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1958 (2) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... at such public notice was given and since admittedly the Respondent Company did not prefer its objection to the valuation of premises No. 433/1 even after that, the Respondent Company lost its right to challenge that valuation. 43. If we now set aside the valuation of premises No. 433 and direct the valuation of the premises to be made on the basis of its amalgamation with premises No. 433/1, we would be really touching the valuation of premises No. 433/1, which has now become final, by operation of law. We should not do that because we have no jurisdiction now to touch the assessment of valuation of premises No. 433/1. 44. The Respondent Company has by its own default lost its remedy, in the present proceedings. 45. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the court of appeal below and affirm the assessment of premises No. 433, Grand Trunk Road. 46. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. Renupada Mukherjee, J. 47. I agree.
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1958 (2) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... these circumstances I am not prepared to agree with Mr. Laud's contention that by virtue of any statutory provision or by any of the decisions relied upon by him, the remedy by way of a suit would not be either an adequate or an efficacious remedy. The very fact there has been and still is a radical conflict between the partners inter se, whose property the petitioner is alleged to be seeking to preserve and protect, coupled with the fact that the partners representing one half interest in the 4th respondents are opposed to the present petition would be a sufficient ground to hold that the proper remedy for the petitioner or the partners represented by Mr. Kania would be an ordinary suit. 21. For these reasons the preliminary contentions raised by Mr. Khambatta and Mr. manekshaw must be upheld. The result therefore, is that the petition fails and is dismissed. Since the parties are agreed that there should be no order as to costs, I make no order. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 54 - PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... maintain her, does not come to an end, but only remains suspended so long as she wilfully continues to absent herself. If during the period of her absence she has not been guilty of any matrimonial impropriety, and desires to return to the husband, bis liability to maintain her revives. After having contracted second marriage, the husband can no longer, as a condition precedent to maintaining her, impose upon her an obligation that she should live with him. 17. While agreeing with the views expressed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, on the question of law, I cannot accept his recommendation that the order of the Magistrate should be set aside, as on this record a case has been made out for grant of maintenance; though perhaps not OB the alleged grounds of assault and expulsion. In the result, I agree with the order of the Magistrate awarding maintenance allowance of Rs. 12/- per mensem to Soma Devi from 3-1-1957, the date of his order, though for different reasons.
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1958 (2) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... rety bond which does not come under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act. In this connection he relied on the decisions reported in Mahomedalli Ibrahimji v. Laxmibai, AIR1930Bom122 and Parvati Bai v. Vinayak Balvant, AIR1939Bom23. It may be noticed that the principle of these decisions is not consistent with the decision of our High Court in. Appunni Nair v. Isaak Mackadam, ILR (1920) Mad 272 AIR 1920 Mad 355 but it is unnecessary to pursue the matter any further, as in our opinion the respondents are entitled to succeed in the view we have taken in regard to the other aspects of the case. 12. We agree with Balakrishna Aiyar J. that the bond was a surety bond, and that the first respondent was discharged from his liability there under by reason of the appellant, entering into-a composition with the principal debtor without any reference to the surety. 13. In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs. The appellants would be entitled to take their costs out of the estate.
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1958 (2) TMI 52 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... subsequent notice which is superfluous cannot invalidate the proceedings already validly commenced. In this view we think it is not necessary to consider the several authorities cited before us. Therefore our answers to question No. 1 is in the affirmative and that to questions 2 and 3 is in the negative, 9. With particular reference to question No. 2, we are further of the view that the circumstances mentioned in the statement of the case do not in law warrant the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for not filing the return. The assessee's power of attorney agent entered into a lengthy correspondence from 1948 to 1951 and on each occasion promised to submit returns and took time It was only at a very late stage that he took up the plea that the service of the notice is not valid. He had in our view sufficiently long time to produce the accounts and submit them. (10) The reference is accordingly answered with costs to the respondent which we fix at ₹ 200/-.
