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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 36 Records
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1954 (11) TMI 59 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... proviso was enacted several years ago but our attention has not been invited to any authority in which the view put forward by the assessee has been endorsed either in England or in this country. It is true that in construing an Act which imposes a burden, doubts should be resolved in favour of the taxpayer but this general rule cannot be applied either when the taxing provision is clear and explicit or when a doubt arises in regard to a provision granting a deduction or an exemption from payment of tax. In United States v. Stewart the Supreme Court observed as follows "Those who seek an exemption from a tax must rest it on more than a doubt or ambiguity. Exemption from taxation cannot rest upon mere implications." For these reasons, I am of the opinion that notwithstanding the ingenious arguments which were addressed to us, both the questions which have arisen in the case must be answered in the negative. D. Falshaw, J. I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (11) TMI 58 - COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the makers of the Constitution and we see nothing in the maxim mentioned above or the wording of the Article which really militates against our giving the fullest effect to the intention of the Constituent Assembly, and holding that no Bill of the type contemplated shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President and no such amendment shall also be moved without the previous sanction of the President. In other words, what the proviso was intended to mean and what it really means according to us is that the prior Presidential sanction is required in the words of S. 109, Government of India Act, 1935, "to the introduction or passing of a Bill or the moving of an amendment". 7. It follows that the two previous decisions of the Court require no re-consideration and that the petitioner must succeed. 8 . The petition is hereby allowed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1954 (11) TMI 57 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ament in its attempts to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to avoiding tax may fall short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for the taxpayers who do not try to avoid their share of the burden, and it is disappointing to the Inland Revenue. But the Court will not stretch the terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the efforts of Parliament and to stop-gaps which are left open by the statutes. Tax avoidance is an evil, but it would be the beginning of much greater evils if the Courts were to overstretch the language of the statute in order to subject to taxation people of whom they disapproved." If the Legislature intended that a person who fails to comply with the provisions of section 18A(3) should be punished under the provisions of section 28, the language which it has chosen to employ appears to me to be most inadequate. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the question propounded by the Tribunal must be answered in the negative. Falshaw, J.-I agree.
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1954 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ecisions of the tribunals set up by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This contention can be shortly answered by referring to our decision in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi 1950 S.C.R. 449, where we held that the Industrial Tribunals were tribunals within the meaning of Article 136 and further that article 136 and further that article 136 has vested in this Court exceptional and overriding power to interfere where it reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to litigant. (Vide Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal 1954 1955 27 ITR 126 (SC) . 25. The result therefore is that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal appealed against must be reversed and that of the Industrial Court (Textiles and Hosiery), Kanpur, restored. The appeal will accordingly be allowed with costs. 26. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (11) TMI 55 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... represented by Jaikrishna and Bhaskar, (ii) Narayan Ghatate and (iii) the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiff, must be held to own equally the fields in suit. If that be so, the decree should have been for joint possession of 1/3 interest in the fields in suit instead of 1/2 as given by the appeal Court. 9. As the defendants dispossessed the plaintiff in denial of his title, the plaintiff was entitled to a share of the profits in 1944-45. See - 'Mohesh Narain v. Nowbat Pathak', 32 Cal 837 at p. 848 (F). and - 'Mst. Mohankuar v. Bhagatram', AIR 1933 Nag 316 (G). 10. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection are partly allowed. There shall be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for joint possession of his 1/3 interest in the fields in suit and for ₹ 50/- on account of the mesne profits for 1944-45. The decree of the Court below is modified accordingly. The parties will be entitled to costs in proportion to success and failure in all the Courts.
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1954 (11) TMI 54 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing penalty on a Hindu undivided family after it had disrupted and after the Income-tax Officer had made an order under section 25A. On behalf of the Income-tax Department Mr. Bahadur made the submission that section 25A should be applied by analogy to the proceedings taken under section 28 because the penalty imposed on a Hindu undivided family cannot be otherwise recovered. It is clear that there is a gap in the provisions of the Act; but it is not the function of the Court to fill up the gap. The function of the Court is to interpret and not to legislate and the Court cannot fill up the gap under the guise of interpretation. That would be legislation and not adjudication. If there is a gap, it is for the Legislature to provide the remedy by enacting suitable amending legislation. For the reasons I have expressed I hold that both the questions referred to the High Court must be answered against the Income-tax Department and in favour of the assessee. Choudhary, J.-I agree.
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1954 (11) TMI 53 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... refrain from expressing any opinion on that matter. 2. As regards the interpretation of the said section its language is ambiguous and it is, therefore, capable of two interpretations. I agree with the interpretation which has been given to it by my learned brother Modi J. I also agree with him that this section is applicable to the present case for reasons given by him. It is not necessary for me to repeat the arguments which he has already given at length and with which I agree. In my opinion also the plaintiff's case is within time and the appeal is fit to be allowed. By the Court.- We would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the District Judge and send the case back to him for trial on the remaining issues in accordance with law. As to costs we would direct that as the question involved in this appeal was full of complexities, the parties shall bear their own costs in this Court but costs hitherto and further costs in the trial court shall abide the event.
