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Showing 1 to 20 of 43 Records
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1953 (3) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ary for possession of rectified spirit because it falls in the category of medical preparations. This contention again is without substance. No evidence has been led that this falls in the category of medical preparations. On the other hand, rectified spirit clearly falls within the definition of an intoxicant and its possession without permit is prohibited by the provisions of Section 66(b) of the Act. Sections (22) of the Act defines an intoxicant as including liquor. Sub-section (24) defines liquor as including spirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids consisting of alcohol. From the chemical analyst's report it appears that the rectified spirit found in the possession of the appellant was 94 v/v of ethyl alcohol. It therefore clearly fell within the definition of intoxicant, as given in Section 2(22) of the Act. This contention is therefore repelled. 7. For the reasons given above, we see no forces in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... all taxes due to local boards. 4. Nor can Article 16, Limitation Act have any application to a case like this, where the tax was merely recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and the claim was not made by the revenue authorities on account of arrears of revenue or on account of demand recoverable as such arrears, and where the tax also had been paid within the 15 days prescribed, and had not become a tax liable to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. So, the only article which can be applied properly to this case is Article 62, Limitation Act, which prescribes three years, from the date when the money was received by the defendant) as the period of limitation. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts is of course, not ousted. See -- 'the Province o) Madras v. Satyanarayanamurthy', AIR1952Mad273 (B). So Article 62 will apply under the Full Bench ruling. The learned Subordinate Judge's decision is correct. This appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1953 (3) TMI 55 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... orities have to determine his total income having regard to the several provisions of the Act to which reference has been made by us; and, in doing so, the Income-tax Officer is bound to take into account the share loss suffered by the assessee out of British India. 18. Having regard to what has been observed above, we are in agreement with the view taken by the Bombay and the Nagpur High Courts. In the result, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing the Bombay losses to be set off against the profits of the Hyderabad business. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to set off the loss of ₹ 51,671 suffered in the business at Bombay against his income in Hyderabad in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1358 Fasli. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference. Counsels fee ₹ 100. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 54 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... B & O' AIR 1936 Pat. 267 (C). On the particular facts presented in this case, we are of opinion that there was no material before the Income Tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000/- which represented the value of high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. 5. In the result, we hold that there was no material before the Income Tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000/- representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. We also hold that there was material before the Income Tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 4,000 representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee, Rai Bahadur S. N. Ganguli. (6) We, accordingly, answer the question formulated by the Tribunal in the manner indicated above. There will not be any order as to costs of hearing of this reference.
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1953 (3) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s they stand is in any way in violation of any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Learned counsel wanted to rely upon decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the due process clause of the Fourteenth. Amendment of the Constitution and (2) the system of assessment and procedure relating to it followed in England and in the United States. We refused to hear him on these points because we consider that these have no bearing on the question to be decided in this case. 6. As already mentioned, the appellants in this case are content with urging these general grounds attacking the validity of the provisions of, the Income-tax Act and the procedure prescribed by them and have nothing whatever to say about the orders actually passed against them. Indeed, these orders are the subject-matter of appeals before the tribunal under the Act. 7. We find no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, and the appeals are therefore dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not very happy. It has certainly led three judges to think that the intention of the legislature was not brought out by the language. People who are not lawyers may well be misled into thinking that the notification issued under the ordinance has terminated with its repeal and not having been re-issued under the Act, the provisions of which again in clear language provide that it only extends to areas specified in the schedule and which gives power to extend it, that those areas are excluded from the scope of the Act. It would have been much simpler if the legislature made its intention clear by use of simple and unambiguous language. 12. Because of the undertaking given by the learned Attorney-General not to proceed any further in this matter, it is not necessary to set aside the acquittal order of the respondents, which will remain as it stands. 13. Appeal allowed. Acquittal not set aside. Agent for the appellant G. H. Rajadhyaksha. Agent for the respondents Ganpat Rai.
