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2021 (2) TMI 1380 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Approach of NIA Court in granting bail despite earlier rejections - delay in trial proceedings before the NIA Court and the respondent languishing in jail for more than six years - Offences punishable u/s 125 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Applicability of proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAPA - Violation of Right to fair and speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution - non-consideration of relevant material and aspects while grant of bail - HELD THAT:- Merely because some prosecution witnesses had been examined, some of whom had turned hostile, could not be a ground to revisit findings on merits rendered twice over when earlier bail applications of the respondent were rejected. If such procedure of moving bail applications on merits upon examination of some prosecution witnesses is permitted, there would be no end to such applications being moved by the accused, thereby derailing the trial proceedings and asking the courts to revisit findings on merits on half baked evidence. If such an approach is permitted, the accused may move successive bail applications during the course of examination of further prosecution witnesses and conversely the prosecution may move applications for cancellation of bail already granted, by relying on evidence brought on record during the course of examination of prosecution witnesses. This cannot be permitted. This aspect was completely ignored by the NIA Court while passing the impugned order.
We are of the opinion that the fresh grounds on which the NIA Court proceeded in the present case in favour of the respondent cannot be said to be fresh grounds at all and merely because some of the prosecution witnesses stood already examined, it could not be a ground for re-visiting the findings already rendered against the respondent. Learned A.S.G. was also justified in relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay [2002 (3) TMI 945 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the consideration pertaining to grant of bail and cancellation of an order granting bail. It was laid down that non-consideration of relevant material and aspects while grant of bail and ignoring relevant material could be a ground for interfering with an order granting bail in the present case.
We are of the opinion that such approach cannot be countenanced particularly in the backdrop of the fact that the finding regarding prima facie truth about the accusations had been rendered twice over against the respondent when the earlier two bail applications were rejected on merits.
We are of the opinion that the NIA Court certainly ignored relevant considerations, including the reasoning given in earlier orders rejecting the applications for bail on merits. We are of the opinion that considering evidence of 49 witnesses already examined, when 107 witnesses remained to be examined, was an irrelevant consideration taken into account by the NIA Court while holding in favour of the respondent by the impugned judgment and order.
We are of the opinion that such findings rendered on the touchstone of proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAPA do not deserve to be re-visited by detailed consideration of the charge-sheet again, merely because some prosecution witnesses have been examined, which according to the respondent, do not seem to support the case of the prosecution. It would not be appropriate to comment upon the merits of the rival contentions. Suffice it to say that we believe that the findings rendered in the orders rejecting the earlier two bail applications of the respondent were justified. Therefore, insofar as the aforesaid aspect of the matter is concerned, the impugned judgment and order passed by the NIA Court cannot be sustained.
Right to fair and speedy trial is a right recognized under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - In the present case, the NIA Court has categorized the respondent in category (b) and, by applying the ratio of Shaheen Welfare Association [1996 (2) TMI 597 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held that since the respondent has spent more than five years in jail as an undertrial, he deserved to be granted bail, subject to two stipulations being satisfied. It was found that these two stipulations were firstly, that there was no likelihood of the trial being completed in the next six months, and secondly, that the respondent did not have any antecedents or that, if released, he would not be harmful to the complainant and witnesses or their family members.
It is an admitted position that the proceedings under the NIA Act are undertaken by the NIA Court once in every week and that the said court is also dealing with cases pertaining to other Special Acts like the MCOCA, TADA, POTA, etc. Therefore, there is every likelihood of the trial continuing for the next few years. There is also no dispute about the fact that even if convicted for the offence with which the respondent is charged, he could be sentenced for imprisonment for a period ranging between five years and life imprisonment. It is crucial that the respondent has undergone more than six years as an undertrial.
We are conscious of the fact that even a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed for the offence with which, the respondent has been charged under the UAPA and the IPC but, we cannot ignore the fact that the sentence could range between five years to imprisonment for life. This is particularly significant in the backdrop of the fact that the respondent has admittedly already undergone incarceration for more than six years while the trial is underway before the NIA Court.
Looking to the pace at which about 51 witnesses have been examined, which took more than five years for the NIA Court, there is clearly no likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable time in the near future. Therefore, we are of the opinion that on this aspect, no error can be attributed to the impugned judgment and order passed by the NIA Court, while holding in favour of the respondent.
