbakonam, for the recovery of Rs. 292 from the company and he obtained a decree for the amount claimed with costs making the same a first charge on the very same movable items which the petitioner is alleged to have wrongfully retained. In view of that, there can be no doubt that the sum of Rs. 294-5-0 was actually due to the petitioner, and if for the amounts due to him which the management of the company did not pay, he retained with himself certain movables of the company, it cannot be said that his action is one which is wrongful, as contemplated in section 282A. I am therefore of opinion that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are illegal. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside, and the petitioner is acquitted. Fine, if paid, will be refunded.
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