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1953 (3) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
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... ... ..... hat land would be an adequate basis for finding that land requisitioned by the order of the S. D. O. in October 1952, was requisitioned mala fide. 60. We do not think that in the circumstances of this case, the charge of mala fides can be regarded as substantiated. No actual bias or prejudice has been attributed to the requisitioning authorities. The requisition is for a public purpose. The property was requisitioned under a valid enactment. If on facts, it can be shown that the requisitioning authorities exceeded their jurisdiction to any extent, the redress must be obtained by a regular suit. 61. In the result, this petition must be dismissed, and we order accordingly. We make no order as to costs. The Rule is discharged. 62. The case involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is, therefore, allowed to the petitioner under Article 132, Clause (1) of the Constitution, Haliram Deka, J. 63. I agree.
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1953 (3) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... capital under Rule 2 of Schedule II. In view of these considerations I think that the credit balance of ₹ 1,02,161 in the present case cannot be held to be 'reserve' within the meaning of Schedule II, Rule 2 of the Act. Mr. Jain placed much reliance upon the decision of Chagla C. J. in --'Commissioner of Income Tax v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd.'AIR 1951 Bom 420 (B). I need hardly say that I have the greatest respect for the opinion of Chagla C. J. but for the reasons I have stated I have reached a different conclusion on the point. 6. In the result I hold that the credit balance of ₹ 1,02,161 in the profit and loss account on 1-1-1947 should not be included in determining the capital of the company under Rule 2, Schedule II of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. 7. I would accordingly answer the question in favour of the department. The assessee must pay the cost of the reference hearing fee ₹ 250/-. Jamuar, J. 8. I agree.
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1953 (3) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to prove in the trial Court and which was accepted by it. These defects would undoubtedly warrant a reconsideration of the evidence by the lower appellate Court. It is no doubt true that the learned Judge recorded an alternative Ending even on the assumption that the evidence of D. Ws. 4, 8 and 9 was admissible. But it is rather difficult to separate how much of his finding was coloured by the fact that his evidence was inadmissible and that the pleading was inadequate or insufficient. However it is unnecessary to adopt that course, as in my opinion the finding on the first point is sufficient to dispose of this second appeal. 10. It follows from the foregoing that the decision of the learned District Judge must be set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs here and in the Court below. The appellant will pay the court-fee payable to the Government which will of course be included in the costs recoverable from the respondent. (Leave to appeal is refused).
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1953 (3) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch is provided by way of penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence. In spite of his labors Shri N. C. Taluqdar has not been able to point out to us any provision of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, which constitutes what is contemplated under section 431(2), a penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence. The offence that the respondent could be charged with is defined in section 421 of the Act and the punishment for that offence provided in section 500 is fine and not forfeiture. 10. We are therefore of the opinion that the order of the District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, dated 14th August, 1951, was not an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to rule 9, Chapter II, Part I, of the Rules of the High Court, and Chunder J. had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal to refer such a question to the High Court. Mr. Kolah says that inasmuch as we have already directed the Tribunal to refer this question of law and to draw up a statement of the case with regard to it, our order has become final and we must proceed to express our opinion on the second question as well. Now, if this Court has no jurisdiction to require the Tribunal to state a case in matters where no application was made by the assessee under Section 66(1), we cannot confer jurisdiction upon ourselves by requiring the Tribunal to state the case. There is no question of our order becoming final. The question is with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court and if the jurisdiction is absent, no order passed by the Court can confer jurisdiction upon it. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not open to us to answer the second question which has been raised by the Tribunal at our instance. The result therefore is that we must answer the first question in the affirmative.
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1953 (3) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see if we could distinguish the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, but we find it difficult to do so, and if the Calcutta High Court has laid down the law, then on the principle that this Court has always accepted in interpreting an All-India statute we must accept the law as laid down by a sister High Court. We must confess that it is with some reluctance that we have come to the conclusion that we have because, as we have already point out, there is considerable force in the contention of Sir Nusserwanji. But that is more a matter for the Legislature than for us. As far as we are concerned, we must accept the decision of the Calcutta High Court as correctly laying down the principle of law, and if we follow that principle of law, the only conclusion that we can come to is that the Tribunal was right in the view that it took. The result is that the two questions submitted to us will be answered as follows First question in the affirmative. Second question in the negative.
