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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 16 of 16 Records
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1951 (12) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t it is equally well-settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons. 14. On the whole, we are inclined to hold that the Sessions Judge had taken a reasonable view of the facts of the case, and in our opinion there were no good reasons for reversing that view. The assessors with whose aid the trial was held, were unanimously of the opinion that the accused were not guilty, and though 25 persons were placed on trial on identical evidence, the State Government preferred an appeal only against 5 of them on the sole ground that the acquittal was against the weight of evidence on the record. 15. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences of the appellants and acquit them of all the charges. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (12) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... Dikshitars of this temple, functioning as trustees, will not have the same dominion over the income of the properties of the temple which the Matathipathi enjoys in relation to the income from the Mutt and its properties. Therefore, the sections which we held ultra vires in relation to Mutts and Matathipathis will also be ultra vires the State Legislature in relation to Sri Sabhanayakar Temple, Chidambaram and the Podu Dikshitars who have the right to administer the affairs and the properties of the temple. As we have already pointed out even more than the case of the Shivalli Brahmins, it can Be asserted that the Dikshitars of Chidambaram form a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution. 88. The rule nisi must be made absolute, 89. The petitioner is entitled to his costs to the petition. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. We certify under Article 132 of the Constitution that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Rules made absolute.
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1951 (12) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... his view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether even otherwise, E.A. No. 617 of 1943 was not liable to be rejected. 28. In this second appeal, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to be in possession of the property till the vendor's dower debt is discharged and whether the plaintiff has got a possessory lien or not. This question may be relevant in other proceedings, i.e. when the defendants seek to dis possess the plaintiff. Consequently, the order of the District Munsif in E.A. No. 617 of 1943 has to be vacated with the result that the plaintiff is allowed to retain possession of the proper ty till he is dispossessed in other and appro pirate proceedings. The decrees of the Courts below will be confirmed subject to the deletion of Clause 1 of the trial Court's decree. In view of the fact that the plaintiff has succeeded partially, we think it is desirable that the parties bear their respective costs throughout.
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1951 (12) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing was not based on evidence. The question whether Amarnath and Dina Nath had a right to represent the family does not concern the Department and does not really arise. On the facts the only inference that can be drawn is that though the names of Amarnath and Dina Nath only were used the karta and other members of the family were agreeable to the funds of the joint family being utilised for the purpose, as without their consent, probably, the funds would not have been made available to Amarnath and Dina Nath for the purpose of investment. The Tribunal came to a clear and categorical finding that Amarnath and Dina Nath had not invested from their personal Ramings but the entire funds were contributed by the two joint families. If the new venture made any profits, on these facts neither Amarnath nor Dina Nath could claim to keep the money as their own and refuse to part with it for the purposes of the joint family. Our answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative.
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1951 (12) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re not thinking of their future rights of survivorship at all. What Sundara Pandiya must be taken to have said by this release was "I am giving up my present rights as a senior member in favour of Kandasami whom I recognize as the rightful heir to the zamindari as a member of the joint Hindu family." Kandasami agreed to give him the village of Dombacheri in lieu of recognition of his title by him. It was not within the ken of the parties then as to what was to happen to the zamindari in case Kandasami's line died out. 45. For the reasons given we are of the opinion that by the release Sundara Pandiya did not renounce his rights or the rights of his branch to succeed to the zamindari by survivorship in case the line of Kandasami became extinct. We hold therefore that Kulasekara's claim was rightly negatived in the courts below and that of Rajaya was rightly decreed. 46. In the result all these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. 47. Appeals dismissed.
