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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 18 of 18 Records
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1951 (2) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found." 7. There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if the Controller may be assumed to have wrongly decided the question of non-payment of rent, which by no means is clear, his order cannot be questioned in a civil court. It seems to us that on this short ground this appeal must succeed, and we accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree of the courts below. The appellants will be entitled to costs throughout.
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1951 (2) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n by Panchayati Adalats or compel them to exercise their jurisdiction & do their duty. They are, therefore, judicially subordinate to this Ct. 23 In view of the apologies tendered by all the three opposite parties I do not think it necessary to take any severe action against any of them. The main responsibility lies on opposite party No. 1 who got the matter published in the paper & he should be saddled with the costs of these proceedings including fee of the learned Govt. Advocate which may be assessed at ₹ 160. Subject to this the apologies may be accepted. Raghubar Dayal, J 24 I agree. 25 By the Court. -- We accept the apology of J. N. Wilson & Kedar Nath Tiwari & cancel the notice issued against them. We find Brij Bhushan Misra guilty of contempt of Ct., but, in view of his apology, pass no order against him except that he should pay the costs of the appct. assessed at ₹ 200 & also the Govt. Advocate his fee, which we assess at ₹ 160.
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1951 (2) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... e steps to prohibit the transfer to Pakistan of the proceeds of such transfer, if any. In my opinion, the restriction on the power of disposal of immovable property contained in Section 20 of the Ordinance, as it stands, is an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the intending evacuee's right as a citizen under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It is, however, unnecessary to make any order in this case on that ground, because it is not alleged that there has been any attempt at transfer by the applicant which has not met with approval of the Custodian. 23. As we have held that the applicant was rightly declared to be an intending evacuee within the meaning of the definition in the Ordinance, the only thing we can do at present is to dismiss the application. There will be no order as to costs. 24. The petitioner will have a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution that this case involves a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
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1951 (2) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e to reply to the assessees letter dated the 20th April, 1950, asking for extension of time and has thus denied justice to the petitioners firm. No grounds for not granting any extension of time as asked for are forthcoming and in fact there was no express order refusing extension and so the petitioner could not even have the opportunity of taking recourse to Section 33A of the Act and ask the Commissioner to exercise his power of revision (See Moti Lal v. Uttar Pradesh Government where the alternative remedy of appeal could not be availed of because no grounds of the order were forthcoming). In my view this petition should succeed in part and this Rule is made absolute to the extent that the respondent is directed to forbear from taking any steps or further steps for enforcing the notice of demand dated the 30th March, 1950, issued under Section 29 of the Act until the disposal of the appeal. The petitioners are entitled to costs of the present proceedings. Petition allowed.
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1951 (2) TMI 23 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assessee. 4. It was contended by the applicant's advocate that as no proviso analogous to the 2nd proviso contained in Section 33A of the Indian Income-tax Act has been enacted in the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939, the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council cannot be said to apply to ascertain the meaning of words used in Section 28(2) of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act. We are unable to accept this contention. The relevant words in Section 28(2) of the Assam Act, namely, "an order under section 27 enhancing an assessment or otherwise prejudicial to him" must bear the same interpretation as has been put upon them by their Lordships of the Privy Council on words used in Section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act. 5. The result is that we decline to order the Assam Board of Agricultural Income-tax to state the case to this Court. The petition is rejected with costs. Ram Labhaya, J. - I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the kinds of transfer contemplated in that section. Similarly, Section 12 implies that lease is a transfer of property. Illustration (a) to Section 25 is of a lease of a farm & so is also the illustration to Section 43. If a lease of property were not to be regarded as a transfer of property within the meaning of Chap. II, a considerable difficulty would be caused by not applying provisions like those in Sections 43, 62, etc., to such a transfer. We must, therefore, hold that the transfer of Immovable property contemplated by Section 53A includes a transfer by lease." 