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1954 (11) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... once say that no justice had ever been demanded of him and, therefore, no question of his having denied justice to the appellants could arise. If, on the other hand, we made an absolute order against the present Collector without any amendment of the application, he could say that an order had been made against him without giving an opportunity of showing cause against it. From whatever angle the matter may be looked at, it appears to me that the appellants had created for themselves a situation out of which they cannot extricate themselves with any chance of the Court being able to make a valid and effective order in their favour, even if they succeeded in making out a case on the merits. On the merits too, they appear to have no case. 10. For the reasons given above this appeal must, in my opinion, fail. In view, however, of the irregularity to which I have referred in the course of the judgment, there will be no order for costs in this appeal. S.C. Lahiri, J. 11. I agree.
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1954 (11) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... illustration the settlors mentioned eight objects, the last of which eight was in these terms "Such other purposes beneficial to the Hindu community and Indians in general not falling under preceding heads." The trust was held to be a valid trust of a religious and charitable nature and under the provisions of section 4 of the Act the income was exempt from taxation. The other case, Re The Lokamanya Tilak Jubilee National Trust Fund, Bombay 1942 10 I.T.R. 26 is not helpful. That was a case where the income was to be spent for such objects as might facilitate the attainment of independence of the country and it was held that the object was neither religious nor charitable. Our answer to the question, therefore, is that the deed of trust is not void for either uncertainty or ambiguity. The assessee is entitled to its cost which we assess at ₹ 1,000. The fee to the counsel for the department is also assessable at the same amount. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (11) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... my opinion, the plain reading of the section means that it is within the jurisdiction of the Court at any time after the transfer of the shares to order that the transaction is a good transaction and shall stand". We have held on an investigation of the facts and circumstances that the transaction in favour of the Bank was a good transaction. That being the position, up question of vacating or recalling the order of Imam, J. "ex debito justitiae' or on the ground that it was made ex parte can arise, whatever be our power to set aside an ex parte order on an appeal or rehearing preferred under Section 202, Companies Act. 18. In our opinion the order of his Lordship imam, J. (as he then was) dated 7-8-1953 was a good order and cannot be recalled or vacated. 19. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs; we assess the hearing fee at ₹ 200/- only to be paid by the appellants to the respondent Bank. Narayan Roy, J. 20. I agree.
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1954 (11) TMI 49 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... Romer, L.J., laid down as the test which is to be applied, I think that although the first clause of the agreement states that the taxpayers purchased the deposit of sand and gravel, the true view is that they purchased the means of obtaining that raw material for the trade which they carried on, namely, the sale of gravel. Finally, I observe that Harman, J., said in his judgment that the appellants "were buying their stock-in-trade when they bought the gravel." If this company unfortunately had gone into liquidation, and if the contract had not been performed, it might have been difficult to say that one asset, the stock-in-trade, lay below the surface of the ground on that particular plot of land. I should have thought that to describe that property as stock-in-trade would be quite inappropriate. For these reasons, I feel that it is impossible to support the judgment of Harman, J., and I agree with the judgments which have already been delivered. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (11) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... e I of that Act but I am unable to agree with that submission. All that the Legislature seems to have done is to firstly define what 'manufacture' means, and secondly to put an Explanation to clarity what perhaps it originally thought it to be and now finds to be doubtful. If by way of abundant caution the Legislature amends an Act to explain things we cannot conclude from that that what was in the unamended Act did not cover what is given in the Explanation. No case was cited to support that when the Legislature amends to clarily things it necessarily means that what was in the original Act did not include what is given in the Explanation. M of the opinion thereiore that the petitioners are covered by the Schedule of the un-amended Act and the opposite party has rightly called upon theM to subMit stateMents under the provisions of that Act. This petition is therefore dismissed and the rule is discharged with costs. Counsel fee ₹ 150/ -. Dulat, J. (9.) I agree.