Whether it can be said that releasing the respondent would amount to prejudicially affecting the trial and whether there would be possibility of influencing the witnesses and tampering with the evidence - We have observed that the respondent is an educated person, who was completing his graduation in Civil Engineering when he left for Iraq at the age of 21 years. He categorically stated before us that as a 21 year old, he was carried away and that he had committed a serious mistake, for which he had already spent more than six years behind bars. In the past more than six years of his incarceration, the respondent has argued his case on his own before the NIA Court. He represented his own case before this Court as well as the NIA Court and we could find that he was presenting his case by maintaining decorum and in a proper manner. During the course of hearing, it transpired that his father is a doctor of Unani medicine and his sisters are also doctors. His brother is an engineer. This shows that he comes from an educated family and that if stringent conditions are imposed upon him, with an undertaking to cooperate with the trial proceedings before the NIA Court, his release on bail may not be harmful to the society at large and it would not adversely affect the trial proceedings before the NIA Court. Therefore, we are of the opinion that on the second aspect of the matter, the findings rendered by the NIA Court need to be upheld.
Thus, although we have held that the findings rendered by the NIA Court on the merits of the matter in the impugned judgment and order are unsustainable and consequently they are set aside, on the second aspect of the matter pertaining to the long pendency of the trial and the respondent having already undergone incarceration for more than six years, we are inclined to uphold the impugned order on the said ground. Yet, we intend to impose further stringent conditions on the respondent while upholding his release on bail. Consequently, part of the impugned order deserves to be modified by imposition of further conditions.
Hence, the following order that - The impugned order dated 17/03/2020 passed by the NIA Court granting bail to the respondent accused is sustained on the ground of the respondent-accused having already undergone incarceration for more than six years and likelihood of the trial being delayed for considerable period - The respondent-accused Areeb Ejaz Majeed is released on bail
The appeal stands disposed of in above terms.
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2021 (2) TMI 1379 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, CHANDIGARH
Seeking initiation of CIRP against the corporate debtor - Compliance with requirements of the Code and Regulations made thereunder or not - Whether the requirements of the Code and Regulations made thereunder, have been complied with or not? - HELD THAT:- The successful resolution applicants confirmed by way of their respective affidavits (Annexure A-45) that they are not disqualified under Section 29A of the Code to submit a resolution plan or under any other law applicable, which further shows that the resolution plan conforms to the provisions of the law for the time being in force and did not contravene any such provision. The RP in the Form H referred above, has certified the same - the resolution plan fulfills all the requirements of Regulation 38 and 39 of the CIRP Regulations. A perusal of Regulation 38 would clearly show that by virtue of mandatory contents of resolution plan as discussed in the preceding paragraphs in relation to Section 30 and Section 31 of the Code, the requirement of Regulation 38 also stands fulfilled.
Even the requirement of Regulation 39 has been satisfied, as the RP has submitted that the resolution plan of Resolution applicant, as approved by the Committee of Creditors, to this Tribunal along with the compliance certificate in Form H, as per the requirements of Regulation 39(4) of the CIRP Regulations meets all the requirements of the Code and the CIRP Regulations and that the resolution plan has been duly approved by the Committee of Creditors.
The Resolution plan is accepted.
Seeking impleadment of the applicant - seeking approval of the resolution plan, on the ground that its rights are likely to be affected by the resolution plan approved by the COC, as it may prescribe the scaling down of the amounts to be paid to the operational creditors, including the applicant - HELD THAT:- The resolution plan dated 19.08.2020 along with addendum dated 30.09.2020, as approved by the COC satisfies all the requirements of the Code and Regulations made thereunder, no further orders are required in the instant application and accordingly, the same is dismissed.
Applications disposed off.
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2021 (2) TMI 1378 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Compromise decree passed in Lok Adalat on the ground of fraud - possession of suit property - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the petitioner and respondent Nos. 7 to 9 and 12 are the daughters of deceased Revaji. On going through the pleadings of said R.C.S. No. 374 of 2013 wherein there is no reference to the petitioner and respondent Nos. 7 to 9 and 12. On the other hand, plaint is silent and there is no pleading as to whether the daughters have relinquished their share in respect of the ancestral property. There are much substance in the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that deceased Revaji was suffering from severe health condition and the same is evident from the fact that within four months of institution of the suit deceased Revaji died. It further appears that the said R.C.S. No. 374 of 2013 was instituted on 18.6.2013 and it was compromised on 30.6.2013 i.e. within 12 days. Thus, prima facie, the contention raised about the fraud is sustainable.
