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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 31 Records
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1957 (7) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efore, quite justified in rejecting the appellant's contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to get back the ornament in the appellant's possession without paying to him the amount which he had himself advanced to Manni Ram. 7. The learned counsel also urged that the decree in this case needed clarification because a joint decree had been passed against defendants Nos. 3 and 4. This does not appear to be correct. In the relief of the plaint it had been made clear that ornament No. 1 was being sought to be recovered from defendant No. 3 and the other two ornaments therein described were to be recovered from the defendant No. 4. This is the relief which has been granted to the plaintiff. In the circumstances no joint decree can be said to have been passed against respondents Nos. 3 and 4. No question of any clarification of the decree, therefore, arises. 8. The only point pressed in appeal being thus without force, the appeal must fail. It is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (7) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unction and there is no provision in the Constitution or under any law which makes it compulsory that the tribunal must sit for disposal of the matter at the very place where the cause of action may have arisen. Often enough, one single tribunal sitting at one place is constituted by law for dealing with disputes which may arise anywhere in India. The result is that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 225 to 227 of the Constitution in such cases is exercised by that High Court within whose jurisdiction the tribunal is situated and there is nothing in the Constitution laying down that this automatic vesting of the jurisdiction in that High Court as a result of the situation of the tribunal is prohibited or can be held to be void on the ground that it amounts to interference with the jurisdiction of the High Courts. Consequently, there is no substance in this contention also. 9. For the above reasons we hold that this petition has no force at all and we reject it.
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1957 (7) TMI 50 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ittal for, in this case, the accused was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge and the question arises only after the final sentence was imposed. As it has not been established that the irregularity or error committed by the Magistrate has occasioned failure of justice, we hold that the defect is cured under Section 537, Cr.PC. 24. Now, coming to the sentence, we have held that the accused is not guilty of murder but only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It is clear from the facts of the case that the accused strangled his young wife with the intention of causing her death. Though he had committed the act under grave and sudden provocation, he put an end to a young life in a gruesome manner. We therefore sentence him to imprisonment for 10 years. 25. In the result, we set aside the conviction for murder and the death sentence and instead convict the accused for culpable homicide not amounting to murder and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for ten years.
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1957 (7) TMI 49 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... in the document Ext. B5 is almost similar to the one that the learned Judge had to consider in Govindaraja Pillai and others v. Mangalam Pillai and another (63 M.L.J. 911) and respectfully following that decision, we hold that the defeasance clause in this case is valid. Therefore, in this view, on the death of Aliyumma without issues, as stated in the document, the person entitled to the properties will be her brother the 2nd defendant herein. Lastly, Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyar contended that the decision in O.S. 205/1946 operates as res judicata in these proceedings. As mentioned at the beginning of the judgment both O.S. 205/46 and 1062/45 were tried together and a common judgment was delivered. In view of the reasoning of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Narahari v. Sanker (1950 I SCR 754 at 758), the last contention of Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyar also fails. In the result, we confirm the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1957 (7) TMI 48 - ANDHRA PARDESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of a person, who died after the Act, from claiming maintenance. In view of the general terms of Section 21, we must hold that, under the Act, every dependant, subject to limitations laid down in Section 22, has a right to claim maintenance against the heir of a Hindu whether he died before or after the Act. We hold that the plaintiff is entitled to maintenance under the Act from 21-12-1956. The learned Judge, having regard to the changed circumstances, held that the plaintiff would be entitled to maintenance at ₹ 2,400/- per year. We accept the rate as reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 14. For convenience of payment, the defendants would pay the proportionate amount of the maintenance payable at that rate one week in December 1956 on or before 15-8-1957, and pay maintenance at the same rate every subsequent year on or before 15th of January of every succeeding year. The decree of the lower Court is accordingly modified. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1957 (7) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the date Act V of 1954 came into force. It is only to such cases that the ban on the trial imposed by Section 4(1) applied. It is difficult to hold on the basis of Section 4(1) of the Act that a suit filed in contravention of Section 3 could not be dismissed until after the expiry of the period ending with 1st March, 1955, specified in Section 4(1). 8. That the suit was ultimately dismissed only on 19th July, 1955, really made no difference to the question at issue had the Court jurisdiction to dismiss a suit which was instituted in contravention of Section 3 of Act V of 1954. 9. The view taken by the lower Court, is, in my opinion, right. It is unnecessary for me to express any opinion, whether the lower Court was right in upholding the plea of discharge, except to observe that even if another tribunal could come to a different conclusion on the same evidence, that would not justifiy interference in revision by this Court. 10. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1957 (7) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aside the sale, invoke the aid of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, to extend the period of limitation where the fraud is proved to have been committed by the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser or both. It is the that fraud as contemplated under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, must be fraud of the person against whom the suit or application is made and as both the auction purchaser and the decree-holder are necessary patties to an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside a sale, the fraud of one or the other would be sufficient to have the sale set aside." In this connection it is interesting to note that in the AIR Commentaries on the Limitation Act, the view expressed in this Bench decision is submitted to be the correct view (vol. I page 568). 11. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act are attracted. 12. This Revision is dismissed.
