|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 44 Records
-
1959 (3) TMI 78 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, there occurs the following passage-- The long acquiescence of the Legislature in the interpretation put upon its enactment by notorious practice may perhaps be regarded as some sanction and approval by it. James L. J., The Anna , (1876) 1 P. D. 253. On reconsideration of the matter, therefore, I feel satisfied that the view taken in Bisseswar's case AIR1924Cal1034 is correct and the questions before the Full Bench should be answered in the way in which my Lord has answered them and the application should be disposed of in the manner in which he has disposed of it. 37. The problem however, that more or less gave rise to the reference still remains unsolved because of the existence of a lacuna in the law, revealed by a close examination of the relevant sections, as pointed out by my Lord and, it will be for the Legislature to consider how far it is desirable to have this lacuna removed by appropriate amendments of the relevant sections.
-
1959 (3) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... form, for example, of grant of licences, issue of notices, submission of returns, and so on, actually resulting in wholesale abuse of its provisions, this Court will not permit an applicant under Art. 32 to lead evidence to show that the law was meant to hit him alone. However, the applicants also rely on the infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f). As to that, I have doubts whether an application under Art. 32 challenging a general law of this kind, which affects one or other of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19, can be maintained, in the absence of any further provision therein for direct enforcement of its provisions by the State in the form already indicated above, by a person who merely apprehends that he might in certain eventualities be affected by it. However, on the present occasion, I do not propose to press my doubts to the point of dissent and therefore concur with the proposed order. 19. Preliminary objection overruled.
-
1959 (3) TMI 76 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s been defined as a right which a creditor has over a thing belonging to another, as which consists in the power to cause it to be sold in order to be paid his claims out of the proceeds. It is an Act of pleading a thing as security for a debt or demand without parting with the possession. It follows as a consequence that although the property remains in the possession of the debtor, it cannot be transferred to a third party without the express consent or permission of the creditor. (9) I entertain no doubt in my mind that the respondent in the present case had hypothecated the property to the Bank and consequently that the Bank must be deemed to have been placed in the possession of the property hypothecated to it. I would accordingly hold that the decision of this case must be regulated by the provisions of S. 17. The order of the learned Single Judge must be upheld and the appeal dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly. K.L. Gosain, J. (10) I agree. 11) Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 75 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ssion and as regards the mesne profits the direction of the trial court was that the plaintiff would be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 350/- per year from the date of the suit till the date of possession and dismissed the claim lor damages. Against the order of the trial Court, refusing to give a decree to the plaintiff for mesne profits for three years prior to the suit, the plaintiil did not take any action. That order has become final. As per the directions of the trial Court, the plaintiff therefore would only be entitled to mesne profits from the date ot the suit till the date of possession. This will be determined by the trial Court under Order 20, Rule 12, C. P. C. 8. The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored as indicated above. The appellant would be entitled to costs throughout. The mesne profits will be determined by the trial court under Order 20, Rule 12, C. P. C.
-
1959 (3) TMI 74 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... xecution of Ex. B-5. The present case of the appellant is that Ex. B-5 came into existence four months after the sale in favour of Padmanabhudu. This implies that no possession was obtained by the vendee in part performance of the contract. If it should be assumed that the sale under Ex. B. 5 was earlier, then the sale of Padmanabhudu would convey nothing because the title to the property had already passed to Nagayya under Exhibit B. 5.' This is also pointed out by the learned District Munsif, who observed that admittedly the last unregistered sale deed in favour of Padmanabhudu was said to have been executed by Suramma alone who had no right since she had executed Ex, B-5 prior to that. Placed in that predicament, the appellant could not avail herself of the protection granted to a vendee under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 22. For these reasons, we must affirm the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss this second appeal with costs.
-
1959 (3) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rds, unless it is shown that the repugnancy is between the provisions of a subsequent law and those of an existing law in respect of the specified matters, the Article would be inapplicable; and, as we have already pointed out, Schedule Seven which contains the three Legislative Lists was not then extended to the State; and it is, therefore, impossible to predicate that the matter covered by the prior law is one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. That is why Art. 254 cannot be invoked by the appellant. On this view, it is not necessary to consider whether the construction sought to be placed by the appellant on this Article is otherwise correct or not. 47. The result is that all the grounds urged by the appellant against the validity of the Act fail, and so it must be held that the High Court was right in taking the view that the plaintiff had not shown that the Act was ultra vires. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. 48. Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
... ...
... ... ..... ction 4 of the Act is not a case covered by item 18 of paragraph 2 of the Standing Order and the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary could, therefore, lawfully discharge the functions of the State Government under Section 4 of the Act. 39. The issues relating to the sanction and satisfaction by the State Government and as to the authority of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary to the Department to dispose of the case have not been clearly raised in the petition or in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. Sinha J., however, allowed these issues to be raised and went into them apparently without any objection by the parties. The learned Advocate General did not complain before us that the issues were not properly raised. His argument was that the issues should be answered in favour of the Appellants, We have, therefore, to decide the Appeals on the footing that the issues were properly raised and gone into by Sinha J 40. I concur in the order made by my Lord.
