|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
-
1954 (9) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e majority. 96. (After the opinion of the Constitution Bench the following Order, dated 24th September, 1954, was pronounced by a Bench composed of Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ. who had originally hear the appeal.) 97. The Order of the Court was pronounced by N.H. Bhagwati, J. 98. We have received the opinion expressed by the Constitution Bench. According to that opinion, which is expressed in the majority Judgment, the onus lay on the prosecution to prove that the alcohol of which the accused was smelling was such that it came within the category of prohibited alcohols. 99. We have heard the learned Attorney-General on the question whether that onus has been discharged and he has frankly conceded that on the material placed before us it cannot be urged that that onus has been discharged by the prosecution. 100. The result, therefore, is that the conviction of the appellant will be quashed and the fine, if paid, will be refunded. 101. Conviction set aside.
-
1954 (9) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stand the basis on which these figures were worked out and learned counsel for the appellants was in no better position. In the view we take of the claim it is unnecessary to pursue the matter further. 20. As we have already stated the defendants throughout stuck to the rejection and similarly the plaintiff to his acceptance of the rejection. At one stage when the defendants threatened to sell the goods at the risk of the plaintiff it must obviously be as plaintiff's agents, for in no ofher character could they have effected the sale and if subsequently the goods were actually sold by them without the consent 6f the plaintiff, they were bound to have brought this sum into account in mitigation, if any, o the damage suffered by them by reason of the plaintiffs breach of contract. But the defendants did not even mention this sale in their written statement and so their contention is unsustainable on this also. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1954 (9) TMI 44 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit......." Having regard to the difference in the language used by the Legislature in the different Sections of the Act, I have no doubt in my mind that what is contemplated in Section 28(3) is a hearing. 5. In the circumstances of the present case it is not denied that the assessee was not given a hearing or afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It must accordingly, be held that there has been no compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 28(3). The order of the Income-Tax Officer levying a penalty un the assessee is ultra vires and must be set aside. 6. We accordingly hold that the assessee is pot liable to pay any penalty, and the order of the Income Tax, Officer dated 25-4-1945 levying ₹ 450/- on the assessee as penalty should be set aside. The penalty, if already paid, shall be refunded to him. The assesses shall have the costs of this application. Hearing fee ₹ 100/-. P.V.B. Rao, J. 7. I agree.
-
1954 (9) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
... ...
... ... ..... missioner for this purpose. It provides for withdrawal of the license and consequent remission of the fee. That is, however, a different matter and does not cover the case of a surrender which the Excise Commissioner is entitled to deal with under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 33. For that purpose the petitioner is required to send one month's notice to the Collector of his intention to surrender the license and to pay the fee payable for the license for the remainder of the period for which it would have been current but for such surrender. It is not alleged in the petition that such an action was taken by the petitioner at any tune. There is, therefore, no question of the Deputy Commissioner refusing to exercise the jurisdiction vesting in him under S. 32. 16. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security shall be refunded to the petitioner.
-
1954 (9) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... application. I certify the Summons to be fit for the employment of Counsel and certify it as of a hearing for one day, 74. At the conclusion of the delivery of this judgment, Mr. Ganguli applied on behalf of the attorneys for stay of this order. I have no hesitation in refusing to stay this order after my findings in this case. The attorneys have already received in full from the client the entire amount of ₹ 1,73,035-6-0 on these four bills. Being in possession of this money, the attorneys have denied the client ever since 2-10-1951 and 24-11-1951 his requests for supply of particulars of charges made in these four bills with reference to the High Court scale and for taxation with the indifference going to the length of not even answering the letters of the client of these two dates. As the applicant on this Summons seeks not payment but taxation, I see no justification for delaying taxation any further on the facts of this case. I therefore refuse to stay this order.
-
1954 (9) TMI 41 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r and upon such conditions as the Income tax Officer may think fit". In this case it is the admitted position that the assessee had exercised his option in the course of assessment and had chosen as accounting years, the calender year 1946 and the Diwali year 2002-2003 for the respective business of mica and of cloth and grain. We see therefore, no justification on the part of the Tribunal to hold that the previous year, for the secreted profits of the amount of ₹ 19,000 should be financial year 1945-46 and that assessment should have been made in the assessment year 1946-47. (4) For these reasons we hold that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 19,000 was liable to inclusion in the assessee's total income for the assessment year 1946-48. We accordingly answer the question referred by the Tribunal in favour of the Income Tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250.
-
1954 (9) TMI 40 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n certain income he was to be allowed to have abatement to that extent in the other Dominion. If we give effect to the submission of the learned Advocate-General it will amount to this that although the object of the agreement is to give relief we would really be in the first place amending the provisions in section 23(5)(a) and secondly the assessee will be liable to be assessed on a higher amount than if this agreement had not come into force. I cannot accept the interpretation that the object of this agreement could have been to put a further burden on the assessee rather than give him relief and the contention raised by the learned Advocate-General is in my opinion not sustainable and must be repelled. I would therefore answer the question this way that out of the income of the partnership, which was ₹ 70,136, the income which would go into the share of Seth Satya Pal Virmani for the purposes of taxation is ₹ 56,985 and not ₹ 75,549. Falshaw, J.-I agree.
