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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1954 (5) TMI 42 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... recess of a palace and it never saw the light of the day and the claim made by the Advocate General that the order has the force of law cannot be supported by mere resprt to the theory of the prerogative. 34. In view of the above discussion, it is unnecessary to consider the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner founded on Article 19 and Article 14 of the Constitution, and in consequence I do not even touch upon it. 35. According to Article 265 of the Constitution no tax can be levied or collected, except by the authority of law and having held that the order dated 27-7-1946 has not the force of law,-it is a mere administrative order the contentions of the Petitioner-company must be allowed to prevail. 36. In the result the petition is partly allowed and the State of Madhya Bharat is restrained from any further realisation from the Petitioner-company of any cess due after 26-1-1950 under the order dated 27-7-1946. The Petitioner-company to get Rs. 150/- as costs.
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1954 (5) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion when there has been "any failure to comply with any of the provisions of section 33........" 25. The only jurisdiction the Returning Officer has at the scrutiny stage is to see whether the nominations are in order and to hear and decide objections. He cannot at that stage remedy essential defects or permit them to be remedied. It is true he is not to reject any nomination paper on the ground of any technical defect which is not of a substantial character but he cannot remedy the defect. He must leave it as it is. If it is technical and unsubstantial it will not matter. If it is not, it cannot be set right. 26. We agree with the Chairman of the Election Tribunal that the Returning Officer rightly rejected these nomination papers. The appeals are allowed with costs and the order of the Election Tribunal declaring the elections of the two successful candidates to be wholly void is set aside. The election petition is dismissed, also with costs. 27. Appeals allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... As the accounts were not made up for a year after the commencement of the business, the assessee was not entitled to invoke the latter part of Section 2(11)(c). If that part of Section 2(11)(c) could not apply, obviously the assessee could not invoke the benefit of Section 2(11)(c) and contend that the assessee had no previous year at all within the meaning of the Act for the assessment year 1948-49. If so, only the part of Section 2(11)(c) would apply, that is, for the assessment year 1948-49 the accounting period is from the date of the commencement of the business to 31st March, 1948. That was the view of the Commissioner of Income Tax and of the Tribunal, which is our opinion is correct. For the assessment year 1949-50, it is Section 2(11)(a) that will apply. Our answer to the question framed by the Tribunal is in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he should pay the costs of the respondent, Rs. 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1954 (5) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Judge returning a petition filed under Section 53-A (4) of the old Act for setting aside the order dated 7-12-1950 passed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board removing the petitioner from the office of the trustee, the basis of the order being that on the coming into force of the new Act that court had ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. We have also remarked" that on a correct interpretation of the provisions of the statute the court's jurisdiction has not been ousted with regard to the pending proceedings. The result is this civil revision petition is allowed. 18. This order applies to G. R. P. No. 915 of 1952 in which as mentioned above reference was made by Ramaswami J. to a Bench and the order under revision is set aside. We must observe that in this case the learned District Judges, had gone to the length of dismissing the petition which in our opinion is unjustifiable. 19. The parties will bear their own costs throughout in all the cases.
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1954 (5) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re even more important than they are in England where the general level of education is so much higher. We hold that the conduct of Mr. G amounts to professional misconduct and as it was committed in the face of the Bombay view expressed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in 1901 disciplinary action is called for. 22. Now had Mr. G been as restrained and objective in his petition under article 32 as he was while arguing the case before us, we might have considered a warning enough seeing that his is the first time this question has been considered in this Court, but, in view of his personal attacks on the learned Chief Justice in his petition where he has questioned his good faith and attributed malice to him, we are not able to deal with him as lightly. We therefore direct that he be suspended from practising in this Court for a period which will expire on the same date as his period of suspension in the Bombay High Court. 23. There will be no order about costs. 24. Order accordingly.
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1954 (5) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ctural. 18. Mr. Naunit Lal also attempted to argue that he could support the decision of the Tribunal on other grounds which had been found against him and referred to the analogy of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a respondent to take that course. That provision has no application to an appeal granted by special leave under article 136. We have no appeal before us on behalf of the respondents and we are unable to allow that question to be reagitated. 19. The result is that we set aside the order of the Tribunal and hold that it is not proved that the result of the election has been materially affected by an improper acceptance of the nomination, assuming that the case falls within the purview of section 36(6) and that finding is correct. 20. We accordingly set aside the order of the Tribunal and uphold the election of the appellant. The appellant will get his costs from the respondents incurred here and in the proceedings before the Tribunal. 21. Order accordingly.