-
1959 (3) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that the land comprised in that sale stands forfeited to the Government. As regards the purchase price, we hold, for the reasons already stated, that it belongs to the purchaser and in the absence of approprite provisions of law it cannot be forfeited to Government. The order of the Mamlatdar in regard to this must, therefore, be quashed as also his order directing the recovery of the money as an arrear or land revenue. the order of the Prant Officer in appeal and of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal in revision must also be quashed. We accordingly make the rule absolute in both the applications to the extent of quashing the orders of the Mamlatdar, the Prant Officer and the Bombay Revenue Tribunal in so far as the forfeiture of the purchase money is concerned, as prayed for in Special Civil Application No. 2880 of 1958 and in terms of prayer 10 (d) and (e) as set out in Special Civil Application No. 2881 of 1958. There will, however, be no order as to costs. (8) Order accordingly.
-
1959 (3) TMI 70 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... per or a cartoon about a donkey on which the agitation was started by the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, it was contended before the Supreme Court that Section 295-A was ultra vires in that it interfered with the petitioner's right to freedom of expression guaranteed to him under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and it was urged that the restriction imposed thereon was not a reasonable restriction. While dealing with this question, their Lordships stated that where the restriction was in the interests of the security of the State and where the restriction is made in the interests of public order, such a restriction was a reasonable restriction and, therefore, it is no longer open to contend that Section 295-A of the Penal Code is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution--Vide . 85. For all the above reasons I am in agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice that this writ petition should be dismissed with costs.
-
1959 (3) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... posting the cheque the place of payment, there need not be an express request by the creditor and such a request may be spelt out from the facts and circumstances of the case. But on the evidence in this case there appears neither an express request made by the creditor nor any material from which an implied request may be spelt out. There is not even evidence of demand made by the assessees of the money due to them. The mere posting of the cheques from what then was part of British India in satisfaction of the claim of the assessees will not, in our judgment, be sufficient to justify the view that the cheques were remitted in pursuance of an implied request made by the assessees to send the same by post. 4. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was right in the view it took, and the answer to the question referred will be in the affirmative. The assessees will be entitled to their costs from the Commissioner of Income Tax. 5. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1959 (3) TMI 68 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s were clerks and it was found that the business of the creditor was not such as would justify lending such a substantial sum of money. The attestors as in the previous instances were none other than the clerks of the partnership firm of Prafulla Chandra Sudha Khaddar Bhandar and some others were the assessees friends. 7. In so far as the deposits in the Andhra Bank were concerned, the assessee's explanation was that they consisted of small amounts representing accommodation cheques; but the assessee was not able to establish this fact. In these circumstances the Income Tax authorities were justified in holding that these items formed part of the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources. In our view there was ample material for the Income Tax authorities to come to that conclusion. 8. In the result, our answers to all the three questions are in the affirmative. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs to the department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250/-.
-
1959 (3) TMI 67 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ued, came within the mischief of section 44. Quite apart from this, the contention for the assessee is untenable. If really section 44 had contemplated only a case of business being discontinued while the firm is not discontinued, there is no necessity to seek the aid of section 44. If the partnership continues to exist, it would be assessed as such and there is no question of making each of the partners of the firm jointly and severally liable. If a firm continues to exist, the firm as such could be assessed and in general law, the partners are jointly and severally liable. It is also significant that the section speaks of "every person who was a partner of such a firm", the past tense indicating that there was no longer a firm. The language of the section is consistent only with the firm having been dissolved. For all these reasons, we negative this contention of the counsel for the assessee. As the assessee has succeeded on the main point, he will get his costs.
-
1959 (3) TMI 66 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hargeable under the Income-tax Act. In my opinion, this contention cannot be accepted as sound. I do not find from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's finding that he has held that this income is not chargeable to income-tax under the Income-tax Act. On the other hand, the direction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, to which I have referred, clearly shows that his view was otherwise, or else, he would not have directed the Income-tax Officer to consider this credit in the assessment for 1950-51 after giving sufficient opportunity to the appellant to explain the nature and the source of it. In any event, I am of opinion that the question as to whether or not it is chargeable to income-tax under the Income-tax Act will be gone into at the time when the matter is considered by the Income-tax Officer. The result, therefore, is that all the contentions of the learned advocate for the petitioner fail and the petition is dismissed with costs. Somnath Iyer, J.-I agree.