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1951 (12) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er making proper allowance for the fact that it is situated in the midst of a Chinese Colony and a cluster of tanning factories, we are of opinion that the value of the land and the building is very likely to be more than sufficient to meet any possible decree that the plaintiff may obtain. 7. In these circumstances, I do not think that there is any justification at this stage to restrain defendant No. 2 or defendants Nos. 3 and 4 from drawing on their accounts with defendant No. 1. Bank of China. 8. While therefore, I would dismiss the apneal without costs, as incompetent. I would allow the application under Section 115, Civil P. C. and set aside the order of injunction under our revisional jurisdiction. The parties will bear their own costs in the application. 9. Let the sale deed which has been filed he marked on admission as Ex. A, the learned Advocate who filed the said deed will be allowed to take it back on filing a certified copy thereof. S.C. Lahiri, J. 10. I agree.
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1951 (12) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed and may be deductable as an expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred for purposes of the business of the assessee. It, however, appears from the statement of the case and the facts put before the Tribunal that, on the eve of the closing of the business when the employee was leaving the undertaking, the assessee decided to pay a sum of money to him for services which had been rendered by him more than three years before. In such circumstances, without any further facts justifying the payment, it is not possible to hold that the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business of the company. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the payment of ₹ 10,000 to Shri J.N. Cocolas has not been proved to be a legitimate expense in the sense that it was expense incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business of the assessee. The opposite party is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (12) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... endant the right to redeem the whole of the balance of the property (excluding the plaintiff’s) for the aggregate sum due as above and, in default of payment, limiting the liabilities of each item of property to the sum rateably due on it under section 82. o p /o p On the question of costs. The plaintiff repudiated section 82 in the course of the arguments before us and rested his case on section 43 of the Contract Act, nor did he clearly and unmistakably plead a case of subrogation in his plaint even in the alternative. The defendants, on the other hand, set up a case which has failed on the facts. I would, therefore, direct each side to bear its own costs in this appeal. o p /o p As regards the costs incurred in the Courts below and any costs which may be necessitated by a further enquiry, they will be determined according to the final result of the litigation and with due regard to all matters bearing on the question of costs. o p /o p FAZL ALI J.--I agree. o p /o p
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1951 (12) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he period of detention in the initial order itself in the present case was, therefore, contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported. The learned Advocate-General, however, urged that in view of the provision in section 11 (2) that if the Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause for the detention, the person concerned would be released forth- with, the direction in the order dated 30th July, 1951, that the petitioner should be detained till 31st March, 1952, could be ignored as mere surplusage. We cannot accept that view. It is obvious that such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the petitioner's ease when it is placed before the Advisory Board. It cannot be too often emphasised that before a person is deprived of his personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected. Petition allowed. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta.
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1951 (12) TMI 11 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax, U. P. and Ajmer-Merwara 1950 18 ITR 13 , we have attempted to explain the difference, and in the case of Ramkishan Sunderlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P. 1951 19 ITR 324, we have discussed the question as to what are "current repairs". It is not necessary for us to repeat what we have already said in the above two cases. In our view it cannot be said that the changing of the entire roof of the thirty four quarters by substituting new roof with new khaprails was in the nature of current repairs. Even a Jchaprail (tiles) is expected to last for sometime and though it may need annual repairs yet the entire changing of the tiles by new ones is not necessary for a number of years. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the replacement of the old roofs by new roofs using new khaprails is a revenue expenditure, nor, can it be classed as current repairs. The Department is entitled to its cost which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (12) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ting the accused with the crime. The only corroboration relied on for that is the previous statement of the child to her mother. That might not always be enough but this rule can be waived in a given case just as much as the necessity for any corroboration at all. In the present case, the learned High Court Judges would have acted on the uncorroborrated testimony of the girl had they not felt pressed by the corroboration rule. Viewing all the circumstances I am satisfied that the High Court was right. I am satisfied that in this case, considering the conduct of the girl and her mother from start to finish, no corroboration beyond the statement of the child to her mother was necessary. I am satisfied that the High Court was right in holding that that was enough to make it safe to act on her testimony. I would dismiss the appeal and direct the appellant to surrender to his bail in accordance with the terms of his bond, serve out his sentence and pay the fine. Appeal dismissed.
