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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 10 of 10 Records
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1954 (6) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... ury were performing their duties as imposed by the legislature, then there is a complete immunity of the supreme power (now the Sovereign Indian Republic) for tortious acts committed by them during the course of their duties. I am in absolute agreement with my learned brother that the treasury cannot be regarded as a bank, and the tortious acts cannot be deemed to have been committed by the ministerial officers while they were discharging any commercial business on behalf of the Government. What has been done can in no sense be regarded as an act done while conducting a commercial business, and my learned brother has referred to all the important sections of the statute from which it can easily be gathered that whatever was done was done in the discharge of a statutory duty under the existing law. The Government can in no case be liable for tortious acts done by its officers during the course of their statutory duties, and, therefore, this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1954 (6) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion under that provision. o p /o p This conclusion receives full support from a comparison of the provisions of Article 300 and the second proviso to Article 361 of the Constitution with the provisions relating to the immunity of the President, or the Governor or the Rajpramukh of a State for official acts in an action in a Court. As the Government, like any other corporation, is incapable of acting for itself and has necessarily to act through its servants, the only action for disobedience of an order of injunction which can be taken against it is to order its property to be attached. The other alternative remedy of detention in civil prison, cannot apply to a corporation and it will not apply to a State. That, however, does not, in my opinion, militate against the liability of the State of Bihar to be dealt with under Order 39, Rule 2 (3), Civil P. C. Thus it is clear that the State is not immune from liability as contended for by the learned Government Advocate. o p /o p
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1954 (6) TMI 14 - THE EAST PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ee, I do not deem it necessary to deal with or decide it at this stage of the case. For the reason stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is that the assessee's profits and gains earned in the calendar year 1948 were assessable for 2006 (1949-50) at the rates in vogue according to the Patiala Income-tax Act, 2001, read with Section 3 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Administration Ordinance (No. 1 of 2005), as repealed and re-enacted in Section 3 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union General Provisions (Administration) Ordinance ( No. XVI of 2005) and not in accordance with clause (23) of the agreement dated 1st April 1938, between the assessee and the Ruler of Jind State. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs. A copy of this order shall go to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. GURNAM SINGH, J.--I agree with the answer proposed by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (6) TMI 13 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... in no way conclusive on the question whether it is a proper deduction in assessing profits liable to tax. This was very clearly pointed out by Warrington L.J. in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Alexander von Glehn & Co. Ltd. 1920 2 K.B. 553, 567. There does not appear to me to be any difficulty in ascertaining the principles to be applied here as illustrated in the decided cases, nor do I think there is much difficulty in applying these principles to this case. The judges of the majority of the Court of Appeal were, I think, only able to reach the conclusion which they did by holding that expenditure to help the trader to keep the profits of the trade for himself is expenditure for the purposes of the trade. I know of no decision which has gone that length, and for the reasons I have endeavoured state such a result cannot follow on a sound construction of the statute. I would allow the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Solicitor of Inland Revenue; Pennefather &Co.
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1954 (6) TMI 12 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ll sawar logs to Wimco. There was neither an express nor an implied con- tract each time goods were railed. (2) The contract was not for delivery of specific goods but of unascertained or future goods by description. (3) The property in the goods did not pass to the buyer by the delivery to the railway for carriage. It passed at Ambernath where the goods were appropriated by the buyer to the contract with the assent of the seller. (4) The word goods in the definition of sale in the Sales Tax Act must be interpreted according to its definition in section 2 (d) of the Act and not according to the definition in section 2 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act. The standing sawar trees are not goods within the meaning of the former Act. 20.. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Board of Revenue as required by section 23(5) of the Act. Since the applicant has succeeded, he will have the costs of this reference from the non-applicant. Counsel s fee RS. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (6) TMI 11 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... properties or combinations, whether by hand labour or by machinery . This definition has been quoted in the Law Lexicon of British India by Aiyar, page 785, and represents the gist of the, term correctly. Similar meaning attaches to the term produce . 5.. It appears that logs or rafters into which the trees were shaped by the non-applicant had a definite commercial value. Without any work of art the trees were liable to be sold only as raw material, whether as fuel or timber, and would have naturally fetched a low price. As logs or rafters they were liable to be used as beams or further shaped into finer furniture. They had, therefore, assumed a different shape or form which made them fit for use either directly or, if necessary, by applying some more labour and skill. I am not, there- fore, inclined to agree that the logs or rafters were not any distinct advance from their original form and did not constitute taxable goods. 6.. The reference is rejected. Reference rejected.
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1954 (6) TMI 10 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elf unable to agree. I am not only aware of the extent of the binding nature of the Division Bench decision but have also very great respect for it and for the opinion of my learned brother. Had it been, however, necessary to depend on the exception for the decision of this case a reference to a bigger Bench would have been necessary. But the question of law arises in this case independently of the exception and I am placing my doubts on record to avoid the impression that I hold the same view. (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 327 1953 N.L.J. 606. 4.. As already observed however the rest of the discussion of my learned brother clearly shows how the question of law mentioned by him arises and how it is important and why the order of the Board of Revenue refusing to make a reference is not justified. I agree with my learned brother in allowing the application with costs and requiring the Board of Revenue to state the case and refer it. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 if certified. Application allowed.
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1954 (6) TMI 9 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es Tax Act, 1125, postulates the following propositions (i) A dealer cannot make an illegal collection, (ii) Any lawful collection by him should ultimately go to the Government, (iii) He cannot escape his liability to tax on the ground he has not collected, (iv) Even where he has not collected unless he can be said to have waived his right, his right to collect from the customer cannot be questioned, (v) If he has made illegal or excess collection from a customer the latter s right to a refund of it cannot be denied, (vi) The corresponding liability of the dealer to refund it to the customer cannot be obliterated by his paying the amounts collected to the Government, and (vii) The Government is not entitled to levy the illegal collection from the dealer thus depriving the customer of his right to get it from the dealer and/or Government. 11.. In the light of what we have stated above the appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs, advocate s fee Rs. 150. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (6) TMI 8 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n (2). It is, therefore, clear that according to law, as it now stands, the petitioner company comes within the definition of the word dealer and it cannot therefore be said that notices issued to it under Sections 11 and 14 of the Act are ultra vires or without jurisdiction. The Amending Act, it cannot be denied, is a valid Act because the State Legislature can, under the provisions of Article 286(1) of the Constitution read with the Explanation, make provision for the levy of tax on sales where the goods are sold or delivered in the State. The petitioner company on their own showing (vide paragraph 2 of the petition quoted above) did sell and deliver goods to persons within the territories of the Punjab. I cannot therefore hold that the Assessing Authority acted without jurisdiction. This petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed, and I dismiss it, but since the Amending Act came into force after the petition was filed, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (6) TMI 7 - HIGH COURT OF LAHORE
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... ided by the statute under which the Income-tax Officer has acted. The rights and liabilities of a company in liquidation are neither more nor less than those of any other assessee and though the law for the purposes of winding up places its affairs under the special supervision of the liquidation Judge, assessment of the company to income-tax is neither the function of the Judge nor of the liquidator but that of the Income-tax Officer whose powers for determining the liability of the company to income-tax remain unaffected by the incident of the liquidation of the company. If therefore the liquidator of the company has any complaint in the matter of its assessment to income-tax he must refer that complaint to the Tribunal appointed for the purpose by the Income-tax Act. Being the representative of the assessee, the liquidator can neither convert himself into a revising authority of the Income-tax Officer nor ask the liquidation Judge to assume such role. Petitions dismissed.
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