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1971 (12) TMI 127 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... furnished by the accused himself on the second day after his purchase and that dagger contained human blood. One other important circumstance against the accused is the blanket that was found in his house which had human blood stains thereon. The murder of the deceased was in January in the coldest months in Simla and the possibility of the accused having taken a blanket to cover himself also fits in with the other evidence adduced by the prosecution. 19. There is in our view no justification for the High Court in jettisoning this cogent evidence of a conclusive nature on mere conjectures and on the omnibus ground that the witnesses were not independent or impartial which as we have shown is without justification. In our view the evidence in this case is sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused for an offence of murder. We accordingly set aside the judgment of acquittal of the High Court, convict the accused under Section 302 and sentence him to life imprisonment.
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1971 (12) TMI 126 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ordered to be put up on 1-2-63 when the decree-holder to take further steps", taken as a whole. The result must be that the stage covered by Order 21, Rule 23 was not over and when the judgment-debtor appeared on 1-2-63 and asked for time for filing objections, he must be held to have done so within the meaning of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 of Order 21. 30. There can be no justification to entertain a view that the Court while proceeding under Rule 23 had no powers to allow time thereafter to the judgment-debtor to file objections. Nor is it that the order to be passed on failure of judgment-debtor to appear has got to be something automatic and not after an application of the judicial mind. 31. Thus, when ultimately on 9-2-63 the objections were filed, it cannot but be said that these objections came up for consideration as contemplated under Order 21, Rule 23 (2), C. P. C. 32. For the aforesaid reasons, I would dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1971 (12) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... High Court can quash proceedings if them is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is 'reliable or not'. Where again, investigation into the circumstances of an alleged rocognisable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court was correct in dismissing the applications under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appeals are therefore dismissed. Counsel on behalf of the State stated that the cases against the appellant would commence soon. The State should keep that in view particularly because long time has been taken for investigation. Appeals dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... was not justified. The acquittal by the Session Judge cannot be said to be against the evidence or in disregard of evidence. Nor can the acquittal be said to be in violation of the principles of criminal jurisdiction. 10. The High Court in setting aside the acquittal said that the result would have been different if the Sessions Judge had taken into consideration the statement of Hazura Singh Exhibit P. 4 with which Hazura Singh had been confronted. In cross-examination Hazura Singh said that the statement before the Magistrate Exhibit P. 4 was made under threat and was a wrong statement. The Sessions Judge found that Hazura Singh made the same statement disowning the first information report. Hazura Singh was torn in his conscience between emotion for his son the appellant on the one hand and his wife Nihai Kaur and the deceased son Bharpur Singh on the other. 11. The High Court was wrong in setting aside the acquittal. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is set at liberty.
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1971 (12) TMI 123 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... f the appellants had made any improvements in the house at their own cost, that can be taken into consideration and equities can be adjusted by allotting the portion, in which improvements have been made, to the appellants in the partition. Another point urged by Shri Gupta was that the plaintiff could claim only 1/3 share and not 1/2 share in the property, but there appears to be no substance in this contention. Shri Sahasbrabudhe pointed out that the plaintiff could in fact claim 2/3 share in the property, because he was joint with Yeshwantrao who died issueless. But even assuming that Yoshwantrao was separate and his interest passed by succession, the deceased Baburao the original plaintiff, was a preferential heir under the Hindu Succession Act. The plaintiff is thus, in any case, entitled to half share in the property. No other point was pressed before me. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee according to scale, if certified.
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1971 (12) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... here is no conceivable reason why the consequences which would have followed from the alteration of the limits of the local area of Surat when it was a Municipal Borough should not follow when the same alteration takes place in the limits of the same local area of Surat after it is constituted into a City. 10. After fully considering the contentions raised on behalf of the State we are not satisfied that there is any such infirmity in the judgment of the High Court which makes it erroneous or would justify our taking a different view. It must be remembered that in the matter of interpretation of enactments which are in force in a particular State this Court generally attaches a good deal, of value to the views of the High Court of that State, particularly when they have been fully considered by it because that court is expected to be sufficiently conversant with the provisions of the various local enactments. 11. In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (12) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he Annual Wage Bill. If that finding is correct, the direction regarding set on will be justified under Section 15 of the Act. But as we have already held that parties are agreed that on a proper computation, on the basis, indicated by us in the earlier part of the judgment, even the bonus already paid at 17.58%, will be on the high side, it follows that the direction of the National Tribunal regarding set on cannot be accepted. 60. In the view that we have taken about the appellant's claim regarding direct taxes, it has been represented by the counsel appearing for the various unions that they are not pressing their appeals Nos. 813 and 1302 of 1967. 61. In the result, the Award of the National Tribunal is modified to the extent indicated above and Civil Appeal No. 415 of 1967 allowed in part. In other respects the said appeal will stand dismissed. Civil Appeals Nos. 813 and 1302 of 1967 are dismissed as not pressed. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.
