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Showing 1 to 20 of 20 Records
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1953 (8) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uate remedy. 16. The duplication of certain demands to which I referred a little while ago is admitted, and it was said before the learned trial Judge that the Customs officials had certainly no desire to realise duty on account of the same goods twice. I must, however, add my condemnation to that of the learned Judge of the inexcusable carelessness displayed by the Customs officials in making these duplicate demands. Demands of this kind not only put members of the public to unmerited harassment, but also bring the department concerned into discredit which is a public mischief. It seems also to be a matter for comment that some of the letters of the appellant were not replied to till after a long time. These however are only minor matters and do not bear upon the main question of relief by way of a writ in respect of the amount properly charged. 17. For the reasons which I have given, this appeal is dismissed with costs. 18. Certified for two Counsel. Lahiri, J. 19. I agree.
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1953 (8) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... rect that the papers in this matter should go back immediately to the lower Court and that the learned Civil Judge without any delay will dispose of this suit on merits. Mr. Purshottam is apprehensive that there maybe an appeal to the District Court, in which case his client would be still out of the land in respect of which the Mamlatdar has held that he is a tenant. It would be perfectly open to the petitioner to apply to the District Court with regard to the question of injunction and It will be for the District Court to consider whether on the facts of the case the injunction should be continued or it should be dissolved. It would be open to the petitioner also to apply to the learned Civil Judge on proper materials to consider whether the injunction granted by him should not be dissolved. Costs of the revision application costs in the cause. The same point arises in Civil Revision Application No. 1586, and we make the same order in that application. 7. Order accordingly.
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1953 (8) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he plaintiff appellant has not been able to establish her rights to the two-thirds share of the property in dispute and her claim for cancellation of the sale deed executed by Raghubar Dayal in favour of the Union Bank, Utraula in respect of this two-thirds share in the property has been rightly rejected. 14. It may be rioted that the relief claimed by the plaintiff was not properly worded or expressed. The plaintiff was no party to the sale deed and she was, therefore, entitled only to a declaration that the sale deed executed by Raghubar Dayal in favour of the Union Bank, Utraula was not binding on her in respect of the property owned by her. The prayer in the plaint, however, was that the sale deed executed in favour of the Union Bank by Raghubar Dayal be cancelled. The intention evidently was that the sale deed may toe declared ineffectual and null and void as against the plaintiff. 15. As a result both the appeals are dismissed. I make no order as to costs in this Court.
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1953 (8) TMI 29 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hroughout the country that it is too late in tile day to invalidate marriage on the ground of public policy, nor can such marriage contracts be held to be immoral or illegal in the absence of a statutory enactment expressly prohibiting the custom. (v) If a marriage has been solemnised the Courts will not help a suitor to recover back the money paid by him under such a contract, but if the agreement remains executory the Court will direct the recovery of the amount paid as bride price, though no suit for specific performance of the contract will be entertained. 23. Having these principles in mind, I have arrived at the conclusion that the suit by the plaintiff is maintainable and that he is entitled to our judgment. I would, therefore, set aside the judgment under appeal, restore that of the trial court and decree the plaintiff's suit as directed by the learned munsif. The plaintiff will also have his costs of this litigation throughout. Jagannath Mohanty, J. 24. I agree.
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1953 (8) TMI 28 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r relief could be give to the heirs of late Jyotirindra Narayan Sinha Choudhury in one reference covering three assessments for three consecutive years though, in my opinion, that might have been a good ground for Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for refusing to make a reference under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act. In my opinion, therefore, the point under reference should be answered in favour of the Department and the assessees should be made liable for costs. Per Curiam -It is hereby ordered that the question under reference should be answered in the affirmative. In other words it is held that on the facts and circumstances of this case the receipts from the sale of sal trees are agricultural income under Section 2(1) and are exempt from taxation under Section 4(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act. The applications under reference are allowed with costs. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of ₹ 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (8) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... higher footing. Here, on their own showing, the assessees were an association of individuals. Further although they inherited specific and ascertainable shares in the property, they for several years had jointly managed the property and derived income therefrom, and the appropriation of income was not strictly in accordance with their shares. Their cash book showed that the members of the association drew moneys from the common fund as and when money was needed by them, irrespective of their shares in the income. On the facts found in this case, I have no doubt that there was sufficient material for assessment as an association of individuals. The Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the assessees constituted an association of individuals within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act. I consider that the question referred to the High Court must be answered against the assessees and in favour of the Income-tax Department. Das, CJ - I agree.