The petitioner though is not party to the suit which was decreed in terms of the compromise before the Lok Adalat, however, the petitioner, as the aggrieved person, either can file a separate suit for seeking declaration that such decree would not be binding upon her share or the petitioner may file writ petition on the ground of fraud for setting aside the award passed in the Lok Adalat.
The impugned award of the Lok Adalat set aside - petition allowed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1377 - ITAT DELHI
Maintainability of revenue appeal on low tax effect - Revenue preferring appeal before the Tribunal, if the tax effect is less than Rs.50 lakhs - HELD THAT:- CBDT vide Circular dated 20th August, 2019 (F. No. 279/19-93/2018-ITJ), has clarified that it will apply to all pending appeals. Thus, in view of the aforesaid circular, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed as non-maintainable as the tax effect involved in the appeal is below Rs.50 lakhs. However, it is made clear that the Department is at liberty to file Miscellaneous Application for recalling of the order, if the tax effect is found to be more than the prescribed limit of Rs.50,00,000/- or any of the conditions etc., as available in the amendment carried out in para 10 of Circular No. 3/2018, dated 20.08.2018, is made out. Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1376 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Challenge to transaction by way of proceedings under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 - bank seeking to auction the property in favour of the respondent auction purchaser - HELD THAT:- Indeed, what the writ petitioner suggests in the present case is that the DRAT order impugned herein dated August 21, 2019 is wholly without jurisdiction and non-est as it is contrary to law. Though the bank seeks to indicate the description of the writ petitioner in the cause-title, the writ petitioner relies on the body of the petition to show that he has also instituted the writ petition in his capacity as a shareholder of the corporate debtor and as such shareholder of the company, he is entitled to bring it to the notice of a constitutional Court that a quasi-judicial tribunal had committed a grievous error in transgressing its authority and passing an order in breach of the statutory command as contained in Section 14 of the Code of 2016. Thus, the initial ground urged by the bank is negatived.
The bank seeks to assert that the proceedings before the DRAT could not be seen to be a suit or continuation of any suit and even goes to the extent of suggesting that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution may not lie against an order passed by a DRAT, though a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution may be brought. It is too late in the day to suggest that a writ petition against a quasi-judicial authority will not lie under Article 226 of the Constitution and the grievance has to be carried only by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The embargo under Section 14 of the Code of 2016 was expressly brought to the notice of the DRAT, but it appears to have bludgeoned its way through nonetheless. In so doing, the DRAT acted completely without jurisdiction as there can be no greater bar than a statutory prohibition to check any adjudicating authority in carrying on its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functioning.
For whatever it is worth, notwithstanding the practical effect of this order being close to nothing, once it is brought to the notice of a constitutional Court that a quasi-judicial authority had acted in error or excess of jurisdiction and in derogation of a statutory mandate, the constitutional authority has per force to correct the mistake. As a consequence, the order of the DRAT passed on August 21, 2019 and challenged in the present writ petition is set aside and the matter restored to the board of the relevant DRAT at the stage immediately prior to the date when the order was passed.
As far as the merits of the DRAT decision is concerned, the same is not required to be gone into, particularly in this jurisdiction and once it is noticed that the order itself was without jurisdiction.
It is hoped that the matter receives the DRAT's attention at the earliest so as not to prejudice the bank and the auction purchaser who has put in a sum in excess of Rs. 5 crore and has waited so long to enjoy the fruits of its substantial investment - Petition allowed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1375 - CESTAT CHENNAI
Maintainability of appeal - HELD THAT:- The Department has filed letter before the Registry along with list of cases, submitting that the cases have been closed as the assessee has opted for SABKA VISHWAS scheme. The above case is also included in the said list. The assessee has conceded to this.
