Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 42 Records
-
1962 (5) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... may be considered. The High Court in setting aside the order of the Revenue Tribunal exercised jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution, and it was urged by counsel for the appellants that this was not a fit case for exercise of that jurisdiction. But the Legislature has expressly prohibited by s. 29(2) of the Act, landlords from obtaining possession of any lands otherwise than under an order of the Mamlatdar. The possession of the disputed land was obtained by the appellants in execution of the award of the debt adjustment Court and without an order of the Mamlatdar. The respondent was therefore unlawfully dispossessed of the land, and the Revenue Authorities in refusing to give him assistance illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. The question being one of jurisdiction, the High Court was, in our view, competent to exercise the powers vested in it by Art. 227. 9. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. 10. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... t the interests of the plaintiffs and other members of the tarwad. It would, therefore, be legitimate for us to assume that the power of attorney empowered the third defendant to sell family property with the consent of the other adult members of the family for family necessity if he formed the opinion that it was necessary to do so. The fact that plaintiff No. I executed the power of attorney before leaving for Borneo and thereafter several properties were alienated by the Mukthiar in conjunctions with the other anandravans and none of the alienations except the one in suit has been challenged by the plaintiff No. 1 in all these years justifies the inference that these dispositions were in pursuance of the power of attorney and also that power of attorney was itself executed by the plaintiff No. 1 in pursuance of a family karar. Upon this view, therefore the appeal must succeed. The appellants costa shall throughout be borne by the plaintiffs-respondents. 25. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
... ... ... ... ..... any profits being earned, are admissible allowance under Clause (xv) and the Sub-section (4) does not apply to them. Although Income Tax may be popularly described as due for a certain year, it is not in law so due. It is calculated and assessed by reference to the income of the assessee for a given year and when demand is made under Sections 29 and 45, it then becomes a debt due to Government. 38. The amount of the provision for payment of Income Tax and super-tax, in the instant case, is in my view akin to a debt 'growing due' and the same is an apt expression to cover the said contingency. It seems to intend something that in course of time it may ripen into a debt, that is, it is only an inchoate state at the commencement. In the instant case when the words 'debt owed' have been intentionally used by the Legislature, they mean ascertained or certain amount which is opposed to inchoate, contingent, future, un-ascertained, uncertain or imperfect obligations.
-
1962 (5) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... aised in the application is with respect to the assessability of the sum of ₹ 1,16,259 not in one lump sum in the assessment year in question but in smaller sums of money in different assessment years from 1938-39 to 1947-48. This question also does not appear to have been raised before the Tribunal and, therefore, does not arise out of its order. In any case the title of the assessee having been established only in the assessment year 1948-49 and the entire sum also having been received in the accounting period relevant to that assessment year the whole amount was properly assessable in the year 1948-49. This disposes of the application No. 172 of 1962. Our answer to each of the questions in the reference is in the negative. A copy of this order should be sent to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad. The department should get the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Application No. 172 of 1962 is dismissed. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1962 (5) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... fresh inquiry on this question. The plaintiff should on remand be required to suitably amend the plaint so as to convert the suit into one for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage of the year 1916. The first defendant will then file his written statement in answer thereto. An issue will be framed whether Rajanna was a major at the time when the sale deed was cancelled. If it is held that he was a major then the possession of the first defendant thereafter would be adverse and on the findings given by the Courts below the suit will have to be dismissed as barred by limitation. But if it is held that Rajanna was then a minor, then there would be no question of adverse possession and the plaintiff would be the entitled to redeem the mortgage. The decree of the lower court is accordingly set aside and the matter remanded to the court of the District Munsiff for fresh disposal as stated above. Costs incurred throughout in all the Courts will abide the result. 9. Case remanded.
