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Showing 1 to 20 of 46 Records
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1957 (3) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... a certificate under the Revenue Recovery Act sent by a person competent to do so. Such a certificate has not been received by the proceedings taken by him are therefore wanting in jurisdiction. This cannot be considered merely as an irregularity in procedure since thee Collector gets jurisdiction only on receipt of a valid certificate. The proceedings for recovery of tax by the second respondent must therefore be quashed. The question whether proceedings for recovery of tax are barred under section 66(7) does not therefore arise. 8. As the proceedings taken by the second respondent are without jurisdiction, the steps taken by him for recovery of tax from the petitioner are quashed. The second respondent is also prohibited from taking further steps on the basis of the certificate received by him from the Income Tax Officer, Tirunelveli. The original petition is allowed as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed in part.
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1957 (3) TMI 82 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fied, there being no question of any "discovery" such as was necessary before 1948. The language of the section, as it now stands, is quite apt and applicable to the facts before meIt is, however, alternatively contended that as section 35(5) expressly provides for a case like the present one, that special provision excludes the applicability of a general provision like section 34. Whatever force there may be in the argument, I do not think I am called upon to pronounce upon its merits ; for, in accordance with the decision of this Court, cited above, it must be held that that provision was not effective to deal with assessments completed before 1st April, 1952. That being so, the petitioner's assessment having been completed on 22nd January, 1952, it cannot be said that section 35(5) governs this case. 9. I see no substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1957 (3) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... the plaint till date of payment. The omission in the judgment, in our view, is due to oversight. We, therefore, amend the judgment and give the appellant interest at 6 per cent, per annum from date of plaint till date of payment. 24. Another point is raised in Appeal No. 481 of 1951. It is said that by the same parity of reasoning we adopted in the connected appeals, we should have allowed this appeal also in full. This obviously cannot be decided at this stage. The appellant, if advised may take out an application for review of the judgment. 25. In A. S. No. 296 of 1952, it is contended we should, in exercise of our discretion, give the appellant advocate's fee not on the amount at which the plaint was valued for jurisdictional purposes but on the amount in respect of which the declaration was asked for. We do not think there are any extra-ordinary circumstances in this case to exercise our discretion in the manner indicated by the learned counsel. We order accordingly.
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1957 (3) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ame description. This circumstance does not in any way detract from the validity of the notice. The notice is quite in order and there is no defect which is fatal to the suit. Hence the memorandum of cross-objections is dismissed with costs. 30. (These appeals and the memorandum of cross-objections having been set down for being mentioned this day, the Court made the following) ORDER P. Chandra Reddi, J. 31. There is absolutely no justification for deleting the order regarding costs. We have deliberately disallowed costs to the plaintiff on the ground that the point on which he succeeded to a large extent in one appeal and to a substantial ex tent in the other was allowed to be raised for the first time at the time of the hearing of the appeals. There are therefore no grounds to review our order regarding costs. Further we fail to see how the judgment could be reviewed without an application being filed under Order 47, Rule 1, C. P. C. This does not deserve any consideration.
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1957 (3) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice of the trees was also to be paid to the assessee in installments spread over a similar period. The period was of several years. While these facts existed, it is not possible for us to hold that there was not material for the finding given by the Tribunal that the income had arisen from sale of trees which had become stock-in-trade of the assessee when they were served from the forest and this severance was with a view to earn an income from the sale of such trees as they reached their cutting age. This finding having been given by the Tribunal, the further view that it was not causal income but income from a business carried on by the assessee cannot be said to be at all unreasonable. That income was, therefore, not exempt even as causal income. The second question must, therefore, be answered against the assessee. As a result, we answer both the questions in the negative. In the circumstances of the case, we make no orders as to costs. Questions answered in the negative.
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1957 (3) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y fact but merely the view which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held on those facts. Because of the view of the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it appears that the Income-tax Officer also then changed his view and decided to assess this income as the income of Pannalal as an individual. Such a change of view by the Income-tax Officer is not a sufficient ground justifying proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. No definite information having been received by the Income-tax Officer about any facts leading to the discovery that the income had escaped assessment, the proceedings taken were incompetent. Our view is supported by two earlier decisions of this court in New Victoria Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Shubhkaran Seksaria v. Commissioner of Income-tax. In the result we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to his costs which we fix at ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
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1957 (3) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t this stage, this Court cannot ask for a finding on that question of fact and then frame a question of law if that question of fact happens to be answered in favour of the assessee. 6. Then only questions on which a statement of a case can be called upon by the Court are those which arise out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. The question cannot arise out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. As the question of fact now sought to be raised was not raised before the Tribunal and, no finding was recorded on it, the question as framed has to. be answered against the assessee because no question arises for the issue of a fresh notice under Section 28 (3) of the Income-tax Act on the ground -that the previous assessment under Section 23 (4) of the Income-tax Act had been cancelled under Section 27 of the Act, 7. We consequently answer the question ref erred to us in the negative. The department will be entitled to its costs from the assessee which we fix at ₹ 200/-.
