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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 49 Records
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1955 (3) TMI 59 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... committed by the Press and it was only according to the provisions of law that the Manager was held responsible and was fined. Really the fine was against the Press and the liability was that of the Press. The Manager, therefore, must be deemed to have paid the fine for the Press. There is no satisfactory evidence that the offences for which the Manager was fined were committed due to his personal negligence. Therefore, in my opinion, the Manager was entitled to recover the amounts paid by him on account of fine from the proprietor of the Press. The learned trial Judge expressed himself as follows Moreover, it has been admitted by D'. W. 4, who is the Manager of the Press and who is the main witness for the defendants, that the cases under the Factories Act were with respect to the liability of the press. 24. Learned Counsel for the appellants has not been able to show that the aforesaid views expressed by the trial 'Judge and the appellate court are in any way wrong.
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1955 (3) TMI 58 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t for some default which not he, but the Tribunal has committed and therefore section 66(1), in my view, cannot be construed as laying down that the observance of the time-limit for making a reference is also mandatory and that a default in that regard shall make the reference incompetent, although the consequence may be to make a party suffer for the fault of the Tribunal. Having given my best consideration to the arguments advanced by Mr. Ginwala, I find no reason to revise the opinion expressed by us in the previous case. As regards the question itself, I have already said that, according to both parties, it is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay 1955 27 I.T.R. 1. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred should, in our opinion, be 'No'. The Commissioner is entitled to have the costs of this reference. LAHIRI, J.―I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (3) TMI 57 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ccused in another case. An order in each case should be based on the evidence adduced in that case. I am' fortified in this view of mine by reported cases. 5. In 'Doat Ali v. Emperor' there were two separate cases in each of which the accused was convicted by the trial Court. There were two appeals against these judgments. The appellate Court heard the appeals together as one, and allowed one while dismissing the other appeal. The opinion expressed by a Bench of that Court was that the procedure adopted by the appellate Court was bad. The rule stated by Somasundaram, J., in - 'Public Prosecutor v. Sinnappa' AIR 1950 Mad 767 (B) is to the same effect. The learned Judge there held that it was not open to a trial Magistrate to club a number of cases at the stage of the defence. 6. On this discussion, it follows that the Sessions Judge adopted a procedure, which is illegal. Therefore, his judgment has to be reversed. There will be rehearing of the two appeals.
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1955 (3) TMI 56 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of six(6) per cent, per annum from 11-2-49 (date of possession) till the date of payment stands confirmed. 16. In conclusion, therefore, Civil Reference No. 2 of 1953 is answered thus that the provisions of First Proviso to Section 7(1)(e) of the Act (Orissa Act No. 18 of 1948) is 'ultra vires' as we have discussed above. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 100/-(rupees one hundred). First Appeals Nos. 22 and 23 of 1953 are partly allowed with proportionate costs and the award is modified to the extent that- the objector-respondent (Bharat Chandra Nayak) is entitled to get ₹ 9,662/8/11 instead of ₹ 14,620/1/11 as fixed by the Arbitrator with interest at the rate of six(6) per cent. per annum from the date of possession till the date of payment. The amount, if not paid already, is to be paid forthwith. The connected cross-appeals are also dismissed without costs; and First Appeal No. 20 of 1953 is dismissed with costs. Lingaraj Panigrahi, C.J. 17. I agree.
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1955 (3) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mand made by the proper (authority?) be paid to such person and at such time and place, as the proper officer may specify.” 58. The language of the rule is plain enough and conclusively meets the objection raised. In view of this rule we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the demand made in the present case for payment of the additional excise duty even though it was made after the goods were cleared from the usual premises can be recovered according to law. There may have been some difficulty in the way of the recovery of excise duty in a case like the present in the absence of R. 10-A, but once that rule was enacted, we can see no legal impediment in the matter of the realisation of the duty sought to be recovered even after the goods have been removed from the place of manufacture or storage under the rules. In view of the conclusions at which we have arrived above, this application fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. 59. Application dismissed.
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1955 (3) TMI 54 - HYDERABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sing. The value of 50 bales would then be ₹ 5,30. During the year he sells 25 bales at ₹ 1 50 each, realising ₹ 3,750. The book balance at the end of the year would be 25 bales of cotton, leaving a book balance on that account ₹ 1,550 which may not represent either the cost price or the market price. In other words, book balance computed after crediting that particular account with the sale price of the item or items of asset stocks sold, whether at a profit or at a loss. 12. Having regard to all the circumstances in this case, as the assessee has not adopted any regular method of valuing his closing stocks, at the market price in the year of accounts is, in our view, justified in law. the assessee having now made his choice will have to follow it regularly. In the result, question No. 2 will be answered in the affirmative. Let the reference be answered according with costs to the assessee which we assess at ₹ 150. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (3) TMI 53 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te of maintenance becomes either excessive or inadequate. The decree of the Court blow is reversed as regards the award of maintenance and cost, to the second plaintiff. 19. In the memorandum of objection filed by the second defendant he has objected to the decree of the Court below making him liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to make the second defendant also liable for the plaint claim. That relief was disallowed by the Court below. In the circumstances, we find no reason why the second defendant should be made liable for the costs of the plaintiffs. The decree of the Court below is modified to that extent, and the memorandum of objection is allowed. 20. The judgment and decree of the Court below are modified to the above extent and confirmed in other respects. The appeal is partly allowed as indicated above. The first respondent will get her costs in this Court from the appellant. The other parties will bear their respective costs in this Court.