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1957 (7) TMI 45 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y High Court that the dividend income received by the assessee in respect of the shares was income from business chargeable under section 10 and the income-tax authorities could not compel the assessee to show his income under section 12. It is obvious that the material facts in the present case are wholly different and the ratio of Ahmuty & Co. Ltd.’s case (supra) cannot be applied to the present case. For the reasons I have already expressed I hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case the receipt of interest from fixed deposits was an income from "other sources" referred to in section 12 of the Income-tax Act and also that the receipt of interest from fixed deposits was not exempt from taxation under the notifications of the Central Board of Revenue. I would accordingly answer both the questions of law referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. Raj Kishore Prasad, J.-I agree.
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1957 (7) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t countries for the purpose of divorce, and Scotland by its own system of law has recognised marriages, which England has not and vice versa and there has been the same difference with regard to the system of divorce. But it would be entirely incorrect to suggest that the relationship between the different States in India or relationship between the States and the Union is the same as the relationship between Scotland and England. There is neither that historical background in India nor does our Constitution recognise any separate system of law as far as the different States are concerned. 14. In our opinion, therefore, the accused could not be prosecuted under the provisions of Section 4 (b) inasmuch as we are of opinion that that sub-section is ultra vires of the Bombay Legislature. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, right in acquitting him though not for the reasons stated by him. In the result the appeal preferred by the State will be dismissed. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (7) TMI 43 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... not necessary to deal. If their Lordships had taken a different view on the main question, it would have been necessary to consider the local situation of certain so-called Mysore bonds. It need not now be discussed. Nor is it necessary to consider whether, as was urged by the respondents, they were not liable to pay the duty upon the son's death, even if it was otherwise exigible. Upon this question their Lordships express no opinion. Finally a submission was made in regard to immovable property in Ceylon in which reliance was placed on section 18 of the Partition Ordinance No. 10 of 1863, and section 7 of the Wills Ordinance No. 21 of 1844. This matter does not appear to have been raised in the court of the District Judge. In the Supreme Court it was dealt with summarily by Gratiaen J., their Lordships concur in the view that he expressed. The Lordships will humbly advise her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.
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1957 (7) TMI 42 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on of that kind the claim would be for a specified sum of money and no question of accounting would arise." In the Nagpur case the question whether the applicability of Article 89 was confined to suits for accounts only did not arise and the observations of Bose, J., must be regarded as confined to the facts of the case with which he was dealing and to the facts of the case which he was distinguishing. What the learned Judge wished to emphasise in that case was that the relation of principal and agent must obtain before Article 89 can be applied. We do not find anything in the Nagpur decision which could be read as laying down that Article 89 applies only to a suit by a principal against his agent. Learned counsel for the respondent was unable to refer us to any decision laying down the proposition advanced by him. 7. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the decision of Mehta, J., is set aside and the plaintiff-respondent's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.
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1957 (7) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e of whom is a common ancestor of three of the four accused persons. It has not been argued, and there is no scope for the argument, that the accused persons have been prejudiced in any way in their defence. They had to meet a straightforward case which they failed to do. 12. After carefully considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, we have come to the conclusion that the proceedings and the trial have not been vitiated by the admitted non-compliance with the provisions aforesaid of the Code, and that the irregularity is curable by reference to s. 537 of the Code, as no case of prejudice has been made out. This Court, in the case of Gurbachan Singh v. the State of Punjab Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 1957, decided on April 24, 1957. , was inclined to take a similar view of the provisions aforesaid of the Code, though it ultimately held that those provisions did not apply to the case then before them. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (7) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... rel about this principle. An enactment would be held to have retrospective effect where it could be gathered from the enactment that by express intendment or by implication the enactment was to have retrospective effect. Section 59 (3) of the Act is clear. The words of the section would indicate that no liability shall be enforced after the coming into force of this Act and, therefore, this being a decrial liability it would not be open to the creditor to enforce the liability except as provided under S. 59 (3) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention of the appellant in this regard must prevail. The result of this will be that the decree-holder would be entitled to interest at ₹ 1-4-6 per cent, compound up to 7-9-1950 and at the rate of 6 per cent simple from 7-9-1950. The appeal is partly allowed and the decree of the lower Court is modified as detailed above. Each party will bear his own costs of this appeal in the circumstances of the case.