As the matter is closed, the appeal is dismissed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1374 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Framing of charges - Whether the instant case can be termed as an appropriate case and the further proceedings against the petitioner to be an abuse of process of court, warranting interference under Section 482, despite the bar under Section 397(3)? - HELD THAT:- The learned Sessions Judge rightly found the trial court to have committed a mistake by holding that the charge does not mention the offence under Section 420 IPC. The first charge, which is general to all the accused, include the offence under Section 420. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that the Government of Sikkim having clarified that the amounts due to it has been paid by the accused and having issued Annexure A15, stating that there are no dues from the distributor and having even refused to grant consent to the CBI to conduct investigation against its officials, the offence under Section 420 will not be attracted. It is contended that the person alleged to have been deceived being the Government of Sikkim, the petitioner cannot be proceeded against for the offence of cheating, in the absence of a complaint in that regard from the Government of Sikkim.
Other than the Government of Sikkim, the Government of Kerala and the accused, the major stakeholders are the public who have purchased the tickets under the belief that the lottery was being conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. By conducting the lottery in violation of the provisions, the public, who spent money for purchasing the lottery tickets, was deceived. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that the Government of Sikkim has no complaint, the offence under Section 420 is attracted. Moreover, if during the course of trial, it is found that the officials with the Government of Sikkim are also part of the conspiracy, the trial court can exercise its power under Section 319 to proceed against those persons also.
The substantial contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel having been answered, there is no special circumstance in this case which compels this Court to entertain a second revision and grant relief, in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Appeal dismissed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1373 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Right to fair trial - privacy and dignity of the individual - sovereignty/integrity of the country - whether there could be reasonable restrictions that could be imposed considering the nature of the investigation that is currently taking place? - right to free speech and the right of the public to know - HELD THAT:- This Court has had the opportunity to view the videos, which have been placed on record of News18 and several other materials, which have been revealed from the record including the tweets by of Delhi Police and other publications which are online. There is no doubt that the regulation of content in print and electronic media has been a very contested issue across the world and India is no exception to that. The reasons for the same are not far to seek in as much as content regulation is viewed as being directly affrontive to the Right of free speech.
The question that arises is what should be the ad interim directions that ought to be passed, if any, in order to ensure that all the three aspects – the Petitioner’s privacy, dignity and right of fair trial - the sovereignty and integrity of the country - & the right to free speech are equally protected and balanced. The various cases which are placed on record have laid down two principles which are clear that the right of the individual has always to be balanced with the right of the public and the public interest which is involved.
The print and electronic media plays a very important role in ensuring that there is no sensationalism and that they adhere to responsible journalism. Recent coverage by the media definitely shows that there is sensationalism. While police briefings and the happenings in Court proceedings etc. can also be broadcasted and disseminated, leaked investigation material ought not to be disseminated so as to prejudice the investigation.
The Delhi Police will strictly abide by the affidavit dated 18th February, 2021, which has been filed today as also the Office Memorandum dated 1st April, 2010, which is, admittedly, still in operation. The Delhi Police or other investigation authorities would, however, be, in terms of the said OM, entitled to conduct their briefings in accordance with law so long as no rights of the Petitioner are violated - Media houses shall also ensure that the telecast/broadcast by them is from verified/authenticated sources, though the sources need not be revealed. All disseminated content shall be in strict adherence to the `Programme Code’ as contained in the Cable Television Networks Rules 1994 as also the Code of Ethics & Broadcasting Standards prescribed by the News Broadcasters Association.
List the matter for further hearing on 17th March, 2021.
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2021 (2) TMI 1372 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application seeking Grant of anticipatory bail - carrying Swiss 1 kg Gold 995 Bars weighing about 2797 gms - Offence committed u/s 135 of the Customs Act - HELD THAT:- This court finds that there is a case registered/about to be registered against the applicant. It cannot be definitely said when the police may apprehend him. After the lodging of FIR the arrest can be made by the police at will. There is no definite period fixed for the police to arrest an accused against whom an FIR has been lodged. The courts have repeatedly held that arrest should be the last option for the police and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative or his custodial interrogation is required. Irrational and indiscriminate arrests are gross violation of human rights.