10. Having regard to all the considerations which we have set out above, we have come to the conclusion that the lease is a transfer of Immovable property within the meaning of Section 53A, T. P. Act. We are of opinion, therefore, that the decisions arrived at by all the Cts. below as well as by Bavdekar J. in second appeal were correct & this Letters Patent appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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1951 (2) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... year" as so determined for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1938, and that for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1939; or (d)the "previous year" as so determined for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1939, and that for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940 Provided that in no case shall any period of less than nine months be taken as a standard period". In the present case the standard periods are 1936-37 and 1038-39. For the reasons given above, in our view, the Excess Profits Tax Officer was wrong in his mode of calculation. He first went into the question of status of the assessee under Section 4A, while determining the income under Section 10 for the standard period. That is clearly wrong under Rule 1 of the Schedule. In our view, the Tribunal was right and the sum of ₹ 66,386 cannot be ignored from calculation of profits for the standard period. We answer the question in the affirmative. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessment during the periods in question, namely, 1941-42 and 1942-43 although the discovery is actually made by the Income-tax Officer at the time when the matter is referred to him for report. He then discovered that these amounts of "income" had been wrongly included in "excess profits" and therefore had escaped assessment. There is nothing to show that this was an erroneous inference arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and the fact that this position was not disputed by the assessee when the matter actually came up for assessment before the revenue authorities indicates that the inference of the Income-tax Officer was correct. The notice thus contained the statement of an existing fact even on the date of the notice under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the notice at all. So far as the legal aspect of the question is concerned my learned brother has already very fully discussed the matter and I have nothing to add to that.
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1951 (2) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re of them. The true method of determining as between the partners themselves what belongs to the firm, & what not, is to ascertain what agreement has been come to upon the subject. Lindlay on Partnership, 9th Edn., pp. 409, 416. 62. It is quite clear, therefore, that unless there is an agreement between the partners that a particular property would be the separate property of a partner, there cannot be an entrustment of it to the other partner or partners. In the absence of such an agreement, each partner is interested in the whole of the partnership assets and there cannot be an entrustment of 'a partner's property' as such by one partner to another, because there is no 'property' which can be entrusted. 63. In the case before us there is no evidence that there was an agreement by which the partnership assets were converted into separate property of the partners. Therefore there cannot be a breach of trust, because nothing was or could be entrusted.
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1951 (2) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount of dividend declared by the first defendant between the years 1938 and 1943 and ascertain if the first defendant paid the dividend to the second and third defendants or their predecessor Rajani Kanta Mukerjee (deceased.) If it is found that the first defendant paid the dividends to the second and the third defendants or their predecessor the Court will make a decree against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the proportionate share of the plaintiffs. If, however, it is found that the 1st defendant did not pay the dividend to the 2nd and the third defendants or their predecessor the Court will pass a decree for the proportionate share of the plaintiffs against the first defendant. On these points the Court will base its decisions upon the materials on the record and further evidence that may be adduced by the parties. 17. The appellants will be entitled to half the costs of this appeal, hearing fee being assessed it 10 gold mohurs. Gopendra Nath Das, J. 18. I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... staying proceedings in execution must be set aside, but the petition on which that order was passed will be treated as an application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite & the court will proceed to deal with the application on the merits, keeping in view the principles indicated above. It will be open to the opposite parties to file an additional petition giving further particulars in support of the prayer for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite if they are so advised. The D. Hs. who are the petitioners before this Court will also be allowed to file objections to the same & be given a hearing. 11. This Rule is accordingly made absolute. The learned Dist. J. is directed to proceed to deal with the question of the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. It is also desirable that the proceedings for the grant of letters of administration should be expedited. 12. There will be no order for costs in this Court. Guha, J. 13. I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oughout been that he was given no particulars at all till the 5th August, 1950. As the petitioners were given only vague grounds which were not particularised or made specific so as to afford them the earliest opportunity of making representations against their detention orders, and their having been inex- cusable delay in acquainting them with particulars of what was alleged. the petitioners have to be released, the rules being made absolute. Ordered accordingly. PATANJALI SASTRI J.--I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. DAS J.--In view of the majority decision in Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother. Order accordingly. Petition No. 194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner R.R. Biswas. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta. Agent for the intervener P.A. Mehta. Petition No. 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition R.S. Narula. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehla.
