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Showing 1 to 20 of 56 Records
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1958 (4) TMI 132 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir primary function of administering justice as authorities charged with that function. I cannot find that there was any impediment caused in the present case to the administration of justice by this Court by what the appellants had done after this Court had disposed of the Revision Case and made the order which it considered fit and proper. In my view, while it is necessary to exercise the jurisdiction in contempt on proper occasions, it is of equal importance that the integrity of the proceedings in contempt ought to be maintained by taking the utmost care that it is not used on occasions or in cases to which it is not appropriate. 21. For the reasons given above, I find myself unable to uphold the order of the learned Judge. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the learned Judge, dated 17-1-1958, committing the appellants to prison for six months, is set aside. They shall be released forthwith. 22. We make no order for costs. S.C. Lahiri, J. 23. I agree.
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1958 (4) TMI 131 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... in defence. In any event, he should have been heard on the question as to why he should not be reverted, and the order of reversion should have been made after giving him an opportunity to be heard, or at least after hearing his explanation. 10. For the reasons aforesaid, it appears to me that the order of reversion of the petitioner to the substantive rank dated the 25th June, 1951 is bad and the Rule should be made absolute and a Writ in the nature of Certiorari is issued quashing the said order. There will also be a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the said order. There will be no order as to costs. 11. I must however make it dear that this does not mean that the petitioner should be reinstated in service, he having retired upon attaining the age of superannuation. It will only affect his arrears of pay and may affect his pension but those are not matters within the scope of this Rule and I am not called upon to deal with them.
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1958 (4) TMI 130 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assurance he wants to turn round and question the legality of the order of the Income-tax Officer for which he was himself responsible. In such circumstances, it would be a perverse exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 to quash the order of this Income-tax Officer. Another answer to this appeal is that it is within the discretion of the learned Judge to issue certiorari or not and this court will not interfere with the exercise of the discretion unless it finds that it was exercised erroneously or improperly. It cannot be postulated in this case that any such complaint can be made as against the orders under appeal. For all the above reasons this appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. The above judgment covers the other Writ Appeal Nos. 15, 16 and 17 of 1958 as the questions raised by them also are the same as those in Writ Appeal No. 9 of 1958. these appeals are also dismissed with costs. pleader's fee ₹ 50 in each. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (4) TMI 129 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Act. Mr. Sen has argued that this would put his client in a very difficult position as Goswami is really conducting the mine and it would be impossible for the petitioners to deal with the provident fund of the employees. In my opinion, that is not a relevant consideration for this Court. Either the petitioners come within the definition of an "employor" as given in the Act, or they do not. If by do, then it is up to them to safeguard their own interests in the best way possible, but they cannot escape liability under the Act or the Scheme framed thereunder. This point therefore fails. 16. These are the three points taken in this application all of which have, failed. The application must therefore fail and must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. 17. I direct that the copy of the agreement dated 12-1-1948 which has been handed over to me and made use of at the hearing be kept as of record.
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1958 (4) TMI 128 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... writ rather than an appeal, and we accept his affidavit that he had the money ready to make the security deposit if required. We think that the opinion which was given by his counsel was an opinion which might well have been given, but which, as it transpires, is erroneous on the decision of this Court, though a contrary view has been taken in another High Court. We think, therefore, that sufficient cause has been made out. 9. The contrary opinion which was given to him was by a junior counsel, and we think that the appellant has not acted with negligence in accepting the advice of his senior counsel. We are of opinion that sufficient cause has been made out for the delay in filing the present appeal. We accordingly extend the time under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 116A, but we made no order about the costs of this matter. 10. We further admit the appeal, which has already been delayed. Notice shall issue immediately on payment of process-fee within three days.
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1958 (4) TMI 127 - THE HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... he sells the property in its damaged state and the purchaser spends money for that purpose, section 28 still applies to prevent credit being taken for such expenditure in so far as it does not exceed the amount of the value payment. For these reasons I find great difficulty in reading into section 28 an implied provision with regard to cost of works payments but refusing to read in a similar provision with regard to value payments. But, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, I do not find it necessary to dissent from the conclusion at which your Lordships have arrived. LORD TUCKER. My Lords, for the reasons which have been stated by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. LORD SOMERVELL OF HARROW. My Lords, for the reasons which have been stated by my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors R. C. Bartlett & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1958 (4) TMI 126 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fine only would meet the ends of justice in this case. I would accordingly convict them and sentence them to pay a fine of ₹ 250 each. In default of the payment of the fine, respondent 1 will suffer simple imprisonment for one month. 9. The case of the second respondent stands on a different footing. He is the Factory Manager. There is no evidence that as Factory Manager he was in charge of the management of the affairs of the mills concerned. Therefore, his case is covered by Sub-section (2) of Section 14A. He cannot be held guilty of the offence unless the prosecution establishes that the offence was committed either with his consent, or with his connivance or was due to any neglect on his part. No such evidence has been adduced in this case, and it must be held, therefore, that he is not guilty of the offence. His acquittal is affirmed. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed so far as respondents 1 and 3 are concerned and is dismissed as regards the second respondent.