-
1959 (3) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y the assessee has been determined, that adjustments are made of the amount of tax payable by him, the amount deposited by him on account of advance payment of tax, and the interest payable to him. Mr. Joshi has also urged that the amount which was paid to the assessee by way of interest reduced his tax liability to that extent. There is no force in this argument, for, as we have pointed out, the amount of tax payable by the assessee is assessed and determined irrespective of the amount deposited by him and irrespective of the interest to which he is entitled. It is only after the tax payable by the assessee has been determined, that allowance is made for the interest due to him, in order to ascertain the net amount payable by him. In our opinion, therefore, the learned judge was right in holding that the first appellant was not competent to take action in this case under section 34(1)(b) of the Act. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lf the deposits in the two Banks held in the name of Kuar Lal and his wife. In other words, the letters of administration will now relate only to the estate of Kuar Lal. We order therefore that the formal letters of administration, if already granted, will be amended and a note to this effect will be made. If formal letters of administration have not already been issued, then at the time of issue a note will be made as aforesaid in the grant. In the circumstances parties will bear their own costs throughout. 30. Learned counsel says that as a consequence of our order he would be entitled to a refund of court-fee paid in respect of the assets of Smt. Ram Pyari also. He will be entitled to make an application for refund to the court below which will consider the prayer in the light of the legal position. 31. In consequence of our order the administration bonds already ordered to be executed will necessarily be reduced in amount according to the value of the estate of Kuar Lal.
-
1959 (3) TMI 63 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... be an order prejudicial to the assessee. Section 43 of the Cochin Income-tax Act also contains the same proviso, and in view of that proviso no order of the Commissioner dismissing a revision petition filed before him can be said to be prejudicial to the assessee. Since the right of the assessee to obtain a reference, when the Commissioner has passed an order in revision, is confined by section 109(2) of the Cochin Income-tax Act only to cases where the assessment has been enhanced by the Commissioner or the Commissioner's order is otherwise prejudicial to him, it follows as a result of the proviso to section 43 of the Cochin Act, that when the Commissioner has dismissed the application for revision the assessee has no right to obtain a reference. We accordingly hold that the Commissioner was right in these cases in rejecting the applications for reference and dismiss these original petitions with costs, advocate's fee ₹ 100 in each of them. Petition dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... word "individuals" must be read as laying down a restriction upon the powers of the Union Legislature to impose a capital levy by confining it to individuals and companies. Now it would appear that the entries in the Lists are legislative heads primarily designed to demarcate the area of legislative competence of the Union and the State Legislatures. They give simplex enumeratio of categories of legislation and are not designed to circumscribe or logically define the ambit of article 248. It would be difficult, therefore, to read in any entry in List I any restrictions by implication or otherwise on the residuary legislative power conferred on the Union Legislature by article 248. But in the view I have already taken on the interpretation and effect of entry 86 it is not necessary to decide this interesting question. 39. For reason I have already stated, I agree with my learned brother that this petition fails and must be dismissed with costs. 40. Appeal dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ffirmative. Being a 'proprietary right', it vests in the State under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The decision in Chhotabhai's case 1953 4SCR476 treated these rights as bare licenses, and it was apparently given per incuriam, and cannot therefore be followed. 37. Even assuming that the documents in question do not amount to grant of any proprietary right by the proprietors to the petitioners, the latter can have only the benefit of their respective contracts or licenses. In either case, the State has not, by the Act, acquired or taken possession of such contracts or licences and consequently, there has been no infringement of the petitioners' fundamental right which alone can support a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. 38. The result is that these petitions fail, and are dismissed, but in view of the fact that they were filed because of the decision in Chhotabhai's case 1953 4SCR476 , there shall be no order about costs. 39. Petitions dismissed.
-
1959 (3) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on of the order under section 25A is concerned, he being aggrieved by that order, in the sense that he is deemed to be a member of the Hindu undivided family when he is contending that he is separated member, he has a right to appeal. In the result, our answer to the first two questions is in the affirmative, namely, that the proceedings under section 33B, in so far as they relate to the orders under section 25A of the Act canceling the orders passed by the Income Tax Officer dated March 22, 1952, March 31, 1952, June 12, 1953 and March 31, 1952, are bad in law. Our answer to the fourth question is that T. G. Sulakhe has a right to file an appeal and it is not necessary that he should file it in the capacity as a Kartha of the family. In the view we have taken the four miscellaneous reference applications do not arise and are, therefore, dismissed. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs to the assessee. Advocates fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1959 (3) TMI 59 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ttack Municipality, or as the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the said Municipality, as the case may be, on the strength of the Ordinance. Opposite Party No. 1 is also permanently restrained by Mandamus from enforcing the aforesaid two provisions of the Ordinance. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this application. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200/- (Rupees two hundred) to be apportioned equally between the State of Orissa on the one hand and the contesting Municipal Councillors on the other. 32. Before concluding this judgment I wish to mention that though under the Orissa High Court Rules a Division Bench has jurisdiction to hear this case, a Special Bench consisting of the Chief Justice Hon. Rao, J. and Hon. Das, J. heard the case in the earlier stages, but for the reasons mentioned in our order dated the 16th March, 1959, the hearing of the petition was continued by a Division Bench and judgment is being pronounced by the same Bench. Das, J. 33. I agree.
|
