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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 65 Records
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1958 (9) TMI 111 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... them to that court and the High Court was accepted, and issued a strong admonition and warning to the two counsel for their conduct. Accordingly, in my view, on the authority of the above-said decision if the contemner tenders an unqualified apology after receipt of notice to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, he should be held guilty of contempt, but the court might accept the unqualified apology and discharge him without any punishment. It cannot, in view of the unqualified apology, drop the proceedings against the contemner. 14. Accordingly I hold the opposite party, Shri P. Topno, Income Tax Officer, Titlagarh, guilty of technical contempt of this court, but in view of the unconditional apology offered by him I do not propose to impose any punishment except observing that he would act with more circumspection and regard for law in future. The proceeding is disposed of accordingly. Under the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (9) TMI 110 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ministrative Officer during this interregnum might have changed his mind and counter manded or destroyed the order. In my opinion, the order cannot be said to have been made until the 3rd of May 1952, when it was served upon the petitioner. It is from that date that his dismissal should be counted. If that is so then in view of the reasonings, I have set out above, the reinstatement by the Corporation was quite in order. In fact, it is doubtful whether he had ever been dismissed. However, I need not deal with that aspect of the matter. It is sufficient to hold that the order of reinstatement made by the Corporation by its resolution in June 1952 was quite in order, and the order by the State Government annulling the resolution is defective and this hide must be made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of certiorari issued quashing the same and a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Government not to give effect to it. There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (9) TMI 109 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tal authorities, respondents Nos. 1 and 2, are liable to be set aside as they did not take into account the relevant factors on a consideration of which the petitioners claim had to be disposed of. I have only indicated the true basis in law for the claim for relief and the absence of any provision having the force of law in the 1936 Order itself prescribing any period of limitation. It will be for the first respondent to decide in the first instance whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief, and, if he is entitled, the authority will have to decide the quantum of relief in accordance with the provisions of the 1936 Order, in particular, rule I of Part II of that Order. 22. The rules nisi is made absolute and the orders of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will stand set aside, with a further direction to the first respondent to dispose of the application of the petitioner according to law. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Petition allowed.
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1958 (9) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bringing their ship back to the port. As a matter of fact, I am not sure that I can at all order refund in this application because moneys must have merged, in the general revenue. What I shall, therefore, do is to issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the order of the Additional Collector of Customs dated 5-9-1957, only in respect of the confiscation of the ship and payment of a fine in lieu thereof and direct that the matter may now be re-considered in accordance with law. But, mean-while I shall restrain the petitioner by an injunction from taking any steps for the refund of the fine which has been paid, pending the disposal of the matter by the Customs authorities which must be done within a reasonable time not exceeding six months from date of service of the order. There will be no order as to costs. I make it clear that the other parts of the order of the Additional Collector of Customs particularly the confiscation of the gold is not touched by this order.
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1958 (9) TMI 107 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by Section 172, has further held that the seizure of the goods was also authorised by Section 178. In taking this view also he was right, but in my opinion it is sufficient to refer to Section 172 and it is not necessary to invoke Section 178. 21. For the reasons given above the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Judge quashing the orders contained in the notices dated, respectively, the 19th May, the 20th May and the 23rd May, 1955 and the order for a writ of mandamus, directing the Appellants to forbear from giving effect to them is set aside, subject to the reservation as to the right of the Respondents to claim the constitutional immunity if and when they think they are going to be subjected to self-incrimination, as I have explained above. The Cross-objection is dismissed and the result is that the application of the Respondents for various writs made on the 23rd May, 1955, is also dismissed. There will be no order for costs. K.C. Das Gupta, J. 22. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 106 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant bore clear marks of falsehood and there was the further circumstance that no partner of the firm or any person other than the representative who was supposed to have fallen ill had ever pledged his oath or sought to support the representative. In view of the fact that the date on which the arbitration proceedings were held was the first date of hearing that it was an arbitration held by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce conducted according to the Rules which I have mentioned and in view of the further fact, as found by the learned Judge, that the appellant's conduct amounted to refusal to attend, I am of opinion that the appellant cannot make any grievance that the award was made ex parte. 7. This is the only point which was urged by the appellant before the learned Judge below and which is, as I have already pointed out, open to us in appeal. As that point fails, the appeal must fail as well. 8. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Lahiri, J. 9. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 105 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tified copies." The words underlined by us show that the Legislature has given a special meaning to the expression "certified copies". We, therefore, respectfully agree with the opinion expressed in the Madras and Calcutta cases referred to above and hold that the assessee was entitled under section 115 of the Travancore Income-tax Act (corresponding to section 67A of the Indian Income-tax Act) to exclude the time taken for obtaining the certified copies after the intimation received by him of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's orders. It follows that the two appeals, Nos. 5007 and 5008 of 1952-53, were preferred in time and that the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in dismissing them as time-barred. The question referred is answered accordingly, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. As the assessee has succeeded in the reference the Department will pay its costs including an advocate's fee of ₹ 150. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (9) TMI 104 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... do fall under section 27, then all the three authorities have laid down that an appeal against the assessment under section 23(4) must be restricted to the quantum. The result, therefore, is that we must uphold the view of the Tribunal, although with respect we feel that the controversy between the parties has not been properly brought out in the questions as framed by the Tribunal. We will, therefore, reframe the question and divide it into two parts. The first question will be "(1) Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessee could have made an application under section 27 ?" To that our answer will be in the affirmative. "(2) If the assessee could have made an application under section 27, whether it was open to him to challenge the validity of the assessment under section 23(4) in an appeal under section 30 ?" And our answer to that question will be in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs. The notice of motion is dismissed with costs.