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1953 (8) TMI 26 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e received was not his income. At page 1034 Lord Macmillan said - "When the Act by Section 3 subjects to charge ' all income ' of an individual, it is what reaches the individual as income which it is intended to charge. In the present case the decree of the Court by charging the appellant's whole resources with a specific payment to his step-mother has to that extent diverted his income from him and has directed it to his step-mother; to that extent what he receives for her is not his income. It is not a case of the application by the appellant of part of his income in a particular way, it is rather the allocation of a sum out his revenue before it becomes income in his hands". Relying on these cases I am of the opinion that this sum of money received by the assessee was not received by him as professional income but was received on behalf of a trust and not in his capacity as an individual. I would answer the question accordingly. Falshaw, J.-I Agree.
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1953 (8) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roperty the property taken into consideration is only such portion of the property, which is not in the occupation of the assessee for the purposes of any business or vocation carried on by him. The charging section, Section 3, states that the income-tax can be charged on the income, and Section 6 deals with the heads of income, and the computation of income in respect of the heads specified under Section 6 is provided in the following sections, and Section 9 relates to the computation of income in respect of the property. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the property which does not enter into the computation is property which is "chargeable", but which is excluded for the purposes of tax to be levied. It is never made chargeable under Section 9 and, therefore, it is impossible to hold that the second proviso to Section 12B(1) applies to this case. In our opinion, therefore, the second question also must be answered in the negative and against the assessee.
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1953 (8) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (NAGPUR BENCH)
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... ... ..... ated, which is likely to prejudice mankind against them, then, irrespective of whether the matter is indictable, we would expect the Press and the public men to act with the greatest caution before publishing any such inflammatory statement or narration. In this context we appreciate the apologies, in some cases wholly unconditional, which have been tendered by most of the Respondents including all the newspapers concerned. We trust that the Press and public men will always endeavour to exercise moderation and while upholding the privileges of the public, not act in a manner which may shake public confidence in the Courts, Tribunals or authorities functioning within the State. We also trust that all those who are charged with public duty, whatever the domain of their service, will act with large-hearted sympathy and understanding and make this great country a haven of peace, amity and concord. 18. The Rules in all the cases are discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1953 (8) TMI 23 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... circumstance anywhere, I am unable to accept the contention on behalf of the respondent that I should infer from the pleadings of the defendant that he was obliged with the loan on a friendly request. There is no such admission in the written statement as well which contains categorical denial of facts in the plaint, a good part of which was not accepted by the Courts below. For the limited purpose, however, of the applicability or otherwise of the stringency of Section 4, Bihar Money-lenders' Act, I see no circumstance in which I could hold that the plaintiff can claim that he was only a casual money-lender. 9. In these circumstances, I come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is a casual money-lender and the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that the Bihar Money-Lenders' Act will not apply to a transaction evidenced by a hand-note is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the appeal must be allowed, but there-will be no order as to costs.
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1953 (8) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted 2-1-1953, so far as it was held thereby that the Respondent's order of 29-4-1952 was valid even as regards the period prior to its date and the order of the learned Judge, dismissing the Appellant's application are set aside. The application of the Appellant is allowed in part and the Respondent is directed to cancel forthwith his orders, dated 29-4-1952 and 9-5-1952, so far as they purport to place the Appellant under suspension during the period between 16-1-1951 and 28-4-1952, both Inclusive, and to forbear from giving any effect to the said orders and from acting thereon or causing them to be acted upon, to the extent mentioned above, in any manner whatsoever. 18. As the Appellant questioned the entire order before the learned trial Judge and took several other points on which he failed, each party will bear its own costs in the trial Court. The Appellant will get from the Respondent his costs of this appeal. Certified for two Counsel. Lahiri, J. 19. I agree.
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1953 (8) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessed income-tax only on the date of the registration; and on 15th March, 1947, that liability could not have been enforced. If the unregistered firm was under a liability to disclose its income and provide for payment of the income-tax in advance on 15th March, 1947, it was not the unregistered firm that was eventually assessed. So, there was no possibility, in any event, of enforcing the liability for failure to comply with sub-clause (3) of Section 18A, as far as the registered firm, and at any rate as far as the individual members thereof, were concerned. Therefore, there was no question of any default of either the registered firm or of the individual partners thereof. Therefore, there was no question of there being any liability to pay any penalty. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Since the assessee has succeeded, the Income-tax Department will pay the costs of the assessee, ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1953 (8) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h should be allowed to Sarabhai, taking into consideration all the factors mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 10(2)(x). They will consider the evidence in the light of the judgment delivered by us and they will decide the reasonable remuneration on such evidence and such materials as are before them, having considered the evidence and the materials in the light of the factors mentioned by the Legislature in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 10(2)(x). Turning to the questions, the first is unnecessary. The answer to the second question is clause (x) of Section 10(2) applies and not clause (xv). With regard to question No. 3, we would answer the first part in the affirmative. The second part does not arise because it would be for the Tribunal in the light of the judgment to direct itself properly in law and to consider the evidence in the manner indicated by us in the judgment. Question No. 4 does not arise. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (8) TMI 19 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t II, of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Rules, 1947, read with Section 3(1) of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax before whom the assessment proceedings are pending, is an officer contemplated by Section 20, invested with the powers of a Civil Court to compel pro- duction, of documents. As the State Government has refused to grant copies of the required documents, the petitioner has the remedy under the Act to move the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax for compelling their production, if they are really necessary for the just and fair disposal of the assessment case. That remedy is equally efficacious and expedi- tious, and, therefore, it must first be exhausted before the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 are invoked. 6.. The application is accordingly dismissed, but in the circum- stances of the case we make no order as to costs. The petitioner would be entitled to refund of the outstanding amount of the security. Application dismissed.