In the case of Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1994 (4) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT] the Apex Court has referred to the third report of National Police Commission wherein it is mentioned that arrests by the police in India is one of the chief source of corruption in the police. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental rights and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative. According to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the peculiar case the arrest of an accused should be made
Hence without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and considering the nature of accusations and antecedents of applicant, the applicant may be enlarged on anticipatory bail as per the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2020 (1) TMI 1193 - SUPREME COURT] The future contingencies regarding anticipatory bail being granted to applicant shall also be taken care of as per the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court.
The anticipatory bail application is allowed.
This Court directs that till filing of the chargesheet, in the event of arrest, the accused-applicant, shall be released forthwith on bail on furnishing a personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Arresting officer/Investigating Officer/ S.H.O. concerned on the conditions.
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2021 (2) TMI 1371 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Maintainability of writ petition - territorial Jurisdiction - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - Validity and/or legality of the registration of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) in proceedings in ECIR. No. KCZO/4/2014, dated 19.08.2014 - Validity of provisional attachment order - it was held by High Court that Thus, first of all, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable before this Court, when there is an efficacious alternative remedy available for the petitioners to approach the concerned authority under the PMLA; secondly, only a small fraction of cause of action had arisen before this Court and the larger and substantial part of cause of action had arisen only in the State of Kerala, where the FIRs have been registered and the trial is pending before the Special Court at Kerala.
HELD THAT:- This writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. Liberty is given to the petitioners to work out their remedies in the manner know to law before the appropriate forum.
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2021 (2) TMI 1370 - ITAT DELHI
Taxability of income in India - Determination of taxability of the payment received as a consideration for data transmission services - royalty receipts - PE in India or not? - whether assessable as business profits in India? - whether AO erred in holding that the payments received by the Appellant as consideration for data transmission services are in the nature of ‘Royalty’ as defined under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act and Article 12(4) of the DTAA.
HELD THAT:- The matter is in litigation since last many years starting AY 2006-07 and upto AY 2014-15. The AO in his draft order, brought out that the department is in appeal before Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case of the assessee which has been admitted. It has to be borne in mind that the panel is an extension of the assessment process and the AO is now bound by the directions of DRP. Accordingly, the matter needs to be kept alive in view of its pendency before the Apex Court. The panel accordingly upholds the adjustment made by the AO in this matter. The objections are rejected.
Before us, the ld. CIT DR fairly submitted that the additions have been made as the revenue is filed appeal against the order of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court and the matter is being agitated before the Hon’ble Apex Court.
From the above, it is clear that the addition made by the AO is due to the fact that the revenue is agitating the issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Since, the matter stands adjudicated in favour of the assessee as on today, we hold that the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court is applicable to the appeal before us. Appeal of assessee allowed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1369 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Levy of GST on the value of broken rice, bran and husk obtained by the petitioner on custom milling of the paddy - HELD THAT:- When the matter is taken up for hearing, learned counsel for petitioner would submit that the subject matter in this writ petition is squarely covered by the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.45971 of 2018, dated 20.11.2020 [2021 (1) TMI 175 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] and the same order may be passed in this writ petition also.
Following the above said order and for the reasons recorded therein, this writ petition is also allowed and the assessment order passed by the 1st respondent levying GST on the value of by-products i.e., broken rice, bran and husk treating them as part of the consideration paid to the petitioner for custom milling of the paddy, is set aside. However, it is made clear that the petitioner is liable to pay tax on sale of by-products if they are statutorily taxable.
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2021 (2) TMI 1368 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI
Seeking for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor/Company in Liquidation - HELD THAT:- In the present instant, since the Corporate Debtor has been sold as a going Concern, the Liquidator approaching this Tribunal for dissolution of the Corporate Debtor does not arise. In the absence of the dissolution, the life of the Company is not extinguished and continues to survive, albeit, in the hands of the successful bidder viz., the Applicant herein. The Applicant is required to be aware of the above consequences and most of the reliefs as sought having been taken care of in terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale being the bargain between the parties and also taking into consideration the above position of law that the Corporate Debtor continues in existence and not dissolved.
Further in relation to the constitution of the Board of Directors in Paragraph No. 21, it has been pointed out that it is open to the Applicant to constitute Board as per the Companies Act, 2013 and individuals concerned to act accordingly, since the Applicant has purchased the Unit as a going concern - However, in relation to exemption of Stamp Duty and Tax payment and other concessions, it has been observed that it is for the Authorities accordingly to consider the requests of the Applicant. Similarly, if any concessions or any exemptions are being sought by the Applicant herein, it is for the Authorities to consider the same.
