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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 19 of 19 Records
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1958 (1) TMI 43 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has no place of business) at the residence of the party for whom it is intended. Section 98 enumerates cases where no notice of dishonour would be necessary. The rules requiring notice to be given admit of no departure except in the cases enumerated in this section. The present is not a case falling under any of the exceptions. Section 106 states the time which shall be regarded as reasonable for giving notice of dishonour. Where the holder and the party to whom notice of dishonour is given carry on business or live (as the case may be) in different places, such notice is regarded as having been given within a reasonable time if it is despatched by the next post or on the day next after the day of dishonour. Section 30 is to be read as subject to these provisions which relate to the mode or 1 manner in which the notice has to be given. 20. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal and leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. The cross-objections also are dismissed.
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1958 (1) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce going against the case set up by the legal representatives of Subba Rao. 12. We are definitely of the opinion that this suit being one filed against persons who were not parties to the document having no knowledge of the transaction. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to have proved the execution of the mortgage as well as the fact that the debt on the mortgage bond was still subsisting. The onus did not shift to the defendant to prove discharge of the liability. The position therefore, is that the mortgage deed which has been assigned in favour of the plaintiff must be held to have not been proved. If therefore, the mortgage bond has not been proved plaintiff who is only an assignee of the mortgage cannot get any relief as his predecessor in interest could get no relief. 13. The result is that this appeal is allowed the judgment and decree of the lower Court set aside. The appellant will be entitled to his costs from respondents 13 to 15 both here and in the lower Court.
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1958 (1) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... remedy or legal proceeding in respect of certain rights. Once the Court had taken cognizance and had commenced the proceedings, they remain unaffected as a result of Clause (b) of Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, even though the amending Act takes away that jurisdiction in respect of any, remedy or legal proceeding commenced subsequent to its enforcement. This interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act thus also embodies in it and gives effect to the principle that, if a litigant has moved an application in revision in this Court, engaged a counsel and paid the process fee for issue of the notice so that proceedings have commenced, he is not put to the hardship of being deprived of the judgment of this Court for no fault of his in case the decision in the revision is delayed by the Court. I, consequently, agree in the answer proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. M.L. Chaturvedi, J. 10. I agree with the judgment of V. Bhargava Judge.
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1958 (1) TMI 40 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r maintenance or for any other purpose comes within the ambit of Section 6(d) or not is whether the deed conferred any right against the properties comprised therein or whether the intention was to give her for her maintenance a personal right to appropriate the profits in the property assigned to her. The answer to this question depends upon the facts of each case and the interpretation of the relevant document. If, on a construction of the relevant terms of the instrument, the Court comes to the conclusion that right were created against the property, the matter is taken out of the purview of Section 6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. It follows that the interpretation placed by the Subordinate Judge is correct and the decree and judgment of that Court will have to be restored and that of the District Judge set aside. Having regard to the circumstances, of the case, we think this is a profit case where the parties should be directed to bear their own costs throughout.
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1958 (1) TMI 39 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d against the said order of assessment, there has been a very substantial reduction in the amount of tax which he was required to pay by the Income-tax Officer. As I have mentioned, the Income-tax Officer directed the assessee to pay a sum of ₹ 67,383-12-0 and on appeal the said tax was reduced to ₹ 4,569-13-0. Whether or not this is a matter which should be taken into consideration by us in determining the present question, the fact remains that it would have been very hard upon the petitioner if he was made to pay the tax pending the decision of the appeal which he had filed against the order of the Income-tax Officer. In the result, therefore, we hold that the order of the Income-tax Officer dated 11th June, 1956, whereby he imposed a penalty of ₹ 1,500 under section 46(1) of the Income-tax Act was made without jurisdiction and is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this petition. Somnath Iyer, J.-I agree.
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1958 (1) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Court below to reconsider it, if necessary, in the light of its finding on the plaintiff's claim for ejectment and to make an appropriate decree for rent in place of mesne profits to the extent necessary if the claim for ejectment fails to any extent whatsoever. 84. The appeal thus succeeds in part; it is allowed, the decree of the trial Court is set aside and the case is remanded to that Court for further consideration and final disposal according to law in the light of this judgment and in terms thereof. All costs (including the costs of this appeal which would include inter alia the Paper Book costs) will be in the discretion of the Court below when it finally decides the suit. 85. The Court below will try to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. 86. The order for deposit of rent or mesne pro fits made in the connected Rule (Civil Rule 3431 F of 1956) will continue until the final disposal of the suit by the Court below. P.K. Sarkar, J. 87. I agree.
