|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 10 of 10 Records
-
1956 (6) TMI 16 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ect to the provisions of Sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. In Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 417 the word "such" is used with reference to an order of acquittal. The words "such an order of acquittal" appearing in Sub-section (3) can only refer to the order of acquittal mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 417. The order of acquittal referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 417 is an order of acquittal of the original or the appellate Court. Therefore there is no force in the argument advanced by the learned Counsel that Section 417 (3) is applicable only to a case in which the order of acquittal is that of an original Court. Under these circumstances, it has to be held that this revision petition is not maintainable. 6. In the result, this petition stands dismissed.
-
1956 (6) TMI 15 - HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... can be found, is really, to start it all over again and would apparently involve the hearing of further evidence. That is to go beyond the function of a final appeal. LORD TUCKER. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in print opinion of my noble and learned friend, Lord Radcliffe, which has just been delivered. I agree with him that there is no such absolute rule of law governing the ascertainment of annual profits as was contended for by the Crown in the present case, and that there is no ground for holding that the decision of this House in Sun Insurance Officer v. Clark 1912 A.C. 443 must be confined exclusively to insurance companies. I also agree, for the reasons which he has given, that the finding of the Special Commissioners that the appellant's method of accounting is in accordance with "correct accountancy practice" cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as conclusive. I would accordingly dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
-
1956 (6) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... m compelled to make an order which will confuse all these debtors and be instrumental in aiding the immediate petitioner before me to realise monies and take it beyond the reach of the Income-tax authorities. While I cannot hold that a protective recovery is permissible in law, I do hold that on the facts and circumstances of the cases, this Court ought not to come to the aid of the petitioner under article 226 of the Constitution. If they have any other relief and remedies, it is open to them. In my opinion, the proper order will be to discharge this rule but record the undertaking given to Court by the respondent through his learned counsel that if any monies are recovered by virtue of notice under section 46 (5A) it would be kept in a suspense account and that there will not be a double recovery, namely, once against Jagannath Hanumanbux and for the same amount against Ladhuram Taparia. There will be no order as to costs. Interim orders are discharge. Ordered accordingly.
-
1956 (6) TMI 13 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d revision under the Act against the assessment order made by any such Special Commercial Tax Officer. I am satisfied that the impugned G.O. does not suffer from the vice of being inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. Finally, it was contended that section 5A is not valid in law. The argument was that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it makes invidious distinction between those assessees whose turnover is more than three lakhs and those whose turnover is less than three lakhs. I had occasion to consider this argument in W.P. No. 1207 of 1964 and I rejected such a contention by the judgment dated 16th June, 1966. That conclusion was based upon an earlier Bench decision of this Court. I do not therefore experience any difficulty in rejecting that contention. Since no other argument was advanced, I find no merit in these writ petitions. The writ petitions are therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
-
1956 (6) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ri materia. The particular section to which reference has been made by the Sales Tax Tribunal, viz., section 26, deals with the rather complicated machinery of assessment of partnerships and partners before and after discontinuance of the partnership, and to draw any inference from the language used in that section in order to construe section 18 would, in our opinion, not be a safe guide at all, nor would it be a proper canon of construction. In our opinion, therefore, the transferor continues to be liable to pay the tax in respect of the periods during which he carried on the business and incurred the liability to pay sales tax. Although two questions have been submitted to us, Mr. Seervai has only argued one, viz., question (1), and we answer that question in the negative. The assessee to pay the costs. Same answer for the same reasons in Reference No. 8 of 1956. As both the references were heard together there will be one order for costs. References answered accordingly.
-
1956 (6) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by the appellants says that they are dealers in cosmetics and drugs. It is admitted that they do not deal in any powders other than the kinds of powders mentioned in the order of the Collector of Sales Tax. In our opinion, even if the connotation accepted in America be considered to be too wide, the articles in question can undoubtedly be regarded as aids to beautification, and therefore, as cosmetics. It may be possible to regard them also as toilet articles within the meaning of entry 39. In our opinion, the latter expression is intended for a wider range of objects than is covered by the expression cosmetics . In this sense cosmetics may legitimately, in our opinion, be regarded as a specific case of toilet articles, and in this view the more specific provision in item 66 rather than item 39 will apply. We do not, therefore, think that the decision arrived at by the Collector of Sales Tax can be said to be erroneous. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1956 (6) TMI 10 - HYDERABAD
... ...
... ... ..... the turnovers do not exceed Rs. 30,000. The notice, issued by him in the instant case beyond his jurisdiction, was therefore illegal. In the result, the Sales Tax Officer, Mahboobnagar, who was the competent assessing authority in the present case, had assessed the turnovers of the appellant without issuing any notice, and his assessment order was therefore illegal. It is further seen from the same record that even the demand notice, dated 2nd January, 1956, relating to the assessment under consideration was issued by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, trespassing his jurisdiction. Though this point was not raised in the grounds of appeal, it being a fact apparent from records affecting the very validity of the proceedings we, suo motu, hold the assessment illegal and set it aside. The Sales Tax Officer is directed to start assessment proceedings against the appellant, afresh, according to law. The institution fee may be refunded to the appellant in full. Assessment set aside.
-
1956 (6) TMI 9 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o far as the manufacturers are concerned, they had no property at all in the goods after they had issued the delivery order for valuable consideration. Their position was only that of a bailee for the real owner. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has laid stress on the expression in a deliverable state contained in section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act. But that expression has again been defined in section 2(3) of the Sale of Goods Act, which says that goods are said to be in a deliverable state when they are in such state that a buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them. Thus the facts of the present case do not clash with the conditions laid down for the sale being concluded as mentioned in section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act. I am, therefore, sorry, I cannot accept the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioners in respect of the addition to the taxable turnover of Rs. 17,94,030. The petition is accordingly rejected. Petition rejected.
-
1956 (6) TMI 8 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ing documents were made over to the officers of the Government before the ship carrying the goods reached Bengal. The balance of the amount should also be deducted, as there were no sales which would attract the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. As for the second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, I find that though the contract was between the petitioners and the Director-General of Supplies, delivery was made to the Controllers of Stores of different railways and that debits were raised against the accounts of the railways. The mere form of the contract is not material so long as it can be shown that the goods were actually delivered to the railways for their consumption and that payment was made out of the railway accounts. As sales to Railway administrations were exempted from sales tax at the time in question, the second contention of the petitioners is also accepted. The petition is allowed, as stated above. Petition allowed.
-
1956 (6) TMI 7 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
Shares – Power, to issue of at discount ... ... ... ... ..... s Act, 1913, and the exemption clause (article 6) in Exhibit AA The bank shall be entitled to treat the registered holder of any share as the absolute owner thereof and accordingly shall not be bound to recognise (notwithstanding any notice thereof) any mortgage or charge thereof or thereon or other claim to or interest in such share on the part of any person other than the registered holder, his executors, administrators or holders of succession certificates under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, in respect of his share, and other than such rights upon transmission as hereinafter mentioned. We entertain no doubt that as regards the two heads of claim in respect of which priority is claimed before us (items 2 and 3 of the particulars of claim given in the plaint) the bank is entitled to succeed on the basis of article 36 of Exhibit AA and decide accordingly. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
|
