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Showing 1 to 20 of 32 Records
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1950 (5) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not be such a matter ? It was argued that a small riot or a affray will not undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer - (1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There are degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also and an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, from the layman's point of view, be a matter which undermines the security of the State, but that would not affect the law which aims at checking sedition. It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another. We are here concerned with the latter aspect only. I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected case. 15. Petition allowed.
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1950 (5) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he still detains the books, there will be no doubt that he will be acting mala fide in the matter. If the petitioner does not get hold of the books after this judgment, he will be entitled to pursue his proper remedies against the Income-tax Officer. A further point was raised before me by Mr. Sen that the writ of mandamus ought not to issue because there is an alternative specific remedy at law which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective. He argued that a suit would lie against the Income-tax Officer and the petitioner would be entitled to relief in such a suit. As I have come to the conclusion that I cannot make any order in this application because of Section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act, I do not propose to decide the question as to whether the writ of mandamus or a suit is the remedy. The result is that the petition must fail and is dismissed, but having regard to the circumstances of the case, each party must pay and bear his own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... m one Income Tax Officer to another. Under Section 5(5), the Commissioner of Income Tax is given the power to transfer a class of cases from one Income Tax Officer to another. The notification dated 8-9-1944, did not direct the transfer of one specified case but of a class of cases. I, therefore, do not think that there is any substance in this objection. 22. It, therefore, appears that the assignment of the Income Tax case of the assessee to the Income Tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta, was valid. After the assignment that officer was discharging the functions of an Income Tax Officer in regard to the case of the assessee. By reason of the notification dated 14-9-1940, therefore he automatically derived power to make the Excess Profits Tax assessment in that case. 23. The question in my opinion referred to us should be answered in the affirmative. 24. The assessee will pay the costs of this Reference. Certified for two Counsel. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 25. I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... Legislature in amending. Section 34 in the year 1939 intended that the Income Tax Officer could take action only if the conditions of Section 34 were strictly fulfilled, and that Section 34 as amended was, "not merely a section designed to afford the Income Tax Department a ready means of re-opening past accounts, but as also a section which was designed to protect the subject against anything in the nature of inquisition at the instance of the department founded on mere suspicion rather than on positive material." In Kedar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. and C. P. 1947 15ITR224(All) , it was again pointed out that a mere change of opinion based on the same facts and figures does not amount to discovery. 7. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the negative, i.e., the Income Tax Officer was not entitled to re-open the assessment under Section 34 of the Act. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at a sum of ₹ 350.
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1950 (5) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he question formulated by the Tribunal accordingly is that, in the circumstance of this case, for the chargeable accounting period 30th October, 1940 to 19th October, 1941, (a) the applicant-firm is liable to be assessed to the excess profits tax on the income, profits or gains derived by it from the selling agency business of the Cawnpore Cotton Mills Company; and (b) the applicant-firm is not liable to be assessed to excess profits tax on the income, profits or gains derived from the running or management of the retail cloth shop of the Cawnpore Cotton Mills Company, but the income, profits or gins derived from the running or management of the retail cloth shop of the Cawnpore Cotton Mills Company are liable to be increased by the amount which was received by the firm for actual reimbursement of the expense incurred by it on advertisement and salaries of travelling representative. In the circumstance of this case we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (5) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ₹ 1,48,260 made on Manton & Co. It is however suggested that by reason of clause 7 of the agreement Bajoria may be liable, but that is an entirely indefensible proposition. Clause 7 only says that Bajoria would be liable to excess profits tax for the year beginning with 1st May, 1945, and ending on 30th April, 1946. The demand to which I have referred is not for that period but for an earlier period namely from 1st May 1944, to 30th April, 1945. Even if Bajoria was liable under clause 7 of the agreement the Income-tax authorities could not take advantage of the provision of that agreement and make Bajoria liable. It is however clear that under clause 7 Bajoria did not undertake the liability to pay the excess profits tax for the relevant period. He is not, therefore, chargeable for the excess profits tax which has been assessed by the Excess Profits Tax Officer. In my opinion the answer to the question propounded should be in the affirmative. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hey have to satisfy the definition of the word "charitable" in the explanation. But if they are religious they can only be affected if they can be said to be "private religious trusts." In any other case income derived from property held under a legal obligation to apply it wholly for religious purposes is within the ambit of the exemption in Section 4(3)(i). Dr. Gupta submitted that under Section 40 of the Act the shebait is assessable as guardian of the deity who is a perpetual minor. It is however firmly established that the deity is not a minor and the shebait is not its guardian. The shebait is only the manager of the deity, the human agency through which the purpose of endowment is carried into effect. Section 40 has, in my view, no application to the case of a shebait. The result is that the question referred must be answered in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of the reference. Certified for two counsel. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 35 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... found by the Income-tax authorities. 67. The learned Counsel has not contended for obvious reasons that a widow in the rule would include a wife. The only possible answer to the question, therefore, is that the amount paid to the ladies under the will of the late Raja P.C. Barua though charged on Lakheraj Srijangram shall not be deducted from the agricultural income of the petitioner. The answer to the question is in the negative. 68. Our answers to the questions are as follows (1) That the amounts realised by the petitioner in each case from sale of Sal trees are revenue receipts. (2) Being revenue receipts they can be regarded as agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939. 69. The consideration of questions (3) and (4) is deferred till a. fuller statement of facts bearing on the point involved in question (3) is received. 70. The answer to question (5) in Reference No. 8 is in the negative. Thadani, CJ. - I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... so that it could provide finance for the companies. Financial assistance was to be provided to the companies by purchase of their unissued shares through the machinery of subscription and allotment. That was part of the business of the company. 50. The change of investment was made by the assessee not for changing one fixed asset for another but for the purpose of trade and as part of the profit-making scheme of the company. The investments were, therefore, realised really and substantially in the course of carrying on their business and for carrying out the objects of the company set out in the memorandum. 51. It is impossible to say in those circumstances that there was no evidence on which it was possible for the Tribunal to arrive at the findings they did. 52. If the findings cannot be disturbed, it is clear that profit made on the realisation of investments is a revenue profit and is taxable. 53. I agree that the question referred should be answered in the affirmative.
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1950 (5) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the stores ordered or received by the assessees after the 9th August, 1943, Messrs. Dalmia Jain & Co. were to pay nothing more than the cost price, and in consequence, on these stores at least the assessee made no profit at all. Clause (c) of para 19 contained a statement by the purchasers as to how they proposed to allocate the total consideration money of ₹ 28 lakhs between certain specific items, but the stores were not separately valued but were valued along with other property and to the whole a sum of ₹ 2,50,000 was allocated. In my opinion there was no material upon which the Income-tax Officer could draw the inference that the vendors made profit of ₹ 15,882 on the sale of stores. On the second question of law formulated by the Division Bench I agree with Shearer, J., and hold that the amount of ₹ 15,882 which is alleged to be the profits on the sale of the stores is not taxable under the Income-tax Act in the circumstances of this case.
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1950 (5) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mind overlooks the mandatory provisions of proviso (b) that the allowance for a particular year was the percentage allowed for that year together with the unabsorbed depreciation for the previous year. In my view it is quite clear that the allowance for the year 1939 was not only the percentage permitted by the statute for that year, but that percentage together with the unabsorbed depreciation for the previous year. When it is stated in proviso (b) "where full effect cannot be given to any such allowance in any year" the word "allowance" there means not only the percentage, but the percentage plus anything which had to be added to it as unabsorbed depreciation for the previous year. 14. It seems to me that the view of the assesses was undoubtedly right and that being so the question formulated by the Tribunal must be answered in the negative. 15. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two counsel. Sinha, J. - I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly over the income or the assets. After this deed was executed the income of these properties belonged to the cestui que trust and if the settlor as trustee used this income he would be guilty of a breach of trust. The first proviso to Section 16 (1) (c) only contemplates cases where the settlor can lawfully reassume power over the income or the assets. Unless that was so, the proviso would cover every trust where a settlor has made himself trustee because a trustee acting dishonestly could always assume control over the income. It appears to me that the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be assailed. The settlor by this trust put this income for ever out of his control, and that being so the income from these trust properties could not be assessed as part of the income of the assessee. The result therefore is that the questions submitted must be answered as follows - (1)In the affirmative. (2)In the negative. Sinha, J.-I agree.