Application disposed off.
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2021 (2) TMI 1367 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
Seeking impleadment as a necessary party - pre-admission stage under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - HELD THAT:- The ground projected by the Appellant in his capacity as Resolution Professional of NDL for seeking impleadment in pending consideration before the Adjudicating Authority does not warrant impleadment of Appellant as party Respondent. In an application under Section 7, the Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor alone are the necessary party and the Adjudicating Authority is, at the pre-admission stage, only required to satisfy itself that there is a financial debt in respect whereof the Corporate Debtor has committed a default warranting triggering of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority is required to satisfy itself in regard to there being a financial debt and default thereof on the part of the Corporate Debtor besides the application being complete as mandated under Section 7(5) of the ‘I&B Code’ and then pass an order of admission or rejection on merit as mandated under sub-section (4) of Section 7 within 14 days. No third party intervention is contemplated at that stage.
No lengthy hearing is warranted at the pre-admission stage nor can the dispute in regard to shareholding or inter se directorial issue be entertained.
There are no legal infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Adjudicating Authority. The course open to Appellant would be to apprise the IRP of the admission of the claim in CIRP of NDL if the application under Section 7 pending before the Adjudicating Authority is admitted and IRP is appointed. Such situation may not arise if the Adjudicating Authority is not satisfied about debt and default.
Appeal dismissed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1366 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Disallowance u/s 14A - AO recording of dissatisfaction as regards the disallowance voluntarily made by the Appellant - HELD THAT:- As decided in [2020 (1) TMI 1473 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] From perusal of Section 14A of the Act, it is evident that for the purposes of computing the total income under this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of the expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation of the income which does not form part of his total income under the Act. The expenditure, the return of investment and cost of requisition are distinct concepts. Therefore the word ‘incurred’ in Section 14A of the Act have to be read in the context of the scheme of the Act and if so read, it is clear that it disallows certain expenditures incurred to earn exempt income from being deducted from other incomes which is includable in the total income for the purposes of chargeability to the tax. It is equally well settled that expenditure is a pay out.
In order to attract applicability of section 14A of the Act, there has to be a pay out and return of investment or a pay back is not such a debit item. [See: WALFORT SHARE AND STOCK BROKERS (P) LTD [2010 (7) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT] as well as MAXOP INVESTMENTS LTD [2018 (3) TMI 805 - SUPREME COURT]. In the instant case, the assessee has admittedly not incurred any expenditure. This case pertains to income on dividend, which by no stretch of imagination can be treated to be an expenditure to attract the provisions of Section 14A.
MAT applicability - The provisions of Section 115JA do not apply to the banking companies
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2021 (2) TMI 1365 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Refusal to accept the application of Appellant seeking modification of order dated 19th July, 2018 - direction in the name of Resolution Professional to abide the terms and conditions of four work orders - direction to not take charge or control of the current account operated by the AppellantCIRP being at an advanced stage and liquidator having been appointed - HELD THAT:- It is opined that the appeal can be disposed off without issuing notice to Respondents - the notice is dispensed with - Since a liquidator has been appointed, under provisions of Section 38 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (I&B Code) it is enjoined upon the liquidator to receive and collect the claims of the creditors within a period of 30 days from the date of commencement of liquidation process. The liquidator, being a quasi-judicial authority, is empowered to admit or reject the claim, in whole or in part and such determination is subjected to appeal under the provisions embodied in Section 42 of the I&B Code. The appeal lies to the Adjudicating Authority i.e. NCLT.
In view of these statutory provisions, there is no difficulty in holding that the Appellant would not be precluded from filing its claim before the liquidator. The impugned order cannot be construed to curtail or prejudicially affect this statutory right. In fact, the Adjudicating Authority itself has observed that the Appellant would be entitled to lodge his claim before the Competent Court/ Authority.
The impugned order need not be interfered with, which does not suffer from any legal infirmity - this appeal is disposed off in the light of foregoing observations giving liberty to the Appellant to approach the liquidator with its claim within one week from today.
