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Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1955 (8) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ceptance of an offer, simply because before the completion of the formalities, another purchaser had appeared with a better offer. In the present case, however, the Appellants, on their own showing, never intended to purchase the property on the conditions on which it was actually offered for sale and in spite of the clear indication given of those conditions at the meeting of the 12th. They say that they made their offer on a different basis altogether. The Commissioner or the owners have therefore no obligation to them, contractual or otherwise, and no illegality or impropriety is involved in directing the Commissioner to disregard their offer and negotiate with a party who is willing to pay a better price, with liberty to the Appellants to compete with him, if they so desire. That is the direction which the learned Judge has given. For the reasons given above, this appeal is dismissed with costs and the order of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. S.C. Lahiri, J. I agree.
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1955 (8) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se the liability of the agent or the principal the right of a landlord where forfeiture of a lease has been committed to exact the forfeiture or to treat the former tenant as still tenant and the like. To those cases the statement of Lord Blackburn in Scarf v. Jardine (1882) L.R. 7 A.C . 345 at p. 360, applies 'where a man has an option to chose one or other of two inconsistent things when once he has made his election it cannot be retracted.' The first defendant was undoubtedly prejudiced by the election but even if this feature were absent I would hold that there had been an election by proceedings against the tenant notwithstanding that the appellant was unable to obtain a judgment in it and that he cannot thereafter seek to treat the first defendant as in possession and recover mesne profits against him. 12. The Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The Civil Revision Petition also is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re therefore not liable to be included in the assessments for those assessment years. As regards the assessment year 1948-49, the question does not seem to me to arise, because the whole of the commission amount included in the income of the relevant accounting year was earned in that very year and was not either wholly or in part accumulated or arrear commission of any previous year. As respects the last assessment year, the amount of ₹ 1,650 is referable only in part to commission which had been earned in a previous year, but what that part is no one has determined. In the result, the question referred should, in my opinion, be answered in the following way As respects assessment years 1943-44 and 1944-45-"No." As respects the assessment year 1948-49, the question does not arise. As respects the assessment year 1949-50-"No", as to the part coming out of commission earned in previous years and lying to the credit of the assessee. Lahiri, J.-I agree.
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1955 (8) TMI 49 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... they should be allowed to withdraw the reference. There does not appear to be any provision in the Income-tax Act under which a party who has caused a reference to be made can be allowed to withdraw it after the Tribunal has made a reference to this Court. A reference made to this Court must be decided unless at least the party who had caused the reference to be made fails to appear and to take any interest in the matter. In the present case the assessees have appeared through an advocate and have brought it to our notice that the question has now been finally determined against the contention of the assessees by the highest Court of the country. In the circumstances the only order which we can possibly make is an order in accordance with our previous decision now affirmed by the Supreme Court. The answer to the question referred must therefore be in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax prays for his costs. He will have them from the assessee. Lahiri, J.-I agree.
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1955 (8) TMI 48 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... due s to him from the father of the Plaintiff, while D. W 2 deposed that the debt referred to as be1ng payable to him was real. The scribe of the mortgage-bond, was examined on the side of the Defendants as D. W. 3 and he supported them. On these facts, the lower appellate Court decided that Exhibit B-l is binding upon the Plaintiff. In the course of its judgment, after discussing a portion of the evidence, it observed that the burden lay upon the Plaintiff to establish want of consideration. We are inclined to agree with the learned District Judge, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the burden lay upon the Plaintiff to establish that the recitals in a mortgage-bond which was executed six years before the actual alienation and twenty years before the date when it was attacked were false, especially in the absence of their father from the witness-box. 14. We therefore , affirm the decision of the learned District judge and dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 47 - TRAVANCORE-COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xcluded from liability for income-tax in Travancore except under certain circumstances. In the absence of a similar provision to the effect that losses incurred within British India or any other Indian State should not be taken into account in computing the income of an assessee under section 13 of the Act (section 10 of the Indian Act), there will be no justification in not deducting those losses when computing the income of the assessee. 14. We, therefore, hold that, in computing the income of the assessee, the sum of ₹ 79,275 representing loss incurred by the assessee in the erstwhile Cochin State and the former British India should be deducted from the profits made by the assessee in the erstwhile Travancore State. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee will get his costs of the reference including advocate's fee ₹ 100 (one hundred only), from the Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin and Coorg. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (8) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... led and the accused were examined. 11. As we hold that there has been proper committal of the accused in respect of the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, we have the option of either to direct the learned Judge and jury to proceed with the trial in respect of the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code or to quash the proceedings. As, however, evidence in respect of the charge under section 471 read with section 467 of the Indian Penal Code has already been led before the jury on a substantive charge we think it should be proper to exercise out powers under section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code and to direct that the proceedings from the stage of empanelling the jury before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bombay, should be quashed and that the Sessions Court should proceed to try the three accused before a fresh jury for the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (8) TMI 45 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m a line of succession under the Hindu law. These notions of Hindu law have not in our opinion to be imported in interpreting the words "lineal descendant". The view that we are taking is further confirmed by the provision of the First Schedule to the Finance Act of 1955 dealing with the question of exemption. In the Finance Act of 1955, the words used are "lineally descended from any other living member of the family not entitled to claim partition." This would clearly show that lineal descent is possible from female members who may not be entitled to claim partition. Our answer, therefore, to the question put to us by the Division Bench is that a son or a grandson can be said to be a lineal descendant of his mother or grandmother respectively within the meaning of condition (b) of clause (i) of Part I (A) of Schedule I of the Indian Finance Act (No. 23 of 1951) which prescribes ₹ 7,200 as an exemption limit in the case of a Hindu undivided family.
