|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 37 Records
-
1955 (10) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s no positive proof of any fraud, or waste. If the mere fact that a portion of the estate consists of movables is sufficient to justify the appointment of a receiver in the case of a limited owner, then there will be practically no case in which a receiver need not be appointed. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decree in so far as it appoints the defendant and Sundaram Pillai as receivers in respect of the outstandings and the business respectively. We, however, confirm the decree of the Court below in so far as it directs the defendant to file a statement of account disclosing the oustandings, movables and cash belonging to the estate. It is represented to us that the defendant has since the date of the decree filed such a statement of account. The defendant will be directed to submit half-yearly reports about the business. Except for these two comparatively minor conditions imposed on her, the suit deserves to be and is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.
-
1955 (10) TMI 50 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for the second time over the same cause. In our opinion, there would be absolutely no justification for saying so. It was only in the case against which this appeal has been filed that the trial Court has given its decision on the questions on which the parties are at issue. In the other case, it was contended in the trial Court by the respondents before us that since there has been a decision in the first case, they should not be vexed over twice and it was on that ground that the appellants' suit was got dismissed by them. Now, they cannot with any justification turn round and argue in the appeal before us that the decision in the second case is res judicata. That would be arguing in a circle and it would end in a travesty of justice if it is allowed to stand. We cannot, therefore, allow the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The preliminary objection is dismissed. The case may be listed for hearing on merits of the appeal as soon as possible.
-
1955 (10) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gross less than what he was charged for the De Luxe pens is not relevant for the assessment of the damages recoverable by him, for ex-concessis' there was never any contract for solid colour pens and the price at which the buyer could have ob-dallied them is wholly immaterial for assessing the damages sustained by him. 15. We therefore hold that the Appellant would be entitled to claim the difference between the market price of good masur (i.c. 7 1/2 seers per rupee) and the market price of the damaged masur (i.e. 15 seers per rupee) as his general damages under Section 59 of the Act which he can set up in diminution of the price. On the basis of the price of damaged masur being 15 seers for a rupee the damages on the aforesaid principle would amount to Rs. 2,000/-. The decretal amount in F.A. No. 119 of 1947 would thus stand reduced by Rs. 500/-. This appeal is thus partly allowed. Under the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in both the Courts.
-
1955 (10) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o. I could not be convicted of the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators accused 2, 3 and 4 were acquitted of that offence. In our opinion, therefore, the conviction of the accused No. I of the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was clearly illegal. The appeal of the accused No. 1 will, therefore, be allowed to the extent that his conviction under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 18 months awarded to him as the result thereof would be quashed. We are not concerned here with the conviction of the accused No I of the offences under section 471 read with section 465 and also his conviction for each of the three offences under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the concurrent sentences of rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of each of them passed by the lower Courts upon him in regard to the same. These convictions and sentences will of course stand.
-
1955 (10) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dditional District Judge-after receipt of the records of the three references will decide the objection regarding the existence or non-existence of the 'shikmi' right of Lila Mahto in the land, and other allied and consequential questions, arising out of the references, after giving full opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence on the disputes under references. At that time, it would be open to the opposite party to adduce such evidence, as will be considered proper by him' to negative the 'shikmi' right claimed by Lila Mahto. The order dated 29-6-55 is, therefore, set aside. This order having been set aside, the subsequent orders passed by the learned District Judge stand automatically vacated. 15. In the result, I would make the Rule absolute, and set aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 29-6-55. Subject to the directions given above, the application is accordingly allowed with costs hearing fee ₹ 32/-. Rai, J. 16. I agree.
-
1955 (10) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... immediate environments. These small embankments are also the work of human agency. The scraping out of the salt, the sieving of it for the purpose of grading the salt into crystals of various sizes, packing of it into gunny bags with a view to its transport, delivery or disposal are all done by the workmen. In these circumstances, upon a proper construction of Clause (k), we must hold that a manufacturing process is being carried on upon these salt works. 19. In conclusion, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, hold that the Wadia Mahal Salt Works of which the respondent is the occupier are a Factory and that the respondent committed an offence under Section 92, Factories Act, 1948, in that he failed to obtain a licence for working the salt works under Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Act. We convict the respondent of this offence and sentence him to pay a fine of ₹ 25/-. 20. Judgment reversed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
... ...