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1953 (3) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the railway administration to offer to the consignor that they will carry the entire risk if the consignor is willing to make payment of the percentage on value authorised under Section. 75 and if the consignor fails to do so the railway administration is entitled by virtue of the approval of the form under these circumstances by the Central Government to obtain a risk note in form 'X'. In the present case, therefore, in my opinion, the railway administration was perfectly entitled to obtain a risk note in the form in which they did and the railway administration has fully protected itself by this note. 15. I agree with the order proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice and I also join in the recommendation that Government will consider the case of the appellant from the point of view indicated in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. 16. PER CURIAM. Liberty to the appellant to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited for security of costs. 17. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... f which all necessary facts are set out in the statement of the case. The question raised will be - "Whether the order of the Commissioner acting under Section 33B (1) setting aside the order of the Incom3-tax Officer while an appeal from that order was pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was valid?" and we answer that, question in the negative. Question No. 2 It is unnecessary to answer this question. Question No, 3 "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the orders passed by the Income-tax Officer, dated 21st June, 1952, are bad in law, as fresh notices as required by Sections 22 and 23 of the Income-tax Act were not given by the Income-tax Officer to the assessee ?" In our opinion it is unnecessary to decide this question because all proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer pursuant to the orders passed by the Commissioner under Section 33B must be bad inasmuch as we have held that the orders of the Commissioner are bad.
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1953 (3) TMI 43 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 36 4 I.T.R. 108. On the particular facts presented in this case, we are of opinion that there was no material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000 which represented the value of high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. In the result, we hold that there was no material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000 representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. We also hold that there was material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 4,000 representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee, Rai Bahadur S.N. Ganguli. We, accordingly, answer the question formulated by the Tribunal in the manner indicated above. There will not be any order as to costs of hearing of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hallenge the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer, and if anything, Sections 30 and 31 should be liberally construed in favour of the assessee rather than against him so far as to deprive him of the right to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, we are rather inclined in favour of the more liberal interpretation put by the Allahabad High Court than the construction put by the East Punjab High Court on these two sections. The question submitted to us does not really bring out the controversy between the department and the assessee. We would, therefore, re-frame the question and the re-framed question will be "Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated the 20th of September, 1950, is an order under Section 31 and appealable?" and we answer that question in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. No order on the notice of motion except that the Commissioner should pay the costs of the motion. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to bring it in the category of agricultural income it may be necessary for the assessee to establish that such use was being made of the land and human skill, labour and money were being spent on it so that the income may be deemed to be agricultural income, when normally it would not be so. In the case before us, the pasturage or land used for grazing of cattle normally used for agricultural purposes, is an agricultural activity and it is not necessary to spend money, human skill and labour to make it agricultural. We may point out that we do not propose to express any opinion on the question whether income from every kind of trees not of spontaneous growth but on the growth of which labour and money have been spent is "agricultural income", as the point does not arise in this case. The result, therefore, is that our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s entirely independent of the business of the assessee as a casual and non-recurring receipt. The Tribunal has framed a question with regard to the casual and non-recurring nature of the receipt as the main question and in the alternative it has framed the question with regard to the receipt being a capital receipt. In our opinion the main question is whether the receipt is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt and the argument at the Bar has proceeded on that basis. Therefore we will treat question No. 2 as question No. 1 and answer it in the affirmative and we will also hold, if necessary, that the receipt is of a casual and non-recurring nature. We will frame question No. 2 as follows - "Whether in any event the receipt of ₹ 57,435 is of a casual and non-recurring nature and therefore exempt from taxation under Section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act?" and the answer is in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o we feel a nominal fine would have met the ends of justice even on the view the learned Judges took of the law. The charge on the second count relating to the 6 bales is a similar one and the facts follow the same pattern. They have been detailed in the High Court's judgment, so it is not necessary to do more than outline them here. The quota-holder here is Beharilal Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkadas Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales to Dharsi Moolji for- delivery in the same truck as the 13 bales. Dharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales also, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made. For the reasons given above, we hold that this was a true and accurate return. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (3) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... remand committing the accused to further custody till the 11th March. It has been held by this Court that in habeas corpus proceedings, the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings. The material date on the facts of this case is the 10th March, when the affidavit on behalf of the Government was filed justifying the detention as a lawful one. But the position, as we have stated, is that on that date there was no order remanding the four persons to custody. This Court has often reiterated before that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and -scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law. That has not been done in this case. The petitioners now before us are therefore entitled to be released, and they are set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed.
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