|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 44 Records
-
1959 (11) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
... ...
... ... ..... ered the observation in Pisani's case, (1874) 5 PC 516 concerning decisions extra cursus curiae not affording adequate material for the appellate court to properly exercise its power to review. The same criticism could be justly offered against the view in ILR 47 Mad. 39 for without any express or implied surrender of right to appeal, the acquiescence of parties may put the trial court out of its usual course causing no material on record for proper exercise of appellate powers and giving parties to such a proceeding the right to appeal cannot he accepted as correctly following precedents. I therefore hold that the right of appeal would be lost where there be expressed or implied waiver of such right. Further if the decision appealed against be extra cursus Curiae, no appeal would lie provided the procedure followed by the original court results in consequences mentioned in the observation quoted from Pisani's case ((1874) 5 PC 516). This is my reply to the reference.
-
1959 (11) TMI 74 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Littledale, J., observed I am of opinion, that where goods are warranted the vendee is entitled, although he does not return them to the vendor, or give notice of their defective quality, to bring an action for breach of the warranty. This dictum is relied upon, but obviously, the dictum must be understood together with the implications of such a situation. It is for the buyer to establish that the defective qualities existed throughout, and at the time of delivery. Unless he establishes this, the dictum cannot apply. 41. Under those circumstances, we must certainly hold that the appellants are entitled to succeed, since the plaintiffs respondents failed to prove that there was a breach of condition as to the description of these goods, assuming that this was a sale of specific goods by description, or that there was a breach of warranty as to merchantable quality. I hence agree that the appeal must be allowed, and the suit dismissed with costs throughout. 43. Appeal allowed.
-
1959 (11) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... idance or reduction of the excess profits tax. Therefore, the formation of the new companies could not have been prompted by a desire to be relieved of a portion of the work. The real or dominant object must have been to divert the profits to the other partners, so that the excess profits tax might be reduced. Having regard to the relationship between the partners, the circumstance that Mr. Karumuthu Thiagaraja Chettiars share of profits were reduced by the arrangement could not militate against the conclusion that it was made with the object of avoiding or reducing the liability to excess profits tax. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had, in our opinion sufficient material for coming to the conclusion that the main object of the transaction was for avoidance of excess profits tax. We answer the question referred to as in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1959 (11) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58(1) (a) read with s. 58(2) in the order of renewal made by it in favour of the petitioners on December 15, 1958. The petitioners will get one set of costs from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has contested these petitions. In Petition No. 76 of 1959. 39. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, we allow the petition and quash that part of the order complained against which specified the renewal of the permits upto September 30, 1959, and direct the Authorities to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58(1)(a) read with s. 58(2) in the order of renewal made by them in favour of the petitioners on April 30, 1959. 40. The petitioners will get their costs, except hearing costs as the hearing was common with Petition No. 75 of 1959, from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has opposed the petition.
-
1959 (11) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... But as the language, character and purpose of Section 45G is different, this decision is of no assistance to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant also cited in support of his argument the case of (1875) 1 Ch D 48 to which I made reference in my judgment dated 2.5-2-1958 in the Sree Bank case, Matter No. 280 of 1957, D/- 25-2-1958 (Cat), Section 10 of the Judicature Act 1875 which was cons- but trued in that case is materially different in its nature and object from the section which is the subject-matter of consideration before us now, and so this decision is also of no avail to the appellant. It may also be noted that the general proposition laid down by lessel, M.R. in this case of (1875) 1 Ch. D 48 has been criticised and modified by Sir Raymond Ever-shed in the case of Hutchinson v. Jauncey (1950) 1 All ER 165. 47. In my view this last contention of the leaned counsel for the appellant must fail. 48. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
-
1959 (11) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Act. Even if the currency notes are returned to the petitioner, they would, the veiy next moment, be liable to attachment for recovery of the penalty. In the circumstances, I think that the proper disposal of these currency notes may well be left to the magistrate; in any event I do not think that a case has been made out for my interference. 23. I might perhaps mention that it was said in the course of the argument that the action of the customs officers in this case was in violation of the right of innocent passage afforded to the vessel by international law. The facts stated by me should suffice to show that there was no such violation, and. in any case, I can decide only in accordance with the municipal law. As I see it, the relevant municipal law is not at conflict with international law, but even if it were, I would have to enforce it and it would be for the legislature to resolve the conflict. 24. I dismiss the petition with costs. (Advocate's fee ₹ 250/-).
-
1959 (11) TMI 69 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, the Indian Companies Act deliberately makes no provision for exercise of jurisdiction in regard to resignation of directors. This is on the well recognised principle that courts should not generally interfere in the internal affairs of the company unless where the act complained of is ultra vires of the company or a fraud on the minority or where there is absolute necessity to waive a rule in order that there may not be a denial of justice. 12. Therefore, when this application is made to this company court invoking powers not provided for by the Companies Act or the rules made thereunder and which absence cannot be made good by judicial legislation it has got to be dismissed, leaving it open to the Registrar of the Companies to recognise the resignation of the applicant and give effect thereto in his further dealings with the company. 13. This application is dismissed subject to the above observations. 14. Application dismissed.
