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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1951 (1) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , & I see no reason to disbelieve it. The pltf. has a bona fide claim supported by written documents. Shortly before the institution of the suit, the defts. have been trying to dispose of the entirety of their Immovable properties at a price which according to their own case is highly inadequate. They have stopped their business & have started doing business in a foreign country & have expressed their wish to migrate there. Under the circumstances I am of the opinion that the pltfs, have made out a case for the orders asked for & there will be an order that the defts. do furnish security to the amount of the pltf's. claim within a fortnight from the date of this order & that in default, the right, title & interest of the defts. in the properties mentioned in Schedule B to the petition be attached before judgment. The ad interim injunction will continue until the attachment is made effective. The costs of this application will be costs in the cause.
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1951 (1) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... o it for its supervision & control of the business from London. The assessee became entitled to receive the income when the sale proceeds actually reached the hands of the Oil Company. It seems to us therefore that in no sense can it be said that its income, profit or gain accrued or arose in India. 15. Mr. Sukumar Mitra on behalf of the assessee has contended himself to this reference by urging before us that the income did not accrue or arise in India. He said that the assessee could be taxed, if at all, under Section 42, & not under Section 4(1). We think his contention is right & in this Reference we hold that the assessee's income did not accrue or arise in India. If the assessee is liable to be taxed, the proper section applicable is Section 42, Indian Income Tax Act. 16. We, therefore, answer the question asked in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this Reference. Certified for two counsel. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 17. I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 46 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s. Before 1939 the method was rather cumbrous. The total partnership profits were assessed and thereafter each partner was entitled to a refund. There is now no necessity for a refund because the profits are assessed in the hands of each individual partner and therefore the difference in the rates contemplated in Section 48(2) can no longer arise. The amount eventually obtained by Government is precisely the same and therefore it appears to me that we are bound to hold that this amendment in 1939 was purely procedural and merely affected the machinery for collecting the tax rather than the tax itself. It is a more convenient method of collecting the amount which Government obtained in rather more complicated circumstances before 1939. As this amendment was procedural, retrospective effect could be given to it and that being so it appears to me that the view of the Tribunal was right, and therefore I would answer the question submitted in the affirmative. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... held (1) that the unrecorded information was in fact the first information in the case;........& (iii) that the information given by the woman's father not being the first information could not be taken into consideration." A large number of decisions have been read before me by learned counsel on both sides, but I do not think it necessary to refer to them, for, in substance whether a particular information amounts to an F. I. R. or not is essentially a question of fact and in the present case the matter seems to be plain to my mind. I have no doubt that Ex. P. 4 on the basis of which the petnr. was convicted was a statement falling with the mischief of Section 162, Criminal P. C., & therefore not available to be used against him. In this view it becomes unnecessary to deal with the other questions of fact raised by Mr. Nambiar. The revn. petn. is allowed & the petnr. acquitted & ordered to be set at liberty unless he be otherwise lawfully detained.
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1951 (1) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trust for the deities, but were properties which had been dedicated or given to the deities. The income from such properties cannot be said to be income arising from a private religious trust, as the word "trust" has a definite meaning and dedicated properties are not in the strict sense properties held in trust or properties which are the subject matter of a trust. Once it is held that these properties were dedicated properties then the earlier case to which I have made reference admittedly applies and I would therefore answer the questions Submitted as follows - Question (1) is answered in the negative. Question (2) is answered as follows The last paragraph of Section 4(3)( xii) of the Indian Income-tax Act governs only the word "trust" and does not govern the words "other legal obligation" which appear in Section 4(3) (i ) of the Act. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two counsel. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a partnership document, dated 1945, between Squire, Hilman and Gilbert and said that in 1945 a different firm was constituted. But it is to be noted that there is no reference of this document in the records except in the schedule to the statement of the case. We do not know how the document came in, but we have no doubt that this document was never discussed before any of the authorities before, and therefore we are not prepared to allow Dr. Gupta to rely on this document in support of his argument. We shall consider this case on the basis that it was the same firm that continued throughout, though there was change in the personnel and that being the case we think that under Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act there was succession in 1947 when the private company was formed. Therefore, the provisions of that section are attracted and the firm should get the relief in accordance with it. We answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion. The first test would be whether the assessee was charged with regard to a transaction which took place in the ordinary course of business, and the other test would be whether he was charged in his capacity as a trader. If these two tests were satisfied and the Court came to the conclusion that the primary object of incurring the expenditure was to protect the good name of the business then it could be said that the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. 8. As I have said, the Appellate Tribunal have held in this case that the primary and indeed the sole object of incurring these expenses was the protection of the good name of the business and the stock-in-trade thereof. In my view the Appellate Tribunal were right in allowing this amount as a deduction and that being so the question submitted must be answered in the affirmative. 9. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ich the replacement of the Act of 1918 with its basis of taxation as the income of the current year, by the Act of 1922 with its basis of taxation for the assessment year as the income of the immediately preceding year, the accounting year, necessarily involved. A beneficial enactment must no doubt, as is sometimes said, be liberally interpreted; but as I had occasion to remark in my judgment in A.S. No. 138 of 1948 this rule of liberal interpretation of such an enactment does not sanction a construction founded upon the equity of the statute, as it is sometimes called, in disregard of the actual language employed therein. The golden rule of literal construction, as Lord Wensleydale described it in the House of Lords in an early English case, Grey v. Pearson 1857 6 HLC 61 affords in my judgment the safest course to adopt, on the whole, in this rather difficult case; and applying that rule I would concur with my learned brother in answering the reference against the assessee.