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1971 (12) TMI 120 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e respondent. Suspicion by itself howsoever great, would not constitute proof of the offence against the respondent. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Gian Mahtani and another v. The State of Maharashtra and another , and Kami Ambu Vish v. The Stale of Maharashtra 197UD Scc 503(13), Reference was also made to some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. (44) We have kept these principles in view and our decision to reverse the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is in keeping with these authorities. (45) The result is that the appeal is accepted. The judgment of acquittal is reversed and the respondent is convicted of an offence under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act and Rule 126P(ii) of the defense of India Rules. He is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of ₹ 500.00 or in default of payment of fine to further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
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1971 (12) TMI 119 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... suit for, in the absence of such an averment, the plaintiffs would have no cause of action as against defendants No. 1 on the basis of that agreement. The provisions of the Code discussed above require that such a fact should have been specifically denied if an issue was sought to be raised in regard to it, or not admitted if the plaintiff was to be put to proof of that fact. A comprehensive denial of the nature that is to be found in para. 5 of the Written Statement of defendants No. 1 cannot, in my opinion, amount to a specific denial or a specific non-admission of such a fact. Defendants No. 1 not having denied the authority of defendants No. 2 to act as the agents of defendants No. 1 for the purpose of entering into the agreement pleaded in para. 6 of the plaint, I must, in view of the clear terms of Order XIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, decline to raise an issue in respect of the same in terms of issue No. 5 of the draft issues submitted by defendants No. 1.
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1971 (12) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... were produced. These statements were made at a time when no disputes had arisen and were made in connexion with a matter of local interest viz. the appointment of a new Sirdar. The Judicial Committee held that the documents carried greatest possible weight and could not be dismissed as mere self-assertions. Similarly in this case, the police reports in question were made by the government officials who are not shown to be inimically disposed towards the respondent or his party. They were made when there was no dispute and the dispute in question could not have been anticipated.- In view of the above conclusion, it is not necessary to go to the other contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, accept the election petition of the appellant and set aside the election of the respondent. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant both in this Court as well as in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1971 (12) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... transfer of the case, by Shri Ganguly to Shri Sarkar. The issue of process is a matter for judicial determination. Before issuing a process' the Magistrate has to examine the complainant. That is why the issue of process is by the Magistrate who has taken cognizance or the Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred. The High Court therefore correctly quashed the issue of process. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court should not have gone to the question as to whether a prima facie case was established or not. The High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure can go into the question as to whether there is any legal evidence. When the High Court said that the evidence in the present case came from tainted sources and was not reliable the High Court meant what can be described as 'no case to go to the jury'. The High Court correctly quashed the process against T. Ganguly. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 116 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ain Act there was no provision for assessing the escaped income but a provision had been made only in the Rules. The learned Judge held that where the main enactment is silent on the question of levy of escaped assessment, the Rules made under the Act cannot extend the charging power. Following the decision in Haji J.A. Kareem Sait v. Deputy Commercial-Tax Officer, Mettupalayam (1966)2MLJ396 referred to above, we hold that Rule 12 in so far as it seeks to extend the charging power under Section 3 of the Act is invalid and without jurisdiction. Ramakrishnan, J., however, without considering this aspect held that the rule is valid. In the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to deal with the only remaining question whether the impugned Rule contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of opinion that the notices issued seeking to assess the petitioner are without jurisdiction. 22. The Rule nisi issued is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1971 (12) TMI 115 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... it was not clear that the accounts had not been maintained. From Annexure C to the affidavit of Kishan Chand Seth, dated 2nd of June. 1971 it is evident that there is a difference in the items seized and the items received under the vouchers. One such item is Item No. 7 in Annexure C. Ten sets, weighing 636.400 grams were seized while only eight sets, weighing 636.400 grams were received as per vouchers. This shows an uncertainty in the mind of the officers effecting the seizure. The Act does not authorise the seizure of any article or ornament except that in respect of which any provision of the Act had been contravened or was being contravened or was attempted to be contravened. The affidavits filed on behalf of the Department, the stand taken by the Senior Standing Counsel. Central Government, and the facts narrated above will show that the seizure was effected without due regard to the provisions of Section 66 of the Act. 22. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1971 (12) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Courts (Amalgamation), Order, 1948 refers to legal proceedings, including civil cases, criminal cases, petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment, in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression "arising in such areas in Oudh" refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place of sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court. Question No. 5 -- Writ Petition No. 5833 of 1971 cannot be entertained, heard and decided by the judges sitting at Lucknow. 97. Let the papers of these petitions be laid before the Bench concerned with our opinion on the questions referred.