-
1962 (5) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hat is not a case of redemption at all. At the moment when the rents and profits of the mortgaged property sufficed to discharge the principal secured by the mortgage, the mortgage came to an end and the correlative right arose in the mortgagor 'to recover possession of the property'. The framers of the Transfer of Property Act have clearly recognised the distinction between the procedure which follows a mortgagor's desire to redeem a subsisting mortgage and the procedure which follows the arising of a usufructuary mortgagor's right to get his property back after the principal has been paid off." 17. We therefore hold that the mortgage was not subsisting on the date of vesting, it having come to an end on payment of the mortgage money in 1943, and that the respondents cannot get the advantage of s. 6(1)(c) of the Act. 18. We therefore dismiss the review petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 19. Petition dismissed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... recalled. But it was during the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage that the second notification was issued cancelling the first. Hence, the Court was bound to apply the law as it was found on the date of its judgment. Hence, there is no question of taking away any vested rights in the landlords. It does not appear that the second notification, cancelling the first notification, had been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge, who heard and decided the second appeal in the High Court. At any rate, there is no reference to the second notification. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the learned Judge came to the right conclusion in holding that the tenants could not be ejected, though for wrong reasons. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but there would be no order as to costs in this Court, in view of the fact that the respondents had not brought the second notification cancelling the first to the pointed attention of the High Court. 9. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... to show cause before penalty for failure to pay the demand was levied. The levy of penalties therefore is wholly unsustainable. For these reasons I would direct that a writ ofmandamus will issue requiring the Income-tax Officer not to treat the assessee as an assessee in default, till the disposal of the appeals for the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and not to enforce recovery of the demands for the sums of ₹ 9,177-89 nP. and ₹ 58,971-58 nP., respectively, for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57. A writ of mandamus will also issue requiring the Income-tax Officer to effect all revisions and adjustments and to finally settle the up to date account of demands and payments of the petitioner without further delay. A writ of certiorari is also directed to issue quashing the orders dated 22nd January, 1962, imposing penalties of ₹ 917 and ₹ 5,897 for the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57 respectively. This writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs.
-
1962 (5) TMI 48 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... o repair the kohlus keeping them in readiness for use during the next season. In Sadhucharan Roy Chowdhry In re it was held by the High court that even if the repairs were to be carried by the licensee, the owner was entitled to the normal depreciation. The expression "worked" in proviso (2) does not mean "worked continuously for the entire year". A different construction would lead to absurd result. It would means that even where the factory is closed on account of normal holidays or for repairs or on account of normal closing hours, depreciation would not be allowed for that period. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of proviso (2) to rule 8, and his claim for depreciation for the entire year was justified. I would, accordingly, answer in the affirmative the question referred to us. Parties are left to bear their own costs. S. B. CAPOOR J. - I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (5) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... f the Act stated that Mau Nath Bhanjan was not a municipality during the relevant period. That application, however, was made after the decision by the Tribunal. Besides, it is not mentioned in that application that even in the records of the town area of Mau Nath Bhanjan, the house stands in the name of the assessee. It also appears that in some years, subsequent to the alleged date of transfer, the assessee himself has shown the income from the house to be his. A gift without a simultaneous transfer of possession is not valid. Consequently, the Tribunal, in our opinion, is right in holding that the house belonged to the assessee and not to his wife. We, therefore, answer the second question in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the result, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee and the second question in the affirmative arid against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1962 (5) TMI 46 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nd Manilal Dhanji's case (supra). It is to be remembered that both the expressions "trustee" and "on behalf of" appear in the Income-tax Act of 1922, though the Indian Trusts Act is of the year 1882. In the instant case the shares of persons on whose behalf the income is received by the assessee are determinate and the assessment on the assessee will be a separate assessment for each of the persons on whose behalf the income is received. Therefore Question No. 1 is not pressed and needs no answer. Question No. 2-First part is answered in the negative and the second part is answered in the affirmative, that is to say, the answer is that the provisions of section 41, Income-tax Act, were applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and the assessment should be made as a separate assessment for each of the persons on whose behalf the income is received. There will be no order for costs in this reference. G.K Mitter J - I agree Order accordingly.
-
1962 (5) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ilitate against the validity of the partnership. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in B.R. Naik v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 ITR 124 . It may also be pointed out that whereas under section 239 of the Contract Act the definition of "partnership" required not merely the agreement to share profits but also the agreement to combine "property, labour and skill", the definition in section 4 of the Partnership Act widened the scope of the agreement by removing the words "property, labour and skill" from the definition and thus doing away with the limitation effected by those words. The Tribunal has already pointed out that under section 20 of the Partnership Act the power of a partner may be extended or restricted. For all these reasons the answer to the question referred to us should be in the negative and against the department. The reference should be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal with this answer.
-
1962 (5) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e used in clause (b) of sub-s. (3) which deals with a suit for eviction which does not come within clause (a) and provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed in such a suit if on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. It is clear that where the legislature intended to give some benefit to the tenant on account of the payment of the arrears during the pendency of the suit, it made a specific provision. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that the Court has no discretion and has to pass a decree for eviction if the other conditions of sub-s. (2) of s. 12 of the Act are satisfied. 33. The result therefore is that this appeal fails, and is accordingly dismissed with costs. 34. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e. It is not also reasonable, in my opinion, to expect that a lay client should be able to' argue his appeal. To ask the appellant personally, in the circumstances like these, to argue the appeal is to ask for the impossible. It appears to me to be neither fair nor just that, when a Counsel' suddenly withdraws from a case, the lay client should be asked to argue the appeal himself. Justice, in my opinion, requires that in such a case the client should be given some time-however short-to engage a Counsel. I am constrained to think that the action of the High Court in refusing the appellant's prayer for time to engage a counsel and to call on him to argue the case himself was not in the interests of justice. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I would therefore allow the appeal and remand the case to the High Court for a proper hearing of the appeal before it. By Court. In accordance with the opinion, of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with 'Costs.