-
1959 (11) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ted would have operation only from that date with respect to the State so adopting. 29. There is nothing in the Act to make the operation of the Act retrospective either by express words or necessary implication to a date earlier than the date of the publication of the notification under S. 5(2); it must follow that the duty will be leviable in regard to the agricultural lands of a deceased only in case of his death after the publication of the notification by the Central Government under S. 5(2), that is, 11-6-1955. 30. In the present case, the deceased died in April 1955, sometime prior to the coming into force of the Estate Duty Act in respect of the agricultural lands in the Madras State; the applicant would be entitled to a rebate of duty with respect to the value of the agricultural lands situate in the Madras State. The question referred to us is answered in the negative. The applicant will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/-. Answer accordingly.
-
1959 (11) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nting and violating the order already passed on 16-10-1958. I am, however, not satisfied that any such violation of the order of that date has been made by the opposite parties as calls for any action. The orders now being questioned are independent orders-passed after the earlier application had been decided. In the earlier application some portions of the order questioned had been quashed but no directions had been issued which could be disobeyed. Therefore, there can be no question of violating or disobeying those orders. This prayer cannot, therefore, be granted. 19. In the result the applicant succeeds passed on 24-10-1958, a copy of which is annexure 'C' of the application, is quashed. The order passed by the District Magistrate opposite party No. 2 on 31-10-1958 is quashed to this extent that it cannot apply to letters or parcels received after the date of the order and will also not apply to anything other than letters and parcels. It is. ordered accordingly.
-
1959 (11) TMI 66 - PRIVY COUNCIL
... ...
... ... ..... sections cannot be read as part of a co-ordinated scheme in which the provisions of one reflect upon and adopt the provisions of the other. They do not in fact harmonise as they stand ; if they are to be harmonised, it must be by new enactment of the legislature in which the various complications of their inter-relation can be foreseen and specifically provided for. 8. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be allowed ; that the order of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa dated April 2, 1958, and the order of the High Court of Tanganyika dated November 12, 1956, be set aside and that the respondent be ordered to pay the appellant's costs of those two hearings ; and that the assessments T, 1234 and 3718 which are under appeal should be remitted to the respondent with directions to amend them in accordance with their Lordships' opinion here expressed. The respondent must pay the costs of the appellant of this appeal.
-
1959 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s conceded that he had knowledge of the litigation between Rukhmabai and Chandanlal claiming the property under the trust deed; but, for that suit he was not a party and the decision in that litigation did not in any way bind him or affect his possession of the house. But in execution of the decree, the Commissioner appointed by the Court came to the premises on February 13, 1937, to take measurements of the house for effecting partition of the property, when the plaintiff raised objection, and thereafter in 1940, filed the suit. From the aforesaid facts, it is manifest that the plaintiff's right to the property was not effectively threatened by the appellant till the Commissioner came to divide the property. It was only then there was an effectual threat to his right to the suit property and the suit was filed within six years thereafter. We, therefore, hold that the suit was within time. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 35. Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (11) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF ASSAM
... ...
... ... ..... come for purposes of taxation." In this case there has been no remission by the bank and the advantage that the assessee derived was in the matter of transaction through these deposits. This case could not be applied even in the case of transaction with the depositors since the assessee owed them nothing; nor was any remission granted by them in the matter of liability. What took place was clear transactions of purchase of the full payment certificates from the depositors with a view to cash them for higher values for satisfying the assessee's liability to the bank. These cases, therefore, have no bearing on the point at issue. We accordingly decide the point under reference in favour of the Department and hold that the surplus of ₹ 16,995 received from the transactions amounted to profit under section 10 of the Income-tax Act. The point under reference is answered in the affirmative and the assessee is liable to pay ₹ 200 as costs. Mehrotra, J.-I agree.
-
1959 (11) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... are not at liberty to contend that the second decision which is the final decision in the matter, should be interfered with in appeal. ( 4. ) Apart from all this, Section 3 -A (4)(b) of Madras Act XXIX of 1956 is very clear that the decision of the Tribunal upon such matters on appeal " shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law ". We find that a precisely similar provision has been enacted in Section 7(3) of Madras Act XXX of 1956. Whatever might be the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, so long as this Court is exercising its powers in civil appeal, its jurisdiction to interfere will certainly by affected by these valid provisions of law. Hence we hold upon all the grounds set forth above, that the dismissal of the suit by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge was proper, and that no interference is merited in appeal. The appeal accordingly fails, and is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
-
1959 (11) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r the circumstances, reason to believe that part of the income had escaped assessment. It will be recollected, and in this respect I cannot go beyond the assessment order, that the assessee did not take advantage of the proceedings and did not adduce any evidence in respect of its case, or at least the evidence adduced is not sufficient. Mr. Mitter argued that evidence had been adduced and should have been found satisfactory. However, I am not a court of appeal upon such points, and I cannot go behind the finding of the Income-tax Officer in respect thereof. If the case of the assessee is that such findings are incorrect, he should appeal in the usual manner. The result is that I find no ground for interference in this case and this application must fail. The rule is discharged. Interim order is vacated. No order as to costs. The operation of this order will be stayed for six weeks from date. But any further stay must be taken from the court of appeal if appeal is preferred.
