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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 24 Records
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1956 (10) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Election Tribunal on this point. It is not necessary for us to decide the question as to the effect of Section 72 of the Amending Act. 16. Nor is it necessary for us to discuss the effect of Section 84 of the Amending Act which excludes the application of the Amending Act to pending elections and pending election petitions, save as otherwise provided in that Act. 17. Writ App. No. 19 of 1956 must be, and is hereby, dismissed on the ground that the appellant sought for a writ of prohibition to which he will not be entitled as the election tribunal has completed the enquiry. This dismissal however docs not mean that we agree with all that is contained in the order of Balakrishna Aiyar J., against which the appeal has been filed. Actually, in dealing with W. P. No; 478 of 1958, we have expressed our dissent from one part of the learned Judge's judgment. The order for costs passed against the appellant will be set aside but there will be no order as to costs in the appeal.
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1956 (10) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)
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... ... ..... #39;s contract related to the single trans-action in Madhya Bharat and he cannot for that reason be said to be a 'dealer' within the meaning of that term. 126. The word 'business' is not a word of art and it cannot be said that where there is single contract which runs into thousands or more and extends over a period of several years does not involve carrying on business. Each case will depend on its own facts and in the present case we are not persuaded to hold that the Petitioner is not a dealer. No case is cited to show that in a case of this description a person is not held to carry on business. 127. In other respects the reasoning of Civil Miscellaneous case No. 5 of 1956 family applies. I would therefore hold as in that case that Rule (sic) of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Rules is ultra vires and void. 128. In other respects the petition is not entitled to succeed. 129. Parties to bear their costs of this petition as well. S.M. Samvatsar, J. 130. I agree.
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1956 (10) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... workmen who have lost their jobs would in any even get compensation. If it was not bona fide or not justified, it may be that the measure of compensation would be larger then if it was otherwise". 22. For the reasons given above, we cannot assent to these observations. It should be mentioned that in Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd. v. Their Employees (supra), there was no closure of business, but winding up of the Calcutta unit by a newspaper publishing company which had its headquarters at Bombay. We must accordingly overrule this contention also. We should add that the Tribunal was of the opinion, that apart from agreement, the workmen should not, in view of their conduct, be awarded compensation, and we entirely agree with it. And as we have found against the agreement, we must allow this appeal, and set aside the award of compensation to the workmen made by the Tribunal. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. 23. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (10) TMI 41 - HYDERABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can entertain the appeal in which the question of the power of the Income-tax Officer to impose a penalty could be challenged and any decision given by him could not be said to be without jurisdiction, and that order of the Income-tax Officer can be set aside by the Appellate Tribunal. While answering the questions referred to us by the Tribunal as aforesaid, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Bombay under article 227 to pass necessary orders to the Income-tax Officer setting aside his order imposing a penalty as a logical consequence of the view it has taken regarding the absence of power in the Income-tax Officer to levy a penalty. We would have also issued a writ of certiorari to the Income-tax Officer quashing his orders if that was necessary; but in the view we have taken the proper course is to pass the above direction under article 227 of the Constitution. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made.
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1956 (10) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in partnership with two other persons. The assessee was the capitalist partner while the other two were the working partners in charge of the management of the business. During the account year relevant to the assessment year the Rangoon business sustained a loss of ₹ 43,969. In the books maintained by the assessee at Madras this sum was adjusted, and in the return filed by the assessee he claimed that this loss from the Rangoon firm should be allowed as a set-off. The Income-tax Authorities negatived the claim relying on the provisions of section 16(1)(b) and the second proviso to section 24(1). The Tribunal sustained this disallowance on appeal by the assessee. In our opinion, the point involved in this reference has to be answered in favour of the assessee in view of our decision in Case Referred No. 66 of 1953. This reference is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs; counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1956 (10) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uiry by the Labour Minister, as a result of which he recommended the reinstatement of seven out of the fourteen who had been dismissed, leaving the order in operation as regards the other seven, of whom Joydeb Banerjee was one. In the face of these facts, it is idle for him to contend that he had been dismissed without hearing or enquiry. The order of the Appellate Tribunal awarding compensation to him should be set aside. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1955 is allowed, the order of the Appellate Tribunal set aside and that of Shri Banerji restored, except that (1) the minimum pay of the clerical staff will be ₹ 65 per mensem with modifications as to the ceiling level and increments as set out supra and (2) that S. N. Chatterjee will be reinstated with compensation as provided in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The Union will pay half the costs of the appellant throughout. Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1956 is dis- missed, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1956 (10) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the purposes of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him the profits of which are assessable to tax subject to the following allowances, namely ....." On the avoidance of the trust deeds the title of the family revived and it had to be treated as the owner all along. No doubt the trustee might as a fact have been in reception of the rents and profits from these houses during the intermediate time when the deeds were thought to be operative but it is not the receipt of the rent that is the criterion for tax under Section 9 but only ownership. In these circumstances, the assessee became liable to have included in its income the 'bona fide' annual value of the houses which were the subject of the trust deeds which were set aside as on the several dates. Therefore the second question also Is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Commissioner. 9. As the assessee has failed It will pay the costs of the reference, counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1956 (10) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... anding. He admitted that he knew nothing about the rights of the Jagirdar and the landlords inter se with regard to the lands in dispute. It is obvious that such evidence does not prove the case of the appellant. Had the Raja been in possession of the pine trees for such a long time as he now claims, one would expect him to produce some documents showing his income, etc. from the trees. No such documents were produced. For these reasons, we hold that the appellant has failed to establish his claim to the pine trees, and the decision of the High Court is correct. The appeals fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of these cases, where much of the doubt as respects the right claimed arose out of the entries made in the Wajib-ul-arz, the High Court properly directed that there would no order for costs either in the High Court or in the Courts below. We think that that order was correct, and we also pass no order as to costs of the hearing in this Court. Appeals dismissed.