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1957 (7) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
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... ... ..... al was competent to pass a supplementary order. Our answer is that if the supplementary order is treated as one under section 35 it was a perfectly competent order, and we say that it was. In view of this our answer to the first question is in the affirmative. That being so, the order of the Tribunal passed on the second occasion would stand, and there would be no need to answer the second question, which, as will be seen from what we have stated above, must be answer ed as the Appellate Tribunal itself has decided in the second order. We answer the reference, therefore, in the following words Question (1) Yes (but under section 35 of the Income-tax Act). Question (2) There is no need to give a decision on this point. 13. We think that there should be no award of costs because the mistake was an inadvertent one, which was corrected by the Tribunal, and the reference was made because the Tribunal was probably not aware of its own powers or was at any rate in doubt about them.
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1957 (7) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said that any part of the payments provided for the nominees was determined on the basis of the restraint sought to be imposed. It is important to recall again in this connection that the persons who are promising to the assurance company are the company of the chief agents and the directors. The promise is not by the nominees, although some of them are shareholders and certainly there is no promise by the nominee who is a stranger. In all the facts of the case and from the look of the thing, it appears to me that the receipts of the nominees of the company of chief agents which are the only receipts, with which we are concerned in this reference, were in their hands income and not capital receipts. The question referred by the Tribunal must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. Since there has been no appearance on behalf of the taxpayer and he has not resisted the reference, there will be no order as to costs. GUHA, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (7) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ned by the Court as and when it arises with reference to the particular facts and circumstances of that individual case. It is no use, therefore, appealing to precedents in such matters. No case on facts can be on all fours with those of another. Therefore, it will serve no useful purpose to decide this case with reference to the decisions of this Court in previous cases. We have to determine whether on the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence which has been accepted by the courts below, the crime charged against the appellant has been made out. We have carefully weighed the facts and circumstances pro and con forcefully brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellant and, in our opinion, no grounds have been made out for differing from the conclusions arrived at by the courts below. In our opinion, the facts and circumstances proved in this case establish the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1957 (7) TMI 36 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... operty" of the undivided family. Judging by that test their Lordships have no doubt that the Supreme Court came to the right conclusion. Had their Lordships taken a different view from that of the Supreme Court it might have been necessary to review some at least of the large number of cases cited at the Bar, from which chosen passages appeared to favour the contentions of the appellant. But, as was said in the case of the previous appeal, the matters upon which the parties and their expert witnesses were agreed were of far greater significance than those upon which they differed, and their Lordships doubt whether, even if the appellant's evidence stood alone, they could have come to any different conclusion as to the meaning and scope of the words "joint property of that Hindu undivided family" as used in the 1938 Ordinance. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.
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1957 (7) TMI 35 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... his life-interest, and this right existed without change from the beginning of the settlement. The enforcement of a right cannot create a beneficial interest arising by survivorship. For the reasons given I would allow the appeal. My Lords, in Wrightson's case I reach the same conclusion. I had at first some doubt whether this case could not be distinguished from the case of the Westmister Bank on the view that no beneficial interest accrued or arose in the policies to anyone until the death of the settlor. I am now satisfied, however, that from the time the policies were assigned to the trustees there was a beneficial interest in the policies in the group of persons who were ultimately to take as lifetenants on the death of the settlor and that this beneficial interest remained unchanged in character from the date of the settlement. The case is accordingly, in my opinion, indistinguishable from the case of the Westminster Bank. I would allow the appeal. Appeals allowed.
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1957 (7) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gs were to be compulsorily stayed upon the filing of an appeal. But, on the other hand, if the discretion was not exercised properly, an application for a high prerogative writ will lie. Thus, if the discretion was not properly exercised by the Income-tax Officer the petitioner ought to have asked for the order to be quashed. But there is no such prayer, and the respondents have not been called upon to answer any such issue. Consequently, I do not think that I can make an order for stay. This however will not debar the petitioner from making such application as he may be advised to make in this behalf, in further, on proper materials. The result is that in my view all of these applications fail and the rules must be discharged and the two applications dismissed. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondents with regard to the two applications for contempt. With regard to the three rules, there will be no order as to costs. Certified for counsel. Applications dismissed.
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1957 (7) TMI 33 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cluded. It is contended that the intention in selling these trees was that they should be severed from the land and utilised as timber, and not that the trees were to remain standing on the land for yielding fruits or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, contended that the sale in this case was sale of movable property , and would be covered by the definition given in the Sales Tax Act. It is unnecessary for us to decide this question at present in the view which we have already taken of the petitioner s contention on the first point before us, namely, that he was not a dealer . The application must, therefore, succeed, and the order of the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, has to be set aside and the Rule made absolute. The respondents are, therefore, directed not to take any action against the petitioner on the assumption that he is a dealer in respect of these transactions. The petitioner is entitled to his costs hearing fee Rs. 100. DEKA, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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