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1955 (8) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was immediate performance or within a reasonable time. 7. In our opinion, therefore, with respect to the learned Judge, he was in error when he looked upon this agreement as constituting a contract for purchase or sale of shares. In our opinion, at the date when it was entered into there was no such contract and that contract only came into existence at the end of 12 months when the performance was either immediate or within a reasonable time. As the plaintiff is suing the defendant in respect of that obligation his suit is hot rendered bad by reason of the provisions of the Bombay Act and the contract in our opinion is valid and enforceable. 8. The result is that the appeal succeeds and the decree passed by the learned Judge will be set aside. The suit will be remanded back for trial on the other issues. The respondent must pay the costs of the appeal. 9. Liberty to the' appellant's attorneys to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited in Court. 10. Appeal allowed.
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1955 (8) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ficult, but I do not consider it impossible that it can be performed under the provisions of section 26(1) of the Income-tax Act. It appears to me to be desirable that the language of the section, as also that of the rules, should receive legislative attention. Apart from the instances of disharmony which I have noticed, the Legislature does not seem to have known very well what it would direct to be registered. Under section 26A(1) itself, what is to be registered is the firm. Under rule 2 of the rules, certain particulars are to be registered. Under paragraph 4(1) of the form, what is to be registered is the instrument of partnership. Such draftsmanship is obviously not the best. In accordance with the view which I have taken with respect to the true meaning of section 26A(1) and for the reasons I have given, the answer to the question referred to this Court must be in the negative. We would make no order for costs. LAHIRI, J. --I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (8) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s own method. But in doing so he must have reference to the accounts before him as section 13 does not contemplate the rejection of the accounts. Section 13 adds nothing to and takes nothing away from section 23(3)." We respectfully accept the said observations as laying down the correct law on the subject. If the Income-tax Officer intends to act under that proviso, he can adopt his own method but in doing so he must have reference to the accounts furnished by the assessee. But in this case as aforesaid the Income-tax Officer rejected the assessee's accounts and determined the income under section 23(3). The order of the Tribunal, a gist of which we have given supra, gives valid and relevant reasons for determining the income under section 23(3). The finding arrived at by them is one of fact and there are no grounds for directing them to state a case. The applications fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocates' fee ₹ 100 in each. Applications dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es no further, that contention will not have been properly disposed of. We can however protect the interest of the assessee only by qualifying our answer and indicating the precise point to which it is limited. What we do decide is only this, that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the service of the notice was not sufficient service within the meaning of section 63 of the Indian Income-tax Act, merely on the finding that the notice had been served upon a brother of the assessee who had no authority to receive it on the assessee's behalf, without considering the presumption which arose under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and without coming to any decision as to whether that presumption had been rebutted. The answer to the question referred will, therefore, be "No, in the absence of any consideration of the presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and any finding that the said presumption had been rebutted." Lahiri, J.-I agree.