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1954 (5) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r receipts which he admitted were given to him. The Magistrate states in his judgment that the genuineness of the receipts was not at all challenged by the prosecution; but still the High Court says that the receipt for ₹ 2 was a forged one, and even though Ghammanlal might have made a false statement in saying that he paid the money at Lohara Sarai, the defence story could not be accepted as correct. In our opinion the High Court's approach to the case has been wrong from the start. It did not apply the principles stated above which it was incumbent upon it to keep in mind when dealing with a judgment of acquittal. The reasons given by it to overrule the estimate of evidence made by the trial court which heard and recorded it are in our opinion altogether inadequate and flimsy. The result is that in our opinion this appeal should succeed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trying Magistrate restored. We direct that the accused be acquitted.
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1954 (5) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h Court to issue a writ of certiorari, the matter might have been different, but the situation, as it stands, is that there are no such express words, and I am, therefore, not prepared to hold that the Courts are precluded from issuing a writ of certiorari to the Government where they come to the conclusion that the notification under Section 6 should not be made as the purpose of the acquisition cannot possibly be 'useful to the public'. This objection of the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, fails, but on the view that I have taken on both the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this petition must fail. 20. I accordingly dismiss this petition with costs which I assess at ₹ 300/- but of the sum of ₹ 300/- awarded as costs to the respondents, the respondent No. 2, namely, the Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Pilibhit, shall be entitled to recover ₹ 200/-, and the State Government, respondent No. 1, ₹ 100/-.
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1954 (5) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s Court in his' affidavit dated 30-11-1953. In that undertaking the opposite party promised to vacate the premises by 25-2-1954. From that date he has had a period of two months and a half and as he has not been able to comply with-the undertaking during this period, we find no reason for holding that any useful purpose will be served by allowing him to comply with the undertaking by adjourning this case for a further period of one month. 9. We accordingly convict the opposite party Chintaharan Das for having committed an act of contempt and sentence him to simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of rupees one thousand. 10. Let a writ of arrest be drawn up by the Registrar, Original Bide, and placed before us immediately. The Registrar is to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this order. 11. All "expenses and charges for issue of the writ and for conveying the prisoner to the jail will be borne by the petitioner. J.P. Mitter J. 12. I agree.
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1954 (5) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es of profit. In any view it cannot be argued that even if a Chairman or a member of a Government committee works in a purely honorary capacity and there is no remuneration attached to the office, he will still be regarded as a person holding office of profit in view of the provisions of the section. This provision might in our opinion have been made only out of abundant caution and nothing else. We think therefore that the view taken by the High Court is not right and as we hold that the appellant was not holding any office of profit under the Government at the material time he was certainly entitled to be chosen as a Councillor under the Mysore Town Municipalities Act. The result is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Sub-Judge, Tumkur. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal. 14. In view of our decision that the election of the appellant was valid, the third point raised by him does not require consideration.
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1954 (5) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the opinion that the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to the Appellant was justified under the circumstances. This ground also does not avail the Respondent. 16. The amount of pension, viz, ₹ 43-11-0 per month which was granted by the Saurashtra State to the Appellant was not the subject-matter of the suit. The amount of compensation clamed by the Appellant was over and above the said amount of pension and the Trial Court adjudicated upon such compensation. The Appellant's rights in regard to the pension were not at all affected by the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to him. The Appellant will therefore continue to receive the amount of pension in addition to whatever compensation has been awarded to him, by the Trial Court. 17. The result, therefore, is that the appeal will be allowed, the decree passed by the High court set aside and the decree passed by the Trial Court in favour of the Appellant restored with cost throughout.
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1954 (5) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y with regard to Kharagpur forest. The facts found by the Tribunal are that sal and ebony trees which grew in the forest were conserved by allowing each tree a circle of 15 feet, that there was cutting down of the trees and jungles which fell within that circle leaving sufficient space for growth, and that forest conservancy staff, consisting of Forest Guards, Inspector of Forest, and other servants, was maintained to look after the forest. As regards coppice work there is some material to show that a scheme was prepared from 1871 to 1876 and coppice work was proposed to be taken up in 1944. There is no material furnished by the assessee to show that the scheme of coppice work was actually put into practice. In my opinion the facts found by the Tribunal do not support the case of the assessee and the receipt from the Kharagpur forest cannot be taken to be "agricultural income" within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Income-tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (5) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icle 135(1) for special leave. 8. Regarded from the angle, this is not a proper case for special leave. The High Court gives a clear finding that there were more than five persons and believes the eye-witnesses who identify the two appellants. The mere fact that only two out of the band of attackers were satisfactorily identified does not weaken the force of the finding that more than five were involved. The use of section 149 Indian Penal Code was therefore justified and the convictions are proper. 9. We see no reason to interfere with the sentences. A number of persons joined in an attack at two in the morning on helpless persons who were asleep in bed. At least one of the assailants was armed either with a gun or a pistol. He shot one man dead and attempted to murder another, and the band looted their property. The sentences of two years, four years and transportation and therefore not severe and call for no review. 10. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (5) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stitution a further condition for the receipt by Anglo- Indian Schools, of the special grant secured to them by that article. On the other hand if clause 7 is to be treated merely as advice, which may or may not be accepted or acted upon,then clause 5 will amount to An absolute prohibition against the admission of pupils who are not Anglo-Indians or citizens of non-Asiatic descent into Anglo-Indian Schools and will compel the authorities of such Schools to commit a breach of their Constitutional obligation under article 337 and thereby forfeit their constitutional right to the special grants. In either view of the matter the impugned order cannot but be regarded as unconstitutional. In our opinion the second question raised in these appeals must also, in view of article 337, be answered against the State. The result of the foregoing discussion is that these appeals must be dismissed and we order accordingly. The State must pay the costs of the respondents. Appeals dismissed.