-
1954 (9) TMI 39 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hold that the order passed by the Tribunal was not communicated to the applicant in accordance with section 33 (4) and rule 34. As the firm was not served with a notice of the order the question of the application being made within 60 days of the service of notice did not arise. The Tribunal proceeded on the view that the applicant had been duly served. The assumption was erroneous and has vitiated its order. We agree that neither the Tribunal nor this Court has the power to condone delay. The question, however, of condonation does not arise as the applicant, as we have shown, has not been served with a copy of the order in accordance with the terms of section 33 (4) and rule 34. The decision of the Tribunal holding that the application was barred by limitation is wrong. 8. We hold that the application was not barred by limitation. We direct the Tribunal to treat the application as made within time and dispose of it according to law. 9. The application is allowed with costs.
-
1954 (9) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PARDESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e document only records the changing in the constitution and provides for continuing the existing business. It does not either express of by unnecessary implication dissolve the earlier partnership and form a new firm. There is nothing on record to show that the earlier accounts were looked into and the rights and liabilities of the partners were settled. The mere fact that the scope of the business has been enlarged is not decisive on the question whether the firm was dissolved for an existing firm can always extend the scope of the business by a separate agreement. After going through the aforesaid recitals in Ex. B-1, I have no hesitation in deciding that under the said document, a new partnership was not formed, but the old partnership was continued with certain changes, in the constitution. If so, it follows that S. 69(2) is not a bar to the maintaibility of the present suit. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. 16. Appeal dismissed.
-
1954 (9) TMI 37 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... The contention raised by Mr. Gosain does not seem to be supported by this judgment. Besides the language used in section 13 is quite different and it gives power to the Excess Profits Tax Officer to require any person whom he believes to be engaged in any business or to have been so engaged during any chargeable accounting period or to be otherwise liable to pay excess profits tax to make a return. The language of this section is in my opinion quite wide and notice can go to a person who is engaged or has been engaged or is otherwise liable and therefore the interpretation sought to be put on this section by the petition is in my opinion unsustainable. In view of the interpretations which I have put on sections 13 and 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, no question of limitation arises and it cannot be said that the notice issued by the Excess Profits Tax Officer on the 8th March, 1950, was barred and I would therefore answer the question in the negative. Falshaw, J.-I agree.
-
1954 (9) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... re actually reasonable or unreasonable, but an estimate of the collection charges which ought to be allowed is not and cannot be a matter of law, unless it be that some statute had laid down some principle somewhere which had not been followed. It was not contended that any principle had been laid down in the Act or under the rules to which no attention had been paid. The question is one of pure fact and I cannot see how any law can be made out of it. In the result the answers to the questions referred should, in my opinion, be as follows - Question (1) The income is liable to be taxed under section 9 of the Act. Question (2) "No." Question (3) "No." Question (4) Does not arise, as it is not question of law. In view of the circumstance that the main question involved in this case was not too clear and that the Department had not made any attempt to tax the assessee since 1927 or 1928, we shall make no order for costs in this reference. Lahiri, J.-I agree.
-
1954 (9) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... within three months from the date of the subsequent visit, and that Section 106 of the Act does not mean that the prosecution must be launched within three months from the date of the first visit in the case of continuing offences. With respect, we agree with this view. 10. We must, therefore, hold that the charge in the case from which Criminal Appeal No. 761 of 1954 arises is barred by limitation. In the result, this appeal fails and must be dismissed. The first part of the charge in the case from which Criminal Appeal No. 762 of 1954 arises is also barred by limitation, but the second part of the charge which relates to the use of the premises in question by the respondent as a factory without obtaining a licence is not barred by limitation under Section 106. This appeal would, therefore, be allowed and the case sent back to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate with the direction that he should deal with the second charge in accordance with law. 11. Order accordingly.