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2021 (2) TMI 1364 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy of appeal - petitioner says that in order to send the petitioner before Tribunal, the writ court has to first hold that the refund application made by the petitioner is maintainable otherwise the appeal will not lie.
HELD THAT:- Let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within a period of four weeks; reply, if any within a period of two weeks thereafter.
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2021 (2) TMI 1363 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Suspension of the period of limitation to file written statement - denial Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the present case, the prescribed time to file written statement by the applying defendants had expired on March 8, 2020 or thereabouts, at least way before the order dated March 23, 2020 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 [2020 (5) TMI 418 - SC ORDER] came into being. The order dated March 23, 2020 has prescribed that the same is to be construed to be effective from March 15, 2020. The original period of 30 days to file written statement by the applying defendants had expired much before March 15, 2020.
The order dated March 23, 2020 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the subsequent orders with regard to the period of limitation has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagufa Ahmed and others [2020 (9) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT] by stating that, “what was extended by the above order of this Court was only ‘a period of limitation’ and not the period of limitation up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by this statute”.
Section 16 of the Act of 2015 has laid down that, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule. In sub-section (2) thereof it has specified that, the Commercial Division and the Commercial Court shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by the Act of 2015 in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value.
The second proviso to Order V Rule 1 and the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 as have been amended by the Act of 2015, has prescribed an outer limit of 120 days for filing of written statement by a defendant, from the date of service of the writ of summons on such defendant. This period of 120 days has been divided into two parts. The first part is of 30 days from the date of service of the writ summons on the defendant. In this period of 30 days, the defendant is entitled to file written statement in the suit, unquestionably - The original period of limitation for filing written statement has been prescribed to be 30 days with a condonable period of 90 days thereafter being available to the Court to condone the delay in filing the written statement within 30 days, provided the Court records the reasons for doing so and the defendant pays such costs at the Court may deem fit. The object of the Act of 2015 has been stated to provide for speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes.
The applying defendants have not ascribed any reason as to why the applying defendants could not file written statement within the period of 30 days from the date of service of the writ of summons on them. In the facts of the present case, it is found that the applications of the applying defendants for extension of time to file written statement to be bereft of material particulars. The applying defendants have not exhibited any promptness in having the written statements prepared and filed.
Application dismissed.
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2021 (2) TMI 1362 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA
Violations of provisions of PFUTP Regulations, 2003 - misleading appearance of trading in the scrip to the market participants - Whether the Noticees are connected entities? - HELD THAT:- As observed from records that some of the connected group entities have been made Noticees in the instant proceedings while some other entities have been reportedly proceeded against in separate proceedings including adjudication proceedings. Be that as it may, the Board has set its criteria and exercised intelligible differentia while selecting cases/entities for proposing action and the Noticees cannot plead innocence by merely basing their arguments on such extraneous reasons.
Also find it appropriate to observe that though the Noticees have claimed parity with the other entities, who have not been proceeded with, however, these Noticees have not brought any specific instance to my attention which are factually identical or similar to that of the entities so as to stake a claim that they also ought to have been exonerated from the instant proceedings. Considering the foregoing, Reject this contention of the Noticees in limine and do not find it necessary to further deal with this contention.
These entities are found to be connected to each other and almost all of their trades have been entered with the connected entities and from their unusual trading pattern in the scrip of the Company, it cannot be stated with confidence that the trades executed by them were mere coincidences without there being any commonality between the Noticees and their trading pattern do not in the scrip of Rutron do not suggest for abnormality. It can be reasonably concluded that the Noticees are enjoying close proximities as well as close connection amongst themselves.
Whether the acts of the Noticee nos. 12, 13 and 14 during Patch-1 of the Investigation period have resulted in violations of the provisions of regulation 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and regulation 4 (1) and 4 (2) (a) and (e) of SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003? - 3 Noticees have failed to give any plausible reason/explanation to defend themselves against the charges levelled against them in the SCN. Further, the roles played by the 3 Noticees to artificially increase the price during the Patch-1 need to be perceived as the acts of a united group of entities which was aimed at manipulating the price of the scrip of Rutron over a period of time by cumulatively contributing to the LTP of the scrip during the Patch-1 of the Investigation Period. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble SAT and after considering the trading pattern, and the manner and frequency with which such trades were executed by the 3 Noticees, as constrained to hold that the Noticee nos. 12, 13 and 14 were not acting as genuine market participants and had no bona fide intention to trade in the shares of Rutron.