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1951 (12) TMI 9 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. Province of Bihar, Indian Sales Tax Cases, Volume I, 1938-1950. There again the order in question was an original order, and not an appellate order. We are unable to apply the principle of the decisions of the Madras and the Bihar High Courts to appellate orders. The Assam Sales Tax Act ex- pressly provides for a period of limitation from an appellate order as being 60 days which are to be computed from the date of the order, and not from the date of the service of the order. We can only interfere with the order of the Commissioner holding that the petition before him as time-barred, under the provisions of See- tion 32(6) of the Act, but we are not satisfied that the decision of the Commissioner is erroneous. We think the decision of the Commissioner is right. Accordingly, we reject this petition. The petition is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee assessed at Rs. 51. The Rule is discharged. DEKA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed. (1) 1951 19 I.T.R. 402 A.I.R. 1951 Mad, 204.
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1951 (12) TMI 8 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... context indicates otherwise see clause (b) of Section 2. The assessee did not claim exemption on this ground in his return. He did so at a late stage, without getting any finding whether a ropeway, used collectively, comes within the special meaning of the word contract . Question (6)-Though the claim of a deduction under rule 4 was mentioned in the grounds of revision, it is not clear to me if this ground was pressed before the Board. The Resolution of the Board dated the 21st July, 1949, by which the revision petition was dismissed, does not mention this point. The point is mentioned as point (f) in the applica- tion for a reference to this Court the Board then said that it was a question of fact. Though I do not understand what the Board meant by saying that it was a question of fact, I presume that it was open to the Board to refuse to consider in revision a claim which was not made earlier and for which full materials were not available. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (12) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppears in the exemption section and by means of a simple merger of the functions of these departments with the newly designated depart- ment, the petitioner can be deprived of the benefit of the exemption claimed. As I have pointed out before, although the notification in question created this new department and conferred on this new department these functions which were being performed by the Indian Stores Department and the Department of Supply, there was no amend- ment effected in sub-clause (iii) of clause 5(2). I am of the view, therefore, that the petitioner is not liable to pay sales tax in respect of the supplies in question. In the circumstances this Rule must be made absolute, the Noti- fication dated 8th November, 1950, is cancelled and the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to forbear from giving effect to the said Notification. The West Bengal Government will pay one set of costs to be divided between the petitioner and the Union of India. Rule made absolute.
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1951 (12) TMI 6 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tax Officer. So, it is ordered in review that the assessment in respect of the year ending 31st December, 1945, should be done afresh by the Commercial Tax Officer who has jurisdiction over the area in question. 4. The assessment for the year ending 31st December, 1945, being without jurisdiction and, therefore, illegal, there could be no question of the taxable turnover for the next three years being more than 3 lakhs as contended by the opposite party. The opposite party evidently means by this that the taxable turnover as determined by the Assistant Commis- sioner during the years in question did not fall below 3 lakhs. But the assessment itself being without authority, the latter assumption cannot be accepted. And as at present under the law only a Commercial Tax Officer can make assessments under Section 11, all the four petitions are allowed and the cases are sent back so that a fresh assessment may be made in each case by the Commercial Tax Officer. Petitions allowed.
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1951 (12) TMI 5 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... dwill. It is shown in the balance-sheet of March 31, 1950, as Rs. 1,04,636 which appears to me to be a very inflated figure for a business of this kind. It has been pointed out by the directors that the depreciation allowance on buses and spare parts and such like should be increased. But even so, the goodwill of this company is shown at a higher figure than the value of the buses which operate the bus services and of the spare parts. In fact it is the main item in the balance-sheet. If the goodwill of this company is not worth anything like the amount stated then quite obviously this company is in a bad way. Banerjee J. was of opinion that it could not pay its debts and I think he is right. In my judgment therefore the petitioner established the grounds upon which the court rightly made a winding-up order and that being so, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. The costs of the company will be paid out of the assets. Das, J. mdash I agree.
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