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1954 (11) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on, uncertain, unsettled. 3. Subject to chance or accident." In the present case the assessee obtained profits by sale of the molasses permits which was known and anticipated and worked for by the assessee. The assessee did not obtain the profits in an accidental or fortuitous manner, and it is therefore impossible to accept the argument of Mr. Untwalia that the consideration paid by Mr. Sabir Ali to the assessee was a receipt of a casual nature. A similar view has been taken as to the construction of section 4(3)(vii) in Commissioner of Income-tax v. V.P. Rao 1950 18 I.T.R. 825. In my opinion the argument of Mr. Untwalia on this point must be rejected as unsound. For the reasons I have endeavoured to state I hold that both the questions referred to the High Court must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference; hearing fee ₹ 250. SAHAI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (11) TMI 46 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent. In our opinion the Tribunal has committed an error of law in holding that the two annas six pies share of the income of Mr. D.D. Kapoor derived from the partnership business was the income of the Hindu undivided family and taxable in its hands. The view that we have taken is borne out by several authorities (see Commissioner of Income-tax v. S.N. Sankaralinga Iyer 1950 18 I.T.R. 194 and Murugappa Chetty Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1952 21 I.T.R. 311). For the reasons we have expressed we think that in the circumstances of this case it cannot legally be held that the two annas six pies share of D.D. Kapoor in the income of the partnership firm is the income of the Hindu undivided family. We accordingly answer the question referred to the High Court in favour of the assessee and against the income-tax department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. There will be one hearing fee of ₹ 250 for all these cases. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (11) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Income-tax. They might have liked to be personally present. They might have liked to place further facts and circumstances before the Income-tax authorities. By the procedure followed by the Appellate Tribunal the final order was passed against them without giving them an opportunity of making a proper representation. We are of the opinion that the answer to the second question must be in the negative, that is, on the facts and circumstances of this case it was not open to the Tribunal to convert an assessment made against Mohammad Hanif as representing an association of individuals composed of Mohammad Husain and Mohammad Jan and assess him as representing an association of individuals composed of himself, Mohammad Zahir, Anwar Ali and Abul Hasan. In the circumstances of the case we think that the assessee should get his costs which we assess at ₹ 400. The fee payable to counsel for the Commissioner is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ality. The only fundamental right which is guaranteed is that of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. There is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the disqualification of the type enacted in section 16(1) (ix) of the Act. If he wants to stand as a candidate for election it is but proper that he should divest himself of his paid brief on behalf of the Municipality or the brief against the Municipality in which event there will be certainly no bar to his candidature. Even if it be taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable one and well within the ambit of article 19 clause 5. Such restriction would be a reasonable one to impose in the interests of the general public for the preservation of purity in public life. We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also. The appeal accordingly fails and stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (11) TMI 43 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion that these credits represented undisclosed profits of the firm. 13. The statement of the case prepared by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and submitted to the High Court for its opinion was not perused by the assessee. He had no opportunity to make suggestions in respect of the same. It cannot be said that the statement of the case was settled with the knowledge and approval of the assessee. On behalf of the assessee no one was present either at the first hearing of the case on the High Court's order under section 66(2) or when the statement of the case was finalised. It is not made clear in the statement of reference whether the assessee was duly served with notice before the statement of the case was finalised. The decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Calcutta Agency Limited(1), is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. 14. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. No order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (11) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n made there was in the circumstances no further necessity to consult the Public Service Commission. in our opinion therefore there is no force in this contention as well. After having examined all the arguments of Mr. Thomas, we are of the opinion that all the rules of natural justice were fully observed during the enquiry in this case, and the petitioner had the fullest opportunity to put in his defence both before the Enquiry Commissioner and against the action proposed to be taken against him. It was by reason of his own default that he failed to avail himself of the second opportunity. He put in a belated review but such a review is not provided for under the rules and in our opinion, it was not necessary to consult the Public Service Commission at that stage. Such petitions are not within the contemplation of the Constitution. For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (11) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ff or counter-claim would be such as was leviable at the date when the set off or counter-claim was filed, and an appeal arising out of the set-off or the counterclaim would also be liable to pay Court-fees which were leviable at the date when the set-off or counter-claim was filed. It is unnecessary to point out that the right of appeal in respect of a set-off or counter-claim would not be regulated by the date of the suit. The set-off or counter-claim must be looked upon as a fresh suit, Therefore no difficulty arises with regard to a question of set-off or counter-claim. 10. The result is that in both these applications we will make an order under Section 151 and direct that any excess paid by the appellants over and above the Court-fees payable on these appeals when the respective suits from which these appeals were filed should be refunded. No order as to costs of these applications. The excess Court-fees paid not to be refunded till 10-1-1955. 11. Applications allowed.
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1954 (11) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he dealer whose turn- over is Rs. 10,000 or more that is obliged to submit a return. If a person is not a dealer, he could not be required to do it. I have already stated that a person in the position of the plaintiff is not a dealer and also that the sales effected by the commission agent could not be regarded as the turnover of the plaintiff. If so, no duty is cast on him to submit the returns. If a person is not a dealer, failure to comply with the requirements of section 9 does not attract the penal consequences contemplated by section 15 or 16 of the Act. Hence he could not be called upon to pay a fee by way of composition of the offence. In this situation, the demand by the respondent of a com- pounding fee from the appellant is unauthorised and the latter is justi- fied in refusing to pay it. Consequently the declaration asked for should be granted and the judgment and decree under appeal should be set aside. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
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