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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 42 Records
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1954 (1) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ere to be resumed it would mean that those students would be put back to where they were two and a half years ago and would be compelled to do the courses which they have already covered all over again. In order to avoid such injustice we were told at the outset by counsel on behalf of the Vice-Chancellor that the University did not want to penalise them and so gave us the following undertaking drafted by the appellants' counsel The students who are declared to have passed the first M.B.B.S. Examination of the Utkal University held in April, 1951, shall be deemed to have duly passed that examination and shall not be required to appear again in Anatomy. 18. The appeal is allowed. The High Court's order is set aside and the petition for mandamus filed before it is dismissed, but without costs. There will be no order about costs in this court either. 20. Agent for the appellants Rajinder Narain. 21. Agent for the respondents Nos. 1-8, 10-16, 18-23, and 25-34 S. P. Varma.
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1954 (1) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... econd part of Clause (b) is concerned. The element of notice is only an essential ingredient of the first part because the period of limitation runs from the receipt of the notice. As far as the second part is concerned, limitation runs from the date of the award and the date of the award has nothing whatever to do with the notice which the collector has to give under Section 12(2). 11. We do feel in this case that there is a considerable prejudice and hardship caused to the petitioners. A claim of ₹ 28,00,000 has not been adjudicated upon by the Court and the petitioners have been compelled to accept an award for ₹ 28,000. But as we said earlier in the judgment, an argument of hardship when dealing with a provision of limitation is a bad argument. Every case of limitation must entail some hardship. The question is more for the Legislature than for a Court of law. 12. The result is that the petition fails & must be dismissed with costs. 13. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in refusing to stay the suit. 9. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to decide the exact controversy upon which the order of the Court below was based, though it may be stated that there is ample authority in support of that proposition. 10. It must further be observed that the matter of stay is entirely within the discretion of the Court, and if that discretion has been exercised in accordance with the well established principles governing such cases there is no reason for this Court to examine too nicely the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order refusing to stay the suit. We have naturally refrained from saying anything which may for construed later on as expressing any opinion on the merits of the case of either party, and the Court below, we hope, would not be in any way fettered in its decision on the controversy between the parties to be decided hereafter. We would accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1954 (1) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... perior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus Obtained; but he can be allowed to do so long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated. As we have said above, the plaintiff's service ceased on the 27th of November 1946; the leave, which was allowed to him subsequent to that date, was post-retirement leave which was granted under the special circumstances mentioned in F. R. 86. He could not be held to continue in service after the 26th of November 1946, and consequently it was no longer competent to him to apply for joining his duties on the 16th of May 1947, even though the post-retirement leave had not yet run out. In our opinion, the decision of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court is right and this appeal should stand dismissed. In view of the fact that the plaintiff is a pauper and has not been permitted to draw his pension as yet, we make no order as to costs.
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1954 (1) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... umber of punishments proposed, the enquiry must be in two stages -- firstly an enquiry into the charges and secondly as to the punishment that is proposed to be inflicted. In both the enquiries, the petitioner was entitled to show cause and defend himself. It will also be observed that the petitioner never got a copy of the report of the Sub Divisional Officer, nor was he apprised of its contents. Now of course it has been disclosed and made an exhibit. Therefore he did not get a reasonable opportunity of showing cause and defending himself. 11. For the reasons aforesaid, the order dated 9-1-1953, complained of, cannot be supported. The Rule is accordingly made absolute and the respondents are directed to rescind the same and to forbear from giving effect to it. 12. I say nothing however as to the suspension of the petitioner. He must remain suspended pending further action by the respondents in the light of the observations made above. 13. There will be no order as to costs.
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1954 (1) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cate Officer acted in excess of his jurisdiction and also acted in flagrant violation of some of the mandatory provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act. We are clearly of the opinion that the entire proceeding before the Certificate Officer is without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, we think we are competent to exercise our powers-under Article 227, Constitution of India and we propose to exercise that power. 40. We accordingly make this Rule absolute and direct that the certificate proceedings in Certificate Cases No. 62F/8 of 1951-52 and also 193K/8 of 1952-53 pending before the Certificate Officer, Midnapore, should be quashed. It will be open to the Income-tax Officer concerned to start fresh proceedings according to law if he is so advised. The petitioner must have the costs of this Rule. We assess the hearing-tee at five gold-mohurs. Two months' time from the date of the decree is allowed to the opposite party to pay the costs. Mitter, J. 41. I agree.
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1954 (1) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de in which a right of action already existing is to be asserted. I shall only refer to one sentence from Salmond's Jurisprudence, 10th edn., as it is an apt answer to the present argument. It is as follows (p. 476) Whether I have a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate to the modes in which courts fulfil their functions. But jurisprudential considerations apart, it is quite clear that the proviso to Article 225 deals only with the question of restriction on jurisdiction previously existing and which restriction was abrogated by it. That certainly is a matter of procedure and, therefore, both on principle and on authority the plea of the bar of jurisdiction fails, The rest of the judgment is not material to the report.