... ... ..... nts for new permits, to a person who has persistently broken one of the conditions of the permit by plying the vehicles without paying the taxes. Though the question raised now was not considered by the learned Judges, the conclusion of the learned Judges is consistent with the view that Rule 160-C is constitutionally valid. We, therefore, hold that the condition laid, down in Rule 160-C is not extraneous to the control of motor vehicle traffic and that it is not an unreasonable restriction upon the right of the permit holder to ply his vehicles for hire. 55. Before leaving this case, we must express our appreciation of the manner in which Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. Srinivasamurthi and the Learned Counsel appearing for the Government Mr. A. Gangadhara Rao have worked up the cases and placed all the relevant material before us. 56. In the result, both the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in Writ Petn. No. 271 of 1952. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
-
1955 (10) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PARDESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ." Then the learned Judges noticed the passage in the judgment of Kennedy, J., cited already and expressed their respectful assent to the view expressed by that learned Judge. We are bound by this decision. The Commissioner, in the present case, declared the 1st Respondent as duly elected without adverting to the fundamental principle that where there has been an election and where 'it- had not been shown that the electors have -thrown away their votes the successful party cannot be declared as duly elected unless has secured the majority of the votes. There is therefore an error apparent on the face of the record. 15. In the result the order of the Commissioner in so far as it set aside the election of the Petitioner is sustained and that part of the order declaring the first Respondent duly elected is set aside. The result is that there should be a new election to the seat. As the parties have succeeded and failed in part, they are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1955 (10) TMI 43 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lar case there was no material on which the Income-tax Officer could come to the conclusion. I am unable to accept this contention either because the order of the Income-tax Officer or of the Assistant Commissioner which was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal referred to and quoted above show what material there was from which they were coming to the conclusion as to what was wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business of the assessee. It cannot be said that there was no material before the Taxing Officers. As a matter of fact, in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Calcutta Agency Limited 1951 19 ITR 191 , the Supreme Court has held that the burden of proving the necessary facts in order to entitle the assessee to claim exemption under section 10(2)(xv) is on the assessee, and if he does not establish these facts he is not entitled to the deduction claimed. I would, therefore, dismiss this petition and discharge the rule with costs. Bhandari, C.J.-I agree.
-
1955 (10) TMI 42 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d to liability to pay tax on "excess dividends" within the meaning of the proviso to the Finance Act, a matter which the learned Officer was himself unable to judge at the first blush even after full scrutiny of all the records. It seems to us that the excess taxation by scrutiny of all the resorted to at the second stage in the rectification proceedings was a total abuse of process and not justifiable to any the least extent. 14. We are clear that the proceedings for rectification taken by the first respondent Income-tax Officer and filed in the case Exhibits B and C are lacking in jurisdiction and cannot stand. The orders in revision passed by the second respondent filed in the case as Exhibits F and G confirming the rectification orders as above are also unsustainable. We therefore grant a writ of certiorari quashing the above-said proceedings as prayed for. The petitioner will get his costs from the respondents; advocate's fee ₹ 150. Petition allowed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... But he makes it clear that if there had not been this provision with regard to notices a different view could well have been taken of the effect of the Amending Act. Therefore, with respect to the Calcutta High Court, that decision was given on the peculiar facts of the case. The facts before us are entirely different. The Amending Act does not in any way invalidate notices already given before the Amending Act came into force. The notices are perfectly valid. What the Amending Act does is that it imposes a new limitation upon the right of the landlord to obtain possession, and if the landlord fails to satisfy the Court at the date when the tenancy expires and he becomes entitled to possession that he is entitled to possession in law as the law then stands, he cannot obtain relief from the Court. 8. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Amending Act would apply to all cases where the period of notice expired after the Amending Act came into force. 9. Answer accordingly.
-
1955 (10) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that a very clear context would be required to enable a meaning to be put on the word ' purchase ' in this section, which would extend it so as to cover the acquisition of shares by subscription. Quite apart from those considerations of mere language of the Act, it seems to me that the word ' purchase ' cannot with propriety be applied to the legal transaction under which a person, by the machinery of application and allotment, becomes a share-holder in the company. He does not purchase anything when he does that. 29. That being the decision in that case, it is obvious that it affords very little help in the solution of the question before us. 30. We, therefore, hold that it was within the powers of the Directors to put up the proposed construction even under the terms of the original trust-deed and that the policy-holders have no right to interdict it. The appeal fails and it is dismissed; but in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs of the appeal.
-
1955 (10) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he questions of law which can be agitated in what we might for convenience describe as the second reference, could only be those questions which do not arise out of the first order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and which have not been considered by the Appellate Tribunal in its first order. If a question has been considered and no reference is sought, then it is not open to the assessee or the Commissioner to seek a reference at a subsequent stage because that reference would be barred. But if in giving effect to the decision of the High Court, the Tribunal passes an order out of which a question of law arises, which question never arose out of the first order, then there is no reason why the assessee or the Commissioner should not have the right of coming to the High Court under section 66(1) or section 66(2). In our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in the view that he took. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the result, we must hold, differing from the learned Judges of the court below, that the arbitration proceedings are not incompetent and that the award made therein is not void on the ground that the contracts containing the agreement are void. The respondent contested the validity of the award on several other grounds. They were rejected by the City Civil Judge and in the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court that the contract notes were void under section 6 of Act VIII of 1925, they did not deal with them. Now that we have held that the contracts are not void, it is necessary that the appeal should be heard on those points. We accordingly set aside the order of the court below, and direct that the appeal be reheard in the light of the observations contained herein. As the appeal succeeds on a point not taken in the courts below, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. The costs of the further hearing after remand will be dealt with by the High Court.