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1955 (3) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which he carried on, cannot be disputed. If the Tribunal attached more importance to that relevant factor than to the other relevant factors which also it considered, it cannot be said that there was no evidence before the Tribunal on which the Tribunal could come to a conclusion, that the trading activities of the assessee in the purchase and sale of shares for himself constituted a business separate from the commission agency business which he carried on. Learned counsel for the assessee could not deny that the nature of the business in this case, distinct from the commission agency business, was a relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the activities in the purchase and sale of shares was a business separate from the commission agency business. The question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the respondent of this reference. Counsel's fee, ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1955 (3) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on in the circumstances of this case. The application to the High Court for leave to appeal was filed on 23-9-1950 and leave was granted on 18-7-1952. The decree of the trial Court after remand was passed, in between, on 4-12-1951. The decree must, in the circumstances, be taken to be subject to the result of this appeal. In our opinion this case falls within the principle recognised by. the Privy Council in --'Shama Purshad v. Hurro Purshad', 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC) (C), and not that in -- 'Nanganna Naidu v. Venkatapayya', AIR 1923 PC .167 (D). 14. We accordingly direct the trial Court to take such further evidence as may be necessary and submit to this Court its findings on the two issues above stated within three months from the date of receipt of the records by that court. On receipt of the finding in this Court it will be open to either side to, file objections thereto within ten days therefrom and this appeal will be thereafter posted for final disposal.
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1955 (3) TMI 50 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... yment was made to the assessee company at the office of the Reserve Bank, Bombay, in accordance with the contract, and in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1950 18 I.T.R. 423, the sale money was collected by the assessee company's managing agents in British India. The facts of this case are, however, different and are similar to those of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Anamallais Timber Trust Ltd. 1950 18 I.T.R. 333, in which, although the formation of the contract was made in British India, the appropriation of the goods and the receipt of money had taken place outside British India, and accordingly the income was held not liable to be taxed. It cannot, therefore, be held in the instant case that the income was received or should be deemed to be received in British India. 8. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative. Costs shall be borne by the department. Hearing fee ₹ 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (3) TMI 49 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he affidavit is merely derivation or hearsay. Secondly, it is not a fit case in which the ends of justice would call for interferecen by a high prerogative writ. The books of accounts of the assessee appear to have been rejected by the taxing officers for good and substantial reasons. The estimate made by those officer was not seriously questioned before the Tribunal and in effect the decision of the Tribunal shows that these estimates were adopted. In substance it comes to this that the Tribunal also did not see its way to accept the books of account of the assessee. That being so, it is obvious that the deductions claimed on the basis of the entries in those books also could find no support from the Tribunal. In the circumstances, I have agreed to adopt the order proposed by my learned brother in rejecting the application. 37. The Department is entitled to the costs of reference and in Civil Rules No. 83 of 1954; hearing fee ₹ 250 (rupees two hundred and fifty only).
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1955 (3) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... permit is bound to consider the provisions of Section 47. Of course, if nobody raises the question which is relevant to Section 47(1) (e) it does not follow that the R.T.A. would have to act suo motu. But if the point is raised or is obvious from the facts placed before the R.T.A., it is bound to consider it. 5. The respondent Meghendra Narayan Singha has appeared before me, and the learned advocate appearing for him says that he has no objection to the appeal being reheard by the Appellate Tribunal. 6. For the reasons aforesaid, this Rule must be made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari issued quashing and setting aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 20-8-1954 mentioned in the petition, and there will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from acting on the said order. The matter will, therefore, now go back to the Appellate Tribunal, to be dealt with ac cording to law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (3) TMI 47 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tor. But there was no irregularity at all be-cause the proclamation was ordered to be issued on 21-7-1951, the sale statement was filed on 14-10-1950 and the sale itself was held on 1-10-1951. The lower Appellate Court further erred in setting aside the sale on the ground that Section 43 created a bar against attachment and sale of the property in question and the execution Court acted without jurisdiction in ordering the sale. The assumption of the lower Appellate Court that there was an irregularity and the decree was for recovery of a debt was, therefore, unwarranted. 22. The application for review is accordingly dismissed but the miscellaneous (second) appeal No. 117 of 1952 is allowed as revision. The order, of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the executing Court is restored. Costs of the application for review shall be borne as incurred. Costs of the miscellaneous (second appeal No. 117 of 1952 and of then first appeal shall be or the judgment-debtor.