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1954 (1) TMI 42 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quot;Section 3 of Chapter 1, Sections 21, 22, 24-27 (both included) 20-51 (both included) and 53-57 (both included) of Chapter 2, the whole of Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Sections 339 and 340 and 343-352 of Chapter 11 & the whole of Chapters 12 and 13". If the two notifications are read together, it is clear that the Local Government have constituted the notified area for the purposes described in the schedule and it is impossible to accede to the argument that there is any legal invalidity in the notifications constituting the notified area of Mehijam or appointing the Committee for carrying out the purposes of the Act in the said area. 6. For the reasons we have attempted to state we think that there is no case made out for issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the opposite parties. This application accordingly fails and must be dismissed with costs. We assess hearing fee at ₹ 50/- to be paid to opposite party, State of Bihar.
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1954 (1) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he suits to this extent, namely, that the amount still remaining due shall be paid in two equal instalments, the first to be payable by the last date of Ashar 1361 and the second by" the last day of Ashar 1362. In default of payment of any of the instalments, the entire amount will fall due. 14. The appeal No. 137 of 1949 is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge as against Manick Ratan Guin is set aside and the suit dismissed against them, and the decree passed against the other appellant is affirmed subject to the directions as regards instalments, mentioned above. 15. The Appeal No. 136 of 1949 is dismissed with costs, subject to the directions as regards instalments mentioned above. 16. In Appeal No. 137 of 1949 the respondent will get his costs from the appellant Prasanta Kumar Sengupta. 17. The cross-objections are not pressed and they are accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs. Debabrata Mookerjee, J. 18. I agree.
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1954 (1) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... did not become an unauthorised person within the meaning of Section 3(1)(b) and the notice issued by the Union of India against him is an invalid notice. 7. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed. No order as to costs. 8. As the result of this decision would be that the Union will have to file a suit to eject the respondent, and as there does not seem to be any defence to such a suit being filed, the respondent not being protected by the Rent Act as the premises are Government premises, in order to avoid any such unnecessary litigation Mr. Malkani has fairly agreed and undertaken to this Court that he would hand over possession of the premises in question on or before December 31 of this year. If the Union of India files a suit or takes any other proceedings to eject the respondent, the respondent would not be bound by this undertaking. 9. Liberty to the appellants' attorneys to with draw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited in Court. 10. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 39 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... the light of the declaration aforesaid and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, to determine (a) whether any binding agreement has been made between the appellant and the respondent which fixed the vale of the said share and interest of the said Frederick Charles Henry Thomas in the business and assets of the said firm, including the goodwill thereof, and if not, (b) what value ought to be placed thereon under section 8(1) of the said Act having regard to all relevant circumstances. If upon such reconsideration by the High Court the appellant secures a reduction in the assessed value of the said estate, the respondent shall pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Board. If the appellant fails to secure such reduction each party shall pay his own costs of such appeal. The costs of all the proceedings in the High Court of Australia are to be in the discretion of that court. Solicitors Crowther & Gray; Coward Chance & Co.
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1954 (1) TMI 38 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... clearly entitled to this amount. Similarly, the 151 bags of rice of the plaintiff which were seized on 27-7-1943 (7th seizure) were sold and the sale proceeds deposited in the treasury under the orders of the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Khurda (see Exts. C-3 and C-4) due to the failure of the plaintiff to take possession of these bags when they were released. From Ext. I it appears that the sale proceeds of these 151 bags amounted to ₹ 2,642/5/6. It is not denied by the defendants that the plaintiff is entitled to this sum. We would, therefore, direct defendant No. 1 to refund to the plaintiff the sum of ₹ 5,494/4/6 and ₹ 2,642/5/6 being the sale proceeds of the aforesaid bags. 32. I would, therefore, dismiss P. A. No. 23/46 with costs. F. A. No. 18/46 is allowed as against A. S. I. Lokanath Misra (defendant No. 4 and respondent No. 4) with proportionate costs. It is dismissed as against the remaining respondents with costs. S.P. Mohapatra, J. 33. I agree.
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1954 (1) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ame the present petition on 2045-1953 and next the third of the three impugned Orders. 13. It will be seen that the New Ujjain Society did not merge with the petitioning Association till after the impugned Order was passed. The fact of merger cannot therefore be used to impugn that Order; and as regards the other two Orders, they were made within four and six months of the merger and that has not left the Textile Commissioner sufficient time to judge of the effectiveness of the merger. The merger has been accomplished in a very leisurely and somewhat unbusiness like way; for example, it took from 4-10-1951 to 23-3-1953 to effect the merger. Consequently, there is justification for the omission to include the petitioning Association in the exemption given to the East India Cotton Association of Bombay. Also, the two associations cannot be said to be on a footing of equality, so no question of discrimination under Article 14 can arise. 14. The petition is dismissed with costs.
