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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 29 Records
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1957 (10) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which has proceeded on the evidence in support of the charge of Pal Singh's transaction, indicate the existence of any prejudice and there was nothing indicated before us leading to the conclusion of prejudice or to consequent failure of justice. 13. The High Court came to the conclusion that the trial for the offence of habitually accepting illegal gratification could not be validly tried and evidence led on that charge could not be considered but the conviction of receiving a bribe of Rs. 50 from Pal Singh is well founded and also that the appellant has not been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. 14. No arguments were addressed to this court on the correctness of the finding of the High Court in regard to the conviction for receiving illegal gratification from Pal Singh. We agree with the opinion of the High Court that the offence under s. 5(1)(d) of receiving illegal bribe of Rs. 50 has been made out and would therefore dismiss this appeal. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he result, it was no trial at all. The question of prejudice does not arise because it is not a mere irregularity, but a case of "mis-trial", as the Judicial Committee put it. It is unfortunate that a prosecution which has been pending so long in respect of an offence which is said to have been committed about eleven years ago, should end like this, but it will be open to the State Government, if it is so advised, to take steps for a re-trial, as was directed by the Judicial Committee in the reported case referred to above. 9. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the convictions and the sentences are set aside. We do not express any opinion on the question whether it is a fit case for a de novo trial by a competent jury or by a Court of Session without a jury, if the present state of the law permits it. The matter will go back to the High Court for such directions as may be necessary if the High Court is moved by the Government in that behalf. 10. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (10) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant cannot be criminally liable for being reckless or unwise in carrying on his business. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Judge below was in error in characterizing the order of acquittal as a perverse one. The learned Judge's decision is based on an erroneous assumption that the appellant was bound by law to disburse the amounts collected in a particular competition amongst the prize winners of that competition. But it has not been pointed out by what process that conclusion was reached. Nor has the learned counsel for the respondent brought any statutory or other rule to our notice casting an obligation on the appellant to appropriate the entry fees in a particular manner. That being so, it must be held that misappropriation has not been made out either on evidence or as a matter of law. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside and the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is restored. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (10) TMI 42 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ome or deliberately furnishing inadequate particulars of such income are penalised under that section. The defaults enumerated therein relate to the process of proper assessment of taxable income and can properly be said to apply to an assessment under Chapter IV. We cannot say that there is a lacuna in section 44 such as that found in section 25A of the Act." The penalty order in respect of the assessment year 1124 was passed under section 41(1) of the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121. Sections 41(i) and 58 of the Travancore Income-tax Act, 1121, correspond to sections 28(1) and 44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. 7. It was agreed that if our view is the same as that embodied in Mareddi Krishna Reddi’s case (supra) no other question arises for consideration. We are in entire agreement with that view and it follows that this petition should fail. 8. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed, though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
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1957 (10) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l document. This has been admitted and marked as Ext. D. This document shows what was stated in the summons issued to the defendants was that on default of their appearance on the specified date, "the action will be proceeded with and heard and determined" in their absence. This clearly indicates that even in the absence of the defendants, the plaintiff's claim had to be heard and determined. It is significant to note that the summons did not state that the default of appearance of the defendants would be construed as an action on their part that the plaintiff's claim is true. Ext. D rules out the possibility of any such argument. Thus in any view of the case it cannot be said that under Ext. A there has been a judgment in favour of the plaintiff on the merits of the case. The lower appellate Court was therefore right in its view that the present suit based on Ext. A is unsustainable. 5. In the result this Second Appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (10) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd above the sum of ₹ 5,953 already awarded to them by the High Court an additional sum of ₹ 6,457 by way of damages for wrongful detention of the said trucks by the respondent. We accordingly allow this appeal and pass in favour of the appellants, in addition to the enhanced decree which they have already obtained from the High Court, a decree against the respondent for ₹ 3,500 being the appreciated value of the said trucks together with interest thereon at 6 per annum from July 7, 1944, till this date as also for a sum of ₹ 6,457 by way of additional damages for wrongful detention of the said trucks, additional proportionate costs both in the Trial Court as well as in the -High Court as also the costs of this appeal, subject of course to the payment of additional court-fee for the excess amount awarded hereby. The whole of the decretal amount as above will carry further interest at the rate of 6 per annum from this date till payment. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (10) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mstances, it must be held that there has as yet been no. transfer of the salt pans to respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The appellants cannot therefore claim the benefit of S. 29 and ask that they should not be evicted. Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas contended that the sale certificate will in any event be granted and that once it is granted, as the form of this certificate shows, the transfer will relate back to the date of the auction. It is enough to say in answer to this contention that assuming it to be right, a point which is by no. means obvious and which we do not decide, till it is granted no. transfer with effect from any date whatsoever takes place and none has yet been granted. 11. In the view that we have taken on the question of transfer it is not necessary to decide the other point as to whether the appellants can be said to have been in lawful possession. In the absence of a transfer the question does not arise. 12. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (10) TMI 38 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... the statute does not say "having regard only" to losses previously incurred by the company and to the smallness of the profits made. No answer, which can be said to be in any measure adequate, can be given to the question of "unreasonableness" by considering these two matters alone. Their Lordships are of the opinion that the statute by the words used, while making sure that "losses and smallness of profit" are never lost sight of, requires all matters relevant to the question of unreasonableness to be considered. Capital losses if established, would be one of them. For the reasons which they have given their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal be allowed and the decision of the High Court restored. It was agreed between the parties that the appellant should pay the costs of this appeal. The respondent must pay the costs in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. Solicitors Charles Russell & Co.; T.L. Wilson & Co.