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1958 (4) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lf to the deduction of all that period between January 31, 1929 and July 4, 1940. It is also clear that the courts below were in error in expecting the contesting defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary. When the plaintiff has not satisfied the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within section 14, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the other contention raised on behalf of the appellants that, even after giving the benefit of section 14, the suit is still barred under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. This is a serious question which may have to be determined if and when it becomes necessary. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, it must be held that the suit is barred by limitation. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout. One set to be divided equally between the two appeals. 14. Appeals allowed.
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1958 (4) TMI 124 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of Income-tax v. Rajah of Parlakimedi 1926 2 I.T.C. 104, decided by the Madras High Court; Amir Singh Sher Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1935 3 ITR 171 , decided by the Lahore High Court; and Chimanram Motilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (Central), Bombay 1943 11 ITR 44 , decided by the Bombay High Court). Faced with these authorities Mr. Dutt conceded that his argument was put in an extreme form and that he would not contend that section 34 should not be applied if an assessee had returned a certain sum at the time of original assessment and the Income-tax authorities had wrongly refrained from taxing that amount. For the reasons we have already expressed we hold that the question referred to this Court must be answered in favour of the Income-tax department and that the proceeding under section 34 was validly taken and the interest on the arrears of rent was validly assessed under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference.
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1958 (4) TMI 123 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and this applies equally to religious as to other charities Gilmour v. Coats 1949 AC 426. In the ultimate analysis, on interpretation of the Annadan Patra it appears to be that the main object of the pilgrims' contributions was intended to benefit only the Pandaji (the assessee) himself and the pilgrims coming from a particular area, namely, the district from which the particular pilgrim making the contribution, came from. There was no element of public benefit in the document, the main purpose having been for the benefit of the Pandaji (the assessee) and the pilgrims of the district of the donor ; the other objects were only ancillary to the main purpose and, therefore, it did not make the said Annadan Patra anything but a private trust with the consequence that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of the exemptions under the Income-tax Act. In this view of the matter, I agree with the order proposed to be made in the main judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1958 (4) TMI 122 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erved at any time. It has been pointed out that this would place the assessee in a very disadvantageous position. It may so happen that a notice is issued by the office within eight years, but a large number of years expire before it is served. This may be a defect in the Act, but it can only be remedied in the appropriate manner. I have, however, to interpret the Act as I find it. It seems to me impossible to interpret it in any other fashion. That being so, the notice herein, having been issued within eight years and being in terms of the proviso, the fact that it was served beyond the eight years would not invalidate it. The result is that on both the points the petitioner has lost. There is, therefore, no reason to interfere in this matter, and the application must be dismissed. The rule must be discharged. The interim order is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. The operation of this order will be stayed for 3 weeks, in order to enable the petitioner to appeal.
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1958 (4) TMI 121 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e issued against the assessee if the escaped income is less than a lakh of rupees. Therefore, on the one hand, the assessee whose escaped income is less than a lakh of rupees is now put in a better position than he was before the amendment; the assessee whose escaped income is more than a lakh of rupees is put in a worse position because he can be proceeded against even without a direction contained in an order of an income-tax authority provided the Central Board of Revenue has applied its mind to the question of the issue of the notice. In our opinion, therefore, the notice issued by the Income-tax Officer is clearly bad. The petition must, therefore, succeed. The rule will be made absolute and there will be an order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. The respondents to pay the costs. We have not permitted Mr. Mehta to put forward his other contentions which he has set out in his petition, to show that the notice is bad, apart from the question of limitation.
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1958 (4) TMI 120 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... road traffic". He describes that allegation by Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement, B.N. Dutt, as wrongly made and' may have been inspired by Dutt's own personal note which he might have made at the interview between Mr. Barua and the Customs Officials. Finally India's Standard Specifications as laid down by the Indian Road Congress, which I have , quoted above defines culvert as a structure. 10. On fact and law, therefore, this order of appraisement and assessment cannot be sustain ed and I set aside such assessment. I, therefore,. make the Rule for Certiorari and Mandamus absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition and I direct the Customs Authorities to proceed according to the law laid down in this judgment and to assess these goods under Item 63 (9) of the Customs Tariff If by such assessment any money becomes refundable to the applicant, the- same should be refunded to the applicant after such fresh assessment according to law.
