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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 37 Records
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1958 (11) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... char or the long possession of Sadagopalachar and, after his death, of Narayana lyengar can prove the transfer of Lakshmamma’s title or its extinction by adverse possession respectively. It is apparent that, in recording these conclusions, the High Court has not fully or properly considered all the relevant evidence; and consequently, the reasons given by it are open to serious challenge on the merits. Indeed Mr. Viswanatha Sastri did not appear to be inclined to support the said findings. We do not, however, propose to decide these questions on the merits because in view of our conclusion on the principal issue it is unnecessary to consider any other points. We would, therefore, like to make it clear that the said two issues are not decided in the present proceedings and may have to be considered afresh between the parties if and when they arise. The result is the appeal fails and must be dismissed but there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (11) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... apping or abduction in order that the person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered. Section 365, I. P.C.deals with kidnapping or abduction with intent to cause that person to be secretly and wrongfully continued. Section 366, I. P. C., deals with the kidnapping or abduction of a woman, in order that one or other of the various offences enumerated in that section may be committed against her. Section 367 deals with the kidnapping or abduction of a person that he may be subjected to grievous hurt, slavery, etc. Section 369, I. P. C. deals with the kidnapping or abduction of children under ten years of age. 22. The position, therefore, conies to this the evidence does not support the findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge; and his findings cannot support the conviction. 23. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted and ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless he be otherwise law fully detained.
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1958 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... liable to resumption under the Act. In the Ajmer Regulations, (Vol. H to L) at pp. 564-6, these two estates have been considered and their history is given, and they are called jagirs. The history of jagirs in Rajasthan was considered by this Court in Thakur Amarsinghji v. State of Rajasthan 1955 2SCR303 , and the word 'jagir' was held to connote all grants which conferred on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue. In the case of these two jagirs also, as annexures B and C show, land revenue was remitted and they were granted as estates for particular purposes. They are, therefore, clearly estates in view of the origin of the title of the holder of these estates who is called a jagirdar and therefore the State could take them over under section 4 of the Act. 15. There is no force in any of the points raised on behalf of the petitioners, and the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with one set of costs to the contesting respondent. 16. Petitions dismissed.
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1958 (11) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Federal Court in J.K Gas Plant Mfg. Co. v. Emperor AIR 1947 FC 38 The same phrase was again expounded by Hemeon J. in Dhawanji Rawji v. Emperor, AIR 1949 Nag 134, as including a reference to pending proceedings including prosecutions not completed or about to be commenced. An analysis of this phrase is to be found in Jogendrachandra Ray v. The Superintendent of Dum Dum Special Jail, ILR 60 Cal 742 (AIR 1933 Cal 280) by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In my opinion, Article 369 contains its own saving clause and the full operation of that saving clause is to keep intact not only the savings enacted by Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, but, for purposes of prosecution -- both in continuation and to be commenced -- the entire Act. The non-obstante clause at the beginning of Article 369 excludes any consideration arising from any other part of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that I do not accept the references. They are returned as not accepted.
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1958 (11) TMI 42 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lear that all these who wished to be present in the hall where the sessions trial was going on were not able to gain admission into it. There is nothing strange or improbable in Thimmiah having waited downstairs in the hope of getting admission into the Court-Hall sometime or other during the day. Neither Thimtmiah nor Narayanappa the other deponent was ever summoned by the landlord for cross-examination. 30. In my opinion, the finding of the learned Munsiff, that the tenant was not present in the premises of the Court on October 6, 1956. has to be reversed as being manifestly unreasonable. 31. This revision petition is allowed. The order under revision is set aside as also the ex parte order made against the tenant on October 6, 1956. The learned Munsiff will now take back to his file the original application made by the landlord for his eviction and dispose of it according to law. In the circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs. 32. Revision petition allowed
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1958 (11) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... general terms the allegations made by the petitioners in para 11 of their petition. Even assuming that this document was not shown to the petitioners, we do not think that any injustice has been caused to them, because the only transaction alleged by them, which took place during the time the firm, in which they were employed, was in existence, was a transaction in which the respondents purchased a property in execution of an order made in their favour for costs. This transaction by itself would not be a sufficient ground for holding that the respondents were engaged in the business of purchasing and selling property. 19. The view taken by the Industrial Tribunal that the respondents' firm did not constitute an industry, and that the dispute between them and their employees was not an industrial dispute, which could be the subject of a reference under the Industrial Disputes. Act, is therefore correct. 20. The rule will be discharged. There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (11) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r may be non est and can be completely ignored but such would not be the case with the latter. 25. Further even assuming for a moment that this contention of the petitioners is well-founded, it is of no further assistance to the petitioner in Miscellaneous Petition No. 470 of 1956 because he could only be deemed to be holding a post at Drug which does not form part of the State of Bombay. He therefore cannot be deemed to have been appointed to that post by the Government of the State of Bombay as from 1-11-56, Consequently he cannot claim any relief against the State of Act. 26. In the result, therefore, in our judgment, Miscellaneous Petition No. 523 of 1956 and Special Civil Application No. 73 of 1957 are maintainable against the State of Bombay; while Miscellaneous Petition No. 470 of 1956 is not maintainable against the State of Bombay. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. We make no orders as to costs. The former two petition will now be placed for hearing on merits.