Therefore, hold that the trading behavior of Noticees nos. 12 to 14 during Patch-1 of the Investigation Period of vis-à-vis the scrip of Rutron has been conspicuously ill motivated, fraudulent and was targeted to manipulate the price of the shares of Rutron hence, is in violation of regulations 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and 4 (1), 4 (2) (a), (e) of SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003.
Whether the acts of the Noticee nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, and 11 during Patch-2 of Investigation Period have resulted in violations of the provisions of regulation 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and regulation 4 (1) and 4 (2) (a) and (e) of SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003? - As unusual LTP contributing trades executed amongst the connected entities strengthens the allegations made in the SCN that these trades have been deliberately executed with a fraudulent intent of manipulating the price and causing misleading appearances of trading in the scrip, thereby causing inducement to the investors at large., It is highly inconceivable that the trades of the 6 Noticees executed on an anonymous trading platform matched with their connected entities on a numerous occasions by sheer coincidence of matching of orders and not by any pre-set design keeping in view the inter se nexus that existed amongst the 6 Noticees during the relevant period.
In fact, the repeated matching of such orders suggests how these 6 Noticees have deployed a strategy to defeat the objective of even an anonymous trading platform and have successfully ensured that their trades match with each other as per their preconceived strategy to mark up the price of the scrip of the Company. Therefore, in my considered view, the alleged trades can’t by any standard be categorized as trades executed in normal course of trading in securities market.
As glaringly show that the trading conduct of Noticee nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 11 was evidently laced with malicious intent and fraudulent motive, hence, on the basis of the reasons recorded above, hold that the Noticee nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 11 have violated regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and regulation 4(1), 4(2) (a) and (e) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003 while trading in the scrip of Rutron during Patch-2 of the Investigation period.
Whether the acts of the Noticee nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 during Patch-3 of Investigation Period have resulted in violations of the provisions of regulation 3 (a), (b), (c), (d) and regulation 4 (1) and 4 (2) (a) and (e) of SEBI (PFUTP) Regulations, 2003? - As manner and frequency with which such trades were executed by the above noted six Noticees, we are constrained to hold that the Noticee nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 were not acting as genuine market participants and had no bona fide intention to trade in the shares of Rutron.
As having found that the charges levelled against Noticees in the SCN stand established, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Sections 11(1), 11(4) and 11B(1) read with Section 19 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, hereby hold that considering the volume of trades executed and percentage of contribution to the LTP by the Noticees and their impact on the price of the scrip of Rutron, it would be proper and in the interest of Securities Market that such entities should be restrained from being associated with the Securities Market and accordingly, restrain all the Noticees from accessing the securities market and further prohibit them from buying, selling or otherwise dealing in securities, directly or indirectly, or being associated with the securities market in any manner, for a period of six (06) months from the date of this Order.
As clarified that during the period of restraint, the existing holding of securities of the Noticees including units of mutual funds, shall remain frozen.
Obligation of the aforesaid Noticees in respect of settlement of securities, if any, purchased or sold in the cash segment of the recognized stock exchange (s), as existing on the date of this Order, can take place irrespective of the restraint/prohibition imposed by this Order, only in respect of pending unsettled transactions, if any. Further, all open positions, if any, of the aforesaid Noticees in the F&O segment of the stock exchange, are permitted to be squared off, irrespective of the restraint/prohibition imposed by this Order.
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2021 (2) TMI 1361 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT
Default in payment of loan instalments - non-service of possession notice - HELD THAT:- The grounds urged by the petitioners that they were not served with sale notice under Rule 8(6), and 30 day notice period fixed there under was not given to them to clear the loan, and to redeem the property, is found to be not correct, and the Bank has followed the due procedure as envisaged under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, and the Rules of 2002, and further, the petitioners have suppressed the material facts with regard to filing of securitization applications before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and the facts and circumstances manifestly disclose that they are resorting to dilatory and subterfuge tactics, to see that the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank, are defeated. This cannot be appreciated.
For suppression of material facts, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary cost - Petition dismissed with costs.
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