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1957 (3) TMI 76 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd prohibi- tion, restraining the Income-tax Officer from giving further effect to the very notices, which were being quashed, appear to me to have been unnecessary and inapposite. The writ of prohibition, again, does not seem to have been appropriate, because that writ goes only to inferior Tribunals to control judicial or quasi judicial action and is not intended to control executive acts or administrative action aimed at collection of revenue. These observations which I have felt bound to make will not cause any prejudice to the respondent company, because we are not interfering with the actual orders made by the learned Judge and, in any event, the writ of mandamus restraining the Income-tax Officer and the Union of India from realising the sums mentioned in the notices or any part thereof secures for the respondent company complete and permanent relief. For the reasons given earlier, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. DAS GUPTA, J.--I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (3) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... by an order in council to a group of British possessions which concept, as the Supreme Court pointed out became repugnant to the concept of a Sovereign Democratic Republic which our country became upon the passing of the Constitution and in applying an English Act like the Copyright Act which was applicable to "His Majesty's Dominions" to the whole of India. Reference was also made to Bill No. XV of 1955 wherein provision has now been made for the repeal of the Indian Copyright Act, 1914 and the English Copyright Act of 1911 passed by the British Parliament, vide Clause 32 of the Bill. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that this shows that the two Acts are still in force in India. The argument is unsound. The Bill is not law and therefore nothing can turn upon the provisions of the Bill. 19. Looking at it from every point of view, I am satisfied that the injunction granted by the trial Court was correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave refused.
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1957 (3) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on that arises for decision is whether Exhibit F can be sustained in view of Exhibit C. Section 31(3)(f) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, provides that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order under section 28, "confirm or cancel such order or vary it so as either to enhance or reduce the penalty" and section 33(2) "The Commissioner may, if he objects to any order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 31, direct the Income-tax Officer to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order, and such appeal may be made within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to the Commissioner by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner". No action has been taken under sub-section (2) of section 33 and I must hold that the Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam Circle, Ernakulam, is not entitled to ignore Exhibit C and proceed to impose a penalty as he has done by Exhibit F. 5. The petition is allowed. No costs.
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1957 (3) TMI 73 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... llant that the finding that the payments were "made from circulating capital," that they "constituted the purchase of stock-in-trade" and that the timber "was in fact stock-in-trade," were findings in fact which should not be disturbed. In truth they are findings in law or of mixed fact and law which, for the reasons I have already expressed, are opposed to all the real findings of fact and documents in the case. In my opinion, the court below came to a right conclusion. The assessments, I apprehend, have still to be considered on actual figures, and nothing that I have said in upholding the decision that the sums in question were capital payments is intended to preclude consideration of what, if any, allowance is to be made for timber actually cut down and taken into stock by the appellant. I would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors Tyrrell Lewis & Co . for Fyfe Ireland & Co., W.S., Edinburgh ; Solicitor Of Inland Revenue.
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1957 (3) TMI 72 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he meaning of section 46(2) of the Act. That question did not arise for consideration in Rajah Manyam Meenakshamma v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1956 30 ITR 286. In our opinion the petitioner was not an "assessee" within the meaning of section 46(2) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to treat him as an assessee for the issue of a certificate under section 46(2). Since the jurisdiction of the Collector depended on a valid certificate issued under section 46(2), the notice issued by the Deputy Tahsildar on July 17, 1956, was also without jurisdiction. Though it was a writ of prohibition that the petitioner asked for, we consider that the appropriate remedy would be to grant a writ of certiorari to set aside the certificate issued under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act by the first respondent and to set aside the notice dated July 17, 1956, issued by the second respondent. Such a writ of certiorari will issue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1957 (3) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as wrongly decided. The conclusions for which I have endeavoured to give my reasons at some length are (1) that on the notice under section 34, as issued on the respondent in the present case and issued also on another partner, there could not possibly be an assessment of the firm or of the firm's income ; and (2) that hence, after the dissolution of a firm, an assessment to income-tax of its pre-dissolution income can only be made, assuming section 44 applies, on the persons who were partners of the firm at the time of the dissolution jointly and severally and it cannot be made on the firm, as a firm, and this whether the firm was a registered or an unregistered one. The result of the above conclusions is that this appeal is dismissed. As the respondent falsely alleged in his petition to this court that he had received no notice under section 34, for which his application might well have been dismissed at sight, we shall make no order as to costs. Das Gupta, J.-I agree.