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1955 (8) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the assessee was the owner of firm Harish Chandra Satish Chandra. The Bombay High Court, in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Gokaldas Hukumchand, 1943 11 I.T.R. 462 had occasion to deal with a case where very similar facts were found. In that case also, firms were inter-connected and the owner of one had financed the other. In fact, in that case, there were closer associations between the assessee and the partners of the firm, the profits of which were sought to be assessed as the profits of the assessee. It was held that the circumstances could merely give rise to a suspicion but could not justify holding that the assessee had a share in the other firm. The principle laid down in that case is applicable to the case before us. Consequently, our answer to the question referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to its costs from the department which we assess at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (8) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lf to the proper question at issue, and considered whether the sums in question could fairly be taken as part of the concealed profits of the business and having considered that matter, it decided against the assessee and held that the amount should be restored as concealed profits from undisclosed sources. The question which I have so long been discussing has been referred in the following terms - "Whether on the above facts and circumstances of this case, the addition of ₹ 23,563 as income from undisclosed sources is legally justified when an estimate of gross profit on the turnover was already made and the sum of ₹ 50,000 added as suppressed income of the assessee from business." The answer to the question must, in my opinion, be in the affirmative. As one of the two questions was of some difficulty, we direct that the Commissioner of Income-tax shall get half of his costs from the assessee. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1955 (8) TMI 38 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al should have given a personal hearing to the applicant. It was urged that a bearing was given by the Minister concerned, but we feel that in the absence of a rule or law to that effect the hearing by the Minister is not the same thing as the hearing by a quasi -judicial tribunal like the Rajpramukh in the present case by virtue of S. 3 of the Ordinance. We are, therefore, of opinion that as the applicant was not given a hearing by the Rajpramukh before the order in dispute was passed, we should set aside that order and direct that the case of the applicant should now be heard in the manner provided by S. 4(d) of the Ordinance. 16. We , therefore, allow the application, and quashing the order of the Rajpramukh communicated to the applicant on 3 -4 -1954, order that the applicant should be heard in the manner provided by S. 4(d) of the Ordinance. Considering, however, the circumstances of the case, we are of opinion that parties should bear their own costs before this Court.
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1955 (8) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , this application succeeds in part only. The rule is therefore made absolute to this extent that a writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to or take steps under the following notices (1) Notice dated 19-5-1955, issued by D. G. Banerjee to Sree S. N. Jajodia, partner of Messrs Calcutta Motor and Cycle Co., being Ex. A to the petition; (2) Notice dated 20-5-1955, issued by J. Smith to the partners of the petitioner firm, being Ex. B to the petition; and (3) Notice dated 23-5-1955, issued by D. G. Banerjee to the petitioner firm, being annexure 'A' to the affidavit of Mannalal Jajodia affirmed on 23-5-1955. A writ in the nature of Certiorari is also issued quashing the orders contained in the said notices. 31. The rest of the rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated, except the interim orders in respect of the three notices abovementioned, which had merged in this final order. 32. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion was led and the accused were examined. As we hold that there has been proper committal of the accused in respect of the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, we have the option of either to direct the learned Judge and jury to proceed with the trial in respect of the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code or to quash the proceedings. As, however, evidence in respect of the charge under section 471 read with section 467 of the Indian Penal Code has already been led before the jury on a substantive charge we think it should be proper to exercise our powers under section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code and to direct that the proceedings from the stage of empanelling the jury before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bombay, should be quashed and that the Sessions Court should proceed to try the three accused before a fresh jury for the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (8) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... first occasion. But, for one reason or other, they were not able to substantiate the facts by placing the necessary and relevant material before the Tribunal. Section 12-A(6)(a), in our view, is not intended to give two opportunities to every assessee to establish his case before a Tribunal. It is really conceived in the interests of the assessee, who was not able to place some facts before the Tribunal at the first instance which would have made a difference in its decision. In the instant case, the petitioners sought for review on the ground that they were not able, on the first occasion, to place their evidence before the Tribunal as the documents were in Gujarathi language. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot say that the evidence to substantiate the plea of commission agency is a new fact within the meaning of section 12A(6) of the Act. The review petition was rightly dismissed. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs-Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 34 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be substituted in place of the State of Bihar. This application for amendment has been made on the footing that the description of the petitioner in the substantive application is a mere misdescription. We cannot accept the view that the substantive application suffers from any misdescription, because the State of Bihar was entirely different from the Commissioner of Sales Tax and it cannot be said that the expression the State of Bihar was a misdescription of the authority known as the Commissioner under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. Secondly, we do not think that an amendment should be allowed in the circumstances of this case when more than forty-five days have already passed from the date of the refusal by the Board to refer any question of law to this Court. For the reasons given above, we hold that the application is not maintainable and must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. KANHAIYA SINGH, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies by Canadian manufacturers or producers within the meaning of the taxing statute, and that the payments made under them constituted the sale price of goods produced or manufactured in Canada. (1) 1928 A.C. 340. (2) 108 E.R. 461. We have cited this decision only to show that, in the case of a taxing statute, we should be guided by the general scope of the enact- ment and the express provisions of the statute and not by considerations that might weigh in a case arising under the Statute of Frauds or similar statutes. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the packing materials were goods and that there was a sale in regard to them within the meaning of the Act. If so, the turnover in respect of the transactions in ques- tion was certainly liable to sales tax. The Sales Tax Tribunal was, therefore, right in negativing the contention of the petitioners. The revision petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in all the revisions. Petitions dismissed.
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