|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 32 Records
-
1952 (12) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 1950 Bom 360 (FB) (Z) and -- 'Govindarajulu v. Balu Ammal' AIR 1952 Mad 1 (Z1). 18. In addition, where the language of an order is clear this exploration into the wilderness of single instances (to quote Tenyson) is a wholly supererogatory task and in the interpretation of these procedural provisions regard must be had to the fundamental principles laid down by Lord Penzsnce in -- 'Kendall v. Hamilton', (1879) 4 AC 504 (Z2) cited with approval in the Civil Justice Committee Report 1924-25 page xxviii. The procedure is but the machinery of the law after all, the channel and means whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strangely departs from its proper office when in place of facilitating it is permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish the legal rights and is thus made to govern where it ought to subserve. Therefore, these decisions do not substantiate the contentions of this petitioner. 19. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 48 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f jurisdiction vested in them by law, it will be seen from, what I have said above that should the Court come to the conclusion that the order made by the Government was wrong and there was no other objection to the issue of a writ or direction, it would be within its power to grant the appropriate relief, but I have already made it clear that there was nothing wrong in the letter that the Government addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and the cause of the whole trouble was that the Tehsildar had the mutations prepared and later on sanctioned without going into the matter carefully. 16. In the result I would allow the petitions as against respondent 2, quash his orders by which lie sanctioned the mutations in question and issue a writ prohibiting him from giving effect to those mutations. As regards the Government I would dismiss the petitions. In the peculiar circumstances of the case I would direct the parties to bear their own costs. Gurnam Singh, J. 17. I entirely agree.
-
1952 (12) TMI 47 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the full sense" may have the charm of novelty, but appears to be opposed to logic and commonsense. The learned Judge himself seems to have realised that this is an indefensible proposition but has justified it by saying "We shall have to make compromises or exceptions in order to meet the ends of justice". It is not the function of a Judge to legislate and introduce exceptions or compromises into the plaintext of an enactment. The judicial function is limited to the interpretations of the law within the limits of recognised canons of interpretation. 18. After having given my anxious consideration to the judgments of the learned Judges who constituted the majority, I feel unable to subscribe either to their reasonings or to the conclusions arrived at by them. In my opinion, 'Radhi Bewa's case (C)' requires reconsideration as I am afraid it is bound to lead to unforeseen complications and throw this branch of the Hindu law into a welter of confusion.
-
1952 (12) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... proached Kulraj, the officer-in-charge of the police station, and requested him to allow the truck to pass through. The Additional Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that the only motive of Darshan Singh was to help his colleague, namely Attar Singh, who was about to leave the district. It is necessary, therefore, that the case of Darshan Singh should also be reheard and the whole evidence against him reconsidered with a view to find out whether he is guilty or innocent. The result, therefore, is that both the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court as well as that of the Additional Sessions Judge are set aside and the cases remitted to the Sessions Court in order that they may be heard afresh on the evidence on record in the light of the observations made above after excluding from consideration the supposed admission of Attar Singh., Pending the decision of the Session a Court, the accused would remain on bail 7 on the same terms as before. Appeals allowed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sentence set aside and they should be acquitted. In the premises it is also hardly possible to claim a retrial as envisaged in the second part of the appellants' third contention, and as, in inflicting punishment, the learned Magistrate, although he has chosen to convict the appellants under the new Act, has confined himself within the lesser limits prescribed by the old statute, and the sentences do not at all appear to be service, the only thing that requires to be done in this appeal, in the circumstances of this case, is to alter the appellants' conviction from one under Sections 461/537 of the new Act to one under Sections 406/488 of the old Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923. The appellants' third contention also, therefore, fails in both its parts and it is rejected. 26. In the result, this appeal is dismissed, the appellants' conviction being merely altered to one under Sections 406/488 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923 but their sentences confirmed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rms of section 10(1) (C) of the Act even on the first respondent's interpretation of it, namely that the words, " the dispute " require Government to indicate the nature of the dispute which the Tribunal is required to settle. I say this because, in my judgment, we must read the order of the 20th May, 1947, along with the documentS which accompanied it. I also agree that one must not be over-technical, but had it not been for the /of act that the point is now settled by the decision in the India Paper' Pulp Company's case( 1949-50 F.C.R. 321). I would have been inclined to consider that an indication of the nature of the dispute, either in the order itself or in the papers accompanying it, was necessary. However, that is now settled and I have no desire to go behind the decision but I would like to say that even if it is not legally necessary to indicate the nature of the dispute, it is, in my opinion, desirable that that should be done. Appeal allowed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 43 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of management." In the present case the managing agents were appointed on the 9th of April, 1936, whereas Act XXII of 1936 by which Section 87C was added to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, came into force on the the 15th of January, 1937. Section 87C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, provides that that provision has no application to cases where managing agents were appointed before the commencement of Act XXII of 1936. For the foregoing reasons I think that we must answer the question referred to us for decision by saying that in computing net profits of the company upon which commission is to be paid to the managing agents as provided by the managing agency agreement read with the revised article 83 of the articles of association of the assessee company excess profits tax is not to be deducted, though Section 87C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, does not govern the case. No orders as to costs. SONI, J.--I agree. FALSHAW, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1952 (12) TMI 42 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the agreement was to have been entered into, the managing agents would have got the agreement differently worded without much difficulty. Had it not been because of this circumstance of lack of interest prevailing in the country I would have found it difficult not to agree with the majority opinion in the House of Lords in Ollivant's case (supra) cited by my learned brother Harnam Singh, J. As matters stand in this country the agreement, must be taken as it is. A different agreement cannot be spelt out by means of judicial construction. Falshaw, J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments of my learned brethren, and agree with the answer proposed. I cannot usefully add anything to the exhaustive statement of the case by my learned brother Harnam Singh, J., and I also agree with my learned brother Soni, J., that if the excess profits tax had been in existence it is probable that the managing agents would have had the agreement worded differently in their favour.