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1958 (9) TMI 103 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ponsibility and automatically becomes entitled to the protection under Section 5 of the Limitation Act merely by entrusting his work to a senior advocate. But if the view taken by the legal adviser is quite a reasonable view even though mistaken and the advice could be given by any senior lawyer inspite of due care and caution then only the party is entitled to the provisions of Section 5 or Section 14 of the Limitation Act. But this is not the position in the instant case. The advocate invited a great risk to his client without any justification whatsoever. The lower appellate Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the petition. Moreover, as we nave already mentioned, the appeal was incompetent even in the absence of defendant No. 1, the judgment-debtor who was not made a party and there was no attempt made to make him a party at any subsequent stage also. 11. In conclusion, therefore, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Sujit Barman Roy, J. 12. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 102 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rofit contained in them was clearly liable to be taxed as business income. Indeed, when the assessee company admitted that its receipts from the sublessees by way of royalties were business receipts of an income nature and had been properly brought to tax, it admitted that in dealing with the coal-fields and the coal-mining leases by way of subletting them it had been carrying on a business and had not been holding and exploiting them as a mere proprietor. If so, and if its transactions with the sublessees which yielded the royalties was a business, it is impossible to see how the selami amounts, arising out of the same transactions, could be anything but business receipts earned by using the coal-fields and their head-leases as stock-in-trade. For the reasons given above, the answer to the question referred must, in my opinion, be in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax will have his cost of this reference. GUHA, J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (9) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... got to consider not the assessable income of the company but the actual profits made by the company; and again in Bipinchandra Maganlal & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 28 ITR 1 when the total income of the assessee was increased by a notional income, we held that, although the notional income was part of the assessable income, it did not constitute the actual profits of the assessee from a commercial point of view and that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in making an order on the basis that this notional income constituted the profits of the assessee. Our attention has also been drawn by Mr. Joshi to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Mazagaon Dock's case 1958 34 ITR 368 where the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that the income under section 42(2) is a notional income. The result is that the assessee succeeds on this reference and we must answer the question submitted to us in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs.
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1958 (9) TMI 100 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plication of the income and, therefore, the income is assessable in the hands of the settlor, irrespective of whether the wife is also assessable on her receipts. The case is outside the main clause of section 16(1)(c) and, therefore, the third proviso to the section is also not relevant. The assessee exhibited a certificate from the company, showing that they had paid the dividend for a certain year to the wife. In what form that was paid has not been explained, but in view of the terms of the deed it could have been paid over only on an endorsement of the dividend warrant by the settlor. The third question must, therefore, be answered in the Department's favour. In the result, the three questions are answered as follows Question No. 1 "No." Question No. 2 "No-." Question No. 3 "Yes." In view of the fact that many of the contentions of the Department before the Tribunal were not tenable, we would make no order as to costs. Guha, J.-I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 99 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thority? It was on an erroneous view of the law that the Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee, and as we said there was no occasion at that stage to investigate the question at issue on a proper basis. We therefore direct the Tribunal to examine the question afresh, after affording an opportunity to both the assessee and the department to place all the relevant material on record, and submit a further statement of the case. The documents filed by the assessee with T. C. M. P. No. 42 of 1958 will be forwarded to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal will afford the assessee an opportunity to produce further documents, if any, as are relevant for the determination of the question. (20) The Tribunal will submit the further statement of the case within three months from the date of the receipt of the records by the Tribunal. It may not be necessary to print the further statement of the case. The Department will furnish typed papers after which the case will be posted for disposal.
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1958 (9) TMI 98 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere is a further clear indication that the view we are taking is correct in the explanation to clause 2 of the Order which was subsequently substituted and that explanation is "For the purposes of this paragraph, the expression 'all depreciation actually allowed under any laws or rules of a Part B State', means and shall be deemed always to have meant the aggregate allowances for depreciation taken into account in computing the written down value under any laws or rules of a Part B State or carried forward under the said laws or rules." Now, this explanation makes it amply clear that in determining the aggregate, depreciation which can be carried forward under any rules applicable to a part B State must also be taken into account. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in the view that it took on both the questions. The result therefore is that the answer that we must give to question (1) is in the negative and the answer to question (2) in the affirmative.
