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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 53 Records
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1954 (4) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The question is one of intention -- 'Babu Sheo Lochun Singh v. Babu Saheb Singh'Ind App 63 (D). But the question is one of fact and must be decided as such -- 'Raja of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiyasami Tevar', AIR 1918 PC 156 . 24. In the present case, there can be no doubt about the intention because the widow dedicated the properties to the family deities. It is true that she said in the deed of endowment that she was doing this in accordance with her husband's intentions and wishes but that only furnishes the reason for her action. As the income was hers to do what she liked with she had the right to make the dispositions whatever the reason. The plaintiffs have not shown anything which would indicate a contrary intention. We therefore agree with the High Court that the evidence here establishes that the widow's intention was to keep the property separate and not add it to her husband's estate. 25. This appeal also fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1954 (4) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was provided that "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in Article 395...... the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." This Article has no operation to the laws that had previously been repealed or which had died a natural death. Explanation III of this Article enacts that "Nothing in this Article shall be construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this Constitution had not come into force." The Defence of India Act or any provisions for extending its life therefore cannot be called in aid for continuing the prosecution in the present case. 12. The result therefore is that there is no substance in this repeal and it is accordingly dismissed.
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1954 (4) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat decision. The present notification is more on the lines of the Ordinance that was in question in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case 1952 S.C.R. 284, and has no affinity to the Ordinance and the attending circumstances that were considered in the Saurashtra case 1952 S.C.R. 435, or in the case of Kedar Nath Bajoria 1952 S.C.R. 30, and in the light of that decision it must be held that the notification issued in 1947 became discriminatory in character on coming into force of the Constitution and was hit by article 14 of the Constitution. 21. The result therefore is that the trial of the appellant after the 26th January, 1950, by the Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors was bad and must therefore be quashed and the conviction set aside. In our opinion, it would not advance the ends of justice if at this stage a fresh trial by jury is ordered in this case. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and direct that he be set free. 22. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (4) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vious year will debar the assessee in all subsequent years from claiming that they had never been members of a Hindu undivided family, so that they must continue to be assessed in that capacity unless they can establish in proceedings under Section 25A(1) that the property had been divided by metes and bounds, our answer must be that, in such a case, Section 25A will not be applicable and it is open to the Income Tax Officer to consider whether the assessee should be assessed as a Hindu undivided family or as an individual or a firm. As the confusion has partly been caused by reason of the fact that though the assessee set out his claim correctly in his application that he should never have been assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family, he made his application under Section 25A of the Indian Income Tax Act and thereafter continued to claim the benefit under that section, we consider it proper to direct parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (4) TMI 69 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion could validly extend the duration of the Ordinance, neither I nor this Division Bench is entitled to hold that the Notification does not validate the extension of the duration of the Ordinance. The fact that the new argument that has been raised in this case was not raised in the 'case of Sukh Pal (G)' would not entitle me to declare the extension to be invalid. Of course having my own views about the validity of extension by the Notification, I would have been very happy if the question whether the Notification validly extended the Ordinance could be referred to a Pull Bench, but as my learned brother even after hearing the arguments on the new point raised in this case is of opinion that the Notification validly extended the duration of the Ordinance, this course is not possible. I am, therefore, bound to agree with the order of my learned brother and consequently, dismiss the petition. BY THE COURT The petition is dismissed. Each party will bear its own costs.
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1954 (4) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her order dated 5th August, 1948, the Privy Council enlarged the scope of the appeal by permitting the appellant to raise the contention that there had been a contravention of section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These are the two points that arise for determination in his appeal. The question whether sanction under section 197 was necessary for instituting proceedings against the appellant on charges of conspiracy and of bribery, is now concluded by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in H. H. B. Gill v. The King 75 I.A. 41 and Phanindara Chandra Neogy v. The King 76 I.A. 10, and must be answered in the negative. The question whether there was contravention of section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a denial or fair trial must, for the reasons already given, be answered in the affirmative, and the conviction of the appellant set aside on that ground. His appeal will also be allowed, and there will be an order of acquittal in his favour. 12. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (4) TMI 67 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le of strict construction is subordinate thereto." -- Crawford. I think, I ought to agree with my learned brother Das J. that when no creche or pit-head bath had been constructed, the persons responsible cannot escape conviction, and it is not open to them to contend that because some of the clauses are in excess of the rule-making power, they were at liberty to disregard the entire rules. The clauses to which exception has been taken are easily separable, and there does not appear to be any justification for completely disregarding the rules as to the construction of the creche or the pit-head bath which, according to Sections 30(bb) and 30 (bbb) had to be constructed. 48. The question of the competency of the reference is not at all important, but, if it is necessary for me to express an opinion on this point as well, I would say that I am inclined to adopt the view taken by my learned brother Das J. 49. In the result, therefore, I must dismiss the criminal revisions.