-
1952 (12) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... been taken. We hold that the respondent has no right to interfere with the rights of the several petitioners under the contracts and agreements in their favour set out in their petitions, and we hereby issue a writ prohibiting the State from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the enjoyment of those rights by the petitioners. In cases where the periods under the contracts have expired, or where the proprietors have ill to recover anything from the transferees after he date of vesting, the State will be at perfect liberty to assert and enforce its rights standing in the shoes of the proprietors. The respondent will pay the petitioners their respective costs. Petition allowed. Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 232, 233, 286, 309 and 320 Bajinder Narain. Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 360 and 351 M. S. H. Sastri. Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 319, 354 and 490 Harbans Singh. Agent for the respondents in all petitions G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
-
1952 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... unworthy of credit, the alleged conduct must be referable to some innocent reason. Different persons react in different ways in similar circumstances and in the absence of satisfactory evidence the court ought not to treat the case as positively proved beyond reasonable doubt only by reason of the appellant's failure to put up his defence immediately when he was confronted with the three notes. Taking all the surrounding circumstances into consideration and in view of the unsatisfactory evidence adduced by the prosecution we think that the learned Additional Sessions Judge rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant. 15. In the view we have taken as to the facts, it is not necessary for us to discuss the question of the validity of the sanction to prosecute the appellant. For reasons stated above, this appeal must be allowed and the conviction and sentence passed by the High Court must be set aside and the accused must be set at liberty. We order accordingly.
-
1952 (12) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the word "deemed" as given in law lexicons. "Deemed" is a word with which we are sufficiently familiar. It has been evidently used because ostensibly the transaction is only a sale. When the condition of reconveyance is embodied in the same document it is open to the Court to hold that what purports to be a sale is really a mortgage. Then it can be said that the sale is "deemed" to be a mortgage. What the proviso says is that when the condition is not embodied in the same document in no case shall a sale be deemed to be a mortgage. We see no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. 9. We may mention that even on the merits the learned Subordinate Judge has held that the transaction was not a mortgage. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. As the appeal was filed 'in forma pauperis' the appellants shall pay to the Government the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal.
-
1952 (12) TMI 38 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ferred by Ex. 1 to renew old debts or obligations should be limited to the debts and obligations that were in existence on the date of execution of the power-of-attorney. It cannot, in my opinion, be interpreted as empowering the agent to contract new loans and to renew them from time to time on behalf of the executants. On a consideration of all the facts and the principles of law discussed in the foregoing paragraphs I have arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief against the non-executing defendants and that his suit has been rightly dismissed, it is unfortunate that a righteous claim should be defeated by an unrighteous defence. I would, accordingly, while dismissing the appeal direct that the defendants other than defendant 1, should not be allowed the costs of this appeal. There will be a decree against defendant 1 alone for the suit amount, with costs and future interest, as directed by the Court below. S.P. Mohapatra, J. 14. I agree.
-
1952 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ch of the family was in October 1942 and thereafter as alleged by the plaintiffs in their plaint. This allegation of the plaintiffs was however denied by the defendants and as the matters stood there was really no proof of any demand having been made by the plaintiffs upon the defendants for payment of their moiety of the deposit and the suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants without any such demand having been made. If that was so the period of limitation had not commenced to run against the defendants and the suit against them was well within time. With regard to this contention also there were concurrent findings of fact reached by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, viz. that no demand was made within the period prescribed under Article 60. If that was so, the suit was certainly not" barred by the Law of Limitation. This contention of the appellants also therefore fails. 12. In the result the appeal fails and must- stand dismissed with costs.