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1951 (1) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of ownership, mean to suggest that even where the legal integrity of the business becomes affected by the later transaction of partition between members of the joint family which originally owned it, there is no cessation of the business in the eye of law. In support of his argument Mr. Rama Rao Sahib stressed the following features - (i) that the businesses after partition were carried on in the same premises as those of the head office and its branches as of old; (ii) that the same set of account books continued ; (iii) that the same old goodwill availed the several businesses after partition; and (iv) that the old customers continued connections with them. These are not, even if true, necessarily inconsistent with and sufficiently conclusive against the legal discontinuance of the old business which is the ordinary incident of partition. The position taken up by the Commissioner is absolutely untenable and the question referred must be answered in favour of the assessee.
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1951 (1) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titled to the relief he has asked for. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs, both here and below., Certified for one counsel. 13. By consent the landlord is appointed receiver without security and without remuneration to withdraw the rent which is in deposit in the Rent Controller's office. When he takes out the money he will give credit to the tenant for the amount withdrawn. Filing of accounts by the receiver 'is dispensed with. 14. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. I agree. In my view the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950, apply to this case as the application was pending when that Act came into force. 15. I should prefer to offer no opinion at the present moment on the question whether or not the decree could be regarded as a decree made on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. I leave the question open for decision where it is essential to decide the question.
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1951 (1) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... nclude the matter. It is therefore clear that the three receipts amounting in all to over ₹ 98,000 were receipts of interest beyond eight years of this assessment. The sums could not be assessed under Section 34 and if these amounts are eliminated then quite clearly the assessment on the sum of ₹ 79,532 under Section 34 cannot be sustained. The answer therefore to question (3) must be in the negative. Mr. Atul Gupta has addressed no argument to us on the matters raised in question (4) and he agrees that that question should be answered in the affirmative. Question (1) appears to us to be a purely hypothetical question and in any event, having regard to the view which we expressed on question (3), it is conceded that question (1) does not really arise and does not require an answer. Question (2) also does not arise having regard to our answer to question (3) and it is also conceded that that question need not be answered in these proceedings. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l those steps in order to satisfy himself that the loss which occurred with the original disappearance was a permanent loss and if so to define for himself the exact quantum of the loss which he must face after all his efforts? The consideration by which the matter has to be reasonably judged is pithily put in 'Burnett v. Huff', 288 US Rep 156 77 Law Edn 670, at p. 783 in the passage quoted by my learned brother in his judgment, in this way, viz., "that the requirement that losses be deducted in the year in which they are sustained calls for a practical test." 39. For the reasons given in the foregoing as well as in my learned brother's judgment I agree that the answer to the reference must go in favour of the assessee on the first question. I also agree in the order as to costs proposed by my learned brother I express no opinion on the second question, as I find it unnecessary to do so, in view of my answer to the first. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (1) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urt is defective in not taking into consideration the different detailed reasons given by the Sessions Judge for rejecting the rest of the evidence alleged to prove the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the High Court was in error in convicting the appellant of murder and we have, therefore, reversed the decision of the High Court. The reasoning of the High Court that the accused had not made any attempt to show that the ornaments belonged to him is clearly fallacious. The failure or omission of the appellant to prove that fact does not in any way help the prosecution in proving the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the observations of the Sessions Judge in the concluding para. 31 of his judgment deserve careful notice by the State authorities. 10. As the ornaments are not proved to be the ornaments of the deceased, no conviction under Section 404, I. P. C., can also be sustained. The ornaments which are lying in the lower court should be returned to the appellant.