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1957 (3) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of payments made to employees when the question that has to be gone into depends upon the extent of the services rendered by the directors or the employees. The distinction sought to be drawn by learned counsel between this case and the Full Bench case relied upon by us does not, therefore, exist. The views expressed in that case are fully applicable to the facts in the present case and lead to the conclusion that there was no sufficient ground on which the Excess Profits Tax Officer and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could disallow these amounts. In view of the fact that there is a Full Bench decision of this court which is fully applicable in the present case, we have not considered it necessary to examine the cases of other High Courts. The case of Walchand & Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) relied upon by the Excess Profits Tax Officer was taken notice of by the Full Bench of this court. In the circumstances, the question referred to us is answered in the negative.
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1957 (3) TMI 69 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... reasons I am unable to agree with my learned brother's view, which is also the view of the learned Judges who decided the Patna Pull Bench case, that in cases of such contravention the agent and the manager have got a co-liability with the owner. I prefer to accept the view expressed by the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1956 Nag 71 (F), although on different grounds. I may also point out here that the Centra1 Government thought it advisable to amend the Coal Mines Pithead Bath Rules of 1946 by expressly extending the liability of non-construction of a pithead bath to an agent and manager of a coal mine (vide notification No. S. R. O. 2465 published in the Gazette of India, D/- 22-10-1956). The amendment seems to be deliberate. I would, therefore, have set aside the conviction of the agent and the manager involved in these Rules on this ground if I held that their conviction is other wise good. With these observations, I agree with the final order passed by my learned brother.
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1957 (3) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntal rights under the Constitution. 43. For all the above reasons we are unable to hold that any fundamental right of the petitioners has been infringed. This petition is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. 44. In holding that quasi-permanent allotment does not carry with it a fundamental right to property under the Constitution we are not to be supposed as denying or weakening the scope of the rights of the allottee. These rights as recognised in the statutory rules are important and constitute the essential basis of a satisfactory rehabilitation and settlement of displaced land-holders. Until such time as these land-holders obtain sanads to the lands, these rights are entitled to zealous protection of the constituted authorities according to administrative rules and instructions binding on them, and of the courts by appropriate proceedings where there is usurpation of jurisdiction or abuse of exercise of statutory powers. 45. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (3) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR
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... ... ..... 1 and 2 do not claim to be in actual possession of the property at the date of the attachment, viz., 3-2-55 nor is it their case that Nautamlal is in possession on their behalf though this factor is not relevant in this case. They thus fail to establish the ingredients of Rule 59 and they have therefore no right to maintain the application for removal of attachment. The order of the learned Civil judge, Senior Division, cannot therefore be sustained and must be set aside. It is true that the property was not in possession of the judgment debtor at the time of the attachment but was in possession of Nautamlal, and therefore it may be for Nautamlal to object to the attachment, but not for opponents 1 and 2. 3. Accordingly this revision application is allowed, the order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, is set aside and the application filed by opponents 1 and 2 for removal of the attachment is dismissed with costs of both the Courts. 4. Revision Application allowed.
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1957 (3) TMI 66 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or revocation of leave, I see no reason to grant it. The plaintiff has made a case in the plaint, according to which a part of the cause of action did arise in Calcutta. Since the suit is being stayed and the main question will be tried at Bombay, the question of convenience hardly survives. 36. In the result, Appeal No. 64 of 1955 is allowed in part. The order of the learned Judge, dated the 28th April 1953, in so far as, by it, he refused to stay the present Suit under Section 10 of the Code is set aside and it is directed that the suit be and do remain stayed so long as the Bombay suit, viz., Suit No. 1069/X of 1954, may remain pending. The rest of the order is upheld. Costs of this appeal, which will be half-costs, will be costs in the suit. Certified for two counsel. 37. Appeal No. 80 of 1955 is dismissed with costs. The undertaking given by the Respondent No. 1 not to proceed with the Bombay suit will stand discharged. Certified for two counsel. Sarkar, J. 38. I agree.
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1957 (3) TMI 65 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the letting of accommodation and provision of various services, was rejected. We are of opinion that the ratio decidendi of these cases, namely, Ballygunge Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal 1946 14 I.T.R. 409 and Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) 1930 15 Tax Cas. 266 has no application to the present case. For these reasons we hold that the expenditure of ₹ 6,005 and ₹ 5,542 incurred by the assessee for the repair and maintenance of residential quarters in the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51 should be allowed as business expenditure to the assessee under section 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. We accordingly answer the questions of law referred to the High Court, and as amended by us, in favour of the assessee and against the Income-tax Department. The assessee is entitled to the costs of these references. We assess the hearing fee at ₹ 250 for both the references. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (3) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt was not income from business so that it was not liable to excess profits tax and yet was liable to income-tax. When holding that the assessee had an income of ₹ 75,000 in the subsequent year, which is now in question, it was in these circumstances necessary for the Income-tax Officer or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to indicate why it was held that this amount was income from business in this year when the similar amount in the previous year had been assessed to tax on the basis that it was income from some source other than business. This leads to the conclusion that the finding given this year that it was income from business was entirely arbitrary and without any material and in fact in contradiction with the material provided by proceedings of assessment of the preceding year. In the circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to his costs which we fix at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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