-
1954 (9) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... appellant cannot in the circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any corrupt practice under section 123(7) as alleged against him. It follows from this that not having incurred any expenditure over and above what was shown by him in his return of election expenses he cannot be said to have concealed such expenditure and, therefore, he cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt practice under section 124(4) of the Act. In the view we have taken, namely, that these extra men were not employed or paid by the appellant, it is unnecessary, for the purpose of this appeal, to discuss the question whether, if one's own servants are also utilised or employed in the conduct of the election, their salary for the period they are so utilised or employed should be regarded as election expenses and shown in the return. On that we prefer not to express any opinion on this occasion. No other point having been raised we allow this appeal with costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1954 (9) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd to permit such actions would lead to no inconvenience or Injustice. On the other hand to deny such a method of proceeding would practically be tantamount to denying all relief to such injury, since a suit by the individual composing the community would be met by the objection that the plaintiff could not predicate his individual or personal rights to any defined or aliquot part the sum due to the community. In our view, the present suit being a claim for recovery of a sum of money alleged to be the loss caused to the entire body of nanja ayacutdars whom the plaintiff represented, there is undoubtedly sufficient community of interest to bring the suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C. P. C., and the fact that the suit is one for damages does not take it away from the scope of the provision. 21. The result is that L. P. A. No. 69 of 1950 and C. R. P. No. 417 of 1948 are dismissed with costs in L. P. A. No; 69 of 1950 only and S. A. No. 1838 of 1950 is allowed with costs throughout.
-
1954 (9) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
... ...
... ... ..... - 2. Compensation for the removal of mother sal trees etc. ₹ 11,684/- 3. Compensation for the loss of income for 20 years including the year during which the property was under requisition at the rate as fixed by the learned arbitrator, compensating there-by damages for the trees cut or up-rooted ₹ 1,47,600/- Total Rs.1,78,575/- ( 52. ) So far as the question of costs is concerned we direct that each party will bear its respective costs of this Court, inasmuch as the parties themselves were under Section 19, Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder duty bound to produce necessary materials before the Arbitrator for fixing the fair amount of compensation. The Government had not taken necessary steps in proper time for adducing such materials before the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator was not assisted by bringing before him the correct legal position in this case. Under such circumstances we direct that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
-
1954 (9) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he entries in the books merely showed that Indra Chand had passed on the money after having earned it on his own account was held to have not been established, because the assessee failed, in spite of repeated adjournments being granted, to produce the books of the company, the partnership firm and of Indra Chand himself. What the family books showed, therefore, stood. On the above facts as found by the Tribunal, I am entirely unable to say that there was not sufficient or legal evidence before them on which they could hold that Indra Chand was a partner as a representative of the Hindu undivided family and that the income derived by him was really the family's income, liable to be taxed as such. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, will have his costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1954 (9) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the 1st of April, 1946. Mr. Joshi says that the date of the payment of compensation which is the 26th of March, 1946, is irrelevant for the purpose of considering when the amount received is liable to tax under section 12-B. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to consider or decide that aspect of the matter. If our view is that the case does not fall under section 12-B at all, it is not necessary to consider what would have been the proper date for considering when the profits arose if the amount had been a capital gain. It is further necessary to decide that question because the question that has been submitted to us is a general question whether the income is assessable under the head "capital gain" under section 12-B of the Act, and our view clearly is that the income is not so assessable. We would, therefore, answer question No. 1 "It is capital receipt" and question No. 2 in the negative. The Commissioner to pay costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1954 (9) TMI 29 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion. It is impossible further to apportion the total legal expenses between the legal expenses incurred in connection with the appointment of a Receiver on the one hand and the legal expenses incurred for dissolution of the partnership on the other. The two are inextricably mixed up and the entire legal expenses should, in the circumstances of this case, be held to be for the purpose of protecting the assets of the firm during the transitional period. Hence, it would be a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. There can also be no doubt that it is revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure inasmuch as no new capital asset was acquired but the existing assets of the firm were utillsed to the best advantage. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us by the Tribunal in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200. MISRA. J.―I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1954 (9) TMI 28 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rd of Revenue. In our opinion, there is no merit in this argument. Paragraph 3 of Form I is not a provision of a mandatory character and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot dismiss the appeal merely because paragraph 3 of the form has not been complied with by the assessee. The contents of the form of appeal prescribed by Rule 21 have, therefore, no bearing on the interpretation of the first proviso of Section 30, Income-tax Act. 15. For the reasons already given, we hold that in the circumstances of the case the appeal preferred by the assessee against the penalty imposed under Section 46(1) of the Act was competent on 24-4-1952, and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in law in holding that the appeal was not competent on that date. The question referred to the High Court must, accordingly, be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. 16. The Income-tax Department to pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250.
-
1954 (9) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the record to show that that new partnership could not have subsisted and could not have done the work of managing agents without the aid of the assets, if any, left by Narottam Morarji. These are all speculations which have no basis or substance on the facts actually found by the fact finding authorities. All that is clear and patent on the record is that there is absolutely no evidence to justify us in taking the view that the loans on which the interest was paid by the assessee were loans to enable the assessee to earn the profits in the managing agency agreement. In the absence of any such evidence or materials, we must hold that the interest paid by the assessee on those loans was not a justifiable deduction. We must therefore answer the first question in the affirmative to the extent indicated in the judgment, and questions Nos. 2 and 3 in the negative. No order as to costs of this reference. No order as to costs of the notice of motion. Reference answered accordingly.
|
