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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 27 Records
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1954 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that there was due attestation. It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in-chief that they signed the will in the presence of the testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend on the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on appreciation of evidence. The finding of the Court below that the will was duly attested is based on a consideration of all the materials, and must be accepted. Indeed, it is stated in the judgment of the Additional District Judge that the fact of due execution and attestation of the will was not challenged on behalf of the caveator at the time of the hearing of the suit . This contention of the appellant must also be rejected. 18. In the result, the decision of the High Court is confirmed, and this appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. 19. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (12) TMI 39 - ITAT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... and who sold it, did not act under any scheme of common management framed by the semi-wholesalers but acted under the order of the Government. 10. There is considerable force in the contention that the buying and selling was done by Government through its nominee, and the semi-wholesalers who financed the purchases from the importers were given shares of the profits for this finance partly in consideration of the fact that they were dealers during the basic period. 11. In our view, therefore, the answer to the question must be in the negative. As held by the Appellate Tribunal, the semi-wholesalers could not be assessed to income-tax or excess profits tax either as an unregistered firm or as "an association of persons". 12. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under section 66(5) of the Act. Costs of this reference, including paper book costs if any, will be paid by the Commissioner. Counsels fee ₹ 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (12) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and hold that interlocutory orders refusing amendment or allowing amendment should be corrected at the earliest stage in revisioin and not in appeal afterthe parties incur heavy expenses, I therefore, do not propose to follow the view of the Calcutta High Court. (7) The learned Advocate for the respondent laid great stress on the fact that the petitioner stated lies in his affidavit and that no indulgence should be shown to him. I agree with the court below that the petitioiner made false statements in the application, but that is, however, no ground for refusing an amendment. I do not think that the court is justified in refusing the amendment on that sole ground as a punishment for uttering lies. (8) In the result, I set aside the order of the court below refusing amendment. The defendant will have his costs in the amendment application, but as he opposed this Civil Revision Petition, the petitioners is entitled to have the costs of the petition. (9) V.R.B. Order set aside.
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1954 (12) TMI 37 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... penditure in spite of the fact that the expenditure in a particular year happens to be particularly heavy on account of the fact that it is undertaken to remedy the effect of several years of wear and tear or neglect, and also in spite of the fact that such expenditure may not be necessary for sometime to come after the repairs have been effected. It seems to me that these principles ought to be applied to the facts of the present case, in which obviously the resurfacing of the whole of the roadways of the hotel had become necessary on account of several years wear and tear and neglect, and I am inclined to agree with the view of the Appellate Tribunal that the fact that further repairs may not be necessary for some time to come makes no difference. I would accordingly answer the question framed for our consideration in the affirmative and allow the assessee his costs from the Commissioner. Counsels fee ₹ 250. A.N. Bhandari, C.J. I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 36 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e expressed, that the mokarri lease executed by the assessee Raja Kali Prasad Singh is tantamount to a transfer of asset in favour of Rani Usha Debi within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. I should add that Mr. Dutt conceded in the course of his argument that the transaction of the mokarri lease was not supported by adequate consideration within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. For these reasons I think that the Tribu- nal was right in expressing the view that the net amounts of ₹ 7,728 and ₹ 15,889 being the income from Jharia Hat for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50 should be taxable in the hands of the assessee under the provisions of section 16(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. I would accordingly answer the question referred to the High Court in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference; hearing fee ₹ 250. MISRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... further to be noted the Rajasthan High Court observed that the legal position would have been Different if--as in the petition now before us--the order of the subordinate officer had been set aside by the superior authority. The two Rajasthan cases are therefore clearly distinguishable. 13. It has not been contended that the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to make his order of 21-11-1952, in the exercise of his rcvisional powers under Section 27 of the Act; it is not therefore necessary for us to consider the legal issues which would arise were he to act in excess of his jurisdiction. 14. In our opinion this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, U. P. commanding him not to give effect to or to treat as a nullity a quasi judicial order made by the Custodian General so long as that order is a valid and subsisting order. 15. The Petition will now be placed with this opinion before the Bench which made the refer ence for final hearing.
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1954 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... no alternative but to quash this conviction also. 35. We have now to consider whether there should be a retrial. As the present trial cannot proceed against the second accused, and as all the accused are said to have acted in concert each playing an appointed part in a common plan, we do not think it would be right to direct a retrial though this is the normal course when a jury trial is set aside on the grounds of misdirection and non-direction. We therefore discharge (not acquit) both the appellants leaving it to Government either to drop the entire matter or to proceed in such manner as it may be advised. We do this because the accused expressly asked that the charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act should be left over for a separate trial. The two convictions are therefore quashed and also the sentences. We are told that the first accused has already served out his sentence. The fine if paid, will be refunded. The bail bond of the second accused will be cancelled.