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1954 (1) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urt should or should not do when a-debt is disputed. The question is one of convenience and practice and we have only indicated what, as' a rule the practice ought to be when the dispute is a 'bona fide' one and when it is not so. I desire also to, add that if the dispute regarding the construction of the scheme be decided against the company, the company will still have the liberty to urge that no winding-up order should be made against it on such other grounds as may be open to it. Equally, it will be open to the creditors, when the appeal comes up for further hearing, to urge the two remaining grounds on which also they claimed a winding-up order before the learned trial Judge. 12. For the reasons given above, we direct that the further hearing of the appeal do stand adjourned till after the decision of Suit No. 1225 of 1951 'Premraj Dulichand v. Mahaluxmi Cotton Mills Ltd.', pending on the Original Side of this Court. Sudhi Ranjan Das, J. 13. I agree.
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1954 (1) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decree was a decree passed by him and it is that decree which is sought to be avoided on the ground that there was sufficient cause for the appellant's absence on the date the decree was passed. It appears to me that this is pre-eminently a matter, at least primarily, for the learned Judge himself to consider and it is for him to say, in the first instance at least, whether the appellant has been able to make out a sufficient cause for his absence. The proper course for us to adopt therefore is to set aside the order of the learned Judge and to remand the case to him for a decision of the issues other than that of limitation which is the only matter we decide. 15. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the learned Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to him for decision of the issues other than that of limitation, and disposal according to his findings. 16. Costs will abide the result. 17. Certified for two Counsel. Sudhi Ranjan Das, J. 18. I agree.
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1954 (1) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act. If the intention of the Legislature was that a special tribunal set up under the Act should adjudicate not only upon debts, but also upon damages, nothing was easier than for the Legislature to have said so. But the Legislature advisedly uses the expression 'debt' and not 'damages', and the tribunal is set up for the adjustment of debts and not for the determination of pecuniary liability and the assessment of that pecuniary liability. 8. Therefore, in my opinion, as the respondent firm has filed an application in all these three cases for damages for breach of contract, the applications are not maintainable because they are not applications for recovery of a debt from the petitioners. 9. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Judge below and hold that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain these applications. The result, therefore, will be that these applications will be dismissed with costs throughout. 10. Applications dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Chand was being transferred to Kailash Nath. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was for a partition of a half share and it will not be necessary to determine the respective claims of the defendants in respect of the other naif of the property if it is found that the plaintiff appellant is entitled to a half share in the houses. He is also not bound by the partition in respect of house No. 2 made behind his back. 18. The learned Civil Judge who heard the case has dealt with all the points in detail and ws are in agreement with the views expressed by him. The view taken by the lower appellate Court that the appellant was entitled to one-fourth share of the houses does not appear to us to be the correct view. 19. As a result we allow the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and restore the decree passed by the trial Court. The appellant shall get the costs of this appeal from respondent 1 who alone has contested the appeal in this Court.
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1954 (1) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... poken of here must be in accordance with what is laid down in Schedule III and that, as has been said above, does specify a fixed rate and not a maximum and does' not allow the licensing authority to make any reduction he likes. On the whole we are of the opinion that clauses (7 is and (8) of the Control Order do not impose unreasonable restrictions upon the freedom of trade enjoyed by the petitioners and consequently the declaration. of the 16th of July, 1953, cannot I;e held to be invalid. The result is that, in our opinion, clause 4 (3) of the Control Order as well as the cancellation of the petitioners licence should be held to be invalid and -a writ in the nature of mandamus would issue against the respondents opposite parties preventing them from enforcing the cancellation order. The rest of the prayers of the petitioners are disallowed. We make no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed. Agent for the petitioners Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondents C. P. Lal.
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1954 (1) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... th the spirit of the letters of the Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Limited and in order that the other employees of the various branches may not resort to illegal or other shady dealings to the detriment of the assessee, it had agreed to pass on a portion of the additional commission so received to the branch managers and other employees who were virtually in the position of subdealers and as such the commission payments were expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business." This background should also enter into the consideration in deciding the reasonableness of the commission allowed to the employees both under Section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act and Rule 12 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. As there is no consideration of the question from this point of view, we are constrained to remit the case of branch managers and assistant managers to the Tribunal for further consideration and for a better statement of the case. Case remitted.
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1954 (1) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessment under sub-section (3) of Section 34 is restricted to a period of four years in cases falling under clause (b) of Section 34 and to eight years in cases falling under clause (a) of sub- section (1) of Section 34. It is, therefore, in our opinion, not necessary in the notice itself at the initial stage to indicate whether the action is to be confined to a period of eight years or four years. After all the facts are investigated, it will be open to the Income-tax Officer to make up his mind, having regard to the findings reached by him whether the assessment should be restricted to eight years or four years. It is not necessary for him even at the initial stage to indicate the period for which the assessment is going to be reconsidered. These are the only two points that have been raised before us and we see no reason to issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for. The petitions are dismissed with costs in one, W.P. No. 63 of 1953, ₹ 250. Petitions dismissed.
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