-
1962 (5) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... on should be recognised with effect from May 19, 1945, it was information within the meaning of section 34 and proceeding could properly be taken under that section. Thus, even if assessment made on the smaller unit was an assessment under section 34, it was validly made under that section and, as it was made in pursuance of an appellate order of the Tribunal, the bar of four year period of limitation did not apply to such assessment. Thus, whether the fresh assessment is treated as in a class by itself independently of section 23 or 34 or an assessment under section 34, it was valid and was not barred by limitation. The result is that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessments were valid even though they were made after the expiry of four years from the end of the various assessment years in question. The department should get its costs of this reference in the sum of ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (5) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot a substantive enactment is sufficient to turn the scale heavily in favour of the State. 28. On a consideration of the scheme of the Act, and it provisions, we are of opinion that s. 29 is severable from the other portions of the Act, and that its invalidity does not affect the validity of s. 19. 29. In Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961 a contention was also raised that the pistol of which the appellant was in possession was not in a fit condition to be effectively used, and it had no chamber, and it therefore did not fall within the definition of 'Arms' in s. 4(1) of the Act. There is no force in this contention which is accordingly rejected. In Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960 an argument was advanced that the State had launched prosecutions under the Act, some with, and others without sanction, and that was discrimination hit by Art. 14. There is no substance in this contention, which also is rejected. 30. In the result both these appeals are dismissed. 31. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 39 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... to himself that amount which is due to him from another if he has in his hand monies belonging to that other, provided that his dues are legally recoverable. Although that question will be adjudged by the Court of law when it arises, he is not obliged to sue for the recovery of the money which he is already in possession of. For reasons stated above the State Government was entitled to adjust the amount of cess due to it from the plaintiff. The balance really due, namely, ₹ 4206/13/7 to the plaintiff has already been paid. The State Government was not only willing to pay but it had already deposited the amount in the treasury and later on in the trial Court. This appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Judge are varied and it is held that the plaintiff was entitled only to the sum of ₹ 4206/13/6. The plaintiff shall pay to the State Government costs in both the Courts. Counsel's fee in each Court ₹ 250/-. P.R. Sharma, J. I agree.
-
1962 (5) TMI 38 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ch the jurisdiction cannot be exercised. 18. Kent says that the grant of a jurisdiction implies the grant of all the powers necessary to its exercise (1 Kent, Comm. 339). And Sutherland that where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication (3rd Edition, Vol. 3, Page 19). 19. It is unnecessary to pursue the discussion any further. We entertain no doubt that a power to remand is available to a tribunal functioning under Section b4 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that the said power is incidental to and implicit in the appellate jurisdiction created by that section, and that the learned Judge's decision to the contrary cannot be sustained. We decide accordingly. 20. In the light of what is stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, however, the appeal must fail and has to be dismissed. We do so, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
-
1962 (5) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he property which is the subject-matter of the trust. The question of the validity of the said section does not arise in the present case. The only question is whether it is the duty of the trustees of the trust to make an application for registration of the said trust. As I have held that, the trust is a public trust within the meaning of s. 9 of the Act, under s. 18 thereof, the said trust has to be registered in manner prescribed therein. Questions such as the extent of the trust, the scope of the doctrine of cypres, are all foreign to the present inquiry. I do not propose to express any opinion on the same. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. By COURT In view of the majority opinion of the Court the appeal is allowed and the Order of the Assistant Charity Commissioner directing the Trust to be registered- confirmed by the Charity Commissioner on appeal is set aside. The appellants will be entitled to their costs in all the Courts. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (5) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nt material before the Court on which it wants the Court to hold that the compensation which would be paid under everyone of the three Bases under the inpugned statutory provision does not amount to a just equivalent. Looking merely at the scheme of the section itself, it is impossible to arrive at such a conclusion. That is the view 774 taken by the Madras High Court and we see no reason to differ from it. Therefore, the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground that its important provisions contained in section 5 offend against Art. 31 (2) must be rejected. That being our view, we must held that the High Court was right in rejecting both the writ petitions filed by the appellant. On that view, it is, unnecessary to consider whether appellant would have been entitled to get the relief of possession or mesne profits which it purported to claim by its two petitions. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees. Appeals dismissed.
|