-
1959 (11) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oods subsequent to the arrival thereof without his being concerned in illegal importation thereof into India. It appears to me that tile words "person concerned" relate to all those who may have an interest already accrued in the illegal importation prior to the period of time of such importation. That however I have no reason to decide in this case and does not arise before me. So far OS the petitioners are concerned I cannot hold that they were persons concerned in the importation of these two slabs of gold into India. That they have been helping Shankarlal in destroying the evidence of gold of Foreign origin smuggled into India does not in any manner make them persons concerned in the offence as mentioned in Section 167(8). 13. The petitioners are accordingly entitled to have the penalty imposed upon them quashed. The impugned order as against the petitioners will therefore stand quashed. The respondents will pay costs if 'of the petition to the petitioners.
-
1959 (11) TMI 60 - HOUSE OF LORDS
... ...
... ... ..... arent company and controlling shareholder of the subsidiary companies, but that does not avoid the fact that it was a different person from the African subsidiaries. I should have thought, therefore, that there might be a question whether the African subsidiaries could be said to be in any sense resident in the United Kingdom in respect that no actings of theirs could be said to show that the central management and control actually abided there. On the other hand, it is a matter of concession that the African subsidiaries have a residence in Africa, and if there is nothing to show that they have also a residence in the United Kingdom the appeal would be bound to fail. This question was not, however, raised on the appeal and did not, as I understand, enter into the decision of the Court of Appeal, and as your Lordships think that on the issues raised in this appeal the appeal should be allowed, I, with some hesitation, am prepared to agree with your Lordships. Appeal allowed.
-
1959 (11) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uestion to be decided has not been decided, (2) it is not clear whether the Tribunal intended to dismiss the appeal or set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and remand it, and that we should direct it to rehear the same. We cannot see how we can give any such direction, as the matter has not been brought to us on a proper reference. As we indicated, it is difficult to accept the extreme contention urged on behalf of the assessee that the appeal had been dismissed. Question 1 cannot, therefore, arise. As regards the second question, we are of opinion that, as the question as to who received the foreign profits during the year of account was not properly the subject of appeal the Tribunal was not competent to decide that question by giving a finding that the joint family received the foreign remittance and remand the proceedings for fresh assessment. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1959 (11) TMI 58 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assessee by his son-in-law. Reliance was placed on the case of Mangalchand Gobardhan Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1954 26 I.T.R. 706 (Ass.). In that case the question as framed assumed that if it was established as a fact that the money did not belong to the third party, it was an income of the assessee from an undisclosed source. In that case also however it was laid down that there must be some material, before the taxing authorities could treat the amount as an income of the assessee. On the materials before them it was found in that case that the money belonged to the assessee. Here, as I have already pointed out, except the circumstance that Nisi Kanta Saha had no means to get that amount, there is no other material before the assessing authorities from which it could be inferred that the money belonged to the assessee and thus it was a taxable income from some other source. I would, therefore, answer question No. 3 in the negative. Questions answered accordingly.
-
1959 (11) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r the knives and lasts constituted machinery or plant It was apparently taken for granted that if they could be brought within the scope of the statutory expression machinery or plant , the fact that they were integrated with other machinery did not bar the grant of the allowances to which new machinery was entitled Of course, that decision is not authority as such for the conclusion we have reached, that the diesel engines of the assessee came within the scope of the statutory expression new machinery , and the fact that they were made parts of vehicles was not relevant in deciding whether the assessee was entitled to the further allowance for depreciation for which paragraph 2 of section 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(via) provided o p /o p We answer the second question as amended by us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee o p /o p As neither side has wholly succeeded in this reference each party will bear its costs o p /o p Reference answered accordingly o p /o p
-
1959 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... which pardon was tendered. These three cases really turn on the question whether the accused had complied with the conditions upon which the pardon was tendered to him and it was held that be had so complied. In those circumstances, the trial under s. 339 was held to be bad. We are not concerned in the present case with s. 339. What we have to decide is whether a pardon under S. 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted in the case of an offence under s. 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. To that there can be only one answer on the terms of s. 337(1), namely, that no pardon can be granted for an offence of this nature. Therefore, as the present proceedings before the magistrate are only for an offence under s. 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, Mehra cannot be examined as an approver in that court. There is no force in these appeals and they are hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
|