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1954 (12) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Supreme Court his order must be held to be an order under section 30(1) and not an order under section 31. Our answer, therefore, to the first question is (a) that the order by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to admit the appeal on the ground that it was not presented within time was an order under section 30(1) of the Act, and (b) that since it was an order under section 30(1), no appeal lay to the Appellate Tribunal against that order. In view of the Supreme Court decision that whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is right or wrong in not admitting the appeal the order cannot be an order under section 31, the second question does not arise and the answer to the third question must be in the negative. The answer to the fourth question must be that as no appeal lay to the Appellate Tribunal under section 33, the Appellate Tribunal could not consider the question whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should or should not have condoned the delay.
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1954 (12) TMI 32 - ITAT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... ssappropriated by a subordinate or by managing director in order to ascertain whether the loss resulting therefrom could be regarded as a loss in the trade. However, these observations are obiter. 10. In our judgment, the Madras case is very clearly distinguishable because of the finding that the money had not reached the till before it was missappropriated. In the present case it was actually taken out of the till by the munim. 11. Upon the consideration of the entire material our answer to the question posed by the Tribunal is that the amount of ₹ 2,02,442-13-9 cannot be allowed to be deducted under section 10(2)(XV) or under the general principles of dertermining the profit and loss of the assessee. We would, however, like to make it clear that no argument was advanced before us on the question whether could be deducted under section 10(I) of the Act. 12. Costs of the application to be borne by the applicant. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tly impending.” In 'Dozier v. Logan', 101 ga 173 (Z29) Atkinson J. said "The appointment of a receiver is recognised as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the creditors is exposed to manifest peril," Therefore, this exceedingly delicate and responsible duty will be discharged with the utmost caution and only when the 'panch sadachar' or five requirements embodied in the words just and convenient (Order 40, Rule 1) are fulfilled by the facts of the case under consideration -- ('Ramachandrayya v. Nethi Iswarayya', AIR 1952 Hyd 139 (Z30)). 15. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case as set out in the contentions of the respective parties above, we find that none of the requirements for granting the appointment of a receiver is made out. 16. This application is dismissed with costs.
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1954 (12) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from month to month. In my judgment, this contention should prevail and that though the intention of the parties was to create a permanent lease, there being no valid contract for the same, the tenancy in this case should be deemed to be from month to month terminable on the part of cither lessor or lessse, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Admittedly, no such notice has been given. My conclusion, therefore, is that the learned Judge is right in rejecting the plaintiff's prayer for eviction of the defendant. 9. A further point was raised on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Chatterji that if a tenancy is found, Section 9(l)(b) of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act, puts another obstacle in the way of the plaintiff's success. In view of the conclusion I have already reached as mentioned above, it is not necessary to consider this further submission. 10. I would accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Guha, J. I agree.
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1954 (12) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... operly convicted. The paractice observed in civil cases ought not to be applied in such a case". (34) As I understand, this passage, it does not mean that Courts are all equally governed by precedents in criminal cases as in civil matters. All that it says is that a Court will not allow a wrong decision in a criminal case to stand on the ground of stare decisis if, on further consideration by a fuller court, it appears that the law has been misapplied or misunderstood. In civil matters, on the other hand, even a wrong decision is not set aside except "for the best and most urgent reasons". The liberty of the subject being one of the strongest of reasons always, a wrong decision relating to it should not be allowed to stand. (35) For these reasons, I agree that the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in (A) should be followed and Criminal Revision 603/51 dismissed. Satyanarayana Raju, J. (36) I agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice. Revision dismissed.