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1955 (3) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pends upon whether the equipment of the touring cinema would fall within the category of Immovable property. We have no hesitation in holding that it does not. In the question referred to us, the properties are described as collapsible and capable of being removed. In the very nature of things, properties of that nature cannot be Immovable property. The expression "permanently fastened" occurring in the question is a little misleading. Actually some of the machinery or the poles of the tent may be imbedded in the earth, but they are imbedded only temporarily and not permanently, If they were permanently fixed, the equipment would not form part of a touring cinema. 3. We have been taken through the material provisions of the lease deed and there is nothing therein, which lends support to the view that the case covered any Immovable property. In our opinion, the lease in question is not chargeable to stamp duty under Article 30(a)(i) of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act.
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1955 (3) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sidered as much as of those who claim a preferential treatment, and Mr. Justice ACHHRU RAM is at pains to point out that he was dealing with a case where a bank was not being wound up but was working under a scheme of management sanctioned by the court and he also says that this principle which he has enunciated would not apply where there was a compulsory winding up by the court. We are not dealing here with a case of a scheme where the court may agree to certain creditors being paid in a certain manner. We are here dealing with an order of winding up made by the court and payment of creditors according to law, and in law in our opinion the claim of the appellants to be treated as preferential creditors is not justified. 9. The result is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. 10. Liberty to the respondent's attorneys to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited in court and appropriate it towards satisfaction of the order for costs. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (3) TMI 44 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pension was payable after the service was terminated, and, therefore, what was paid to him in lieu of pension was really compensation for loss of employment. So also in P.D. Khosla, In re(1), the assessee's services were terminated, and therefore the amount paid to him was held to be compensation for loss of service within the meaning of explanation 2 to section 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. These cases are, therefore, distinguishable See also Hunter (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dewhurst(2) . 6. In the instant case, the assessee has not been paid any compensation for termination of his service, which still continues. What he had received was a commuted amount representing the reduction in his remuneration and is a revenue receipt. It was, therefore, rightly treated as income and was liable to be taxed. 7. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative, and the reference is rejected with costs. Hearing fee ₹ 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1955 (3) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Railway Authority was by way of an appeal under section 17 of the Act. Since the finding of the Tribunal in this case involved the case of as many as six persons and the net additional amount ordered was a sum of ₹ 1,341, its finding was appealable under section 17 of the Act. Whether or not an employee was entitled to wages of a higher category than what he was till then drawing would depend entirely on the scope of the rules with reference to which he is entitled to become one in the higher category and in cannot be assumed a priori that such a claim is a claim to "prospective wages". 20. In my view, therefore, there is no sufficient reason to reverse the judgment of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court and this appeal should be dismissed with costs. BY THE COURT. In accordance with the decision of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the orders of the Authority and of the High Court are quashed. There will be no order as to costs throughout.
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1955 (3) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bitrator and the award in this case was given on 1-5-1949, one week before the other award. Here also, no specific question of law was referred and we need not cover the same ground. Our decision is the same here as there. The fourth head of claim is about cloth and rations. The claim here., and the Dominion Government's reply, is the same as in the other case, but the award in this case is not based on an implied contractual obligation but on "a moral and implied obligation". The error here is even greater than before. The sum claimed was ₹ 51,495 and the amount awarded was ₹ 30,000. The seventeenth head of claim was about interest. The contractor claimed ₹ 27,665 and the arbitrator awarded ₹ 9,954. There is the same error of law apparent on the face of the award. The High Court was right in dismissing the claims made under the heads in dispute here. The two appeals fail and each is dismissed with costs in this Court. Appeals dismissed.
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1955 (3) TMI 41 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... not necessarily follow that it means the same thing in rule 11(2). If in rule 11 "person" meant person other than the Crown, the whole basis of assessment in the case of a particular class of taxpayer, namely, purchasers from or sellers to the Crown, would be disrupted. A different basis of assessment would exist for persons who had bought or sold businesses according as they bought from or sold to the Crown, or persons other than the Crown. No reason for any such distinction was, or can be, suggested. The rule is, in my opinion, intended merely to deal with the situation that arises on a purchase or sale of a business, and to give the rule a reasonable and intelligible meaning "person" must, if possible, be given a meaning that will include the Crown. There is nothing in the Act to exclude such a reading and it is supported also by the definition of "person" in the Interpretation Act, 1889 s. 2(1) . I would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (3) TMI 40 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e amounts advanced by M.G. Rungta and B.N. Rungta to the Electric Supply Co. came out of their personal funds. The onus should have been placed upon the Department to show that those amounts came from the funds of the assessee family. There is absolutely no material placed on the record by the Income-tax department to discharge the onus which lay upon it. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that there was no material on the basis of which the Appellate Tribunal could come to the conclusion that the capital contributed by M.G. Rungta and B.N. Rungta was really capital advanced by the assessee family. The result is that both the questions referred to the High Court by the Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax department. The assessee is entitled to the cost of this reference. There will be one hearing fee for all these cases which is assessed at ₹ 250. RAMASWAMI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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