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1957 (10) TMI 37 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the message by the Superintendent of the Collectorate and its communication to the Tribunal. This involved a delay of just five minutes. 8. No doubt, the Act does not lay down, in so many words that a petition dismissed in these circumstances can be restored; but we take it that the inherent powers which every Civil Court exercises arc vested in the Tribunal It is the inherent right of a Court to restore proceedings dismissed by it ex debito justitiae when sufficient cause has been made out, not for the absence but for the slight delay of five minutes. If this were not so, parties will be able to play hide and seek. In our opinion, the petition which has been made, before us is frivolous. The Election Tribunal did possess the inherent power to restore the petition to debito justitiae and, if we may say so, has acted quite correctly in restoring it. 9. The petition fails and is dismissed without notice to the other side. The application for stay also fails and is dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 36 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... in the course of the existing trade which is being taxed. It may equally well have been received in the course of a new activity which is not being taxed. That is not good enough to enable the Revenue authorities to succeed in this case stated. The law never gives judgement in favour of plaintiff when the only finding is equally consistent with liability or non-liability. The Revenue authorities have themselves to thank for this result because of the way they formulated their contentions. They are hoist with their own petard. They can go away and ponder against the words of Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney-General 1869 L.R. 4 H.L. 100, 122 "If the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free." I would therefore dismiss the appeal and allow the cross-appeal. Appeal dismissed; cross-appeal allowed. Solicitors Solicitors of Inland Revenue Whittled, Byrne & Dean for Whitely & Co., Liverpool.
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1957 (10) TMI 35 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is petition into one for enforcing a claim for money. An instance of the relief such as the one claimed by the petitioner in this case is to be found in AIR 1954 Cal 340 (B). The question whether for the period of suspension from the date of the order of suspension till the date of the order of dismissal, or for the matter of that for any period of suspension, the applicant is entitled to receive any salary is not before us and we express no opinion on it. 10. For the foregoing reason, this petition is accepted. The order dated 3rd January 1956 in so far as it purports to place the applicant under suspension during the period from 31st January 1954 till 3rd January 1956 is quashed and the opponent State is restrained-from giving any effect to that order and from acting thereon or causing it to be acted upon to the extent mentioned above. The petitioner shall have from the opponent costs of this application. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 100. Newaskar, J. 11. I agree.
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1957 (10) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ious, he sold some of his immovable properties, converted them into liquid cash and increased the capital of his business, is not sufficient to hold that, during the long period from the date of his purchase till the date of sale, he kept the said properties as part of the assets of the stock-in-trade of his business. The question is, did he, after purchase, treat the properties as part of the stock-in-trade of the business. There can only be one answer to this question and that is that he did not, for the simple reason that there is absolutely no evidence to prove that he did. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal further held that, in regard to another small item, the assessee was a dealer in lands as well. The learned counsel for the assessee did not question the correctness of this finding of the Tribunal. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative. The respondent will pay the petitioner's costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (10) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he was deprived of some opportunity to make a proper defence to the prosecution if the right section had been named in the notice or in the charge, if any. Nor has he been able to show that he was misled as a result of any such technical error. Lastly, it was sought to be made out that the prosecution itself was beyond time. This contention was attempted to be made good with reference to the additional evidence adduced at the appellate stage as a result of the direction of the High Court when the case came before it on the first occasion, as mentioned above. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention because as pointed out by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the additional evidence placed before the Court puts the matter beyond all reasonable doubt that the complaint had been lodged in time before the relevant authority. In view of these considerations, it must be held that there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is in credit, section 46(5A) would come into play and the sum so standing to the credit of the assessee might be directed to be paid over. The present is not such a case and this undoubted right of the Department is not what is not sought to be asserted. What the impugned order of the Income-tax Officer directs is virtually that the bank should pay over to the Department the difference between the limit of the overdraft allowed to the petitioner and the amount drawn by him up to the date of the notice under section 46(5A). This in my judgment is not within the scope of the provision and the order understood in the light of the letter dated 24th November, 1955, is consequently beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent. The notice is accordingly set aside but this will not prevent the Department from proceeding to recover the arrears of tax in a manner authorised by the law. The rule is to this extent made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed in part.