-
1952 (12) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of mala fides has not. It was also urged that the resolution is invalid as the District Collector who presided over the meeting of the Transport Authority which passed this resolution had opened the new Municipal bus-stand on April I, 1950. The suggestion is that be did not bring to bear upon the question an impartial and unbiased mind. The District Collector was not acting in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions so that his -action can be subjected to the scrutiny which is permissible in the case of a judicial officer. He, was acting purely in his executive capacity and his conduct in presiding over the meeting of the Transport Authority in the exercise of his normal functions and also opening the Municipal stand which he was entitled to do as the head of the District, does not affect the validity or fairness of the order complained against. We do not think there is any merit in this contention. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e committal court was that he was innocent and that he was being implicated owing to enmity. He stuck to that reply in the Court of Session after fully understanding what he was asked. It is well settled that every error or omission not in compliance with the provisions of section 342 does not necessarily vitiate a trial. Errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities, and, as held in Tara Singh's case( 1951 S.C.R. 729.), the question, whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to the accused. We are of the opinion that the disregard of the provisions of section 342 in this case is not so gross as would justify our quashing the conviction and ordering a retrial. The result is that we uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant B. S. Gheba. Agent for the respondent G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
-
1952 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... iction must be deemed to have been waived and there was no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the case. The suit was clearly barred by the principle of res judicata and was wrongly decided. The question which arises in the present case is not whether the execution Court at Asansol had or had not jurisdiction to entertain the execution application after it had sent the certificate under section 41 but whether the judgment-debtor is precluded by the principle of constructive resjudicata from raising the question of jurisdiction. We accordingly hold that the view taken by the High Court on the question of res judicata is not correct. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and the decree,of the High Court and restore that of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application of the judgment-debtor. The appellant will be entitled to his costs here and hitherto. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant' P. K. Chatterjee. Agent for the respondent No. 1 B. B. Biswas.
-
1952 (12) TMI 33 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... garded as detrimental to the business was allowed as a revenue expenditure. These cases I think are distinguishable from the present. It is true that the expenditure made by the assessee company was perfectly legitimate and was in fact an act of prudent management, but the propriety of expenditure is not the criterion upon which its allowance under Section 10(2) is to be judged. Clearly, the payment of the amounts of the debentures themselves would be a capital expenditure and it seems to me the premium or bonus is part and parcel of the amount of the debenture and is not distinguishable from the other amount paid to the debenture-holder. For these reasons I think the reference should be answered by saying that the expenditure was not expenditure in respect of which allowance could be claimed under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would make no order as to costs in this matter. BHANDARI, J.―I agree in the order proposed. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1952 (12) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... w of the absence of any distinct provision in section 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of April 26, 1950, viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification, cannot, by virtue of section 21, have that effect. If, therefore, the amending order operates prospectively, i.e., only as from the date of the order, it cannot validate the award which bad been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date, of the amending order, during which period the adjudicator was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all. We do not think the respondents can derive any support from section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. The result, therefore is that this appeal must be allowed and the award must be declared to be null and void and we order accordingly. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r business. It is unnecessary to decide whether disputes arising in relation to purely administrative work fall within their ambit. After all, whether there is an industrial dispute at all is for the Government primarily to find out, for it is only then it has jurisdiction to refer. Moreover, it is not every case of an industrial dispute that the Government is bound to refer. They may refer some, but may not also. It is a question of expediency. There was no ground urged before us or before the High Court that the Sanitary Inspector and the Head Clerk of the Municipality were officers and not "workmen " within the meaning of the Act. The dispute raised on their behalf by the Workers' Union of which they were members is, in our view, an " industrial dispute " within the meaning of the Act. The order of the High Court is affirmed., and this appeal is dismissed with costs, only one set to be shared between respondent 2 and respondent 3. Appeal dismissed.
-
1952 (12) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cision in any way by expressing any opinion on this matter. We only desire to state that notwithstanding the observations made by the High Court referred to above, the question shall be treated as an open one. The applicability of article 14 of the Constitution in the present case is, however, not at all dependent upon the fact as to whether or not the respondents have already acquired property in the shape of a decree. Their claim to the estate of the late Nawab which they wanted to assert under the general law of the land is itself a valuable right, and the deprivation of that right by a piece of discriminatory legislation would be sufficient to bring the case within the purview of article 14 of the Constitution. Having regard to the view that we have taken, it as unnecessary to consider whether the impugned Legislation violates the provisions of article 31(1) or article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
|