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1950 (5) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion on the part of the authorities to communicate to the person the grounds upon which the order was made. The aggrieved person consequently may not at all be apprised of the allegations made against him and it will be impossible for him to make any adequate or proper representation, if he is not told on what grounds the order was passed. In my opinion, this is an equally unreasonable provision and neither sub-section (3) nor sub-section (6) of section 4 of the Act can be said to have imposed restrictions which are reasonable in the interests of the general public. My conclusion, therefore, is that under article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution, these provisions of the Act became void and inoperative after the Constitution came into force, and consequently the order made by the District Magistrate in the present case cannot stand. 29. I would, therefore, allow the application and quash the externment order that has been passed against the petitioner. 30. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the persons who were expected to take leading part in the same were externed from Delhi. It is somewhat difficult to see why a different treatment was meted out to the petitioner and he was consigned to detention in jail for an indefinite period of time. There could be no better proof of 'mala fides' on the part of the executive authorities than a use of the extraordinary provisions contained in the Act for purposes for which ordinary law is quite sufficient. Though I am unable to hold definitely that there is want of good faith on the part of the authorities, the case is certainly not free from suspicion. I can only hope that the authorities will take care to see that no instances occur which might savour of injustice or oppression through misuse of those extraordinary powers which the Parliament has vested in the executive in the interests of the State itself. With these observations, I concur in the order made in this case that the application should be dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e course of the business and a discontinuance of the business and the start of a new business is not a transaction. He has quoted from Webster's Dictionary that a transaction means "doing or performing; that which is done, affair, act, doing, negotiation or dealing." The word "transaction" is derived from the word "transact" which means to do something. Partial partitioning of joint family is certainly an act and so is the starting of the partnership business. We fail to see how these acts should not be deemed to be "transactions." The result, therefore, is that our answer to this question is that the partial partition of the Hindu undivided family on the 16th of July, 1943, and the formation of two different firms were "transactions" within the meaning of Section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference which we assess at a figure of ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (5) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at is not exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court in any matter concerning the revenue. It is only asking the appellant to perform his statutory duty. The further argument that the proceedings in this case had passed beyond the stage of assessment and had reached the stage of enforcing payment is again irrelevant because by the relief granted by the High Court no attempt is made to obstruct the Revenue Authority in the discharge of his duties. At one stage an injunction was granted against the appellant but that has been cancelled. In fact, this aspect of the discussion is only academic because if payment is enforced and the opinion of the Court, on the statement of the case is against the appellant, he will have to act in conformity with that opinion under section 59 (2) of the Stamp Act and refund whatever may be held to be recovered in excess. In our opinion therefore the contentions of the appellant fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r to grant a license and having regard to the fact that there is no specific bye-law authorising the issue of a license, we do not consider that the appeal under section 318 to the local Government which sanctioned the bye-laws is, in the circumstances of this case, an adequate legal remedy. We are satisfied that in this case the petitioner's fundamental rights have been infringed and he is entitled to have his grievance redressed. The proper order in such circumstances would be to direct the respondent Board not to prohibit the petitioner from carrying on the trade of whole- sale dealer and commission agent of vegetables and fruits within the limits of the Municipal Board of Kairana, except in accordance with the bye-laws as and when framed in future according to law and further to direct the respondent Munic- ipal Board to withdraw the pending prosecution of the peti- tioner and we order accordingly. The respondents to pay the costs of the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1950 (5) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... complaint. In my judgment, it is not necessary or proper for us to go into the matter at this stage. The learned Magistrate has, in my opinion, clearly committed an error in law in treating the proceedings after the filing of the petition on 2nd February, 1948, up to 7th February 1949, as invalid, and in deciding to start proceedings anew. 9. I would, therefore, make this Rule absolute, set aside the learned Magistrate's order directing the accused to be set at liberty, and direct that the Court should proceed with the trial of the case on the basis that the proceedings up to the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate on 7th February, 1949, ordering transfer of the case to Mr. C.C. Chakravarti are valid. 10. We understand that the Magistrate, Mr. C.C. Chakravarti, has since been transferred. This would necessitate that the case should be tried either by the Chief Presidency Magistrate or by such other Presidency Magistrate to whom he may think fit to transfer the case.
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1950 (5) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g to the Court the grounds communicated to him is not in conformity with Part III of the Constitution and is, therefore, void under article 13 (2). That section, however, is clearly severable and cannot affect the whole Act. On this question the views of Meredith C.J. and Das J. of Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 124 of 1950 (Lalit Kumar Barman v. The State) and the majority of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Full Bench Case No. 1 of 1950 (Kshitindra Narayan v. The Chief Secretary) appear to be correct and sound. For the reasons I have given above, in my opinion, the impugned Act is a valid law except as to section 14 in so far as it prevents the grounds being disclosed to the Court. The petitioner before us does not complain that he has not got proper grounds. Further, the period of his detention under the impugned Act has not gone beyond three months and, in the circumstances, this application should, in my opinion, stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (5) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ll not be such a matter? It was argued that a small riot or an affray will not undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer -- (1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There are degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also and an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, from the layman's point of view, be a matter which undermines the security of the State, but that would not affect the law which aims at checking sedition. It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another. We are here concerned with the latter aspect only. I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected case. Petition allowed.
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