-
1955 (10) TMI 37 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uilon, purported by Ex. B order dated 30th April, 1955, to rectify an alleged mistake in the computation of the income under business in the assessment as above. This was done by setting off the loss of the previous year which had been allowed to be carried forward against the cashew income alone for the year, the income from tobacco being added on to the income from property and other sources for purpose of assessment. 16. The question arising in this case is similar to that which I have already decided in the connected case. Applying the same principle it has to be held that the respondent, Income-tax Officer, exceeded his jurisdiction in taking proceedings under section 35 of the Income-tax Act. The order of rectification dated 29th April, 1955, and filed in the case as Ex. B and passed under section 35 of the Income-tax Act cannot be sustained and is therefore quashed. The respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Order accordingly.
-
1955 (10) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and will be dealing with another category or other categories in future, them undoubtedly this case would fall within the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court on which the Advocate-General has relied. But, as we have pointed out, in this case there are no different categories. The category is one and it is not pointed out, and it cannot be pointed out, that there would be any difficulty in the application of this particular proviso to other tax evaders besides those who have been discovered by the fortuitous circumstance of having the honour of being associated with the particular assessment and the further honour of being mentioned in the judgment of a particular Tribunal. In our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in the view that he took that this proviso offended against article 14 so far as it affects third parties. 93. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Costs to be taxed on the basis of a long cause. 94. Appeal dismissed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 35 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... isdiction to review or revise their order or reconsider their decision on the facts or circumstances of the case. The effect of the issue of notice in the present case calling upon the petitioner to pay the tax by the 15th September, 1955, amounts to cancellation of the previous order made by the then Commissioner permitting the taxpayer not to pay the tax till the decision of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal and such an order cannot, in my opinion, be covered by section 35. It really amounts to coming to a different conclusion two years later on the same set of facts. I, therefore, reject this argument also. For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to relief on this application and I order that the notice dated the 25th July, 1955, being in excess of jurisdiction of the Commissioner be and is set aside. This petition is, therefore, accepted with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 100 (one hundred). Application allowed.
-
1955 (10) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stantial purpose. In the circumstances, and in fairness to the learned Custodian-General, the only proper course would be to set aside his order under appeal and to remit the matter back to him for fresh consideration. On such fresh consideration he will give full opportunity to both sides for presentation of their respective points of view. If on the rehearing, he decides to remand the case to the Custodian, he will clearly indicate what are the matters to be considered by him. The learned Custodian-General may also consider the feasibility of his dealing with the matter finally by himself, calling for a report, if need be, from the Custodian on specified matters, in order to obviate any further delay by appeal and revision in this already protracted matter. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Custodian General is set aside. The case is remanded to him so that he may reconsider and dispose of the same in the light of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1955 (10) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... be regarded as a deliberate act of the Court by way of notice to the accused that he was not being tried for that offence. It would not be a case of mere omission to frame a charge. If, therefore, the accused is convicted under section 302, I would consider his conviction as invalid, as he was misled in his defence. In conclusion I would point out that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are meant to be obeyed. Contravention of its provisions are unnecessary and neither the prosecution nor the Courts of trial should ignore its provisions in the hope that they might find shelter under sections 535 and 537 of the Code. Where the contravention is substantial and a retrial becomes necessary, public time is wasted and the accused is put to unnecessary harassment and expense. I agree that the appellant's conviction be altered from section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to 304 of the Indian Penal Code and that he be sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment.
-
1955 (10) TMI 32 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat a premium has been paid, but a premium must actually have been paid. In the result, the King's Bench Division consisting of Lord Goddard, C. J. and Humphreys and Parker, JJ. granted a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal as the Tribunal had reached an erroneous finding on the question of preliminary fact. 8. For the reasons I have expressed, I hold that the orders of the Additional Sub-divisional Officer of Giridih dated 18-2-1954 and 5-10-1954, cancelling the Khorposh grants and directing the petitioners to give up possession of the villages comprised in the Khorposh grants are entirely without jurisdiction and null and void. In my opinion, a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued quashing the two orders of the Additional Sub-divisional Officer of Giridih dated 18-2-1954 and 5-10-1954, made under Section 4 (h), Bihar Land Reforms Act. I would accordingly allow this application with costs. Hearing fee ₹ 100/-. Imam, J. 9. I agree.
|