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1958 (1) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd the imposition of a disqualification on him so to stand. It might be that the object of the regulation was to ensure that the employees of the Corporation bestowed undivided attention upon their duties as such employees, but this does not militate against the prohibition operating as a disqualification. If a person is disabled by a lawful command of the Legislature, issued directly or mediately, from standing for election, it is tantamount to disqualifying him from so standing. We, therefore, hold that Regulation 29 framed by the Life Insurance Corporation constituted a 'law' which disqualified C. Krishnamurthi from standing for election under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution. 54. The appeal is accordingly allowed and as the improper rejection of the nomination paper was the only ground urged for the setting aside of the election and we have rejected this contention, this election petition 178 of 1957 fails and is dismissed There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (1) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt suit. If there has been a trust, and if this trust is created by a foreign sovereign, it does not mean that the foreign sovereign has created this trust in the exercise of his sovereign powers. In my view, when a trust is created even by a sovereign, the sovereign would be no better then a settlor amenable to the law of the country in which the charity is created and is to be conducted. I, therefore, do not think that the observations relied upon by Mr. Parpia would, in any way, help him in the present case. 26. for these reasons, I agree with the view of the learned Judge that it was pre-eminently a case where thee was great necessity of appointing the Receiver, and that in the interests of justice and convenience the appointment of the Receiver was wholly justified. 27. The result is that the appeal fail and are dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents in A.O. No. 160/57. There will be no order as to costs in A.O. No. 168/57. 28. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (1) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch makes the sense in which the word " modify has been used in this Act perfectly clear, namely, that there may be a modification involving an increase. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Stevens v. The General Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. L.R. (1903) 1 K.B.890. " Modification ", according to Collins M. R. in his judgment at p. 893, implied an alteration and the word was equally applicable whether the effect of the alteration was to narrow or to enlarge the provisions. In our opinion the dropping of the word " reduce " and the introduction of the word 'modify" in the body of s. 60, of the Act under consideration clearly indicate an intention on the part of legislature to widen the scope of this section and the High Court was right in so construing the same. No other point was urged in this appeal and for reasons stated above this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (1) TMI 34 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the section which requires an assessee to furnish an advance estimate of his turnover and proceed merely on the basis of his transaction in the previous year. The true meaning of the said section, according to me, is that the authorities, before making a provisional assessment under the said section, have to require a dealer to furnish an estimate of his turnover as required in the said section and as may be prescribed by the rules and after that return comes to them, they may proceed to determine the amount of tax payable either on the basis of the said return or on the basis of the previous year s transactions. The result, therefore, is that the assessment in question cannot be justified even under the validation clause of the amending Act 17 of 1955. Consequently the order of assessment is held to have been made without jurisdiction and is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. SOMNATH IYER, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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1958 (1) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f sale involved in the transaction to bring it within the legislative entry. We answer this in the affirmative and hold that the transfer of title to the petitioners was necessary to be sufficiently real in order to enable the hire-purchase agreement to be entered into, and the hire-purchase agreement itself was the mode by which the property in the vehicle got re-transferred to the customer. The stipulations in the hire-purchase agreement were not terms on which the hypotheca was redeemed but a true purchase agreement by which the customer acquired title to the vehicle. Bar those instances, where owing to default of customers, the purchase does not go through, they were sales within section 2(h) effected by the petitioners, which brought them within the definition of dealer subject to tax under section 3(1) of the Act. This petition also fails and is dismissed, the rule nisi being discharged. There will be no order as to costs in any of these petitions. Petitions dismissed.
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1958 (1) TMI 32 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and severally be responsible for the payment of the tax levied under the Act. It is nowhere stated by the respondent that either the petitioner or Veeresham has reported the fact, if it is true, that he was a partner with the assessee. If the Sales Tax Authorities considered on the basis of the information obtained by them that the petitioner was really a partner with the assessee, the proper course for them would have been to give him a notice calling upon him to show why he should not be dealt with as such. This was not admittedly done. Under the aforesaid circumstances, I find no warrant in law for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 2,500 from the petitioner. There being a patent want of jurisdiction on the part of the respondents in recovering the tax from the petitioner, a writ of prohibition will issue restraining the respondents from recovering the amount of tax from him. The petitioner will have his costs from the respondent. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1958 (1) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... S.T.C. 776 I.L.R. 35 Pat. 1055., the petitioner would not be entitled to exemption if the goods were not consumed in the State of first destination but were reexported from the State of first destination to other States. In our opinion the proper directions in this case under Article 226 of the Constitution would be that the order of the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Singhbhum, making the assessment on the 13th of November, 1950, should be set aside and that the matter should go back to the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Singhbhum, to make re-assessment of sales tax upon the petitioner according to law for the period in question. We think that there should also be a direction upon the respondents calling upon them to refund to the petitioner so much of the tax as has been paid by the petitioner in excess of the amount of reassessment to be now made by the Superintendent of Sales Tax. We accordingly allow this application. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.