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1951 (1) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xcept the standard set up by the prudence and experience of merchants. But so far as this case is concerned we are not troubled with the distinction. In our view the case is plain. It is quite clear that this sum of ₹ 2,100 was not paid for acquiring any assets of the business itself. We may say that the sum of ₹ 600 was paid for acquiring the agency business, but that is not the case with the payment of ₹ 2,100 which was paid with a view to keep a competitor out of the area in which the assessee was carrying on its business. Therefore it can in no sense be called a capital expenditure. It was, as the Tribunal has found, a sum which was paid for the purposes of the business and as such it comes within the purview of the section set out above. The Tribunal was right. The answer to the question must be in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Certified for one counsel. HARRIES, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (1) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ady Dinbai Petit V. M. S. Naronha A.I R. (33) 1946 Bom 407 at p. 414 (I. L. R. (1946) Bom 832), all this does not make them parties. Hence a writ cannot be issued against them though a direction to the Union to direct; its employees to desist from recovering income-tax can be issued & will serve the purpose of the petnr. 29. For the above reasons, we hereby accept this petn. & issue a writ to the Union of India directing it not to levy income-tax on the income of the petnr. accruing, arising or received in Rajasthan excluding the area of the formes covenanting State of Bundi, prior to 1-4-1950, & to instruct the Income-tax Officers, who are its employees, not to demand from the petnr. any return of income for any period prior to 1-4-1950 or any account books for that period, or other information for the purpose of making any assessment of income-tax or collect the tame for the above period. The resp. will pay costs to the petnr. which are assessed at ₹ 600.
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1951 (1) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of our Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act. In Iswar Das v. The State(1) the question was not raised or argued as it was made clear in the judgment itself. In view of what I have stated above, I am of the opinion that as the grounds originally communicated to the detenu were relevant to the objects which the Act had in view and as there is no proof of mala fides the obligations cast upon the authorities under article 22 (5) which have been reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act have been fully complied with. Even according to the views expressed by the majority of my colleagues I would be prepared to hold that the particulars subsequently supplied along with the grounds originally supplied fully enable the detenu to make his representation. In my opinion there has been no contravention of the fundamental rights of the detenu. I would, therefore, (1) Not reported. allow this appeal and reverse the decision of the Bombay High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (1) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or repealed was by the force of the provisions of article 13 itself and did not result from the decision of the courts. It is also unnecessary to examine the further argument of the learned Attorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this country the rule of construction of statutes is the one laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1868, and that though in express terms that statute may not be applicable to the construction of article 13(1) of the Constitution, yet that rule is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and has become a rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by rea son of their being repugnant to the Constitution. For the reasons given above I see no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss it. MUKHERJEA J.-I am in entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother Fazl Ali J. in his judgment and I concur both in his reasons and his conclusion. Appeal dismissed.
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1951 (1) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... clearly impose an obligation on the assessee to pay tax on the profits arising from this transaction. It seems to me that the language of the statute only imposes that obligation when plant or machinery is sold or discarded and no obligation arises when plant or machinery is acquired compulsorily by Government and the owner is left to accept what Government is pleased to offer him. If the word "sale" in this sub- section was capable of two meanings we should have to give it the meaning more favourable to the subject. But in my judgment the word "sale" can never include a transaction such as the one envisaged in Rule 83 of the Defence of India Rules. In the result, therefore, I am bound to hold that the view of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained and I would answer the question submitted in the negative. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two Counsel. BANERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1951 (1) TMI 30 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oners to produce their account books and other documents. On the other hand, they could exercise the particular power only if the order were a judicial one. We are not prepared to hold that the Commissioner in making the order did some- thing which he was incompetent under the Act to do. The only error committed by him was in not hearing the petitioners before taking the particular step. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the proceedings commenc- ed by the Assistant Commissioner at the instance of the Commissioner are without jurisdiction and that consequently the petitioners are not bound to comply with the notice served upon them by the Assistant Commissioner. It would of course be open to the Commissioner to issue a notice to the petitioners under Section 22(7) of the Act and, after hearing them, to decide whether the case calls for the reopening of the assessment already made. Accordingly, we allow this petition with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1951 (1) TMI 29 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y statute from sales tax. The expression has not been qualified in any manner. The learned Commissioner appears to have restricted its meaning to the prepared paste meant for being used directly in a hooka, thereby reading more into the statute than appears in its wording. The law being what it is, the petition must be granted and the learned Commissioner s decision reversed as not being based on law. At the same time it appears that the wording in question is too vague and indefinite. Most probably tobacco has been used here in place of the Bengali term Tamak which usually refers to the prepared tobacco, the tobacco leaves being described in Bengali as Tamak Pata to distinguish them from the prepared product called Tamak . But the statute being in English, the English dictionary meaning has to be accepted in the absence of a statutory definition. The petition for revision is allowed and the decision of the learned Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reversed. Petition allowed.
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