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1971 (12) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... which the applications of the respondents made in 1968 could be treated as valid applications. 13. The directions given by the High Court being thus unsustainable have to be set aside. In our view, the Commission and the State were perfectly justified in fixing a date for the examination and calling for fresh applications for all the vacancies to enable the Commission to prepare an approved list under and in accordance with the provisions of the amended Rule 5. The only direction which becomes necessary is that if any of the respondents or other candidates who had applied in 1968 has by this time become age barred by reason of the delay in holding the examination, he should not be disqualified from appearing in the examination if he was of the qualified age at the time when he had filed his application. 14. The appeal, for the foregoing reasons, is allowed and the High Court's judgment is set aside, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1971 (12) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... acquisition of the undertaking within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitutions and as such the writ petition and the appeal are not maintainable.” 2. It is stated that this ground goes to the very root of the matter but was not raised before the High Court. The appellants objected to this fresh ground being allowed to be taken up, but we consider that as this ground goes to very root of the matter it should be allowed after the appellants are compensated by costs. 3. We further consider that we would like to have the assistance of the views of the High Court on the matter as important questions are involved. The High Court may allow the appellants herein to file counter-affidavits in reply to the ground raised and then, after hearing the parties, forward outs report to us. 4. The miscellaneous petition is accordingly allowed and the cases remanded to the High Court. The respondents will pay to the appellants the costs of hearing on December 1, 1971, in any event.
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1971 (12) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... and another( 1949-50 F.C.R. 262) is correct and does not require reconsideration. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that there was no holding over by the appellants and if that be so, the question whether the tenancy created by holding over was for manufacturing purpose and therefore the landlord was bound to give six months’ notice for the determination of the tenancy by holding over does not arise for consideration. Appellants’ counsel prayed that the appellants may be given some time for vacating the premises. This Court, when passing the order on July 31, 1969, on the application for stay by the appellants had observed "Petitioner undertakes to vacate the premises within such time as may be fixed by this Court." We accordingly grant three months, time from today to the appellants to vacate the premises, and they have to comply with the undertaking given to this Court and referred to above. We dismiss the appeal with costs, G.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hicle used or kept for use in a public place in the State and a vehicle kept for use as a standby was therefore subject to levy under the taxing provisions. It was absolutely imperative for the owner of a fleet of buses to maintain some spare vehicles to be available for substitution in the case of a break-down. Every owner having five buses is required to maintain one spare bus and operators having more than ten buses are to keep two such buses available. Although they cannot be allowed to run regularly it is essential for the proper regulation of the transport business that some spare buses should be available to avoid inconvenience or hardship to passengers. Accordingly the levy of a tax on such buses which can at any time be put on the road is justified in like manner as in the case of regular buses as a compensatory levy. In the result, the appeals and the writ petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee. V. P. S. Appeals and petitions dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ir way into the State from outside. The transport of tendu leaves purchased outside but consigned to places within the, State to be used for the manufacture of bidis is not integrally connected with the State monopoly as envisaged in the Act. It stands to reason that manufacturers of bidis in the State of Madhya Pradesh would not think of importing tendu leaves from distant places like, Bihar and Maharashtra if they could help it and it must be the exigencies of the situation which drives a manufacturer of bidis to such course of action. In any event, the Act ought not to be construed so as to ban import of tendu leaves from outside the State or restrict their movement once they were within the State unless clear language was used in that behalf. If and when such express embargo is imposed, a question may arise as to whether it offends the different provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. S.C. Appeal dismissed.
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1971 (12) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... maximum limit of the tax has been prescribed, the absence of a minimum limit vitiates the taxing statute. It is not necessary, however, to dilate upon this aspect of the matter as we find that there are enough guidelines in the Act in respect of the rate of cess because the rate of cess in a division has to be corrected to the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the drainage scheme in that division. It may also be mentioned that subsequent to the decision of the writ petition which is the subject of the present appeal, validity of the provisions of the Act was challenged in a batch of writ petitions before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The matter was then referred to a full bench. The learned judges constituting the full bench by means of three separate judgments upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act. As a result of the above, the appeal and the writ petition are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without cost. Appeal and petition dismissed.
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