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1951 (2) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some interest. The learned counsel appearing for both the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this question of interest to be deter- mined by us and we think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest on the sum of ₹ 30,000 at the rate of 4 per annum from the beginning of September, 1943. It is admitted that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by the end of August, 1943. The result is that we allow the appeal in part; the decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance- The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of ₹ 30,000 against the defendants second party with interest at 4 per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of reali- sation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs. Appeal allowed in part. Agent for the appellant R.C. Prasad. Agent for respondents Tarachand Brij Mohan Lal.
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1951 (2) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , subject of course to restrictions contained in Rule 71. Under Rule 71 the matter of registration of a dealer, amendment of certificate of registration or cancellation of registration can be delegated to the Commercial Tax Officer, and it has been so done. Section 20 and Rule 74 make provisions for appeals, revision and review. Section 21 of the Act provides for statement of case to the High Court. Thus there is efficacious and adequate remedy under the Act. It is idle to suggest that by virtue of repeal of Section 18 the petitioner is without any remedy. The petitioner described itself through its pleader as transferee and was registered as dealer as a matter of course. No question whether it was a transferee or not or dealer or not at all arose for determination. There has been no refusal to exercise jurisdiction nor any excess of jurisdiction. The application is wholly misconceived. The petition therefore fails and the Rule must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged.
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1951 (2) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd found it is obvious that the assessee bona fide believed that his act of accommodation to his customers in keeping up to the terms of the contract entered into with them would not change the real nature of the transaction. If he was able to convert the ingots entrusted to him into brass sheets he would have got exemption in regard to his manufacturing charges. Indeed, as the evidence discloses, and as the accounts show, he later on sold away the ingots entrusted to him after converting them into sheets paying sales tax. He might have been wrong in the view but I cannot say that he omitted the item deliberately with the idea of evading tax. The fact that immediately it was pointed out to him he was ready to make good the defect, is really indicative of his bona fides. I therefore hold on the evidence adduced in the case that the appellant did not wilfully submit an untrue return. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (2) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erson being a dealer or not when an application for registration as a dealer is made before him. The petitioners case however stands on a different footing. They are already registered as a dealer. The petitioners purchased the business in May, 1943, and new registration certificate was issued to them on 22nd May, 1943, under Section 17 of the Act. They have not taken any steps to have the registration cancelled. So long as they are registered they are liable to pay the tax. It is submitted by the learned Advocate-General that there is no allegation of demand of justice and its refusal in the petition and this is fatal to the maintainability of the application for mandamus and reliance is placed on the case reported in Surendra Nath Das v. State of West Bengal(1) (Harries, C.J., and Banarjee, J.). This decision is binding on me and I accept the contention. In the result the petition fails and the rule must be discharged with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) 1951 55 C.W.N. 255.
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1951 (2) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... uded from participation in the assets of an unregistered company which is wound up. I think it is in connection with administration and succession actions that the situs of a debt has relevancy. In Cheshire s Private International Law, it is stated at page 595, The fact, however, that a debt possesses a definite situation for some purposes does not necessarily imply that its assignment should be governed by the lex situs. Even apart from that, the provision of law enacted in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code is an answer to the argument based upon the situation of the debt. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to refer to the various decisions cited to us by Mr. Tiruvenkatachari on the question of situs of debt. For the feregoing reasons, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the proof of debts of the foreign creditors should be expunged is not acceptable to us. I entirely agree with my learned brother in his conclusions in other respects.
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1951 (2) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... eetings called by the quarrelling groups of directors may be invalid, the shareholders should not be exposed to the uncertainties flowing from the situation and the consequent litigation and it should be held that a position has arisen which makes it impracticable for the meeting being called in accordance with the articles. It is true that the impracticability contemplated in the section is as to the calling of a meeting. It appears to me however that the section also contemplates that the court should exercise its powers where it cannot say with reasonable approach to certainty, or even prima facie, that the meeting called in exercise of the powers contained in the regulations will be valid. I think, therefore, that in the circumstances of this case I have the power to call the meeting and if I have the power I have no hesitation in exercising it in order to resolve the conflict and uncertainty which has arisen as the result of the quarrel between the two sets of directors.
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