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1958 (2) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ct Magistrate is empowered to tender a pardon even after a commitment if the Court so directs. Under s. 8(2) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, the Special Judge has also been granted power to tender pardon. The conferment of this power on the Special Judge in no way deprives the District Magistrate of his power to grant a pardon under s. 337 of the Code. At the date the District Magistrate tendered the pardon the case was not before the Special Judge. There seems to us, therefore, no substance in the submission made that the District Magistrate had not authority to tender a pardon to Ram Saran Das, the approver, and consequently the approver's evidence was inadmissible. 11. The findings of the High Court establish the offence of the appellants under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and we can find no sufficient reason to think that the appellants were wrongly convicted thereunder. 12. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 13. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... under the appropriate authority and in regard to the accuracy of the statement contained therein. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this alleged acknowledgment also is of no avail to the appellant. In regard to s. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act which was sought to be relied upon by the appellant, it may be shortly stated that the liquidation proceedings had not been filed in the courts below and there is nothing to show that the requirements of s. 14 were at all satisfied. No cogent argument has been advanced before us on behalf of the appellant which would induce us to hold that the conclusion reached by the High Courtin this behalf was incorrect in any manner whatever. On all the above grounds we have come to the conclusion that the appellant's claim was clearly timebarred and the dismissal of his suit by the trial court as well as the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court were in order. This appeal will therefore stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 49 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... counsel for the Department Maqbulunissa v. Union of India AIR 1953 All. 47 at 479. In that case, it was observed that "this court has consistently taken the view that the powers of issuing writs, orders or directions should not be utilised for giving what is in essence a declaratory relief." To the same effect is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Sheoshankar v. State Government of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 Nag. 58 FB at 66. In view of the clear enunciation of the above-cited two decisions, I am unable to agree with the learned Advocate-General that I should grant a relief, which is merely declaratory, in this writ petition. The assessment has not yet been completed and the Income-tax Act provides a hierarchy of tribunals before whom the petitioner can agitate his grievances if any on the merits, if it should become necessary for him to do so. This writ petition must, therefore, be dismissed. Under all the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1958 (2) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
... ... ... ... ..... nt bail as mentioned in the several sub-sections of s. 426. That is how s. 426(2A) and (2B) now deal with the subject of bail even though the main section is a part of Chapter XXXI which deals with appeals, references and revisions. 12. We must accordingly hold that the view taken by the Bombay High Court about its inherent power to act in this case under s. 561A is right and must be confirmed. It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts under s. 561A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. After all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justice; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accused that the inherent power can and should be exercised in cases like the present. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... have already said, in a case of this description the question at issue is Is the payment one made by virtue of a contract to pay a share of profits simpliciter, or is the payment such which is in truth deductible before the divisible profits are ascertained? There is a line to be drawn between these two classes of cases, and the question is, on which side of the line does the present case fall. For the reasons I have already expressed, I hold that the payment of ₹ 72,963-12-0 in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 697 of 1955, and the payment of ₹ 76,526-1-3 in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 680 of 1953, cannot be held to be revenue expenditure deductible under section 10(2)(iii) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, and the question referred to the High Court by the Appellate Tribunal in both these cases must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of these references. Choudhary, J.-I agree.
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1958 (2) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... er of the Court below dated August 6, 1956 and direct that the appellant be brought on record as additional appellant in Appeal No. 152 of 1955. As Sudhir Kumar Mitter, the appellant now on record, has dropped the fight with the first respondent, we conceive that no embarrassment will result in there being on record two appellants with Conflicting interest. But, in any event, the Court can, if necessary, take action suo motu either under 0. 1, r. 10 or in its inherent jurisdiction and transpose Sudhir Kumar Mitter as second respondent in the appeal, as was done in In re Mathews. Oates v. Mooney (1905) 2 Ch. 460), and Vanjiappa Goundan v. Annamalai Chettiar (1939) 2 M.L.J. 551). As for costs, the appellant should, in terms of the order of this Court granting her leave to appeal, pay the contesting respondent her costs in this appeal. The costs of and incidental to the application in Appeal No. 152 of 1955 in the High Court will abide the result of that appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (2) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ainst an exercise of discretion that has been exercised along sound judicial lines. But if the discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that govern its exercise, then interference is called for if there has been a resultant failure of justice. As we have said, the only ground given for concluding that the defence is not bona fide is that the defendant did not prove his assertions before he was allowed to put in his defence; and there is an obvious failure of justice if judgment is entered against a man who, if he is allowed to prove his case, cannot but succeed. Accordingly, interference is called for here. o p /o p 21. The appeal is allowed. We set aside the orders of the High Court and the learned trial Judge and remand the case to the first Court for trial of the issues raised by the defendants. The costs of the appellants is this Court will be paid by the respondent who has failed here. o p /o p 22. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1958 (2) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... dicial decision on it. We do not consider it desirable on the present occasion to express any opinion as to whether any of those sections relied on requires a plain copy or a certified copy. It will suffice for us to hold that so far as s. 419 is concerned, having regard to the context and the purpose of that section, the copy to be filed along with the petition of appeal must be a certified copy. We have also been referred to several sections of the Code of Civil Procedure where the word " copy " is used. We do not consider it right to enter upon a discussion as to the true interpretation of the word " copy" occurring in any of those sections for we think that each section in each Act must, for its true meaning and effect, depend on its own language, context and setting. In the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... rvice Commission has placed upon these rules. I have no doubt that they should be observed, and are meant to be observed; and I have equally no doubt that there are constitutional sanctions which can be applied if they are flouted. But the sanction is political and not judicial and an act done in contravention of them cannot be challenged in a Court of Law. It is legally valid. Also, the fact that Government would not have acted in this way if they had realised that they were under a directive duty of the Constitution to consult the Union Public Service Commission first cannot alter the character of their act or affect its legal consequences. They had the power and they exercised it, consequently, their act became binding despite their mistake. That is how I would interpret the law and administer justice. 1 would allow the appeal and the petition with costs. BY COURT The appeal and the petition are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal and Petition dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... r, will the former be estopped, since there would be no mutuality " (Phipson on Evidence-9th Ed., p. 602.). The result is that s. 92 is wholly inapplicable to the present proceedings and so the appellants are entitled to lead evidence in support of the plea raised by them. It appears that the attention of the learned Judges who heard the appeal in the High Court at Bombay was not drawn to this aspect of the matter. That is why they proceeded to deal with the question about the admissibility of oral evidence led by the appellants on the assumption that s. 92 applied. We must accordingly set aside the decree passed by the court of appeal in the High Court at Bombay and send the appeal back to that Court for disposal on the merits in accordance with law. In the circumstances of this case, we think that the fair order as to costs of this appeal would be that the costs should abide the final result in the appeal before the High Court at Bombay. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1958 (2) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... es unproductive of profit, cannot be regarded as income for purposes of taxation. In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Fleming & Co. on which the Income-tax Department has placed much reliance, the main business consisted in acquiring agencies, of which they had acquired 10 and by reason of the cancellation of the one agency, they had still 9. In that case it was held that a diminution or increase in the agencies must be regarded as a normal feature incidental to the business. The further distinguishing feature about that case is that there was not what was called the parting of an enduring asset of business as we find here. 11. For all the above reasons we are of the opinion that this case could not be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. South India Pictures Ltd. and we, therefore, answer the question in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to his costs; Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1958 (2) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... k, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and especially having regard to the difficulty of precisely evaluating the rights, restrictions, conditions and covenants in favour of the first and second claimants, and in absence of any definite evidence led by the parties to show a more satisfactory assessment of the respective rights, apportionment of compensation between the first and second claimants in the proportion of 10 annas and 6 annas would meet the ends of justice. The same method of apportionment was also adopted by the Nagpur High Court in Laxmanrao v. Jagannath 1942 Nag. 32. We think, having regard to the circumstances, that the same method of apportionment of compensation should also be adopted in this case. There is no dispute that the first claimant is entitled to ₹ 17,489 out of the value of the trees and the balance of the values of the trees should go to the second and third claimants. 28. The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.
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1958 (2) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... language in a manner different from that which it plainly bears,. Lastly, in doing this many cases like Chose earlier mentioned including the present, which are clearly cases of industrial disputes would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent by interpretation a remote apprehension of a misuse of the Act. This would do more harm than good. 1 have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within s. 2 (k). As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so. I would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with law. ORDER OF THE COURT. In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (2) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... case we would like to make one observation. Our decision is not intended to lay down a general proposition that under no circumstances a Sattedar can be considered to be a worker within the meaning of its definition in the Act. Whether a particular person, under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of the contract entered into between him and the employer. In the case before us no attempt has been made by the prosecution to establish that the Sattedars were employed by the management for doing work in the factory. The uncontradicted evidence is that they were independent contractors who came to the factory to deliver the bidis or sent their coolies to do the same. Our decision is, therefore, confined to the facts of this case. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the convictions of the appellants under B. 92 of the Act and the sentences imposed upon them. The fines if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (2) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was right in holding that the Appellate Authority had exceeded its legal power?
Held that:- We would, however, like to make it clear that we are interfering with the interlocutory order passed by the High Court in this case because of its unusual and exceptional features. It is clear that our decision on the main points urged in the other appeals necessarily leads to the inference that, even if all the allegations made by the respondents in their petition before the Assam High Court are accepted as true, there would be no case whatever for issuing a rule. Indeed, the respondent found it difficult to resist the appellant's argument that, if the other appeals were allowed on the general contentions raised by the appellants, the dismissal of his petition before the Assam High Court would be a foregone conclusion. It is because of these special circumstances that we have decided to interfere with the interlocutory order in this case in the interests of justice.
The appeals must be allowed and the orders passed by the High Court in the several cases, set aside.
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