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1958 (11) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e section because the position of an additional director is in certain respects different from the position of an elected director. One-third of the elected directors have to go out by rotation and in computing the number of directors, the additional directors are not to be taken into consideration. Therefore, it may well be that the Legislature thought it desirable that the words "up to the date" should be inserted in the section instead of "at the annual general meeting." This difference in language does not affect the real question before us. 16. In our opinion, therefore, both Jayantilal N. Patel and Solomon Moses had ceased to be directors of the Company. 17. The company will pay the costs of this application fixed at ₹ 500 of Mr. Nariman's client, whom is a director appointed by the Central Government. The company will also pay the costs of Mr. Bhabha's clients who are respondents Nos. 9 and 10 of this application fixed at ₹ 500.
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1958 (11) TMI 38 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ; 3 1/2" in width that it has been narrowed down to a considerable extent i.e. to 3' 9" and it has been further covered by the defendant. This is a clear infringement of the right of the other co-owner, namely, the plaintiffs. The passage is certainly incapable of partition between the parties and under the circumstances the only remedy which could be given to the plaintiffs was a mandatory injunction to the defendant for demolition of the new construction. The decree given by the trial court was thus correct. The first appellate court was not justified in modifying it in the manner in which it has been done. 7. The plaintiffs' appeal (No. 145/B) is there-fore allowed with costs. The decree of the first appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The defendant's appeal (No. 108/B) is dismissed. The plaintiffs have already been allowed costs in one appeal and therefore the parties are left to bear their own costs in this appeal.
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1958 (11) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lant No. 2 in the act of persuasion or offering blandishments or inducements to Mst. Rahmatia. The only evidence against this appellant is that when the complainant went to take away his wife appellant No. 2 threatened him. The record shows that appellant No. 2 is the brother of appellant No. 1; and, if knowing that Rahmatia had married his brother, appellant No. 2 told the complainant to walk away, that cannot legally justify the inference that he must have offered any inducement, blandishment or allurement to Rahmatia for leaving the protection of her husband and refusing to return to him. Indeed the courts below have not considered the case of this appellant separately on its own merits at all. In our opinion, the conviction of appellant No. 2 is not supported by any evidence on the record. The result is the appeal preferred by appellant No. 2 is allowed, the order of conviction and sentence passed against him is set aside and he is ordered to be acquitted and discharged.
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1958 (11) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Commissioner were exercised after the expiry of the time limits prescribed by section 34, the respondent cannot be allowed to raise this ground for the first time in this court. We may also say in this connection that if the individual shareholders are aggrieved by the re-opening of any completed assessment after the time limit prescribed by section 34-from whatever date that time limit might commence to run-it would be open to them to pursue appropriate remedies which they have under the Act as they are not parties to the proceedings before us. We are expressing no opinion whatever as to the date from which limitation will commence to run under section 34 for re-opening completed assessments of shareholders in cases in which an order under section 23A has been made as the reference was not sought for on that question. 19. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the Department and against the respondent.
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1958 (11) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ecords, may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." It will be seen from the above provisions, while there is a right of appeal under Section 64(b) against the revocation or suspension of the permit or any variation of the conditions thereof, there is no right of appeal against a refusal to vary the permit. Nor does Section 64-A limit the power of the Government to call for the records of any orders passed or proceedings taken by any of the officers specified in, Chap. IV only in cases where no appeal lies, as is the case with Section 115, C. P. C,, which specifically limits the power of the High Court to call for the records of any case decided by any Court subordinate to it in which no appeal lies thereto. If the Legislature had intended to fetter the Government in any way, a provision of that nature would have certainly found a place in Section 64-A. 25. In the result, these writ petitions are dismissed with costs, in one. Advocates fee ₹ 100/-.
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1958 (11) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Income-tax Officer had or had not jurisdiction to revise that order. His conclusion, which was against the assessee, is erroneous and it is that error of the Commissioner of Income-tax, which is the error apparent on the face of the record. 10. The result is that the petition succeeds and a writ of certiorari will issue against the respondents as prayed in prayer (a) and the orders passed by the respondents under section 33A(2) and section 35 will be quashed. Respondents to pay the costs of the petitioner of this petition. 11. In this matter when we granted amendment to the petitioner, we made an order directing the petitioner to pay the costs of the respondents of the petition up to the stage of the making of the amendment. Learned counsel are agreed that in view of that the amounts directed to be paid under the orders for costs should be set off one against the other. In the result, neither party will have to pay any costs in respect of this petition. 12. Petition allowed.