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1957 (10) TMI 31 - CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... lue assessable to duty. 5. Subject to proper verification by the respective Collectors of Central Excise, for the current year a discount of 16.43% in respect of canvas shoes and 15.93% in respect of leather shoes may be allowed of the wholesale prices for arriving at such value. These discounts have been arrived at in the manner indicated below - (a) Distribution charges 5.68% (b) Travelling expenses 0.41% (c) Advertisement expenses (Note In the absence of a clear break-up of the charges incurred by the Manufacturing and Sales Organisation an ad hoc allowance of 50% of the total has been made towards expenses incurred by the Sales Organisation. 0.27% (d) Insurance charges 0.40% (e) Interest 0.47% (f) Trade discount 6.00% (g) Expenses on account of Sales Tax and Octroi duty, and discounts towards them. 1.70% (h) Freight discount 1.50%/1.00% (for Canvas/Leather Shoes.) Total 16.43%/15.93% (for Canvas/Leather Shoes.)
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1957 (10) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unnecessary to decide in these cases whether, by the Treaty of the 22nd August, 1899, the Raja of Cochin had surrendered to the British Government all the attributes of sovereignty including the power of taxation or not, I desire to make it clear that I do not share in the doubt expressed by my learned brothers in the sentence we are by no means certain that this is so in paragraph II of their judgment. I am inclined to hold that by the said Treaty all the attributes of sovereignty including the power of taxation over the lands occupied by the Shoranur-Cochin Railway were surrendered by the Raja of Cochin to the British Government. But, of course, the surrender to the British Government would not empower the legislature of the Province of Madras to exercise the power of taxation over these lands unless the British Sovereign had lawfully delegated that power to the said legislature. I would put my concurrence to the dismissal of the appeals on this ground. Appeals dismissed.
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1957 (10) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , Akola, In re 1952 3 S.T.C. 62 1951 N.L.J. 613. and Chauthmal Champalal v. State 1952 3 S.T.C. 245 1952 N.L.J. 342. which following the decision in Dominion Press Limited v. Minister of Customs and Excise 1928 A.C. 340.took the same view. 10.. We are entirely in agreement with this view and we hold that the transactions in question, i.e., with regard to the work done on the yarn supplied to the petitioners by the customers, did not amount to the sale of goods and that consequently the petitioners were not liable to pay any sales tax with respect to the turnover of their business concerning these transactions. 11.. Accordingly, we allow the petition with costs to this extent that the order of the Sales Tax Officer holding the petitioners liable in respect of the two kinds of transactions referred to above is quashed. There will, however, be only one set of costs. 12.. The outstanding amount of security deposited by the petitioners shall be refunded to them. Petition allowed.
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1957 (10) TMI 28 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the first clause of Article 286 of the Constitution. 8.. We, therefore, hold that the taxes recovered or about to be recovered in respect of transactions in which the goods were sent outside the State for delivery to consumers there would be immune from tax in this State after 26th January, 1950, but not in respect of transactions in which sufficient nexus in the goods is established as ruled in Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue(2) before the inauguration of the Constitution. In other words, the tax on transactions prior to 26th January, 1950, must be held to be validly collected while the tax on transactions after 26th January, 1950, must be held to be invalidly collected. We accordingly allow the two petitions but partly. Any tax recovered contrary to our decision shall be refunded to the assessee. 9.. In view of the partial success of the petition we do not think it necessary to make any order about costs. The security deposit be refunded. Petitions partly allowed.
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1957 (10) TMI 27 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alf of known principals or in respect of which more than an agreed commission was collected, it is not open to them on the ground that merely there are such items to reject the claim for exemption in respect of the whole turnover. In my opinion, the case should go back to the trial court for ascertainment of such of the transactions of the plaintiff as were carried out in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence. The plaintiff will be entitled to exemption in respect of such transactions. The plaintiff will prepare and submit to the court a tabular statement showing such transactions and it will be checked by the officers of the department. A decree in favour of the plaintiff will follow on the basis of the amount representing the turnover entitled to exemption. The court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal here and the lower appellate court will be refunded to the plaintiff. Costs of this appeal will abide and follow the result. Leave refused. Case remanded.
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1957 (10) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hom the supply is made, and if such person was the mills whether they were registered dealers and they purchased these goods for the purpose of manufacture of textiles in their own mills. All these facts were not investigated or adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, obviously because no liability was sought to be fixed upon the respondents on the basis of their being dealers in the sense that they supplied the goods on commission and, therefore, this is a case in which several additional facts will be necessary to decide the liability of the respondents to sales tax, on the basis of their being dealers within this part of the definition. In our opinion, therefore, the two questions, questions 2 and 3and in this context we consider question 3 as merely a corollary to question 2-do not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. We have therefore no jurisdiction to determine them, and we, therefore, do not decide those questions. The State to pay costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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