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1954 (5) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stages, that was due to coincidence and not to adoption of the report of the Commission by the 'Committee. Mr. Nambiar also referred us to two Resolutions of the appellant dated 4th January, 195 1, and 6th October, 195 1, adopting the scale fixed by the Commission in respect of certain other categories. That has no bearing on the question whether the Committee whose recommendations were approved by the Government had adopted in part the Report of the Commission so as to result in discrimination. The facts stated above show that the Committee went into the matter independently, and viewed the question from a different standpoint; and in formulating the scheme which they did, they did not adopt the Report of the Commission, though they derived considerable assistance from it. In the result, this appeal must be allowed and the petition of the respondent dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs either here or in the Court below. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a on the basis. of which the goods have been classified and the presumption raised by the section obviously have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The presumption only attaches to goods of the description mentioned in the section and it directly furthers the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of smuggling, and that being the position the impugned section is clearly within the principle enunciated above, not hit by Art. 14. The impugned section cannot be struck down on the infirmity either of discrimination or illegal classification. Confining as it does to certain classes of goods seized by the customs authorities on the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, there is only a presumption which can be rebutted. o p /o p In these circumstances, there can be no doubt whatever that s. 178-A does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution and this petition is, therefore, to be dismissed with costs. o p /o p Petition dismissed. o p /o p
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1954 (5) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... effect any essential change in the Act or alter its policy. The notification of 23rd April, 1951 does, in our opinion, effect a radical change in the policy of the Act. (I) 5 I.A. 178. There fore, it travels beyond the authority which, in our judgment, section 3(1)(f) confers and consequently it is ultra vires, It is not necessary to examine the vire8 of section 5 of the Act of 1915 which was also impugned because no action taken under it has hurt the appellant and so he cannot question its vires. The result is that the appeal succeeds. We hold- (1) that section 3(1)(f) is intra vire8 provided always that the words "restriction" and "modification" are used in the restricted sense set out above; and (2) that the notification of 23rd April, 1951, is ultra vires. The question about the vires of the notification of 25th April, 1931, and of section 5 does not arise. The respondents will pay the appellant's costs here and in the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... declare his election to be void. Under section 98 of the Act this is one of the orders which the Election Tribunal is competent to make. If it is said that section 100 of the Act enumerates exhaustively the grounds on which an election could be held void either as a whole or with regard to the returned candidate, we think that it would be a correct view to take that in the case of a candidate who is constitutionally incapable of being returned as a member there is non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution in the holding of the election and as such sub- section (2)(c) of section 100 of the Act applies. The result therefore is that in our opinion the contention of the appellant succeeds. We allow the appeal in part and modify the order of the Election Tribunal to this extent that the election of respondent No. 2 Vasant Rao only is declared to be void; the election of the appellant however will stand. We make no order as to costs of this appeal. Order accordingly.
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1954 (5) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... quite sufficient for the purpose of disposing of this appeal and it is not necessary to go into the several other minor points raised before us. In our opinion the appellants have made out a valid ground for allowing their application for review. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and admit the review. As the different points involved in this appeal are intimately interconnected we direct the entire appeal to be reheard on all points unless both parties accept any of the findings of the High Court. The costs must follow the event and we order that the appellants must get the costs of this appeal before us and of the application for review before the High Court. We need hardly add that the observations that we have made in this judgment are only for the purpose of this application for review and should not be taken or read as observations on the merits 'of the appeal now restored and to be reheard by the High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e policy of the appellants in making test cases of this character. The only thing that impresses us in this case is that the unfortunate first respondent has had to bear the brunt of the battle and has been worsted in this preliminary point which was found in her favour both by the trial Court and the Court of appeal. We cannot make any order for costs in her favour. But we think that the justice of the case requires that the appellants as well as the first respondent will bear and pay their own respective costs both here and in the Court of appeal. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the Court of appeal and remand the Appeal No. 117 of 1952 for hearing and final disposal by the Court of appeal on the other points which have been raised in the matter after hearing both the parties. There will be no order as to costs here as well as in the Court of appeal. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellants R. H. Dhebar. Agent for respondent No. I R. A. Gagrat,
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