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1958 (9) TMI 97 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d apply to the trustees of the first trust. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion which it did with regard to this amount basing its decision on the fact that Manilal was the sole beneficiary under the trust. We should have mentioned that with regard to the amount of ₹ 410 the Tribunal seems to have proceeded on the basis that the daughter had a vested interest in the sum of ₹ 410. We do not accept that proposition at all. The interest does not vest in the daughter. It is contingent on her attaining majority, and it seems clear that even the Tribunal has proceeded to decide against the assessee with regard to the sum of ₹ 410 on the supposition that the daughter had some interest in this sum of ₹ 410. As we have already pointed out, the daughter has no present interest whatever in this sum of ₹ 410. The result is that we must answer question No. 1 in the negative and question No. 2 also in the negative.
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1958 (9) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pplicable and whether the Income-tax Officer can exercise the power conferred upon him under section 23A. Now, applying the ratio of that decision to the facts of this case, it is undoubtedly true that the nature of the company before us is not one which sub-section (9) would exclude from the category of companies to which section 23A applies. Therefore, undoubtedly it is true that section 23A applies to this company. But the question still remains whether the provisions of that section can be applied. In other words, whether the Income-tax Officer can exercise his power vis-a-vis this company, and again it is not disputed that the company having paid the statutory dividends the section is not applicable. To put it very briefly, although the section does apply to the assessee company, in the present case it is not applicable because the company has paid the statutory dividends. We therefore agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and answer the question in the affirmative.
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1958 (9) TMI 95 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to assess a loss shown in a return, the more so as in this case he actually issued a notice under section 23(2) after the return had been made. Mr. Joshi is not in a position to distinguish Ranchhod's case (supra) but he put forward a rather amazing argument that because he wants to appeal to the Supreme Court he wants to satisfy us that the judgment is erroneous because a certain aspect of the matter was not considered by us. Now, we have often said in this court that when we have a judgment of a co-ordinate authority we accept the judgment without more. The correctness of that judgment can only be challenged in a higher court or if the Chief Justice is persuaded to constitute a Full Bench. Therefore, although we have listened to Mr. Joshi's argument with interest, we feel that that argument should be accepted or answered by a higher Tribunal. We answer the questions submitted to us- (1) in the affirmative, and (2) in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs.
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1958 (9) TMI 94 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r tenure ana before its confirmation, such estate or tenure has become vested in the State under the Act. the execution proceeding cannot be regarded as having terminated and is a proceeding pending on the date of vesting within the meaning of Clause (d), and, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed further with tbe execution proceeding. The legal consequence of this vesting is that the prcceed-ing must be dropped. Such a case also comes under Clause (e), and because of the statutory prohibition of attachment and sale of an estate or tenure that has vested in the State as contained therein, the Conrt should have no jurisdiction to confirm the sale. Therefore, either under Clause (d) or Clause (e) the entire execution proceeding is incompetent and must be quashed. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the execution proceeding pending in the Court below is dropped. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Ramaswami, C.J. 7. I agree.
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1958 (9) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ehalf of the appellants. It was urged that the cause of action for a suit for partition by a minor was one personal to him, and that on his death before hearing, the suit must abate on the principle of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. But that maxim has application only when the action is one for damages for a personal wrong, and as a suit for partition is a suit for property, the rule in question has no application to it. That was the view taken in Rangasayi v. Nagarathnamma (1) at pp. 137-138 and in Mandliprasad v. Ramcharanlal (2) at p. 871, and we are in agreement with it. All the contentions urged in support of the appeal have failed, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The amounts paid by the appellants to the respondents in pursuance of the order of this Court dated March 7, 1958, will be taken into account in adjusting the rights of the parties under this decree. (1) (1933) I.L.R. 57 Mad. 95. Appeal dismissed. (2) I.L.R. 1947 Nag. 848.
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1958 (9) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , it is competent to persons, who may be said to be in the position of sub-partners under one of the partners, to insist upon being recognised by the Income-tax Department and to insist upon registration of the sub-partnership firm. In such a case, it would be a partnership within a partnership and the Department would also have to recognise the sub-partnership or the sub-firm as an entity, which would be entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions contained in section 23(5)(a). In view, however, of the conclusion we have already reached it is not necessary for us to pursue that question or discuss the implications of registration of a sub- partnership. In the result, the assessee's contention must succeed. Our answer to the question will be that the sum of ₹ 5,864 shall be assessed in the hands of the assessee as his share in the profits of the registered firm and not the sum of ₹ 14,661. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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