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1956 (10) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... espect to the learned Judges, we are not quite sure whether the principle laid down in Commissioner of Income-tax v. H. Hirjee 1953 23 I.T.R. 427 was correctly applied. But it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion on that to dispose of the assessee's claim before us. In our opinion the expenditure of ₹ 2,324-14-0 incurred in O.S. No. 80 of 1946 to maintain the assessee's claim of title to the fourteen buses and their route rights is allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Our answer to the question is, that the whole of the amount of ₹ 2,374-9-4 claimed as deduction in the year of assessment 1947-48 and ₹ 2,324-14-0 out of the amount of ₹ 4,994-8-0 claimed by the assessee in the year of assessment 1948-49 are permissible deductions under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. As the assessee has substantially succeeded in this reference he will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (10) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le was founded for the benefit of the members of the family. At the trial, while the witnesses for the plaintiff deposed that the temple was built with the object of providing a place of worship for all the Hindus, the witnesses examined by the defendants merely deposed that Sheo Ghulam built the Thakurdwara for his own use and "for his puja only". The view of the lower court that the temple must be taken to have been dedicated to the members of the family goes beyond the pleading, and is not supported by the evidence in the case. Having considered all the aspects, we are of opinion that the Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji in Bhadesia is a public temple. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decrees of the courts below are set aside, and a declaration granted in terms of para 17 (a) of the plaint. The costs of -the appellant in all the courts will come out of the trust properties. The first defendant will himself bear his own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1956 (10) TMI 34 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ilding. The cylinder of the machine and the flooring of the building had worn out by use and needed replacement in the ordinary course. The question of the amount of expenditure does not count in such cases, for that does not change the nature of the expenditure. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. S.B. Ranjit Singh( 1955 28 I.T.R. 14) it was held that a sum can be allowed as the cost of repairs even though the expenditure in a particular year is heavy on account of the fact that it is undertaken to remedy the effect of several years of wear and tear or neglect and also in spite of the fact that such expenditure may not be necessary for several years to come after the repairs have been effected. As no new asset has been created by the replacement of these parts, the expenditure must be held to be in respect of current repairs. We hold that the expenditure is revenue and not capital expenditure. 6. Costs on the Department. Hearing fee ₹ 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (10) TMI 33 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssed by the assessee or a parent of his for not less than seven years before the date on which the sale took place. On the facts as stated before the Tribunal, it was right in holding that the houses belonged to a firm which, for purposes of taxation, is a separate entity from the partners constituting it. No case of co-ownership as now sought to be raised was then made out. Nor was it then contended that the profits or gains under the head "Capital gains" were mostly made in the Nizam State. The question about the vires of section 12B(1) or of section 14(2)(c) so as to cover the profits or gains accruing or arising in Indian States, therefore, does not arise. We accordingly answer the question in the negative. 10. As regards the question raised in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 98 of 1954 decided by us to day, for the reasons stated therein we answer the question in the affirmative. 11. Costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred. Reference answered accordingly.
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1956 (10) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uently reversed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision was on other grounds however and did not deal with the point relating to section 16-A. But I respectfully agree with the earlier Bench decision and in fact the conflict of these Bench decisions is now the subject of a reference to a Full Bench made by me. 17 . This section 16-A has to be read along with section 18-A of the Act. The result is section 16-A bars a deference while section 18-A bars the institution of proceeding itself at the instance of the assessee. Therefore subject to certain qualifications, with which we are not concerned here, an assessment or levy can be questioned only under the provisions and by the methods prescribed under the Act and not de hors the Act. (For scope and object of section 18-A see the lucid discussion in N.R. Raghavachariar and V.C. Sri Kumar's Sales Tax in Madras, page 242 and foll.). 18. In the result, this criminal revision fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1956 (10) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Shri 'M' intimated Attar Singh about the withdrawal of the unspent balance of printing charges?
Whether Shri 'M' intimated Attar Singh that any fee remained due and made any demand in that behalf?