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1954 (12) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpound the offence and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under section 53(2) of the Act agreed to the offence being compounded on payment of this amount. We are clearly of opinion that this payment cannot be said to have been made wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. In In re Gabdulal Tulsiram where the assessee had compounded a criminal offence on payment of ₹ 11,265 it was held that this was not money wholly and exclusively expended for the purposes of the business and it was not therefore a permissible deduction, and in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. H. Hirjee the Supreme Court held that money spent in defending criminal proceedings was similarly not an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee. Our answer to the third question, therefore, is in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 500. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re of similar character and the Division Bench proceeded upon the same view as they took in the previous case. It was found as a fact in M.J.C. No. 46 of 1953 also that the income represented by the high denomination notes was income derived from the business of cloth and spices for which the assessee had already exercised his option under section 2(11)(a). In my opinion, therefore, the ratio of these two authorities has no application to the present case where the material facts are different. For the reasons I have already assigned I hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the previous year of the assessee in respect of its undisclosed sources of income was the financial year ending on 31st March, 1946, and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference ; hearing fee ₹ 250. MISRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 26 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng the object "to secure legal continuity of pending proceedings and finality and validity of completed proceedings under the preceding State legislation", it cannot be said that taking into consideration this aspect of the matter is of no importance. Giving anxious consideration to the wording of section 13(1) of the Finance Act and the object of the agreement, on the basis of which it is enacted, we do not feel any doubt that finality of completed proceedings, which were not otherwise final but are subject to re-opening and re-assessment, was secured by section 13(1) of the Finance Act, by not providing for re-opening and re-assessment under section 34 of the Mysore Income-tax Act. In the result, the notices issued by the Income-tax Department to re-open the proceedings are declared illegal, and as such, writs will issue quashing the proceedings of the Income-tax authorities as prayed for with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1954 (12) TMI 25 - COURT OF APPEAL
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... ... ..... resent case and it is quite clear that the present appeal cannot be determined by applying the decision in Seymour's case 1927 A.C. 554; 11 T.C. 625 to it. I should have been glad to find, if I could, that the collections made to Mr. Dooland were essentially of the same character as the benefit given to Mr. Seymour, and to say that the collections were voluntary payments made by the cricketing public on grounds which were purely personal to Air. Dooland because lie was well liked and because of his cricketing skill, and were not a profit accruing to him by virtue of his employment. In my opinion, however, this chase is concluded by the special facts, the chief and decisive fact being the contract of employment which had provided for these very collections to be made to him in the circumstances which arose in this case. I am in full agreement with the judgments of the Master of the Rolls and of Jenkins L.J., and in my opinion this appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (12) TMI 24 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to show that the income had either been received or had accrued in British India? We are not undertaking the responsibility of framing the questions ourselves as the statement of the case as also the appellate orders are, as is too frequently the case, wholly unsatisfactory. A large number of questions have been suggested in the applications under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. It is for the Tribunal to formulate the questions of law that arise out of the appellate order some of which have been indicated above for reference to this Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Since it is impossible to dispose of these two references finally at this stage we are not making any order as to costs of the two references. We, however, certify the fee payable to counsel for the Commissioner at a sum of ₹ 350 in each case. The assessee will get the costs of the two applications which we assess at ₹ 100 in each case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (12) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r powers in him under the rules. These cannot be said to be rules which in themselves constitute a system of conservancy, sanitation and watch and ward. Thus the result that is brought about is not within the intend- ment of the section which authorises the making of the rules. A system of ad hoc control of responsible officers may, possibly be one method of regulating the sanitary and other arrangements at such large gatherings. But if it is intended to constitute a system of ad hoc control with reasonable safeguards, the power to make rules in that behalf must be granted to the rule-making authority by the legislative organ in appropriate language. The impugned order of the District Magistrate being bad on both the above grounds, this is enough to dispose of the appeal and it is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the impugned order infringes also the appellant's fundamental rights under article 19. The appeal must accordingly be allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (12) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the record, and calls for interference in certiorari. We have held that the election of the first respondent should be set aside. We have further held that if the Returning Officer had, after rejecting the 301 ballot papers which did not bear the correct marks, declared the appellant elected, his election also would have to be declared void. The combined effect of section 97 and section 100(2)(c) is that there is no valid election. Under the circumstances, the proper order to pass is to quash the decision of the Tribunal and remove it out of the way by certiorari under article 226, and to set aside the election of the first respondent in exercise of the powers conferred by article 227. As a result of our decision, the Election Commission will now proceed to hold a fresh election. This appeal must accordingly be allowed, the decisions of the High Court and the Tribunal quashed and the whole election set aside. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (12) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de for service of the order of attachment, nor does it provide that the formalities laid down in the Code should be complied with. In our opinion there is no substance in this contention and we must hold that there was a valid attachment by the Collector. 24. The result, therefore, is that the petition must succeed. The order of the learned Judge below will be set aside and we will issue an order and direction upon the Collector not to proceed with the confirmation of the sale, and we will also direct the Court below to proceed with the execution application of the Bank of India in accordance with law. 25. We think that the fair order to make with regard to costs would be that the State of Bombay, respondent 2, should pay half the costs of the petition in the Court below and half the costs of this appeal. There will be no order as to costs of respondents 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the petition or of the appeal. Costs of the petition and of the appeal to be taxed. 26. Petition allowed.
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