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1953 (8) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y itself exempt him from paying the sales tax in respect of transactions put through inside the State. I need not repeat them here. For the reasons given there I allow Crl. R. C. No. 778 of 1952 and convict the accused in respect of the transactions prior to 1st January, 1948, and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 200. The accused will also pay the sales tax amount of Rs. 1,867-10-6. In Crl. R. C. No. 655 of 1952, Mr. Pai argued that Section 16(A), on the basis of which the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the convic- tion relating to transactions subsequent to 1st January, 1948, is ultra vires since according to him it contravenes Article 20(1) of the Constitu- tion. The matter, however, seems to be concluded against Mr. Pai by the decision in Syed Mohamed and Co. v. State of Madras(1). I therefore dismiss Crl. R. C. No. 655 of 1952. Note Mr. Pai prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. He was asked to file a separate application and give notice to Public Prosecutor.
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1953 (8) TMI 17 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order prejudicial to the assessee it should render the position of the assessee worse than what it was before, which an order declining to interfere would not do. In the present case the Commissioner merely declined to interfere and therefore in the view of the Judicial Committee there has not been an order prejudicial to the assessee. 10.. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as this aspect was not presented before the Court and debated at the bar but was pointed out by us, it need not be discussed or decided by us in this case which can be disposed of on the other grounds already dealt with. We accept the submission and reserve the question for decision in the future when its decision is called for. 11.. In the result we find that no part of the request contained in these petitions can be granted. The petitions should, therefore, be dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Petitions dismissed. (1) (1947) I.L.R. 1947 Lah. 809 74 I.A. 306 16 I.T.R. 214.
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1953 (8) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that, on most of the occasions when the commission agents sold goods on behalf of their principals, the principals were also present. Therefore, in this case, the plaintiff has certainly made out his claim that the collec- tion of dharmam and dhallal was with the knowledge of the principals. As pointed out in Radhakrishna v. Province of Madras(1), such collection of dhallal and dharmam with the knowledge of the principals was cer- tainly not a violation of any of the terms of the licence granted under Section 8 of the Act. The question really turns on the facts of this case we differ from the learned Subordinate judge s finding and we hold that the collection of dhallal and dharmam by the plaintiff from the buyers in no way violated the terms of the licence. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 8 of the Act. The decree of the lower court is set aside and the plaintiff wiII be granted a declaratory decree he sought with costs in both the courts. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (8) TMI 15 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... edy for challenging the tax levied by the State Government and that in the circumstances a writ should not issue. The application for writ was therefore dismissed on that preli- minary ground. I see no reason to differ from the considered view ex- pressed by a Division Bench of this Court which I am bound to follow and dismiss the present application with costs. Application dismissed.
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1953 (8) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... the date of presentation of the winding up petition and not afterwards. The law in England is also to the same effect. In the case of In re Agricultural Wholesale Society Ltd. it was held that the amounts proved for by the creditors were to be computed only up to the date of the commencement of the winding up , which phrase, as already stated, means the date of the presentation of winding up petition. In the circumstances I am of the opinion that the claimant was entitled to interest up to the date of the presentation of winding up petition only. In offering to pay him interest till the date of winding up order the official liquidators have really offered to make an over payment to him. I am not concerned at this stage with the question whether or not the amount offered to be paid to the claimant can be cut down. All I must hold at present is that the claimant s demand for interest till the date of payment must be rejected. The application is, therefore, rejected with costs.
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1953 (8) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof ... ... ... ... ..... ompany is assessed on an estimated income under section 23(4) against which there is no appeal and it becomes final, it cannot be challenged or reopened subsequently by the liquidator of the company in liquidation proceedings unless there is reason to think that the assessment is vitiated by fraud. This was a case in which although all the dates are not given in the judgment it is clear that the winding up order of the company followed fairly soon after the assessment in question which was for the year 1934-35 and the company was wound up on the 15th of October, 1935. The present case for not re-opening the assessments is even stronger. In the circumstances I consider that the claim of the Income-tax Officer was wrongly rejected by the liquidator and I accordingly order him to recognize the claim of the Income-tax Officer for Rs. 16,574-1-6 shown in the third part of List A. As I understand that the assets of the company are at present negligible, I make no order as to costs.
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