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1954 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n, learned counsel for the State informs us, without conceding the point so taken, that he is prepared to advise the Government to issue the necessary notification and have the case transferred. In view of that statement, it is unnecessary to pronounce on the objection so raised. In the result, all the points raised on behalf of the petitioners fail, and this petition must be dismissed. It is desirable to observe that the questions above dealt with appear to have been raised before the High Court at previous stages by means of applications under article 226 and decided against. No appeals to this Court have been taken against the orders therein. Nothing that we have said is intended to be a pronouncement as to the correctness or otherwise of those orders, nor to encourage the practice of direct approach to this Court (except for good reasons) in matters which have been taken to the High Court and found against, without obtaining leave to appeal therefrom. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (4) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... profusion of a journalist and editor and income from such source was to be exempted from excess profits duty that his work as publisher was business for which he was liable for excess profits duty. In that case the assessee had purchased the paper and was doing the work of journalist, editor, as well as publisher and the income was split up into two parts for the purposes of assessment of the excess profits tax. In Gadodia’s case (supra) cited above we similarly held that though one part of the income was assessable as income from business, the other part was income from service. Having considered the terms of the contract we are of the opinion that the pay of ₹ 100 per mensem received by the assessee as treasurer of the Central Bank of India Limited was salary received by him as servant of the bank, while the remuneration received by him for the work of guarantee commission agent was income from business as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
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1954 (4) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... plate of its protecting provisions and flashing the flaming sword of its inspiration. It was not denied that if the present action of the State cannot be defended as an act of State it cannot be saved under any provision of law. Whether the State would have the right to set aside these grants in the ordinary Courts of the land, or whether it can deprive the petitioners of these properties by legislative process, is a matter on which we express no opinion. It is enough to say that its present action cannot be defended. Article 31(1) of the Constitution is attracted as also article 19(f). The petitioners are accordingly entitled to a writ under article 32(2). A writ will accordingly issue restraining the State of Uttar Pradesh from giving effect to the orders complained of and directing it to restore possession to the petitioners if possession has been taken, The petitioners will be paid their costs by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The intervener will bear its own. Writ allowed.
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1954 (4) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ication by the Board of Directors either before or after the dealings to enter into dealings with the Company by way of sales and purchases of various commodities. There was nothing in the Agency Agreement to prevent the appellants from acting as the agents of other manufacturers, Joint Stock Companies etc., and the appel- lants could have as well acted as the agents of other concerns besides the Company. All these factors taken, into consideration alongwith the fixity of tenure, the nature of remuneration and the assignability of their rights, are sufficient to enable us to 'come to the conclusion that the activities of the appellants as the agents of the Company constituted a business and the remuneration which the appellants received from the Company under the terms of the Agency Agreement was income, profits or gain from business. The appellants were therefore rightly assessed for excess profits tax and these appeals must stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (4) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by Evershed J., in '(1946) 2 All ER 497 (M)'. The above observations are however to be read as not imposing an absolute bar to the registration of a common word as a trade mark. The principles laid down in the above case would ordinarily disentitle the applicant to have a common word registered. In exceptional circumstances the rule may however be inapplicable viz., where the common word has lost its primary meaning by long user of the word by a trader in relation, to his goods and has become identified with the particular goods of that trader. In such a case the principle above enunciated will not be applicable. In the present case however the word "Rasoi" has not become distinctive of the applicant's goods and as such it is also ineligible for registration on the ground that no trader can have ordinarily a monopoly of an ordinary word of the language. 22. Question No. 3 is answered accordingly. 23. Costs will abide the result. Certified for 2 counsel.
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1954 (4) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to be correct and the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant should be given effect to. We accordingly hold that a local custom of pre-emption exists in the city of Banaras and the right attaches at least to all house properties situated within it and no incident of such custom is proved which would make the right available only between persons who are either natives of Banaras or are domiciled therein. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the judgments of both the Courts below are set aside. The case shall go back to the High Court for consideration of the two questions left undecided by it, namely, whether the plaintiff has made the demands in due compliance with the forms prescribed by the Muhammadan Law and secondly whether the plaintiff, being a landlord, could eject his own tenants in exercise of the right of pre-emption. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal from respondent No. 1. Further costs will abide the result. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (4) TMI 60 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dia. Thus court-fees amounting to ₹ 1800/- for the suit in the trial Court and ₹ 3000/- for the appeal in this Court, aggregating to ₹ 4800/- (Rupees four thousand and eight hundred only) will be recovered by the State of West Bengal from the Union of India. 45. The question of principle about the jurisdiction of the Court was a debatable one, and different Courts had expressed different views until during the hearing of the appeal in this Court, the Supreme Court has now settled the question. 46. As we have not made the plaintiff-appellant liable for any portion of the court-fees which would have been paid by him on the plaint in the trial Court and the memorandum of appeal in this Court we do not think that the costs of hearing should be apportioned. The parties will bear their respective costs excluding the costs of court-fees in both the Courts. 47. Let a copy of the decree of this Court be forwarded to the Collector. Renupada Mukherjee, J. 48. I agree.