Whether Shri 'M' was justified in retaining the amount towards fees without lodging a bill for taxation against his client?
Whether, for withdrawing the unspent balance from the Punjab High Court, Shri 'M' had the requisite authority?
Whether on these facts Shri 'M' is guilty of professional misconduct?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Shri 'M' is guilty of professional misconduct. We direct that he should be suspended from practice for a period of two years. The evidence shows that when in 1954 Attar Singh enquired of Shri 'M' he denied knowledge of the unspent balance and that when confronted with the letter received from the Punjab High Court he admitted receipt and demanded fees but evaded the situation without fairly and frankly facing it.
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1956 (10) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enactment only validated assessments already made and did not enable proceedings to be taken with a view to an assessment in future and that, as, in the present case, the petitioners had not even submitted their returns, the respondent had no jurisdiction to call for the returns or to proceed to assess the petitioners. This contention was urged before us in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras(1953) North Ireland Reports 79., where we expressly repelled this argument. We do not consider it necessary to repeat our reasons for this conclusion. In our opinion, section 2 of the impugned Act has validated the law enabling the tax to be levied, and therefore it is open to the taxing authorities to proceed under that law and assess the petitioners if the transactions in question are within the dates mentioned in section 2. These writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The petitioners will pay the costs of the respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 200 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1956 (10) TMI 29 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies Act. The Madras High Court held that such sales could not be regarded as sales effected in the course of business and amenable to the levy of sales tax. We respectfully agree with the view. We may also add that in the second of the cases mentioned above, the Madras High Court held that the High Court had ample jurisdiction to grant relief to the petitioner by the issue of a writ though the petitioner in that case had not exhausted his remedy under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. In the case on hand it will be remembered that the order challenged has been made by the Commissioner of Sales Tax setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. We consider this an appropriate case to issue a writ. We accordingly direct that a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of assessment passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax in Mysore be issued as prayed for in the writ petition. Respondent 2 will pay the petitioner s costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1956 (10) TMI 28 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... both. Therefore, although the rules providing a second appeal were made only subsequent to the filing of the returns, they could be read along with the provisions of the old section. The assessee was therefore entitled to prefer a second appeal before the Commissioner and contend that he was not bound to deposit the tax assessed on him except the amount which was admitted to be due by him. 4.. For the reasons given above, I hold that the applicant is not liable to deposit Rs. 8,636-15-0 and the order of the Commissioner passed on 22nd June, 1954, should be quashed. I grant the alternative prayer claimed by the applicant. 5.. The result is that the order of the Commissioner passed on 22nd June, 1954, is quashed and he is directed to hear the appeal without demand of deposit of tax by the applicant. The petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Petition allowed.
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1956 (10) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r party money Which is not due by contract or otherwise, that money must be repaid. Moreover, if the argument based on inconsistency with section 21 were valid, a similar argument based on inconsistency with section 22 would be valid and would lead to the conclusion that section 72 does not even apply to mistake of fact. For these reasons I hold that the order of the Sales Tax Officer dated the 10th of September, 1950, should be set aside and that the matter should go back to the Sales Tax Officer who should make re- assessment for the period in question according to law. I think there should also be a direction upon the respondents calling upon them to refund to the petitioner so much of the sales tax as has been paid by the petitioner in excess of the amount of re-assessment which will now be made by the Sales Tax Officer. I would accordingly allow this application with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. (1) (1949) 76 I.A. 244. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1956 (10) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ition of tax upon the petitioner was illegal and whether there is a duty cast upon the respondents to refund the amount of tax illegally realised. I have already given reasons for reaching the conclusion that the Sales Tax Authorities were legally entitled to realise sales tax with regard to the second category of (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 133 1953 S.C.R. 1069. transactions. It follows, therefore, that the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to refund the amount of tax realised with regard to the second category of transactions. For the reasons I have expressed, I hold that there is no case made out on behalf of the petitioner for the grant of a writ in the nature of mandamus against the respondents. In my opinion these applications fail and must be dismissed with costs. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 400 for both the Miscellaneous judicial Cases Nos. 330 and 331 of 1955. RAJ KISHORE PRASAD, J.-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1956 (10) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up – Exercise and control of liquidator’s powers ... ... ... ... ..... equent offer of a higher bid should not be a ground for refusing confirmation of the sale provided the price was adequate. In the present case I feel that I should only be justified in setting aside my own order confirming the sale if any fraud were proved, but such is not the case, since it was both mentioned by the official liquidator in his written report, and also told to me orally at the time when I passed the order, that the four joint bidders had been making attempts to approach him with a higher offer after the sale proceedings had concluded. At that time I was of the opinion, and I still remain of the opinion, that the four joint bidders had sufficient notice by the 3rd of October, to the effect that the sale was to be continued on the 6th of October, for them to make up their minds as to what price they were prepared to go, and it is entirely their own fault if they failed to do so. I therefore dismiss their application but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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