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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 9 of 9 Records
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1955 (6) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is exhibited anywhere by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act. No such intention is discernible. Neither do I see that there-is any impossibility in reading the definition of 'Calcutta' as given in the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act by reference to the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923 as a definition, given by reference to the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1951. 22. Section 608 is thus a complete answer to the petitioner's contention. If I have nevertheless referred at length to the position under general principles and The provisions of the General Clauses Acts, I have done so only out of deference to the arguments addressed to us. 23. For the reasons given above, this Rule is discharged, but in the circumstances of this case, there will be no order for costs. Civil Rule No. 389 of 1954. 24. For the reasons given in the judgment delivered in Civil Rule No. 388 of 1954, this Rule is also discharged without any order for costs. Mallick, J. 25. I agree.
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1955 (6) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Rules framed under the Public Demands Recovery Act. was not discussed before us; nor were any of the vexed questions raised as to what the duties of a custody court were when it was merely a custody court and when it was both such court and the executing court, or such court and the attaching court; nor were we asked to consider when, in the circumstances of this case, the money sent by the Superintending Engineer could be said to have been received and whether any crediting to the Petitioners' suit was required for completing reception. No question was raised either on the earlier attachment of the money in the hands of the Superintending Engineer which appears to have been made in 1951. Our decision must be regarded as limited to the two points urged before us. o p /o p 16. For the reasons given above, this Rule is discharged, but in the circumstances of the case no order for costs is made. o p /o p pjudge S.C. Lahiri /pjudge , J. o p /o p 17. I agree. o p /o p
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1955 (6) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ver an Income-tax Officer, after having issued a notice of demand in respect of an amount due under his own order or an order of a higher authority, issues a second notice of demand in respect of the same amount due under the same order it will have to be considered whether he is entitled to do so and I have no doubt whatever what the answer will be. But the present case is not of that description. Here, an alteration had been made in the assessee's liability by, first, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and there was clearly no repetition of a notice of demand in respect of the same amount due under the same order, but a notice of demand in respect of a fresh or an altered liability. In my view, the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is not tenable. The Rule is accordingly discharged with costs the hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Ad-interim stay will stand automatically vacated. LAHIRI, J.-I agree.
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1955 (6) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Privy Council (Vide pp. 224, 225 (of Ind App) (at p 151 of AIR); vide also in this connection AIR1927Cal725 when they were dealing with question of holding over under" Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. But they also pointed out that section (Section 116) was subject to an agreement to the contrary'' and, in that case, there was such an agreement (vide p. 225 (of Ind App) (at p. 151 of AIR) and, further, that the facts and circumstances of the case also militated against the creation of a new tenancy. In the result, they held that no subsisting tenancy had been proved. There is nothing in that decision which in any way conflicts with the view of law which I have stated above. 18. In the above view of the matter, I dismiss this appeal, but, as the legal position was not quite clear and as 18 Ind Cas 448 (D) and AIR1927Cal279 appear to have needed some explanation, I would direct the parties to bear their own costs in this court on the present occasion.
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1955 (6) TMI 11 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecide questions of law or fact which may arise in these assessments. The Act provides an elaborate machinery for obtaining redress if errors of law or fact are committed by taxing authorities. In any case this is not the stage at which any such points arising in these cases may be considered. Jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 may be invoked if necessary when remedies available under the Act have been exhausted. 94. The petitions are dismissed and the Rules are discharged. DEKA, J. - 95. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Ram Labhaya, J., which have been just delivered. I am in total agreement with the views and reasons expressed by their Lordships as to the competence of the legislation, that had been attacked. In these circumstances, I have not thought it necessary to write any separate judgment myself. 96. I agree that the Rules may be discharged. (Leave to appeal granted). Rules discharged.
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1955 (6) TMI 10 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me other officers and therefore the knowledge about the facts could be acquired by Shri Gahlot after perusing the previous cases and after considering the manner in which the assessments were made. For these reasons, it was said, that the knowledge so gained by Shri Gahlot could be regarded as information. In our opinion whoever may have made assessments in the past, the Income-tax Officer who acts under section 34 must be deemed to have always had before him the fact and the knowledge which the officers making the assessments themselves had at the time of making the assessment. 16. Lastly it was contended that the argument advanced on behalf of the assessee does not arise on the points which are referred to this Court. In our opinion, the argument is clearly referable to the first question put before us. 17. Our answer to the first question posed therefore is that the notice was not validly issued by the Income-tax Officer under the amended section 34 of the Income-tax Act.
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1955 (6) TMI 9 - PEPSU HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gistration is to be verified instead of throwing the entire burden of proof on the assessees. I am also inclined to accept the contention of the petitioners that it is the date of application for a registration certi- ficate which should be taken into account and not the date of issue of the registration certificate, inasmuch as the responsibility for delay lies on the shoulders of the Sales Tax Authorities for which the dealers should not be made to suffer. In view of the facts stated above, the case is remanded to the assessing authority with the following directions (1) The assessing authority should give full opportunity to the petitioners to submit such proof as they have in their possession regarding sales to registered dealers and check the factum of registra- tion from his departmental record. (2) In cases where the purchasing dealers had applied for registra- tion certificates before the date of sale, the date of application may be taken into account. Case remanded.
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1955 (6) TMI 8 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs Jagatamba Cloth Stores) the Board observed that though the law, viz., sections 4 and 7 of the Act laid down a particular date for the starting of liability to taxation the taxing authorities might certainly exercise their discretion when making assessment and allow some concession for delay in the issue of the registration certificate provided this was not due to the laches on the part of the dealer and that this would be justi- fied by equity and fairness. The above remarks apply equally to the present cases, though quite apart from the question of equity and justice, in law itself the present assessment is invalid as according to section 11(2) of the Act, as it stood during the period for which assess- ment has been made, the failure of the dealer to get himself registered did not give jurisdiction to the Commercial Tax Officer to make an assessment under the section. The petitions are allowed and the orders of the Additional Commis- sioner set aside. Petitions allowed.
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1955 (6) TMI 7 - COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... ssive Acts since 1862 whereas the definition of officer appears for the first time in the Act of 1948. Further, the argument for a distinction between the meaning of manager in the section and in the definition goes when it is realized that director also, appears in both places. What, however, in my judgment, is decisive of the case is that any work of management done by a receiver is not done as manager of the company. The powers of management are ancillary to his position as receiver, and, in exercising those powers, he is not acting as manager of the company but as manager of the whole or part of the property of the company. This distinction is, as it were, underlined by the Act itself (See the group of sections in Part VI of the Act, where the expression receiver or manager of the property of the company is used throughout.) In my judgment, it is clear that a person occupying the position of Mr. Aizlewood in the present case is not a manager or officer within the section.
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