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1954 (4) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rom the cause of action in the first suit. The cause of action in the first suit was the desire of the plaintiff to separate from his brothers and to divide the joint family property. That suit embraced the entire property without any reservation and was compromised, the plaintiff having abandoned his claim to account in respect of the motor business subsequent to March 31, 1946. His subsequent suit to enforce a part of the claim is founded on the same cause of action which he deliberately relinquished. We are clear, therefore, that the cause of action in the two suits being the same, the suit is barred under Order II, rule 2(3), of the Civil Procedure Code. As the suit is barred both by res judicata and Order II, rule 2(3), of the Civil Procedure Code, no further question as to the applicability of section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act can possibly arise under the circumstances. The result is that we allow the appeal and dismiss the suit with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (4) TMI 58 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e sub-section did not create any real difficulty. Their Lordships did not say that the word "individual" was unambiguous. If we may say so with all respect, their Lordships apparently were not prepared to follow the rule laid down by Lord Lindley, M.R., above referred to and the basic principles of interpretation of a taxing statute. The other Allhabad decision merely follows this decision. The Punjab High Court also followed this case without much discussion. 17. Taking all this into consideration, we are of the opinion that it was not the intention of the Legislature to include in the income of the mother the income of her minor children arising from the benefits of partnership of a firm in which the mother is a partner. 18. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. 19. The assessee will have the costs of the reference. Counsel's fee Rs, 250. The respondent will also pay the costs of the paper book. Reference answered in the negative.
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1954 (4) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal is allowed. The decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the lower appellate Court is restored except as to costs. The original owners of the property have lost it. The value of the property was put at over ₹ 10,000 in the special leave petition. The second defendant oust,.,, the original owners by getting a mortgage decree for ₹ 130 in his favour on a mortgage of only ₹ 25 and purchasing it at the auction himself. He is no longer in the picture as he sold it to the plaintiff for ₹ 400. The plaintiff has accordingly obtained property which on his own showing is worth more than ₹ 10,000 for only ₹ 400. The first defendant spent only ₹ 250 plus ₹ 65-6-0 on it ₹ 315- 6-0 and the consideration of the disputed deed is only ₹ 700. it is evident that both sides are speculators. In the circumstances we direct that each party bear its own costs. Appeal allowed,
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1954 (4) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 25 per cent. of that profit. It was never his case that the extra amount, added by the Income-tax Officer, constituted profits earned by him from which he had paid 25 per cent. to Madan Lal under Section 10 (2)(x) or 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The assessee can only claim deduction of amounts actually spent by him. It is not even his case that he has paid the amount to Madan Lal, of which he claimed deduction. His case is that he is liable now to pay that amount to Madan Lal. When he makes that payment, he may be entitled to claim a deduction but so long as the payment is not made, it cannot be said that it is an allowable deduction under Section 10(2)(x) or 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. This is our answer to the second question. As we have decided one point in favour of and one point against the assessee, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. The fee of learned counsel for the Department is fixed at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (4) TMI 55 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... atturam Horilram's case (supra). It was held in that case that Section 34 could not be invoked merely because the Income-tax Officer changed his mind about the interpretation of the law but the section would operate if the Income-tax Officer was informed that a case had been overruled or that a statute or a regulation had been passed which had not been brought to his attention before. In the face of this decision Mr. Dutt wisely decided not to press his objection regarding the applicability of Section 34 on the facts of this case. Mr. Dutt however argued that the question should be read in a restricted sense and should be confined only to the point whether the assessment order under Section 34 was valid in view of the limitation of four years prescribed in Section 34 (3) of the Act. For the reasons we have already stated we cannot permit Mr. Dutt to argue the question in this form. The result is that we decline to answer the question in the form proposed by the assessee.
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1954 (4) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ether it has inherent power to permit such amendment, it is not necessary to decide, because when it did not, in fact, dismiss the petition under section 85 for not complying with section 83 and passed an order under section 86 appointing an Election Tribunal for the hearing of the petition, the matter is thereafter governed by section 90(4) of the Act, and it is a matter of discretion with the Election Tribunal either to dismiss the petition for defective verification or not. In the present case, the Election Tribunal directed the verification to be amended on 24 July, 1952, and further declined to dismiss the petition under section 90(4) for defective verification. These are not orders with which this Court will interfere in appeal under article 136 of the Constitution. The objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of delay in presentation and of defective verification must therefore be overruled, and this appeal dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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