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1958 (11) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... refore, that the High Court had in effect given the respondent a rate more favourable than what he had himself claimed. We consider, therefore, that on a proper consideration of the materials in the record and after eliminating the two errors which the High Court had committed, the proper value of the land in question should be ₹ 11 per sq. yard. The result, therefore, is that we allow this appeal to this limited extent only, namely, the order of the High Court will be modified by substituting the figure ₹ 11 per sq. yard for the figure ₹ 13/8 awarded by the High Court as compensation to the respondent for land other than the low- lying land. We maintain the order of the High Court that the parties will receive and pay costs in proportion to their success and failure, as now determined, in the courts below; but so far as the costs of this Court are concerned, the parties must bear their own costs in view of their divided success here. Appeal partly allowed.
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1958 (11) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fficult to receive in full the price for which they transferred their assets to the Southern Roadways Ltd., and that in consequence they decided to accept paid up shares in the transferee company, that would be a capital loss which arose outside the accounting year, and, therefore, cannot be taken notice of for the relevant accounting year. As we said before, to attract liability to tax under section 12B it is sufficient if profits have arisen, that is to say, if the assessee has a right to receive the profits. It is not necessary that the assessee should have actually received them. And undoubtedly the assessees had the right to receive the price and, therefore, the profits during the relevant accounting year. The second of the questions referred to us, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative and against the assessees. The Department will be entitled to its costs in both cases. Counsel's fee ₹ 250 only in R.C. No. 91 of 1953. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (11) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bservations do not in our opinion help the learned counsel for the appellant. His contention throughout has been that a statement within the meaning of s. 157 has to be communicated to another person. These observations show that the letter which their Lordships were rejecting was certainly a statement which was communicated to another person. Therefore, when their Lordships rejected the letter it could not be on the ground that the statement was not communicated to another person ; it must be due to the value of the evidence of Bhattacharjee, which was considered in the previous paragraph. It is clear, therefore, the word I statement used in s. 157 of the Act means ',something that is stated' and the element of communication to another person is not -included in it. As such the notes of attendance prepared by Santook were statements within the meaning of s. 157 and admissible in evidence. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (11) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titled to choose that which yields the higher duty as in England. Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent, has urged that the scheme of the Indian enactment is materially different from the scheme of the enactment in England. In our view, the scheme of both the enactments is substantially the same. Mr. Joshi has asked us to look at the provisions of section 12, to look at the settlement and to see if that section applies having regard to the terms of the settlement. He says that if that section applies, there is no reason why it should not be made applicable and the whole property should not be deemed to pass thereunder. We agree with Mr. Joshi. The section in terms applies, and if it in terms applies, there is no reason why effect should not be given to the provisions of that section. In the result, I agree with my brother Justice S.T. Desai, J., as regards the answer to the question raised in this reference and the order for costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (11) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cision of the Madras High Court in Aru-nachala v. Madappa, AIR 1936 Mad 949 and of Horwill J. in Sumermal Jamatraj v. Thukkappa, AIR 1944 Mad 391 (2). I am unable to see the relevance of these cases to the facts of the present case. In the latter case Horwill J., held 'that where the transferee paid the consideration partly in adjustment of an outstanding debt and the balance in cash, the requirements of Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, are satisfied. In a very recent case decided hy the Madras High Court in Mary Joseph v. Mohd. Hajee Moosa and Co., a Bench of the Madras High Court have affirmed the view of Horwill J., in AIR 1944 Mad 391 (2) (Supra). The facts of this case are different. 45. It is not necessary to pursue the matter 'further because on the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge, defendants 2 and 3 cannot be considered as bona fide purchasers without notice. 46. In the result, the three appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Leave refused
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1958 (11) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... harge a quasi-judicial function, but was acting only in its or his administrative capacity. It follows from this conclusion that all considerations flowing from the basic idea of the proceedings before the State Government being of a quasi-judicial character, are wholly out of the way. It must, therefore, be held that the order of the State Government, impugned in this case, is not open to any interference by the courts. I would, therefore, dismiss the petition with costs. ORDER In view of the opinion of the majority the order approving the scheme is hereby quashed and a direction issued to the first respondent to forbear from taking over any of the routes in which the petitioners are engaged in transport business. This will not preclude the State Government from making the necessary enquiry in regard to the objections filed by the petitioners in accordance with law. The petitioners will have liberty to file additional objections, if any. The parties to bear their own costs.
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1958 (11) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ). There may be cases where improper execution of power will result in injustice to the parties. As has been observed, however, the possibility of such discriminatory treatment cannot necessarily invalidate the legislation and where there is an abuse of such power, the parties aggrieved are not without ample remedies under the law (Vide Dinabandhu. Sahu v. Jadumony Mangaraj, 1955 1 S. C. R. 140,146). What will be struck down in such cases will not be the provision which invests the authorities with such power but the abuse of the power itself." It, therefore, follows that s. 7 of the Act cannot be impugned on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. All the various contentions urged by the petitioners therefore fail and the result is that the petitions filed by the petitioners before us must be dismissed with costs. The State of Bombay which is the only respondent in all these petitions will however get only one set of costs therein. Petitions dismissed.
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