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1958 (4) TMI 119 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... connection it is necessary to point out that an omission to implead all the mortgagees either as plaintiffs or as defendants is different from a case where all the persons interested in the equity of redemption are not impleaded as parties. In such a case the omission to implead some of the persons interested in the equity of redemption will not entail the dismissal of the suit as the rights of the parties who are before the Court can be adjudicated leaving the rights of others not made parties to the action unaffected. Vide Nagenderan Chettiar v. Lakshmi Ammal (1933) 65 M.L.J. 108 I.L.R. 56 Mad. 846 (F.B.). 7. We, therefore, agree with Chandra Reddi, J., that the suit as laid was incompetent and that having regard to the provisions of Section 22 of the Limitation Act, the addition of the Official Receiver after the period of limitation had expired would not render the suit competent on the date on which it was filed. 8. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1958 (4) TMI 118 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f could have easily redeemed all the shares sold on 20-2-1951, if only He had been given one day's notice. For all these reasons I hold that the sale held on 20-2-51 is illegal and improper. 30. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The order of Sarkar, J. that the plaintiff is liable to pay interest at the rate of 3 1/2 per cent is affirmed; but his order relating to the validity of the sales is modified in the following manner (a) all the sales held by the Bank prior to 20-5-1949 are declared invalid; (b) all the sales held in 1949 on and after 20-5-1949 are confirmed; (c) all the sales held in 1950 are declared invalid and (d) the sale held on 20-2-1951 is also declared invalid. 31. As the success is divided the parties will bear their own costs before the Special Referee and the Court below; but the appellant will be entitled to half the costs of the paper book and the hearing fee in the appeal. Certified for two Counsel. P.B. Chakravartti, C.J. 32. I agree.
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1958 (4) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he appellant which could certainly be avoided if the preliminary objection urged by him was decided at the initial stage by the Election Tribunal. 45. We are therefore of the opinion that the orders passed by the High Court in M.J.C. No. 480 of 1957 and by the Election Tribunal in Election Petition No. 341 of 1957 were wrong and ought to be set aside. The Election Tribunal will decide the preliminary objection in regard to the non-compliance with the provisions of section 117 by the 2nd respondent in the light of the observations made above and deal with the same according to law. The parties will be at liberty to lead such further evidence before the Election Tribunal as they may be advised. The costs of both the parties, here, as well as in the courts below will be costs in the Election Petition to be dealt with by the Election Tribunal hereafter and will abide the result of its decision on the preliminary objection. 46. Appeals allowed. 47. Appeal No. 48 of 1958 remanded.
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1958 (4) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31, 1956, which also showed that no order was passed by way of punishment for misconduct. The Company chose to terminate the service of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order no. 16, and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for any alleged misconduct, and it was open to the Company to do so. So far as Standing Order no 16. is concerned, all the requirements thereof have been complied with. That being the position, no other point remains for decision in the present case. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated September 26, 1956, are set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders, we think it proper to say in this case that the parties must bear their own costs throughout Appeal allowed
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1958 (4) TMI 115 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion (8) of section 18A, there is a statutory duty cast on the Income-tax Officer to add interest where no advance payment of tax has been made. The Income-tax Officer has no discretion in the matter. He is bound to charge interest. And I have no difficulty in holding that when he has omitted to do so that omission is a mistake apparent from the record. I find that a similar view was taken in Meka Venkatappiah v. Additional Income-tax officer 1957 32 I.T.R. 274. On the final argument of Mr. Srinivasan that the Income-tax officer may have thought that rule II of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, applied to the case, two observations may be made. One is that it is unlikely he made such a mistake and the other is that if he did make such a mistake that would be an error apparent from the record. All the contentions taken before me fail. These writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1958 (4) TMI 114 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ence that the partnership is illegal and because an illegal partnership was assessed to tax, it is now open to them to proceed to assess the partners as an association of persons. The Department never paused to think as to why a partnership which is otherwise legal, ceases to be legal merely because it is not recognised by a particular Association. It is not suggested that this partnership is doing an illegal business or it has in any way violated the law or that it was not constituted as required by the law of partnership. The Department cannot suggest that because the Department itself has registered the firm and has treated the firm as a registered firm under the Income-tax Act. Whichever way one looks at the matter, there does not seem any justification for the issuing of this notice. The result is that the rule will be made absolute. There will be an order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. The respondent to pay the costs of the petition. Petition allowed.
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1958 (4) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... efore, proceed with the suit in their absence. The appeal, accordingly, is allowed with costs throughout and the decision of the High Court in appeal is set aside. The appellants are entitled to a declaration that the building constructed on the land demised under the lease, Ext. A, belongs to the Mankeshwar Temple Trust and the aid trust is entitled to recover all the rents and profits from the, same and the respondents have no right, title and interest therein since the expiration of the said lease. The first respondent is directed to render an account of the rents received by him from the tenants of the building from 23-5-48 and to pay to the appellants the amount found due, after accounting, with interest at 6 per annum from 23-5-48 until payment. There will be an order of injunction restraining the respondents, their agents and servants from interfering with the collection of rents and profits by the appellants from the tenants of the aforesaid building. Appeal allowed.
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