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1958 (1) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y one ban is attracted, namely, the ban imposed by Article 286(2), and not the ban imposed by the explanation to Article 286(1)(a), and, therefore, sales falling under this category has only one hurdle to surmount, namely, the hurdle imposed by Article 286(2), and that hurdle is surmounted by the President s Order and by Central Act No. 7 of 1956, for the period from the 26th January, 1950, to the 6th September, 1955. In view of the principle laid down in this decision there is no force in the argument put forward by the learned counsel for the assessee. For the reasons we have expressed, we hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case the sale of shellac to the extent of Rs. 3,90,289-12-6 has been validly taxed, and the question of law referred by the Board of Revenue and as amended by us should be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (1) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Alteration of memorandum and Alteration of rights of holders of special classes of shares ... ... ... ... ..... nnection with the argument whether clause 5 in the memorandum can at all be altered by a special resolution, attention of the court has been drawn to Halsbury, Vol. VI, 3rd Edition, page 223, paragraphs 459 and 522 and Mr. Chaudhuri has drawn the attention of the court to Palmer s Company Precedents at page 409, 17th Edition, Vol. 1, Part 1, and to page 492, last paragraph, of Gower s Company Law and section 23(2) of the English Act but it is not necessary to prolong this judgment by a detailed discussion of the passages to which reference has been made. I gave an opportunity to the petitioners to amend their petition if they were so advised. The learned counsel took time to consider the matter and ultimately decided not to make any application for amendment. In my view, this objection to the maintainability of the application should be upheld and, accordingly, this application is dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel. The operation of the order is stayed for one month.
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1958 (1) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Memorandum and articles of association – Registration of, Directors - Power of and Certain persons not to be appointed as managing director
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1958 (1) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members ... ... ... ... ..... entity, the former must be deemed to have contracted personally, because in effect such a person merely utilises the names of others as his own aliases. We, therefore, hold that even if the contention is accepted that some of the members of the family of the appellant Kamakhyalal Goenka, who are said to be contributories, are minors, the appellant Kamakhyalal Goenka himself should be substituted as a contributory in respect of those shares. This order we would be justified in making even within the purview of Order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position then is that we modify the decree to the effect that the liability for contribution of Kamakhyalal Goenka will be joint and several in respect of all the 417 shares standing in his name and the names of the different members of his family as mentioned in his own rejoinder petition. The above appeal is, therefore, without any merit and must be dismissed with costs hearing fee Rs. 200. Deka, J. mdash I agree.
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1958 (1) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... he above amount (vide, among others, letters Exhibits P.56 dated 8th of November, 1951, and P. 57 dated 22nd of September, 1951). I am satisfied from the oral and documentary evidence produced on the record that the sum claimed was due to Ram Chand and Sons. There is no evidence in rebuttal. I am satisfied as to the genuineness and correctness of the claim. But this claim became time-barred on the date of the passing of the winding up order, 23rd of September, 1953, though it was within time on the date of the presentation of the application for winding up of the company, 24th of April, 1952. In an earlier part of this judgment, I have expressed the view that the material date for determining whether a claim is within limitation is the date of the order of winding up and not the date of the presentation of the petition for winding up. The claim of Messrs. Ram Chand Puri and Sons is, therefore, rejected on the ground that it was time-barred. There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (1) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ASSAM
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... ... ..... the Civil Court or by taking recourse to other provisions under the Act. But, in this case, the facts are very patent, and we see no reason to leave the parties or the petitioner to go in appeal under the Act itself. It would mean not only delay, but loss both to the Department as well as to the parties concerned, and in the circumstances of the present case, we feel quite competent to deal with the subject matter of the dispute. The order complained of is in our opinion, illegal to the extent that there has been restriction on the right of clearance inherent in the licence issued by the Department. We accordingly order that the order be modified to the extent that, on the basis of the licence the petitioner will have the necessary right of clearance, subject to the payment of taxes, as provided under Rule 52 framed under the Act. The order will be modified to the extent, as prayed for and the Rule is made absolute, as proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. Sd./- H. Deka, J.
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